State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-1236

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Hassan Saleem McKeever,
Appellant.

Filed July 10, 2017
Affirmed
Hooten, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-15-8572

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Thomas R. Ragatz, Assistant County Attorney, St.
Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jenna Yauch-Erickson, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Hooten, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and Reyes,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
HOOTEN, Judge
Appellant argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions because
his convictions are based on the uncorroborated and incredible testimony of a single
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eyewitness. Appellant also argues that his conviction of attempted second -degree murder
is not supported by sufficient evidence because the state failed to prove that he had the
specific intent to kill the victim. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Hassan Saleem McKeever and C.B. met in late September or early
October 2015 and began a romantic relationship. On the morning of October 19, 2015,
C.B. was at a hotel with McKeever and a few other friends when she saw McKeever in
possession of a gun that “looked like a police gun.” C.B. went to work later that day and
met up with one of her friends, T.A., when she got off work. Sometime around midnight,
C.B. and T.A. met up with McKeever and a few other individuals, and the group drove to
an apartment building in order to hang out and drink alcohol. Around 3:30 a.m. or 4:00
a.m., C.B. and T.A. left the third floor apartment where the gathering was being held to tell
McKeever, who was outside the front of the building, that they were ready to get a ride
home. An argument ensued, resulting in McKeever pushing C.B. to the ground and C.B.
and T.A. leaving on foot . After receiving a phone call from McKeever asking them to
return, C.B. and T.A. walked back to the apartment building, and C.B. began climbing the
stairs with McKeever while T.A. remained behind.
As they walked up the stairs, C.B. and McKeever began arguing, and McKeever
punched C.B. in the face, shattering her jaw. When she heard C.B. scream, T.A. ran up the
stairs and found McKeever standing by C.B. Because she was at least a flight of stairs
behind C.B. and McKeever, T.A. di d not see McKeever punch C.B. McKeever told T.A.
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to get C.B. out of there. C.B. and T.A. fled down the stairs and into the alley behind the
apartment building.
As C.B. stood in the alley, she heard a gunshot and turned toward the back door of
the apartment building. T.A. ran when she heard the gunshot and hid inside a garage. The
back of the building was illuminated by a porch light, and C.B. saw McKeev er standing
there with a gun. C.B. heard a few more gunshots and fell after being shot in the leg. C.B.
yelled, “Hassan, stop,” and McKeever ran from the scene.
Law enforcement responded to the scene, and C.B. identifi ed “Hassan” as her
assailant. C.B. did not know McKeever’s last name, but was able to tell the responding
officers the name of a woman with whom he was associated. After searching for the
woman’s name on his squad computer, one of the responding officers learned that
McKeever was associated with the woman and identified him as a suspect.
T.A. emerged from her hiding spot when she heard law enforcement arrive and told
the officers that an individual known to her as “Lil’ Bo” had punched C.B. in the face in
the stairway, that Lil’ Bo’s first name was Hassan, and that, while she was in the alley and
garage, she heard a number of gunshots and C.B. scream, “Hassan, stop!”
The officers were approached by the owner of a house across the alley from the
apartment building who reported that his house had been damaged by the gunfire. The
gunfire broke two windows of the house, and the officers were able to recover two bullets
from the residence. The officers and the homeowner also noted that there were three fresh
pock marks on the outside of the residence where bullets had str uck the exterior
cinderblock.
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C.B. was ultimately transported to the h ospital by ambulance, where she was
diagnosed with a fractured jaw, which required surgery and impaired her ability to eat and
speak. C.B. was also treated for the gunshot wound to her leg. A few days after the
incident, police administered a photo lineu p to C.B., and she identified McKeever as the
person who had fractured her jaw and shot her.
McKeever was initially charged with second -degree assault and possession of a
firearm by an ineligible person. The state subsequently amended the complaint and added
charges of attempted second-degree intentional murder and first-degree assault. Following
a jury trial, the jury found McKeever guilty of all four counts. The district court sentenced
McKeever to concurrent sentences of 240 months for the attempted murder conviction and
60 months for the possession of a firearm by a prohibited person conviction. This appeal
followed.
D E C I S I O N
I. The evidence is sufficient to support McKeever’s convictions.
In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, we engage in “a painstaking review of
the record to determine whether the evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom,
viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, were sufficient to allow the jury to reach its
verdict.” State v. Vang , 847 N.W.2d 248, 258 (Minn. 2014) (quotation omitted). A
reviewing court will not disturb the verdict if the jury, “giving due regard to the
presumption of innocence and to the prosecution’s burden of proving guilt bey ond a
reasonable doubt, . . . could reasonably have found the defendant guilty of the charged
offense.” Id. (quotation omitted).
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A. C.B.’s Testimony
McKeever argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions because
the only evidence identifying him as the assailant is C.B.’s uncorroborated and incredible
testimony. We disagree.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has held that a conviction may be based on the
testimony of a single witness. State v. Foreman , 680 N.W.2d 536, 539 (Minn. 2004 ).
Determining the credibility of a witness and the weight to be given to his or her testimony
is an issue for the jury. State v. Johnson, 568 N.W.2d 426, 435 (Minn. 1997). McKeever
acknowledges that a conviction can rest on the testimony of a single cr edible witness, but
argues that the Minnesota Supreme Court has reversed convictions when a witness’
testimony was of dubious credibility and was not corroborated by other evidence.
In support of his claim, McKeever cites three cases in which the supreme court
reversed a defendant’ s convictions because the state failed to produce corroborating
evidence to support the testimony of a witness whose credibility was at issue. In State v.
Huss, the testimony of a three-year-old alleged victim was the state’s only direct evidence.
506 N.W.2d 290, 292 (Minn. 1993). The supreme court summarized that the child’s
testimony was “contradictory as to whether any abuse occurred at all, and was inconsistent
with her prior statements and other verifiable facts.” Id. Despite the inconsistencies in the
child’s testimony, the supreme court indicated that it might not have determined that it was
necessary to reverse “absent the repeated use of a highly suggestive book on sexual abuse.”
Id. The supreme court concluded that “on these unusual facts . . . the state did not meet its
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burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and . . . the conviction should be reversed.” Id.
at 293.
In State v. Langteau , only the alleged victim and the defendant gave significant
evidence at tri al. 268 N.W.2d 76, 77 (Minn. 1978). The supreme court noted that the
victim’s actions were “unexplained,” the defendant’s motive in committing the crime was
“left a mystery,” and no other evidence linked the defendant to the crime. Id. Under these
circumstances, the supreme court concluded that a new trial was required in the interests
of justice. Id.
In State v. Gluff, the supreme court identified issues regarding the trustworthiness
of a witness identification of the defendant. 285 Minn. 148, 151, 172 N.W.2d 63, 65
(1969). The supreme court noted that the witness observed the perpetrator for only 30
seconds before he “leveled a revolver at her” and that “[h]er description to the police was
wholly at variance with her later identification” in the l ine-up. Id. The supreme court
determined that the witness’ identification of the defendant “clearly lacked probative
value” and stated that because the identification was not corroborated, the identification,
which was the critical issue in the case, was “permeated with doubt.” Id. The supreme
court concluded that a new trial was required in the interests of justice. Id. at 153, 172
N.W.2d at 66.
None of these cases , in which the credibility of the witness’ testimony was
questionable and there was mi nimal or no corroborating evidence, is factually similar to
this case. C.B., who was 19 years old at the time of trial, consistently testified during direct
and cross-examination that McKe ever punched and shot her. Because she had been in a
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three-week romantic relationship with McKeever and had spent hours with him prior to the
assaults, she was able to immediately identify her assailant as “Hassan” and give a
description to the police. The testimony of the police officers regarding what C.B. reported
immediately after the shooting is generally consistent with her testimony at trial. The
officers observed blood in the stairwell of the apartment building and the alley ,
corroborating C.B.’s statement, as well as C.B.’s injuries. T.A. testified that when she
heard a scream and ran up the stairs, she saw C.B. and McKeever, and that McKeever told
her to get C.B. out of there. T.A. also testified that , as she and C.B. were leaving the
building, she heard gunshots and heard C.B. yell, “Hassan, stop!” In sum, C.B. was not
the state’s only witness and her testimony was corroborated by the officers and T.A.
Nevertheless, McKeever contends that the accuracy of C.B.’s identification is
suspect for several reasons. First, although C.B. initially identified “Hassan” as her
assailant to responding officers, she told medical personnel at the hospital that another
person, who was the father of her child , had assaulted her. Second, in various interviews
with law enforcement, C.B. identified different individuals as being part of the group that
drove to the apartment building. Third, when she spoke to one officer, C.B. gave different
details regarding what happened when McKeever shot her than she reported to other
officers and testified to at trial. Fourth, C.B. had consumed alcohol while at the gathering.
However, McKeever’s attorney cross-examined C.B. and the state’s other witnesses
about many of these issues. In closing argument, McKeever’s attorney highlighted the
apparent inconsistencies in C.B.’s story. Specifically, McKeever’s attorney noted that C.B.
had identified other individuals as being in the vehicle at various points during the
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pendency of the case and emphasized that C.B. had told medical personnel that the father
of her child had assaulted he r. His attorney also noted that C.B. had been drinking and
T.A. decided that they should leave the gathering because C.B. wa s “a little too
intoxicated.” C.B. acknowledged at trial that she had falsely told medical personnel that
her child’s father had a ssaulted her, explaining that she “didn’t really want to tel l them
exactly what happened.” But, she consistently told the police during the pendency of the
case that McKeever was the perpetrator. Because the jury, in assessing the credibility of
C.B. and in acting with due regard for the presumption of innocence and the state’s burden
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably have concluded that McKeever was
guilty of the charges, we will not disturb the verdict.
B. Specific Intent to Kill
McKeever argues that the state failed to prove that he had the specific intent to kill
C.B. and that therefore the state’s evidence is insufficient to support his attempted mur der
conviction. We disagree.
“An attempt requires that the actor have specific intent to perform acts and attain a
result which if accomplished would constitute the crime alleged.” State v. Noble , 669
N.W.2d 915, 919 (Minn. App. 2003), review denied (Minn. Dec. 23, 2003); see also Minn.
Stat. § 609.17, subd. 1 (2014). Because inten t involves a state of mind, it is generally
proved circumstantially by inferences drawn from the person’s words or actions in light of
the totality of the circumstances. State v. Cooper, 561 N.W.2d 175, 179 (Minn. 1997). “A
jury is permitted to infer tha t a person intends the natural and probable consequences of
[his or her] actions.” State v. Johnson, 616 N.W.2d 720, 726 (Minn. 2000 ). In this case,
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where there is no direct evidence of McKeever’s state of mind, we must apply the
circumstantial evidence test. Loving v. State, 891 N.W.2d 638, 643 (Minn. 2017).
When reviewing a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, we engage in a two-
step analysis. State v. Silvernail , 831 N.W.2d 594, 598 (Minn. 2013). First, we must
identify the circumstances proved, deferring “to the jury’s acceptance of the proof of these
circumstances and rejection of evidence in the record that conflicted with the circumstances
proved by the [s]tate.” Id. at 598 –99 (quotations omitted). In deferring to the
circumstances pr oved, we consider only the circumstances that are consistent with the
verdict because the jury is in the best position to evaluate the credibility of evidence. Id.
Next, we “determine whether the circumstances proved are consistent with guilt and
inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt.” Id. at 599 (quotations
omitted). This analysis requires us to look at the circumstances proved to determine
whether they “form a complete chain that, in view of the evidence as a whole, leads so
directly to the guilt of the defendant as to exclude . . . any reasonable inference other than
guilt.” State v. Al -Naseer, 788 N.W.2d 469, 473 (Minn. 2010) (quotation omitted). In
performing this analysis, “[appellate courts] give no deference to the fact finder’s choice
between reasonable inferences.” Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d at 599 (quotation omitted).
The circumstances proved relevant to McKeever’s attempted murder conviction are
as follows. C.B. saw McKeever in possession of a gun the day prior to th e incident. C.B.
and McKeever argued earlier in the evening , and McKeev er pushed C.B. to the ground.
Later, while in the stairway of the apartment building, McKeever and C.B. again argued,
and McKeever punched C.B. in the face and shattered her jaw. Aft er C.B. and T.A. fled
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out the back door of the building, McKeever followed them outside and fired at least five
rounds toward C.B., hitting her once in the leg above the knee . McKeever then ran away
from the scene.
McKeever contends that although it is reasonable to infer that he attempted to kill
C.B., it is also reasonable to infer that he only intended to scare C.B. or to assault her.
McKeever supports his argument by noting C.B. was struck in the leg, not a “mo re vital
region of the body.” McKeever also notes that none of the circumstances proved indicate
that he threatened to kill C.B. or said anything to her at the time of the shooting.
Minnesota courts have upheld the inference of intent to kill in several different cases
involving gunshots. In State v. Oates, this court found sufficient evidence of intent to kill
where the defendant fired up to seven shots in a crowded bar after putting a gun to the head
of the intended victim. 611 N.W.2d 580, 587 (Minn. App. 2000), review denied (Minn.
Aug. 22, 2000). In State v. Chuon, a defendant fired at the victim from a distance of six to
eight feet, striking him in the shoulder blade. 596 N.W.2d 267, 271 (Minn. App. 1999),
review denied (Minn. Aug. 25, 1999). This court determined that the defendant’s firing a
single shot at the victim’s torso was sufficient to support a finding of an intent to kill. Id.
In State v. Whisonant, the Minnesota Supreme Court rejected a defendant’s argument that
there was insufficient evidence to show he intended to shoot an officer or kill him where
the defendant fired a “pen gun” at an officer at a distance of 12 feet, even though the officer
was only hit by particles from the discharge. 331 N.W.2d 766, 768 (Minn. 1983). In State
v. Berg, this court found sufficient evidence of intent to kill where the defendant threatened
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to kill one of the victims, pointed a gun at that victim, and shot at the victims through a
door. 358 N.W.2d 443, 446 (Minn. App. 1984), review denied (Minn. Feb. 5, 1985).
Although the inferences that McKeever suggests are inferences that can be made
from the evidence, these inferences are not reasonable, considering that McKeever fired
multiple shots at C.B. within minutes of their verbal altercation and his physical assault of
C.B. The evidence demonstrates that McKeever fired his gun repeatedly at C.B. as she
was leaving the building to escape him after their fight a nd that it was merely fortuitous
that only one of the bullets hit C.B. in the leg, rather than in her vital organs. Because the
evidence as a whole makes McKeever’s suggested alternatives unreasonable, we conclude
that the evidence is sufficient to suppor t McKeever’s conviction of attempted second -
degree murder.
II. McKeever’s pro se arguments are without merit.
In his pro se supplemental brief, McKeever raises a number of additional claims.
Specifically, McKeever notes that (1) one of the officers who testi fied indicated that
another officer was primarily associated with the case; (2) C.B. was under the influence of
alcohol when she was assaulted; (3 ) C.B. indicated to medical personnel that she was
assaulted by her child’s father, not McKeever; (4) C.B. was the only person who identified
McKeever as her assailant ; and (5) he was convicted of possession of a firearm by a
prohibited person even though no firearm was recovered . However, because these claims
are unsupported by citation to legal authority and no prejudicial error is obvious on mere
inspection, we need not consider them. State v. Bartylla , 755 N.W.2d 8, 22 –23 (Minn.
2008).
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Even if we considered the arguments, they are without merit. Most of McKeever’s
arguments relate to witness credibility. “Assessing witness credibility and the weight given
to witness testimony is exclusively the province of the jury.” State v. Pendleton , 759
N.W.2d 900, 909 (Minn. 2009). McKeever’s attorney cross-examined the officer and C.B.,
and the jury had the opportu nity to weigh the testimony. Regarding McKeever’s last
argument, although a firearm was never recovered, C.B. testified that she saw him in
possession of a firearm the prev ious day and that he shot her. The testimony of a person
who perceived something through the senses is direct evidence. State v. Clark, 739 N.W.2d
412, 421 n.4 (Minn. 2007). The jury evaluated C.B.’s testimony and determined that it
was credible, and we will not disturb its credibility determination on appeal. State v.
Hagen, 382 N.W.2d 556, 559 (Minn. App. 1986).
Affirmed.