State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-0928

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Jason Paul Hirman,
Appellant.

Filed May 8, 2017
Affirmed
Connolly, Judge

Dakota County District Court
File No. 19HA-CR-13-1031

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

James Backstrom, Dakota County Attorney, Torrie J. Schneider, Assistant County
Attorney, Hastings, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Rachel F. Bond, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Larkin,
Judge.
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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
CONNOLLY, Judge
On appeal from his conviction of receiving stolen property, appellant argues (1) his
conviction must be reversed because the state failed to prove that he knew or had reason to
know that the property was stolen; (2) the district court committed plain error affectin g
appellant’s substantial rights by allowing the investigating officer to relate inadmissible
hearsay during his testimony; and (3) the court committed reversible error by admitting
evidence of a stolen camera, found in appellant’s father’s storage locker in July 2012, as
intrinsic evidence. Because there is sufficient evidence for all the elements of the crime
charged, the admission of the alleged hearsay testimony was not plain error, and because
the district court did not abuse its discretion in admittin g the camera found in appellant’s
father’s storage locker as evidence under the intrinsic -evidence exception , we affirm
appellant’s conviction.
FACTS
In August 2011, a trailer containing a portable inspection system used to inspect and
photograph sewers, storm drains, and similar remote locations was stolen. The inspection
system was valued at more than $40,000. In August 2012, the inspection system was found
inside a storage locker. The inspection system was intact and the serial numbers had not
been removed. The renter of the storage locker, who purchased the locker at auction after
the former renter failed to make payments, saw the unique equipment and contacted the
manufacturing company. The manufacturing company identified the equipment , and the
locker renter notified the original owner that the inspection system was in the locker. The
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original owner of the inspection system contacted the police to report that the stolen system
had been found.
The police investigators spoke with K.S., the former renter of the storage locker
who failed to make her payments. K.S. testified further that she rented the locker in the
spring of 2011 and that, in the late summer or early fall of 2011, her friend, appellant Jason
Paul Hirman, asked if he could store someth ing in her locker. K.S. testified that she met
appellant, who was alone, at the locker and he removed the inspection system from his
vehicle and placed it in her locker. Appellant never came looking for the inspection system
again. K.S. also testified t hat, after the police talked to her regarding the stolen property,
appellant tried to “remind [her] that somebody else was with him.” (Emphasis added.)
The police found three latent fingerprints that could be examined. O ne print
belonged to appellant. The police also discovered that appellant’s father rented a storage
locker near K.S.’s locker . In an interview, the storage -locker manager told police that
(1) he is typically at the site on a daily basis ; (2) appellant’s father paid the rental fees for
a locker, but only appellant was seen using the locker; and (3) appellant was there “on
occasion.” Based on this information, the police executed a search warrant at appellant’s
father’s locker where they found a camera attachment belong ing to the inspection system
appellant stored in K.S.’s locker. The serial numbers on both the inspection equipment
found in K.S.’s unit and the camera in appellant’s father’s unit matched the serial numbers
from the equipment that was stolen.
At trial, the district court ad mitted evidence of the camera attachment found in
appellant’s father’s storage locker as intrinsic evidence. The district court denied
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appellant’s motion for acquittal, concluding that there was sufficient evidence to conclude
that appellant knew or should have known that the property was stolen. The district court
found that “there is plenty of evidence that [the stolen property] is a highly specialized
piece of equipment that’s used for a very specific purpose and th at it’s a very expensive
unit . . . . [B]ased upon that I believe there is evidence that it is a rather unique item.” The
jury found appellant guilty of receiving stolen property over $5,000, a felony, and appellant
was sentenced to 48 months in prison.
D E C I S I O N
I. Was there sufficient evidence in the record to prove that appellant knew or had
reason to know that the property found in K.S.’s storage locker was stolen?
Appellant argues that there is not sufficient evidence in the record to show that he
knew or had reason to know that th e equipment was stolen. 1 In considering a claim of
insufficient evidence, this court’s review is limited to a painstaking analysis of the record
to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the
conviction, is sufficient to allow the jurors to reach the verdict that they did. State v. Webb,
440 N.W.2d 426, 430 (Minn. 1989). The reviewing court must assume “the jury believed
the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.” State v. Moore, 438
N.W.2d 101, 108 (Minn. 1989). The reviewing court will not disturb the verdict if the jury,
acting with due regard for the presumption of innocence and the requirement of proof

1 The elements of the offense of receiving or concealing stolen property are: (1) t he
defendant received , possessed, transferred, bought or concealed the property; (2) the
property had been stolen; and (3) the defendant knew or had reason to know the property
had been stolen or obtained by robbery. Minn. Stat. § 609.53, subd. 1 (2016). On appeal,
only the third element of the crime is challenged.
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beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably conclude the defendant was g uilty of the
charged offense. Bernhardt v. State, 684 N.W.2d 465, 476-77 (Minn. 2004).
Because the disputed issue is what appellant knew, we apply the circumstantial -
evidence standard . See State v. Al -Naseer, 788 N.W.2d 469, 474 (Minn. 2010). “[A]
conviction based entirely on circumstantial evidence merits stricter scrutiny than
convictions based in part on direct evidence.” State v. Jones, 516 N.W.2d 545, 549 (Minn.
1994). “While it warrants stricter scrutiny, circumstantial evidence is entitled to th e same
weight as direct evidence.” State v. Bauer , 598 N.W.2d 352, 370 (Minn. 1999). In
applying the circumstantial evidence standard, the reviewing court uses a two-step analysis.
State v. Silvernail , 831 N.W.2d 594, 598 (Minn. 2013). “The first step is to identify the
circumstances proved. In identifying the circumstances proved, we defer to the jury’s
acceptance of the proof of these circumstances and rejection of evidence in the record that
conflicted with the circumstances proved by the [s]tate.” Id. at 5 98-99 (citation and
quotation omitted). “The second step is to determine whether the circumstances proved
are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt.”
Id. (quotation omitted).
In this case, the circumstances proved are that: (1) the equipment was stolen in early
August and appellant placed it in K.S.’s storage locker in “ late summer or early fall”;
(2) the equipment was worth over $40,000; (3) the equipment was a portable inspection
system used to inspect and photograph sewers, storm drains, and similar remote lo cations
and was described by the man who found it as something that “stuck out to [him]” and that
he did not have any idea of what it was; (4) the stolen property was “a very high tech piece
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of equipment”; (5) after the investigation had commenced, appellant attempted to convince
K.S. that there was another person with him when he dro pped the equipment off; and
(6) another piece of the stolen equipment was located in appellant’s father’s storage locker
where appellant stored items.
“An individual’s unexplained possession of stolen property within a reasonable time
after a . . . theft will in and of itself be sufficient to sustain a conviction.” State v. Hager,
727 N.W.2d 668, 678 (Minn. App. 2007) (quotation omitted). Appellant argues that, “[i]n
every one of the cases applying that principle [,] . . . the defendant, when asked by police
or in spontaneous statements, failed to adequately explain his possession of the property.”
While the record is devoid of any explanation as to how appellant came into possession of
the property, the unique circumstances of this case convince us that appellant knew the
equipment was stolen.
We rely heavily on appellant’s attempt at convincing K.S. that there was someone
else with him when he dropped the equipment off at the storage locker because, in our
view, it displays a consciousness of guilt. Appellant was trying to create a false alibi, which
supports the inference that appellant knew or had reason to know the item was stolen.
Finally, the item was stolen in early August , and K.S. testified that appellant dropped the
equipment off in “late summer or early fall. ” We conclude that e arly to mid-August fits
the defini tion of “late summer or early fall ” and indicates that appellant possessed the
stolen property within a reasonable time after the theft.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the conviction, we conclude that
the circumstances proved exclude any reasonable hypothesis other than guilt.
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II. Was the alleged hearsay testimony from the investigating officer inadmissible
under the plain-error standard of review?
Appellant next argues that there were two instances of inadmissible hearsay during
the testimony of the investigating police officer. Neither instance was objected to at trial.
Where a defendant fails to object to the admission of evidence, our review is under
the plain-error standard. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 31.02; State v. Griller, 583 N.W.2d 736,
740 (Minn. 1998). “The plain[-]error standard requires that the defendant show: (1) error;
(2) that was plain; and (3) that affected substantial rights.” State v. Strommen, 648 N.W.2d
681, 686 (Minn. 2002). The third prong is satisfied if there is a “reasonable likelihood that
the error had a significant effect on the jury’s verdict.” State v. Vance, 734 N.W.2d 650,
660 n.8 (Minn. 2007), overruled on other grounds by State v. Fleck , 810 N.W.2d 303
(Minn. 2012). “If those three prongs are met, we m ay correct the error only if it seriously
affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Strommen, 648
N.W.2d at 686 (quotation omitted).
Both statements under review occurred during the testimony of the investigating
police officer. In the first statement, the investigating police officer testified that, in his
out-of-court telephone conversation with K.S., she identified the equipment as belonging
to the original owner’s company. K.S. did not actually say that the pie ce of equipment
belonged to the original owner’s company.
In the second statement, the investigating officer testified that “[he] learned that
there was a locker rented . . . by [appellant’s] dad and that [appellant] was the one that was
storing his . . . property in that locker and that [ the storage-locker manager] had seen him
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at the site numerous times in that locker.” The storage-locker manager actually testified
that he saw appellant “on occasion ” and that he saw appe llant at his father’s locker. The
storage-locker manager did not testify that appellant stored property in the unit. He did
testify that appellant’s father never came to the property except to make payments, that he
was never seen actually at the unit, and that he was never seen “putting stuff in or taking
stuff out.”
Hearsay is defined in our rules of evidence as an out -of-court statement offered as
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Minn. R. Evid. 801(c). “The rules bar
the admission of hearsay unless it fits under one of a number of exceptions, which generally
reflect the recognized reliability of statements made in certain situations.” State v.
Manthey, 711 N.W.2d 498, 504 (Minn. 2006).
The number and variety of exceptions to the hearsay exclusion
make objections to such testimony particularly important to the
creation of a record of the trial court’s decision -making
process. . . . The complexity and subtlety of the operation of
the hearsay rule and its exceptions make it particularly
important that a full discussion of admissibility be conducted
at trial.
Id. In Manthey, the Minnesota Supreme Court did not address the six statements at issue
related to a witness’s feelings regarding t he appellant’s illegal gambling; rather, it
concluded that “[i]n the absence of an objection, the state was not given the opportunity to
establish that some or all of the statements were admissible under one of the numerous
exceptions to the hearsay rule.” Id. Manthey is analogous: here the state was not given an
opportunity to raise any of the numerous exceptions to the hearsay rule in response to an
objection to the two statements because no objection was made.
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In any event, appellant was not prejudiced by the admission of the statements, even
if they should not have been admitted . Regarding the first statement, before the
investigating officer testified, the equipment had been positively identified as the same
equipment that was stolen, using the serial number on the equipment, by the pe rson who
purchased the storage locker contents after K.S. failed to make payments. K.S. confirmed
that the metal box was the property appellant dropped off at her storage locker in 2011 .
Substantial evidence existed in the record that the equipment was the same equipment that
was stolen even without the investigating officer’s statement. We conclude the first
contested statement did not affect the outcome of the case and appellant was not prejudiced.
Regarding the second statement, t he storage manager testified that, (1) as property
manager, he is typically at the site on a daily basis; (2) appellant’s father paid for the storage
locker; (3) appellant’s father was never seen actually at the storage locker; and (4) appellant
was seen at the storage locker on occasion. These facts, in addition to the fact that the
equipment in K.S.’s locker matched the camera found in appellant’s father’s locker , is
sufficient evidence that appellant knew or had reason to know the property was stolen .
Therefore, sufficient evidence exists that appellant stored the stolen items in his father’s
storage locker. As a result, the comment by the investigating officer that the storage
manager told him that appellant stored property in his father’s locker was not prejudicial.
Because respondent did not have an opportunity at the district court to raise any of
the numerous exceptions to the hearsay rule and because appellant was not prejudiced by
the statements made by the investigating officer, we conclude that the admission of t he
investigating officer’s statements was not plain error.
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III. Did the district court err in admitting bad -act evidence under the “intrinsic -
evidence” exception?
Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion in allowing the state to
present evidence, under the intrinsic -evidence exception, that the camera attachment was
found in appellant’s father’s storage locker . This court reviews the district court’s
evidentiary ruling for an abuse of discretion. State v. Ness, 707 N.W.2d 676, 685 (Minn.
2006).
In January 2015 , the state noticed its intent to offer evidence of the discovery of
stolen equipment in appellant’s father’s storage locker and appellant objected. The state
argued that the court should admit th e camera found in appellant’s father’s storage locker
because it was inexorably intertwined with the evidence of the charged offense. See State
v. Hollins, 765 N.W.2d 125, 132 (Minn. App. 2009) (stating that evidence of the criminal
activity is intrinsic to the charged offense and admissible if it is inextricably intertwined
with evidence of the charged offense). The district court concluded, under Hollins and the
Rules of Criminal Procedure, that
when there is evidence that’s intrinsically tied to the allegations
in a complaint, [a] 404(b) analysis is not necessary or
appropriate in that it is intrinsically related to the charged crime
if the crime arose out of the same transaction or series of
transactions as the charged crime and either the other crime is
relevant to an element of the charged crime or excluding the
evidence of the other crime would present an incoherent or
incomplete story of the charged crime.
. . . .
The court finds that this is intrinsically related evidence. . . . It
would be an important part of the State’s case in attempting to
establish intent and knowledge of possession of the allegedly
stolen equipment.
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“Evidence of another crime, wrong or act is not admissible to prove the character
of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.” Minn. R. Evid. 404(b).
However, evidence of other crimes or acts may be admitted to demonstrate “motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident.” Id. “In a criminal prosecution, a rule 404(b) analysis is unnecessary if the
evidence of another crime is intrinsic to the crime charged.” Hollins, 765 N.W.2d at 131.
Evidence of another crime is intrinsic to the charged crime and therefore admissible
without regard to Minn. R. Evid. 404 if: “(1) the other crime arose out of the same
transaction or series of transactions as the charged crime, and (2) either (a) the other crime
is relevant to an element of the charged crime, or (b) excluding evidence of the other crime
would present an incoherent or incomplete story of the charged crime.” Id. at 132.
Appellant argues that Hollins has been called into question by State v. Riddley, 776
N.W.2d 419, 425 n.3 (Minn. 2009) (requiring a close causal and temporal connection
between the prior bad act and the charged crime), and that no such connection has been
proved in appellant’s case. However, Riddley involved the application of the immediate-
episode exception to 404(b) evidence and not the intrinsic -evidence exception. Riddley,
776 N.W.2d at 425. Unlike the immediate -episode exception, t he intrinsic -evidence
exception as set forth in Hollins does not require a clos e causal and temporal connection
between the prior bad act and the charged crime. Id.; Hollins, 765 N.W.2d at 132. 2

2 But see Diriye v. State, A15-0869, 2016 WL 208414, at *5 (Minn. App. Jan. 19, 2016)
(“Hollins is the only [published] Minnesota case to create an intrinsic-evidence exception,
under which other -bad-acts evidence is admissible without a rule 404(b) analysis.”).
“Hollins appears to simply reiterate and refine the immediate -episode exception, which is
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Additionally, Riddley concluded that, absent a temporal and casual connection, immediate-
episode evidence is not admissible merely to complete the story of the crime. Riddley, 776
N.W.2d at 425 n.3. In this case, the district court concluded that the evidence was
admissible both because the evidence of the crime is relevant to an element of the charged
crime, that appellant knew or had rea son to know the equipment was stolen, and because
excluding evidence of the other crime would present an incoherent or incomplete story of
the charged crime. Therefore, we conclude that the prohibition on allowing 404(b)
evidence merely to complete the story of the crime is not dispositive here.
Because Hollins created a new exception to 404(b), relying on federal caselaw
interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence, we also consider whether the evidence was
admissible under the immediate-episode exception and Minnesota caselaw. W e conclude

well established in Minnesota evidentiary jurisprudence” and “[the two exceptions serve]
nearly identical purposes.” Id. We disagree. Hollins specifically stated, “No prior
Minnesota case has articulated the [intrinsic-evidence] framework adopted here.” Hollins,
765 N.W.2d at 133. Thus, in Hollins, this court did not intend to “reiterate and refine the
immediate-episode exception, which is well established in Minnesota evidentiary
jurisprudence,” but rather articulated a framework for an independent exception to the
404(b) prohibition against evidence of other crimes or bad acts. See Diriye, 2016 WL
208414, at *5 . Hollins has not been specifically overruled, and, because it discusses an
intrinsic-evidence exception and not an immediate -episode exception, we treat the two
separate exceptions to 404(b) as distinct. Moreover, Diriye is distinguishable from Hollins
and from this case because, unlike those cases, Diriye did not concern uncharged conduct.
Here, it is undisputed that the evidence of the camera in appellant’s father’s storage locker
is not the basis for any charged crime. The camera and the equipment stored in K.S.’s unit
were both stolen from the same trailer unit on August 2, 2011 and were both possessed by
appellant. The two acts arose out of the same transaction or series of transactions as the
charged crime of possession of stolen goods. The evidenc e is also relevant to show that
appellant knew or should have known the property was stolen because it is unlikely that he
obtained the goods on separate occasions from separate vendors.

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that the evidence found in appellant’s father’s locker is res gestae3 and is admissible under
the immediate-episode exception. “[T]he rule excluding evid ence of the commission of
other offenses does not necessarily deprive the state of the right to make out its whole case
against the accused on any evidence which is otherwise relevant upon the issue of the
defendant’s guilt of the crime with which he was c harged.” State v. Wofford, 262 Minn.
112, 118, 114 N.W.2d 267, 271 (1962). The state can prove all the relevant facts and
circumstances that establish the elements of the offense, even if it may prove or tend to
prove the defendant committed other crimes . Id. Immediate-episode evidence is
admissible “where two or more offenses are linked together in point of time or
circumstances so that one cannot be fully shown without proving the other, or where
evidence of other crimes constitutes part of the res ge stae, it is admissible.” Id. The
supreme court in Riddley did not abandon Wofford but rather clarified that , in its prior
cases, it “repeatedly affirmed the admission of immediate -episode evidence when there is
a close causal and temporal connection betw een the prior bad act and the charged crime.”
Riddley, 776 N.W.2d at 425.
In this case, there is a close causal and temporal connection between the theft of the
equipment and the camera. The equipment and the camera were stolen at the same time,
in the same place, and from the same victim. We conclude that this is sufficient to satisfy
the immediate-episode exception. See State v. Darveaux, 318 N.W.2d 44, 48 (Minn. 1982)

3 Res gestae means the events at issue or other events contemporaneous with them.
Riddley, 776 N.W.2d at 425 n.2.
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(admitting drugs found in the defendant’s purse after a drug store robbery because the drugs
were the same type as those stolen from the drug store).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of the camera
found in appellant’s father’s locker.
Affirmed.