Joshua Alvin Peterson, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-1673

Joshua Alvin Peterson, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Commissioner of Public Safety,
Respondent.

Filed June 19, 2017
Affirmed
Worke, Judge

Otter Tail County District Court
File No. 56-CV-16-563

Rich Kenly, Kenly Law Offices, Backus, Minnesota (for appellant)

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Dominic J. Haik, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Kirk,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
WORKE, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s order sustaining the revocation of his
driver’s license, arguing that the stop was unlawful and that there was no proba ble cause
to arrest him. We affirm.

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FACTS
On February 10, 2016, at approximately 7:33 p.m., Minnesota State Trooper
Jonathan Wenzel observed appellant Joshua Alvin Peterson get into the driver’s side of a
vehicle at a gas station and immediately start driving. The trooper believed that there was
little to no time for Peterson to have put on a seatbelt. T he trooper also observed that
Peterson’s vehicle had a third brake light out.
The trooper followed Peterson who sped up and pulled into a driveway. The trooper
viewed the driving conduct as “very quick,” and estimated that Peterson was driving ten
miles or so over the 30-miles-per-hour speed limit. The trooper believed that Peterson was
attempting to elude him.
Trooper Wenzel pulled in to the driveway. Peterson exited his vehicle and walked
very quickly to his home. Trooper Wenzel exited his vehicle, identified himself as a state
trooper, and yelled for Peterson to stop because the trooper needed to talk to him. Peterson
looked back at the trooper and continued walking to his porch where his wife was standing.
The couple went inside their home and locked the door. Because Peterson looked back at
the trooper and continued to go into his home after the trooper told him to stop, Trooper
Wenzel believed that Peterson could be impaired.
Trooper Wenzel knocked on the door, identified himself, and stated that he needed
Peterson to come out and talk to him. Peterson’s wife opened the door and told Trooper
Wenzel that she would see if Pe terson would come to th e door. The trooper observed
Peterson walk to the door , open a beer, and take a sip. Peterson was “swaying,” slurring
his words, and had bloodshot and watery eyes. Trooper Wenzel testified that he could

3
smell the odor of an alcoholic beverage, which was too overwhelming to have come from
the beer that Peterson had just opened.
Trooper Wenzel told Peterson to come out and speak with him. Peterson refused
and backed up i nto the threshold of the home. Trooper Wenzel testified that he was
concerned f or his safety because he did not know what was in side the home, such as
firearms. Trooper Wenzel testified that his foot may have been on the threshold as his arm
reached into the home to grab Peterson’s arm. Peterson, with the help of his wife,
forcefully pulled away. Trooper Wenzel warned Peterson that he would be under arrest
for obstruction of legal process if he did not come outside and speak with the trooper.
Peterson continued to argue, fight, and pull back. Trooper Wenzel called for backup and
was assisted in getting Peterson outside.
Trooper Wenzel arrested Peterson for obstruction of legal process and placed him
in the trooper’s vehicle. Shortly thereafter, Trooper Wenzel removed Peterson from the
vehicle and asked him to perform field sobriety tests. Peterson’s performance indicated
impairment. Peterson agreed to take a preliminary breath test, the result of which showed
0.198 alcohol concentration. Trooper Wenzel placed Peterson under arrest for driving
while impaired (DWI). After reading Peterson the implied -consent advisory, Trooper
Wenzel offered Peterson a breath test, which he refused.
At an implied -consent hearing, Peterson challenged the basis for the stop and
probable cause for his arre st. T he district court sustained the revocation o f Peterson’s
driver’s license. This appeal followed.

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D E C I S I O N
This court reviews the district court’s findings supporting an order sustaining a
license revocation for clear error. Jasper v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 642 N.W.2d 435, 440
(Minn. 2002). “Findings of fact are clearly erroneous if, on the entire evidence, [the
reviewing court is] left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake occurred.” State
v. Diede , 795 N. W.2d 836, 846 -47 (Minn. 2011). “[We] defer to the district court’s
credibility determinations and ability to weigh the evidence.” Constans v. Comm’r of Pub.
Safety, 835 N.W.2d 518, 523 (Minn. App. 2013). We review de novo questions of law in
implied-consent proceedings. Harrison v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety , 781 N.W.2d 918, 920
(Minn. App. 2010).
Stop
Peterson argues that Trooper Wenzel lacked a reasonable basis to stop him because
the trooper did not mention a seatbelt violation, the trooper did not verify Peterson’s speed,
and a vehicle is not legally required to have a third brake light.
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions protect citizens from unreasonable
searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. But a law
enforcement officer may temporarily detain a person he suspects has e ngaged in criminal
activity if the stop was justified by re asonable articulable suspicion. Diede, 795 N.W.2d
at 842. While reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause, an
officer must articulate a “particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular
person stopped of criminal activity.” State v. Timberlake , 744 N.W.2d 390, 393 (Minn.
2008) (quotation omitted).

5
Traffic violations, “however insignificant,” provide a legal basis for a stop. State v.
George, 557 N.W.2d 575, 578 (Minn. 1997). When an officer has reasonable suspicion
that a driver has committed a traffic violation, he may initiate a stop. Sazenski v. Comm’r
of Pub. Safety, 368 N.W.2d 408, 409 (Minn. App. 1985).
An actual violation of the vehicle and traffic laws need not be
detectable. The police must only show that the stop was not
the product of mere whim, caprice or idle curiosity, but was
based upon specific and articulable facts which, taken together
with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant
that intrusion.

State v. Pike, 551 N.W.2d 919, 921-22 (Minn. 1996) (quotation omitted).
Officers may cite motor ists for failing to wear a seat belt indepen dent of another
moving violation. State v. Wendorf, 814 N.W.2d 359, 363 (Minn. App. 2012). B ecause
the failure to wear a seatbelt provides a basis for a citation, the failure to wear a seatbelt
provides a reasonable basis for an investigatory stop. Id. at 363, 365.
Here, the district court found that there was little to no time for Peterson to put on a
seatbelt before driving . Trooper Wenzel testified that he observed Peterson get into his
vehicle and immediately start driving. The trooper believed that there was little to no time
for Peterson to put on a seatbelt. The district court’s finding is supported by the trooper’s
testimony, which the district court found credible.
Driving at a speed in excess of the posted speed limit is unlawful, and an objective
basis for a stop exists when an officer believes that a driver is speeding. M inn. Stat.
§ 169.14, subd. 2 (2016); Sazenski, 368 N.W.2d at 409. Further, a driver’s evasive driving
conduct may give a police officer “a particular and objective basis” for suspecting the

6
driver of criminal activity. State v. Johnson, 444 N.W.2d 824, 827 (Minn. 1989) (quotation
omitted).
The district court found that Trooper Wenzel believed that Peterson was speeding
in an attempt to evade him. Trooper Wenzel testified that Peterson sped up “highly over”
the 30-miles-per-hour speed limit, and based on his training and experience, he estimated
that the vehicle was tr aveling approximately ten miles over the speed limit. The trooper
testified that he believed that Peterson sped up and pulled into the driveway in an attempt
to elude him. The district court found Trooper Wenzel to be credible.
Peterson argues that Trooper Wenzel only believed that he was speeding, but did
not use his radar. But a n officer’s visual estimation of a driver’s excessive speed is
sufficient to support a traffic stop. Sazenski, 368 N.W.2d at 409. A finding of reasonable
suspicion on the basis of excessive speed does not depend upon whether a driver is charged
with speeding or whether the officer “clock[s] the vehicle’s exact speed.” Frank v. Comm’r
of Pub. Safety , 384 N.W. 2d 574, 576 (Minn. App. 1986). E ven if Peterson was not
traveling ten miles o ver the 30 -miles-per-hour speed limit, a mistake of fact does not
invalidate a traffic stop so long as that mistake is reasonable. See State v. Sanders , 339
N.W.2d 557, 559 (Minn. 1983) (stating that an officer’s reasonable mistake of fact does
not invalidate a search if the officer had reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal
activity); see also State v. Licari, 659 N.W.2d 243, 254 (Minn. 2003) (stating that “searches
based on honest, reasonable mistakes of fact are unobjectionable under the Fourth
Amendment”).

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“When a vehicle is equipped with stop lamps or signal lamps, such lamps shall at
all times be maintained in good working condition.” Minn. Stat . § 169.57, subd. 3(a)
(2016). Peterson claims that the law does not require vehicles to have a third brake light,
but the law does require that all brake lights on a vehicle be maintained and in good
working condition. He does not challenge the district court finding that the third brake
light was out.
The district court did not err in concluding that Trooper Wenzel had reasonable
suspicion to stop Peterson based on the seatbelt violation, Peterson speeding in an attempt
to evade the trooper, and the equipment-maintenance violation.
Arrest
Peterson also argues that the arrest was illegal because Trooper Wenzel’s blocking
the door with his foot and reaching in and grabbing Peterson’s arm was unreasonable.
Absent probable cause and exigent circumstances, police officers may not enter an
individual’s home to effect a warrantless arrest. Payton v. New York , 445 U.S. 573, 583 -
90, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 1378-82 (1980).
[But] [w]hile it may be true that under the common law
of property the threshold of one’s dwelling is “private,” as is
the yard surrounding the house, it is nonetheless clear that
under the cases interpreting the Fourth Amendment [a person]
[is] in a “public” place [when in the vestibule of her house].

United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42, 96 S. Ct. 2406, 2409 (1976) (holding that for
Fourth-Amendment purposes, an open doorway is a public place); State v. Alayon , 459
N.W.2d 325, 328 (Minn. 1990) (“Defendant freely chose to open the door and stood in the
open doorway, which the United States Supreme Court and this court have held to be a

8
‘public’ place fo r fourth amendment purposes.”). A defendant who is in a public place
when officers initiate an arrest may not thwart the arrest by retreating into his residence.
Santana, 427 U.S. at 43, 96 S. Ct. at 2410.
Here, Peterson exited his vehicle and walked quickly to his home. Trooper Wenzel
identified himself as a state trooper and yelled for Peterson to stop. Peterson looked back
at the trooper, but went inside his home . Trooper Wenzel knocked on the door, which
Peterson’s wife opened. Trooper Wenzel told Peterson to come out and speak with him.
Peterson refused and backed into the threshold of the hom e. Trooper Wenzel may have
placed his foot on the threshold of the doorway when he reached to grab Peterson’s arm
and Peterson pulled away.
Trooper Wenzel had probable cause to arrest Peter son in the open doorway for
obstruction of legal process for failing to comply with the trooper’s orders to stop and talk
to him. See Minn. Stat. § 609.50, subd. 1(2) (2016) (stating that it is a crime for an
individual to intentionally obstruct, resist, or interfere with a peace of ficer who is
performing official duties). Trooper Wenzel also had probable cause to arrest Peterson for
DWI after observing Peterson driving and indicia of intoxication a s Peterson stood in the
doorway. The district court did not err in concluding that Trooper Wenzel did not violate
the Fourth Amendment by arresting Peterson in the doorway of Peterson’s home.
Affirmed.