State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-0402

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

David Lee Blanshan,
Appellant.

Filed March 13, 2017
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Johnson, Judge

Cass County District Court
File No. 11-CR-15-539

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Christopher Strandlie, Cass County Attorney, Jeanine R. Brand, Assistant County
Attorney, Walker, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Leslie J. Rosenberg, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant).

Considered and decided by Tracy M. Smith, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and
Reyes, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
JOHNSON, Judge
A Cass County jury found David Lee Blanshan guilty of fourth -degree assault of a
peace officer, obstruction of legal process, and failure to wear a seatbelt. We conclude that
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the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction of fourth -degree assault of a peace
officer, that the district court did not err in its evidentiary rulings, and that the prosecutor
did not engage in misconduct in closing arguments. But we conclude that the district court
erred by sentencing Blanshan on both the charge of fourth-degree assault of a peace officer
and the charge of obstruction of legal process. Therefore, we affirm in part, reverse in part,
and remand for resentencing.
FACTS
On March 29, 2015, a state trooper stop ped a moving vehicle on a rural highway
after observing that the front-seat passenger was not wearing a seatbelt. After approaching
the vehicle, the trooper attempted to identify both the driver and the passenger. Blanshan,
the passenger, identified himself with only his fir st name and middle name, and he
interrupted the trooper several times by asking for the trooper’s name and badge number.
Blanshan also said to the trooper several times, “I do not choose to loiter with you.” The
trooper ordered Blanshan to get out of the vehicle. Blanshan did not comply. Instead, he
buckled his seatbelt and locked the vehicle’s doors.
The trooper called for back -up assistance and informed the dispatcher that he was
dealing with a “sovereign citizen.” While waiting approximately three and one-half
minutes for another officer to arrive, the trooper spoke with the driver, who had exited the
vehicle. The driver stated that she did not know Blanshan well and did not know his full
name but that he had talked to her about his political views.
After a deputy sheriff arrived, the driver unlocked the vehicle’s doors, which
allowed the trooper to open the passenger door. Blanshan continued to refuse to exit the
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vehicle. The trooper reached in, unbuckled Blanshan ’s seatbelt , and attempted to pul l
Blanshan out of the vehicle with both hands . Blanshan resisted by swatting or blocking
the trooper’s arms and by kicking the trooper’s legs . After struggling with Blanshan for
approximately one and one-half minutes, the trooper deployed his Taser on Blanshan’s
right leg to gain compliance . The trooper then pulled Blanshan out of the vehicle, and
Blanshan rolled onto the ground. The trooper and deputy sheriff subdued him with wrist
restraints and placed him under arrest. A backpack that the trooper had previously seen on
the floor of the front-seat passenger area fell out of the vehicle during the struggle. Inside
the backpack was a document entitled, “Affidavit of reservation of rights UCC 1 -308/1-
207,” which bore Blanshan’s name, signature, and fingerprint. When the trooper returned
to his squad car , he noticed cuts on the knuckles of both of his hands, which he
photographed.
The state charged Blanshan with one count of fourth -degree assault of a peace
officer, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.2231, subd. 1 (2014); one count of obstruction of
legal process, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.50, subd. 1(2) (2014) ; and one count of
failure to wear a seatbelt, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 169.686, subd. 1(a) (2014). Blanshan
was disruptive during all pre-trial appearances and was removed from the courtroom during
nearly half of them. The district court appointed advisory counsel on several occasions
due to Blanshan’s disruptions and the concern that Blanshan was unabl e to validly waive
his right to counsel.
The case was tried in November 2015. Blanshan was represented by appointed
counsel. The state called two witnesses: the trooper and the deputy sheriff. The trooper
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testified that, based on his training and his experience, he recognized Blanshan to be a
sovereign citizen by his conduct and speech, and that this recognition “heightened [his]
sense of security” and made him think about “what could potentially happen.” The trooper
testified to his understanding of the beliefs of sovereign citizens. The state also played for
the jury a video -recording of the traffic stop , taken from the dashboard camera of the
trooper’s squad car, which showed the entire interaction between the trooper and Blanshan.
In addition , t he state introduced color photo graphs of the trooper’s scraped knuckles.
Blanshan did not testify and did not call any other witnesses.
The jury found Blanshan guilty on all three counts. The district court imposed a
stayed sentence of 13 months on the charge of fourth-degree assault of a peace officer and
imposed fines on the other two charges. Blanshan appeals.
D E C I S I O N
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Blanshan first argues that the evidence is insufficient to prove that he is guilty of
fourth-degree assault of a peace officer.
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we undertake “a painstaking analysis
of the record to determine whether the evidence, whe n viewed in the light most favorable
to the conviction, was sufficient” to support the conviction. State v. Ortega, 813 N.W.2d
86, 100 (Minn. 2012) (quotation omitted). We seek to “determine whether the facts in the
record and the legitimate inferences drawn from them would permit the jury to reasonably
conclude that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the offense of which
he was convicted.” State v. Salyers , 858 N.W.2d 156, 160 (Minn. 2015) (quotation
5
omitted). We “assume that the factfinder disbelieved any testimony conflicting with [the]
verdict.” State v. Palmer, 803 N.W.2d 727, 733 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted). “[W]e
will not disturb the verdict if the jury, acting with due regard for the presumption of
innocence and the requ irement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably
conclude that the defendant was guilty of the charged offense.” Ortega, 813 N.W.2d at
100.
The statute setting forth the offense of felony fourth-degree assault of a peace officer
provides as follows:
Whoever physically assaults a peace officer . . . when that
officer is effecting a lawful arrest or executing any other duty
imposed by law is guilty of a gross misdemeanor . . . . If the
assault inflicts demonstrable bodily harm . . . , the pers on is
guilty of a felony . . . .

Minn. Stat. § 609.2231, subd. 1 (2014). We assume that the phrase “physically assaults,”
as used in this statute, means that a person commits fifth -degree assault. See State v.
Struzyk, 869 N.W.2d 280, 285 (Minn. 2015). A person commits fifth-degree assault if he
“(1) commits an act with intent to cause fear in another of immediate bodily harm or death;
or (2) intentionally inflicts or attempts to inflict bodily harm upon another.” Minn. Stat.
§ 609.224, subd. 1 (2014). The phrase “bodily harm,” as used in the assault statute, means
“physical pain or injury, illness, or any impairment of physical condition.” Minn. Stat.
§ 609.02, subd. 7 (2014).
Blanshan contends that the evidence is insufficient to establish that he inflicted
demonstrable bodily harm , for purposes of the charge of fourth -degree assault, because
there is no evidence that the trooper experienced an impairment of physical condition .
6
Demonstrable bodily harm exists if the victim of an assault sus tains an injury that is
“capable of being perceived by a person other than the victim.” State v. Backus , 358
N.W.2d 93, 95 (Minn. App. 1984). The state’s evidence includes photographs that show
slight scratches on two knuckles of the trooper’s left hand and a very slight scratch on one
knuckle of the trooper’s right hand. The injuries depicted in the photographs appear to be
minimal. But the state’s evidence also includes the trooper’s testimony that he had “cuts”
on his knuckles and that, when he first noticed them, the cuts were bleeding. I n light of
the caselaw and the evidentiary record, the evidence is sufficient to prove that the trooper
sustained injuries that constitute demonstrable bodily harm . See, e.g., State v. Mattson ,
376 N.W.2d 413, 414 -15 (Minn. 1985) ( concluding that victim sustained bodily harm
because defendant’s contact caused bruising); State v. Reinke, 343 N.W.2d 660, 662 (Minn.
1984) (concluding that victim sustained bodily harm because of visible abrasion).
Blanshan also contends that the evidence is insufficient to establish that he inflicted
demonstrable bodily harm because there is no evidence that the trooper perceived pain.
Bodily harm exists if the victim of an assault perceives even a “minimal amount of physical
pain.” State v. Jarvis, 665 N.W.2d 518, 522 (Minn. 2003). T he state’s evidence includes
the trooper’s testimony that Blanshan kicked him “pretty hard” and that “it hurt.” The
trooper’s testimony was corroborated by the video-recording, which showed that Blanshan
engaged in a rough, physical struggle with the trooper. Together, the trooper’s testimony
and the video-recording are sufficient to prove that Blanshan inflicted demonstrable bodily
harm on the trooper because the trooper experienced pain. See State v. Johnson, 277 Minn.
7
230, 237, 152 N.W.2d 768, 773 (1967) (concluding that victim sustained bodily harm
because he felt pain when defendant struck him).
Thus, the evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s finding of guilt on the charge
of fourth-degree assault of a peace officer.
II. Character Evidence
Blanshan next argues that the district court erred by allowing the trooper to testify
about the sovereign-citizen movement and his perception that Blanshan is associated with
the movement, which Blanshan asserts is inadmissible character evidence.
At trial, Blanshan did not object to the trooper’s testimony on the ground that it is
inadmissible character evidence. In fact , it was Blanshan who first elicited evidence
concerning the sovereign-citizen movement. When the trooper testified that Blanshan said,
“I do not consent to loiter with you,” the prosecutor asked the trooper whether he had
received any training on the meaning of that phrase. Blanshan’s attorney objected to the
question on grounds of relevance and foundation, and he asked permission to conduct voir
dire. Blanshan’s attorney asked the trooper, “ [A]re you saying that you had specific
training on the word loiter ?” The trooper testified, “ I’ve had numerous training sessions
I’ve attended that deal with sovereign citizens and the way they deal with law enforcement
and their encounters with law enforcement. ” Blanshan’s attorney did not object to the
answer as being non-responsive. After completing voir dire, Blanshan’s attorney objected
to the prosecutor’s line of questioning as being an improper subject for expert testimony.
The district court overruled the objection on the ground that the trooper was not giving
expert testimony but was merely testifying to his training.
8
The trooper proceeded to testify that “sovereign citizens are people we’ve had
training about where they think that they don’t have to adhere to any of our state laws” and
“believe that . . . as a state trooper, . . . I have no authority to act upon them in an y lawful
manner.” The trooper testified further, as follows: “I through my training and experience,
they are known to be potentially armed and dangerous. There’s been numerous trainings
I’ve attended where [it was said that] sovereign citizens have shot and killed police
officers.” At that point, Blanshan’s attorney objected on the ground that “[i] t’s gone far
beyond the initial question ,” and the district court sustained that objection , although
Blanshan’s attorney did not move to strike the testimony. The trooper later gave additional
testimony about the typical beliefs of a person who identifies with the sovereign -citizen
movement. In addition, the video -recording of the trooper’s conversation with the driver
of the vehicle includes references to th e sovereign -citizen movement and Blanshan’s
apparent association with the movement . The state also introduced as an exhibit the
document found in Blanshan’s backpack that indicates his association with the sovereign-
citizen movement.
Because Blanshan did not ask the district court to exclude any of the state’s evidence
on the ground that it is inadmissible character evidence, we apply the plain-error test to the
issue that he raises on appeal. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 31.02; State v. Mosley, 853 N.W.2d
789, 796-98, 797 n.2 (Minn. 2014) (applying plain-error test to appellate argument
challenging relevance after trial counsel objected on other grounds). Under the plain-error
test, an appellant is entitled to relief only if (1) there is an error, (2) the error is plain, and
(3) the error affects the appellant’s substantial rights. State v. Griller , 583 N.W.2d 736,
9
740 (Minn. 1998). If these three requirements are satisfied, an appellant also must satisfy
a fourth requirement, that the error “seriously af fects the fairness and integrity of the
judicial proceedings.” State v. Little, 851 N.W.2d 878, 884 (Minn. 2014). If an appellate
court concludes that any requirement of the plain -error test is not satisfied, the appellate
court need not consider the oth er requirements. State v. Brown , 815 N.W.2d 609, 620
(Minn. 2012).
A.
We begin by considering the first and second requirements of the plain -error test,
which ask whether the district court erred and, if so, whether the error is plain. See Griller,
583 N.W.2d at 740. Whether the district court erred depends on whether the state’s
evidence is inadmissible character evidence.
As a general rule, “Evidence of a person’s character or a trait of character is not
admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular
occasion . . . .”1 Minn. R. Evid. 404(a). The purpose of this rule of exclusion is to ensure
that the jury does not convict a defendant “to penalize him for his past misdeeds or simply
because he is an undes irable person,” to avoid “the danger that a jury will overvalue the
character evidence in assessing the guilt for the crime charged,” and to make it unnecessary

1As an exception to the general rule, “E vidence of a pertinent trait of character
offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same ,” is admissible. Minn. R.
Evid. 404(a)(1). If character evidence is admissible, there are two recognized methods of
proving character: “by testimony as to reputation or by testimony in the form of an opinion”
and, in certain situations, evidence of “specific instances of that person’s conduct.” Minn.
R. Evid. 405. Because Blanshan did not put his character in issue, the exception in rule
404(a)(1) does not apply in this case.
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for the defendant “to defend against immediate charges [and] disprove or explain his
personality or prior actions.” State v. Loebach, 310 N.W.2d 58, 63 (Minn. 1981).
We begin by examining Blanshan’s premise that the evidence he challenges on
appeal is character evidence. Blanshan does not cite any caselaw on that point.
Commentators describe c haracter evidence, as contemplated by rule 404(a), as a
“‘generalized description of a person’s disposition or of the disposition in respect to a
general trait such as honesty, temperance or peacefulness.’” 11 Peter N. Thompson,
Minnesota Practice —Evidence § 404.02, at 204 ( 4th ed. 2012) (quoting McCormick on
Evidence § 195 (6th ed.)). A person’s beliefs concerning government or politics, or a
person’s affiliation with a group espousing certain beliefs concerning government or
politics, ordinarily would not bear directly on a general trait such as honesty, temperance,
or peacefulness, but it may depend on the particular beliefs. The issue may be complicated
by the principle that “an individual’s right to join groups and associate with others holding
similar beliefs” is protected by the First Amendment right of free association. Dawson v.
Delaware, 503 U.S. 159, 163, 112 S. Ct. 1093, 1096 (1992) (concluding that evidence of
defendant’s membership in Aryan Brotherhood was inadmissible at sentencing hearing ).
Nonetheless, the supreme court has analyzed evidence of a defendant’s “gang affiliation”
as a form of character evidence. State v. Yang, 644 N.W.2d 808, 816 (Minn. 2002); see
also State v. Jackson , 714 N.W.2d 681, 700-701 (Minn. 2006) (Hanson, J., dis senting).
Similarly, this court has concluded that evidence of an offender’s association with
“skinheads” and his corr esponding criminal conduct was relevant at sentencing “to rebut
the evidence of good character presented by appellant in support of his r equest for a
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dispositional departure.” State v. Krebsbach , 524 N.W.2d 17, 20 (Minn. App. 1994),
review denied (Minn. Jan. 13, 1995).
In its responsive brief, the state contends primarily that, even if the evidence at issue
is character evidence, it is admissible to show Blanshan’s motive and opportunity. We
understand the state ’s brief to contend that the sovereign-citizen evidence tends to prove
that Blanshan resisted the trooper’s commands because Blanshan does not believe that the
trooper had valid authority to give such commands. The state does not cite any caselaw in
support of this argument. Motive and opportunity are two exceptions to the rule of
exclusion in rule 404(b), which provides, in part:
Evidence of another crime, wrong, or act is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show
action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible
for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake
or accident.

Minn. R. Evid. 404(b). Evidence of motive and opportunity may be admitted under t his
rule only if, among other things, a district court determines that “the probative value of the
evidence” outweighs “its potential for unfair prejudice to the defendant.” Minn. R. Evid.
404(b)(5); see also State v. Grayson, 546 N.W.2d 731, 737 (Minn. 1996) (concluding that
evidence of defendant’s familiarity and agreement with Malcolm X was unfairly
prejudicial in guilt phase of murder trial). If the exceptions in rule 404(b) for motive and
opportunity were applicable, they would allow “[e]vidence of a nother crime, wrong, or
act.” Minn. R. Evid. 404(b). It is unclear whether t he evidence at issue in this case is
evidence of any other “crime, wrong, or act” by Blanshan. See id. To the extent that the
12
evidence reveals conduct by Blanshan, t he evidence consists primarily of his conduct
during the incident that gives rise to the charged offense , not evidence of any prior
conduct.2 The evidence Blanshan challenges on appeal primarily concerns the sovereign-
citizen movement, its tenets, and the conduct of other members. The nature of the state’s
evidence is somewhat similar to drug -courier profile evidence, which the supreme court
has said “seems akin to character evidence.” See State v. Williams, 525 N.W.2d 538, 547
(Minn. 1994) (quotation omitted). The district court did not have an opportunity to fully
analyze these issues because Blanshan did not object at trial.
The parties’ appellate briefs and our own research reveal that there is no clear rule
as to whether the state may introduce evidence of a criminal defendant’s affiliation with
the sovereign-citizen movement and evidence about the nature of the movement. We need
not discuss the issue further because we are reviewing Blanshan’s argument only for plain
error. Under the plain-error test, Blanshan must show not only that the district court erred
but also that the district court’s error is plain. See Griller, 583 N.W.2d at 740. An error is
“plain” if it is clear or obvious, and an error is clear or obvious if it “contravenes a rule,
case law, or a standard of conduct, or when it disregards well-established and longstanding
legal principles.” State v. Brown, 792 N.W.2d 815, 823 (Minn. 2011). Because there is
no caselaw that clearly and obviously prohibits the state from introducing evidence of a

2It might have been more appropriate for the state to rely on the immediate-episode
exception to rule 404(b) to justify the evidence of Blanshan’s conduct that tends to show
his association with the sovereign -citizen movement. See State v. Riddley , 776 N.W.2d
419, 424-27 (Minn. 2009); State v. Wofford , 262 Minn. 112, 118, 114 N.W.2d 267, 271
(1962).
13
criminal defendant’s beliefs concerning government or politics or a defendant’s association
with such an organization, the district court did not plainly err by allowing the state to
introduce evidence concerning the sovereign-citizen movement and Blanshan’s association
with the movement without sua sponte excluding the evidence.
Thus, Blanshan cannot establish the second requirement of the plain-error test. This
conclusion is sufficient to resolve Blanshan’s argument that the district court erred by
allowing the state to introduce character evidence.
B.
We next consider, in the alternative, whether, if the district court plainly erred, that
error would have affected Blanshan’s substantial rights. See Griller, 583 N.W.2d at 740.
A plain error affect s a defendant ’s substantial rights “if the error was prejudicial and
affected the outcome of the case.” Id. at 741. An appellant bears a “heavy burden” in
seeking to satisfy the third requirement. State v. Davis, 820 N.W.2d 525, 535 (Minn. 2012).
The s tate contends that the evidence concerning sovereign citizens was not
prejudicial. The state points to other evidence that, it asserts, adequately demonstrated
Blanshan’s guilt . Specifically, t he trooper testified that Blanshan refused to produce
identification, interrupted him, displayed a tense and hostile attitude and aggressive body
language, refused to exit the vehicle, and hit and kicked him. Importantly, the trooper’s
testimony was corroborated by the video -recording that was created by the trooper’s
dashboard camera, which was pointed forward, directly at the vehicle in which Blanshan
was a passenger. The video-recording captured the entire incident and, thus, allowed the
jury to hear Blanshan’s tone in speaking with th e trooper and to see his physical struggle
14
with the trooper. We are convinced that all of that evidence, by itself, would have caused
the jury to find Blanshan guilty of assault of a peace officer and obstruction of legal
process, even without evidence concerning the sovereign -citizen movement and
Blanshan’s association with the movement.
Thus, Blanshan cannot establish the third requirement of the plain -error test. This
conclusion also is sufficient to resolve Blanshan’s argument that the district court erred by
allowing the state to introduce character evidence.
III. Prosecutorial Misconduct
Blanshan next argues that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct in her closing
argument by making reference to the sovereign -citizen movement and Blanshan’s
association with it.
Blanshan concedes that he did not object to the prosecutor’s closing argument at
trial. Accordingly , this court must apply a modified plain -error test. State v. Carr idine,
812 N.W.2d 130, 146 (Minn. 2012). To prevail, Blanshan first must establish that there is
an error and that the error is plain. State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294, 302 (Minn. 2006). If
Blanshan were to satisfy that burden, the state would need to show that the error did not
affect the appellant’s substantial rights, i.e., that “there is no reasonable likelihood that the
absence of the misconduct in question would have had a significant effect on the verdict of
the jury.” Id. (quotations omitted).
The right to due process of law includes the right to a fair trial, and the right to a fair
trial includes the absence of prosecutorial misconduct. Spann v. State , 704 N.W.2d 486,
493 (Minn. 2005); State v. Ferguson , 729 N.W.2d 604, 616 (Minn. App. 2007), review
15
denied (Minn. June 19, 2007). A p rosecutor has “an affirmative obligation to ensure that
a defendant receives a fair trial, no matter how strong the evidence of guilt.” Ramey, 721
N.W.2d at 300. A state’s closing arguments must be “based on the evidence produced at
trial, or the reasonable inferences from that evidence.” State v. Porter, 526 N.W.2d 359,
363 (Minn. 1995). A closing argument is improper if it “could have only been intended to
inflame the jury’s passions and prejudices” and is a “blatant attempt to impinge on juror
independence.” Id. at 364.
Blanshan contends that the prosecutor ’s closing argument was “designed only to
inflame the passions of the jury.” Blanshan’s contention is based on this excerpt:
[The trooper has] got an individual who’s taken on a fighting
stance, and he has an individual who now has recited some
words that cause him even greater concern.
“I do not consent to loiter with you. ” [The trooper] ,
based on his training and experience, knew that he was dealing
with a sovereign citizen. You heard the tape itself, on the video
immediately he calls for back -up saying, “ I’m dealing with a
sovereign citizen, ” a person who has by reputation, by the
generality based on his training is a person who is saying I do
not comply, I do not adhere to the laws of Minnesota.
Contrary to Blanshan’s contention, this portion of the prosecutor’s closing argument hews
closely to the trooper’s trial testimony and the reasonable inferences from his testimony.
The closing argument does not even approach the limits of permissible “dramatic
characterizations” of the testimony. See State v. Matthews, 779 N.W.2d 543, 551 (Minn.
2010). In addition, t he statements do not appear to be a “blatant attempt to impinge on
juror independence.” Porter, 526 N.W.2d at 363-64.
Thus, the prosecutor did not engage in misconduct during closing arguments.
16
IV. Impeachment Evidence
Blanshan next argues that the district court erred by not ruling on the admissibility
of evidence of a prior conviction before he waived his right to testify.
In general, “Evidence of another crime, wrong, or act is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.” Minn. R. Evid.
404(b). But e vidence of a defendant ’s prior convicti on is admissible for impeachment
purposes if the crime is punishable by more than one year in prison and the probative value
of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect. Minn. R. Evid. 609(a); State v. Williams,
771 N.W.2d 514, 518 (Minn. 2009). A district court must consider the five Jones factors
when determining whether the probative value of impeachment evidence outweighs its
prejudicial effect: “‘(1) the impeachment value of the prior crime, (2) the date of the
conviction and the defendant’s subsequent history, (3) the similarity of the past crime with
the charged crime . . . , (4) the importance of the defendant’s testimony, and (5) the
centrality of the credibility issue. ’” State v. Hill , 801 N.W.2d 646, 653 (Minn. 2011)
(alteration in origina l) (quoting State v. Jones , 271 N.W.2d 534, 538 (Minn. 1978)). A
defendant “is entitled to have the district court make a determination of the Rule 609(a)
issue outside the presence of the jury before the accused decides whether to testify.” State
v. Tscheu, 758 N.W.2d 849, 862 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted).
In this case, the state requested a ruling before jury selection on the admissibility of
its evidence of Blanshan’s prior conviction . Before the state’s request, Blanshan had
requested permission to be absent from the courtroom during trial. The district court judge
presiding over the trial had presided over all pretrial hearings and, thus, was familiar with
17
Blanshan’s pattern of being disruptive in court. The district court reserved its ruling on the
state’s request, to await additional information as to “if and when Mr. Blanshan chooses to
testify.” Blanshan’s attorney did not object to the district court’s reservation of its ruling
on the state’s request.
During trial, after the state rested and before a lunch recess, the district court stated
to Blanshan that “the choice of whether you testify or not is completely yours” and advised
him to take the lunch recess as “an opportunity for you to consult with and get advice from
[your attorney] about the advantages and disadvantages if you testify so that you can make
a knowing and intelligent decision with respect to that.” After the lunch recess, Blanshan
waived his right to testify. His attorney did not request a ruling on the admissibility of the
state’s evidence of a prior conviction.
The state argues that the district court did not err by not ruling on the admissibility
of its impeachment evidence because a district court is not absolutely required to make
such a ruling before a defendant waives the right to testify, because Blanshan did not object
to the district court’s reservation of its ruling on the state’s request, and because Blanshan
did not make his own request for a ruling before waiving the right to testify. We agree. In
light of the circumstances known to the district court at the outset of trial, the district court
reasonably refrained from ruling until it could be determined whether Blanshan would be
present during the defense case. When the state rested , Blanshan consulted with counsel
and decided to waive his right to testify, without requesting a ruling on the admissibility of
the state’s evidence of a prior conviction. Although a defendant is “entitled to have the
district court make a determination of the Rule 609(a) issue . . . before [he] decides whether
18
to testify,” Tscheu, 758 N.W.2d at 862, he must take steps to enforce that entitlement by
prompting the district court to make a ruling. By not making such a request before waiving
his right to te stify, Blanshan forfeited his entitlement to a ruling on admissibility of the
state’s impeachment evidence before waiving his right to testify. See State v. Beaulieu,
859 N.W.2d 275, 278 (Minn. 2015).
Thus, the district court did not err by not ruling on the admissibility of the state’s
evidence of a prior conviction before Blanshan waived his right to testify.
V. Multiple Adjudications and Sentences
Blanshan last argues that the district court err ed by adjudicating him guilty and
sentencing him on all three counts. He argues that the district court should have adjudicated
him guilty and sentenced him only on count 1.
A.
We begin by considering Blanshan’s arguments concerning the interplay between
the first charge, assault of a peace officer, and the second charge, obstruction of legal
process.
Blanshan contends that the district court erred by adjudicating him guilty on both
the first charge and the second charge. A defendant “may be convicted of either the crime
charged or an included offense, but n ot both. ” Minn. Stat. § 609.04, subd. 1 (20 14).
Accordingly, a defendant “may not be convicted of both the crime charged and ‘[a] crime
necessarily proved if the crime charged were proved.’” State v. Bertsch, 707 N.W.2d 660,
664 (Minn. 2006) (quoting Minn. Stat. § 609.04, subd. 1(4)); see also State v. LaTourelle,
343 N.W.2d 277, 284 (Minn. 1984). To determine whether one charge is included in
19
another charge, a court must compare the elements of the offense. Bertsch, 707 N.W.2d at
664. A person commits fourth-degree assault of a peace officer if he “ physically assaults
[a peace] officer” who is “effecting a lawful arrest or executing any other duty imposed by
law” and “inflicts demonstrable bodily harm.” Minn. Stat. § 609.2231, subd. 1. A person
commits obstruction of the legal process if he “intentionally . . . obstructs, resists, or
interferes with a peace officer while the officer is engaged in the performance of official
duties.” Minn. Stat. § 609.50, subd. 1(2) (201 4). Based on the plain langua ge of the
statutes defining the two offenses, it is possible to commit each one without committing
the other. Thus, the district court did not err by adjudicating Blanshan guilty on both count
1 and count 2. See State v. Cogger , 802 N.W.2d 407, 409 (Minn. App. 2011) (assuming
propriety of adjudications of assault of peace officer and obstruction of legal process),
review denied (Minn. Mar. 28, 2012).
Blanshan also contends that the district court erred by sentencing him on both the
first charge and the second charge. Generally, “if a person’s conduct constitutes more than
one offense under the laws of this state, the person may be punished for only one of the
offenses.” Minn. Stat. § 609.035, subd. 1 (2014). Whether conduct constitutes more than
one offense requires that we determine whether the underlying conduct involved “a single
course of conduct.” State v. Jones, 848 N.W.2d 528, 533 (Minn. 2014). “Offenses are part
of a single course of conduct if the offenses occurred a t substantially the same time and
place and were motivated by a single criminal objective.” Id. Blanshan contends that his
assault of the trooper and his obstruction of legal process were part of a single course of
conduct. The state agrees and concedes that the district court erred by sentencing Blanshan
20
on both count 1 and count 2. We agree as well. The conduct underlying the assault offense
and the obstruction offense “occurred at substantially the same time and place and were
motivated by a single criminal objective.” See id. The appropriate remedy for the district
court’s error is a vacatur of the sentence on count 2 and the corresponding entry of an
amended warrant of judgment and commitment . See Jones, 848 N.W.2d at 537 -38
(vacating sentence imposed in violation of section 609.035).
B.
We also consider Blanshan’s arguments concerning the interplay between the first
charge, assault of a peace officer, and the third charge, failure to wear a seatbelt.
Blanshan contends that the district court erred by adjudicating him guilty on both
the first charge and the th ird charge. It is possible to commit a fourth -degree assault
without violating the statute that requires a passenger in a vehicle to wear a seatbelt.
Compare Minn. Stat. § 609.2231, subd. 1, with Minn. Stat. § 169.686 (2014). Accordingly,
Blanshan was not convicted of “‘[a] crime necessarily proved if the crime charge d were
proved.’” Bertsch, 707 N.W.2d at 664 (quoting Minn. Stat . § 609.04, subd. 1(4)). Thus,
the district court did not err by adjudicating Blanshan guilty on both count 1 and count 3.
Blanshan also contends that the district court erred by sentencing him on both the
first charge and the third charge. The state disagrees. The evidentiary record shows that
the seatbelt offense did not occur at “substantially the same time” and place as the assault
offense and was not motivated by the same “criminal objective.” See Jones, 848 N.W.2d
at 533. Thus, the district court did not err by imposing sentence s on both count 1 and
count 3.
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In sum , we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand to the district court . On
remand, the district court shall vacate the sentence on count 2 and enter an amended
judgment.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.