State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1457

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Jason Paul Hirman,
Appellant.

Filed May 6, 2019
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Jesson, Judge

Dakota County District Court
File No. 19HA-CR-13-1031

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

James C. Backstrom, Dakota County Attorney, Torrie J. Schneider , Assistant County
Attorney, Hastings, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Rachel F. Bond, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Johns on, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judg e; and Jesson,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
JESSON, Judge
After his conviction for receiving stolen property—which stemm ed from his
involvement with a stolen sewer inspection system—the district court ordered appellant

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Jason Paul Hirman to pay $5,0 00 in restitution. The restitutio n related to both the
inspection system and the trailer which originally carried it. Hirman appeals, arguing that
the losses were not a direct result of the conduct for which he was convicted. Because his
conduct was tied to the damage of a portion of the stolen prope rty, but not to all of it, we
affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
FACTS
In August 2012, R.B. bought the contents of a storage locker at auction, and found
a unique piece of equipment, with its serial number still intac t. R.B. contacted the
manufacturing company. The company, ABM Equipment and Supply, identified the
equipment as a sewer inspection system, and informed R.B. that it had been stolen a year
earlier. ABM Equipment then called the police to report that the stolen inspection system
(valued at over $40,000) had been found.
The police spoke with K.S., the former renter of the storage unit. K.S. stated that in
late summer or early fall of 2011, appellant Jason Paul Hirman asked her if he could store
an item in her storage unit. She agreed. Hirman met K.S. at h er storage unit, removed a
“big metal box” from his truck, and placed it in the unit. But after she was unable to make
the monthly storage unit payments, the storage facility sold the contents of her unit to R.B.
The state charged Hirman with receiving stolen property in vio lation of Minnesota
Statutes section 609.53, subdivision 1 (2010). The complaint alleged that Hirman received
or possessed the inspection system found in K.S.’s storage unit, knowing or having reason

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to know it was stolen. The jury found Hirman guilty of receivi ng stolen property valued
over $5,000. This court affirmed Hirman’s conviction.1
In January 2018, the district court ordered Hirman to pay rest itution to ABM
Equipment and to United Fire and Casualty Company, the company that insured the
inspection system and paid ABM Equipment for the loss.2 Hirman objected and requested
a restitution hearing. After the hearing, the district court ordered Hirman to pay restitution
to ABM Equipment for its out-of-pocket loss—$2,000 in deductibl es—and $3,000 to
United Fire and Casualty. Hirman appeals.
D E C I S I O N
Hirman argues that the district court abused its discretion by ordering him to pay
$5,000 in restitution when there w as no evidence that he either stole or damaged the
inspection system. Alternatively, Hirman asserts that the restitution should be reduced by
$1,000 because the theft of the trailer cannot be linked to him.
The district court has broad discretion to award restitution, and this court will not
reverse a district court’s order absent an abuse of that discre tion. State v. Andersen, 871
N.W.2d 910, 913 (Minn. 2015). And the factual findings of the district court will not be
disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous. Id. “But determining whether an item meets
the statutory requirements for restitution is a question of law that is fully reviewable by the
appellate court.” State v. Nelson, 796 N.W.2d 343, 346-47 (Minn. App. 2011).

1 State v. Hirman, No. A16-0928, 2017 WL 1833245 (Minn. App. May 8, 2017), review
denied (Minn. July 18, 2017).
2 Hirman was initially ordered to pay as restitution $2,000 to A BM Equipment and
$62,931.51 to United Fire and Casualty Company.

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Under the restitution statute, a victim has the right to recei ve restitution for a specific
loss if the defendant is convicted of a crime. Minn. Stat. § 611A.04, subd. 1(a) (2010). A
request for restitution “may include, but is not limited to, any out-of-pocket losses resulting
from the crime.” Id. But a loss claimed as an item of restitution “must have some factual
relationship to the crime committed—a compensable loss must be directly caused by the
conduct for which the defendant was convicted.” Nelson, 796 N.W.2d at 347 (quotation
omitted). And the amount of res titution, when disputed, must b e proved by a
preponderance of the evidence. Minn. Stat. § 611A.045, subd. 3(a) (2010).
Here, Hirman was convicted of receiving stolen property—the ins pection system
found in the storage unit. In addressing Hirman’s argument that he did not “directly cause”
the loss, we are guided by Minnesota caselaw addressing the iss ue of restitution in
receiving-stolen-property cases. In State v. Larson, this court affirmed a restitution award
for losses sustained by a taconite company when large metal bus hings were stolen. 393
N.W.2d 238, 243 (Minn. App. 1986). There, the bushings were new when stolen, but were
damaged when recovered. Id. at 240. Although there was no direct evidence tying the
defendant in Larson to the damage, we concluded that it was not an abuse of discre tion
when the district court ordered a restitution award of $34,681 to be paid by the defendant
who received the stolen metal bushings. Id. at 241, 243. Similarly, in State v. Anderson,
we upheld a restitution award of $300, which represented the value of stolen calves which
the Anderson defendant received. 405 N.W.2d 527, 531 (Minn. App. 1987), review denied
(Minn. July 22, 1987). As in Larson, the defendant was found to be “a direct cause of the
victim’s loss,” despite the fact that he may have had no part in the taking. Id.

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As in Anderson a n d Larson, receipt of the stolen property here was—in and of
itself—sufficient support for the restitution order. Although Hiram had no proven part in
the taking, he received the inspection system and placed it into the storage unit. But even
if, as Hirman claims, the state must show a relationship betwee n his possession and the
subsequent damage to the system, Larson guides us to the conclusion that a sufficient tie
exists here. There is no eviden ce in the record that anyone el se accessed or damaged the
inspection system after it was placed in the storage unit. Accordingly, as in Larson, Hirman
is tied to the damage to the inspection system through receipt of the stolen inspection
system, and possession of it.
Still, Hirman cites several cases in support of his argument that because he was not
convicted of conduct that led to the loss of the inspection system, he did not directly cause
the loss. See Nelson, 796 N.W.2d at 347-48 (district court erred by considering losses that
occurred outside the charging period); State v. Latimer, 604 N.W.2d 103, 105 (Minn. App.
1999) (district court erred in awarding restitution for losses stemming from murder, in
which defendant took no part); State v. Esler , 553 N.W.2d 61, 65 (Minn. App. 1996)
(district court erred in awarding restitution for shooting incident which took place several
hours prior to the murder for wh ich defendant was convicted), review denied (Minn.
Oct. 15, 1996). But these cases are not as helpful as Hirman urges us to conclude. In each,
the restitution was based upon losses that were not related to the defendants’ convictions.
Here, restitution was ordered fo r the loss of the inspection sy stem, which Hirman
possessed.

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Hirman also points to State v. Jola, where this court upheld a restitution order where
the defendants possessed a stolen truck for over a year, and di smantled and distributed its
parts. 409 N.W.2d 17, 19 (Minn. App. 1987). Unlike Jola, Hirman contends he was only
tied to possession of the inspection system, not the damage. B ut, as Larson instructs us,
one need not be tied to both possession and damage. One is enough. And here, as in Jola,
Hirman possessed the inspection system—by storing it in K.S.’s storage unit—for
approximately one year, and it was damaged upon recovery.
In sum, Hirman is tied to the r eceipt of stolen property, as well as to the damage of
the stolen inspection system through time, place, and possessio n. His conduct is a direct
cause of the economic loss suffered by ABM Equipment and United Fire and Casualty.
We next turn to the issue of the appropriate amount of restitu tion. The district court
found that ABM Equipment’s out-of-pocket economic loss was $2,0 00 and United Fire
and Casualty’s out-of-pocket loss was in excess of $3,000, resu lting in the $5,000
restitution award. But half of ABM Equipment’s $2,000 out-of-p ocket loss consisted of
the $1,000 deductible ABM paid United Fire for the trailer. He re, Hirman was convicted
only of receiving the stolen insp ection system, not the trailer . Nothing in this record ties
Hirman to the loss involving th e trailer. As a result, we conc lude that the district court
abused its discretion in awarding ABM Equipment $1,000 in restitution for the economic
loss relating to the trailer.
In conclusion, because the district court appropriately awarde d restitution related to
the stolen inspection system, but abused its discretion in awar ding $1,000 to ABM
Equipment for the deductible related to the loss of the trailer , we affirm the restitution

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award for the loss of the inspection system, but we reverse the restitution award for the loss
of the trailer. And we remand for the district court to issue an amended order consistent
with this decision.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.