Federal National Mortgage Association, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-1962

Federal National Mortgage Association,
Respondent,

vs.

Valerie R. LeMaster, et al.,
Appellants.

Filed July 10, 2017
Affirmed
Schellhas, Judge

Dakota County District Court
File No. 19AV-CV-16-2923

Kevin T. Dobie, Usset, Weingarden & Li ebo, P.L.L.P., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Valerie LeMaster, Inver Grove Heights, Minnesota (attorney pro se and for appellants)

Considered and decided by Halbrooks , Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and
Schellhas, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SCHELLHAS, Judge
In this post-foreclosure-sale eviction ac tion in which the dist rict court granted
summary judgment in favor of respondent, appellants argue that the court abused its
discretion and violated appellants’ procedural due-process rights by declining to grant them
a prejudgment stay. We affirm.

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FACTS
Appellants Valerie LeMaster, attorney pro se, and Steven Hauschildt owned real
property (the property) that was encumbered by a mortgage in favor of respondent Federal
National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae). On May 1, 2013, after appellants defaulted
in their payments on the mortgage, the mortgage servicer transferred servicing
responsibilities to Green Tree Servicing LLC. On January 7, 2014, Green Tree purchased
the property at a mortgage-foreclosure sheriff’s sale, subject to appellants’ six-month right
of redemption. On January 22, 2014, Green Tree conveyed the sheriff’s certificate of sale
to Fannie Mae. Appellants did not redeem the property from the foreclosure but continued
to reside at the property through the time of oral argument in this appeal—April 26, 2017.
LeMaster commenced an action against Gree n Tree on July 6, 2014, claiming that
the sheriff’s sale was void because Green Tree violated Minn. Stat. §§ 58.13 (deceptive
practices in connection with a residential loan transacti on), 582.043 (loss mitigation)
(2012). On February 4, 2015, the district c ourt granted summary ju dgment in favor of
Green Tree and dismissed LeMaster’s claims with prejudice. This court affirmed that
summary judgment in an unpublished opinion. LeMaster v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC
(LeMaster I), No. A15-0552 (Minn. App. Dec. 28, 2015), review denied (Minn. Mar. 15,
2016).
In October 2016, Fannie Mae filed an ev iction action against appellants and, in
November, a notice of motion and motion for summary judgment. On December 7, the
date set for trial, Fannie Mae moved for summary judgment, arguing that no genuine issues
of material fact existed. Appellants oppose d the motion; argued that Fannie Mae had no

3
right to possess the home; asked for summar y judgment in their favor; and, in the
alternative, asked that the district court stay the eviction. The court granted summary
judgment in favor of Fannie Mae, denied LeMaster’s request for a stay of the eviction, and
delayed the issuance of a writ of recovery for seven days.
This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
I
On appeal from summary judgment, appellate courts review “a district court’s grant
of summary judgment de novo, determining whether there is any genuine issue of material
fact and whether the district court e rred in its application of the law.” Fed. Home Loan
Mortg. Corp. v. Mitchell , 862 N.W.2d 67, 72 (Minn. App. 2015) (quotation omitted),
review denied (Minn. June 30, 2015). We “view the evidence in the light most favorable
to the party against whom summary judgment was granted.” STAR Ctrs., Inc. v. Faegre &
Benson, L.L.P., 644 N.W.2d 72, 76–77 (Minn. 2002). No genuine issue for trial exists
“where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the
nonmoving party.” D L H , I n c . v . R u s s, 566 N.W.2d 60, 69 (M inn. 1997) (quotation
omitted).
“Eviction actions are summary proceedings that are intended to adjudicate only the
limited question of present possessory rights to the property.” Mitchell, 862 N.W.2d at 72
(quotation omitted). “The pur pose of an eviction action is only to determine present
possession and not to adjudicate the ultimate le gal or equitable righ ts of ownership.” Id.
(quotation omitted). “Parties ge nerally may not litigate related claims in an eviction

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action.” Id. (quotation omitted). “Challenges to th e validity of a foreclosure may be
litigated in an eviction action ‘ only’ when it is the sole forum available.” Id. (quoting
Fraser v. Fraser , 642 N.W.2d 34, 40–41 (Minn. App. 2002)). LeMaster challenged the
validity of the mortgage foreclosure in LeMaster I long before Fannie Mae sought to evict
appellants from the property.
In this eviction app eal, appellants challenge the dist rict court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of Fannie Mae and argue that the court abused its discretion when it
denied their request to stay the eviction acti on “until all claims in the lawsuit are finally
resolved in” LeMaster I. Appellants do not dispute that they failed to redeem the property
from the mortgage foreclosure and that they have remained in possession of the property
since the sheriff’s foreclosur e sale. Nor do appellants dispute that, under Minn. Stat.
§ 504B.285, subd. 1(a)(1)(ii) (2016), a pe rson entitled to possess real property “may
recover possession by eviction when” a pers on holds over on the property “after the
expiration of the time for redemption on forecl osure of a mortgage.” Appellants instead
argue that, under the terms of a joint stipul ation and order filed on August 22, 2014, in
LeMaster I, Fannie Mae does not have a right of possession and is estopped from bringing
an eviction action.
The terms of the joint stipulation and order in LeMaster I state, in pertinent part,
that “[Green Tree] and/or its successors and assigns shall not file or seek an eviction action
against [LeMaster] until all clai ms in the above-captioned La wsuit are finally resolved.”
Appellants argue that the terms of the stipula tion and order remain in effect because all
claims in LeMaster I are not “finally resolved.” We disagree.

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The stipulation and order in LeMaster I are not in effect beca use all claims in that
action were finally resolved when the Minnesota Supreme Court denied review of this
court’s decision on March 15, 2016. 1 Fannie Mae, as successo r to Green Tree, therefore
has a right of possession to the property and was not estopped from seeking an eviction
action against appellants. The district court properly granted summary judgment in favor
of Fannie Mae because no genuine issues of material fact exist regarding Fannie Mae’s
right of possession and its satisfaction of the requirements of the eviction statute.
We also conclude that the district cour t did not abuse its discretion by denying
appellants’ request to stay the eviction proceedings. “A party attempting to stay an eviction
action must provide a case-specific justification for granting a stay.” Mitchell, 862 N.W.2d
at 73 (quotation omitted). Even if appellants had a legitimate dispute regarding the validity
of the mortgage foreclosure, “[a] dispute re garding the underlying mortgage is not such a
reason.” Id. (quotation omitted). And even if a ppellants had provided a case-specific
reason, the district court was not obligated to grant a stay of the eviction proceedings. Id.
But a district court abuses its discretion when it declines to stay an eviction action when a
separate civil action is pending that involves counterclaims and defenses essential to a fair
determination of the eviction action. See Bjorklund v. Bjorkl und Trucking, Inc. , 753
N.W.2d 312, 318–19 (Minn. App. 2008), review denied (Minn. Sept. 23, 2008). Because

1 Following the supreme court’s denial of revi ew of this court’s decision, LeMaster again
attempted to challenge the va lidity of the foreclosure in LeMaster I by moving to vacate
the judgement in its entirety under rule 60.02. The di strict court denied the motion.
LeMaster v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, No. 19HA-CV-14-2658 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Feb. 15,
2017) (order).

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at the time of the eviction action in this case, all claims in LeMaster I were finally resolved,
the district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to stay the eviction action.
II
Appellants argue that the district court violated their procedural due-process rights
by using a standardized eviction template form for the order and by ruling from the bench
before reviewing their summary-judgment pleadings. Appellants also argue that the court’s
approach to disposing of the eviction action suggested implicit bias against them. We are
unpersuaded.
The United States and Minnesota Constituti ons guarantee the right to due process
of law. U.S. Const. amend. XI V, § 1; Minn. Const. art. 1, § 7. “Whether the government
has violated a person’s procedural due proce ss rights is a question of law that [appellate
courts] review de novo.” Sawh v. City of Lino Lakes, 823 N.W.2d 627, 632 (Minn. 2012).
Appellate courts “conduct a two-step analys is to determine whether the government has
violated an individual’s proc edural due process rights.” Id.
First, we “identify whether the government has deprived the individual of a protected life,
liberty, or property interest.” Id. If no individual has been deprived of such an interest,
then no process is due. Id. If an individual has been deprived of a protected interest, “the
second step requires us to determine whethe r the procedures followed by the government
were constitutionally sufficient.” Id.
Because eviction from the property depriv es LeMaster of possession of property,
which is a property interest, we must determine whether the process provided was
sufficient. See Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth , 408 U.S. 564, 571–72, 92 S. Ct.

7
2701, 2706 (1972) (explain ing that, “the property interest s protected by procedural due
process extend well beyond actual ownership of real estate, chattels, or money”). In doing
so, we balance the three factors set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge: (1) “the private interest
that will be affected by the official action”; (2 ) “the risk of an er roneous deprivation of
such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedur al safeguards”; and (3) “the Government’s interest, including the
function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail.” Sawh, 823 N.W.2d at 632 (quoting Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 321, 96 S. Ct. 893, 896 (1976)).
First, appellants’ property rights constitute an important interest. Second, appellants
acknowledge that an eviction pr oceeding is summary in natu re, and they do not clearly
explain the due process to which they believe they were entitled but did not receive. They
have provided no authority that required the district court to specifically address their
defenses in its eviction order and they point to no record evidence that the court’s use of a
form order encouraged or evinced any “implicit bias.” Although the court did not include
a detailed analysis in its order, the court e xplained on the record its reasoning for its
decision at the hearing.
And the record reflects that Fannie Mae’s counsel informed the court that appellants
had submitted a summary-judgment motion earlier in the week and that the pleadings had
been scanned into the record the morning of the hearing. The court therefore was aware
that appellants’ summary-judgment pleadings existed. Moreover, appellants admit that
LeMaster discussed their defenses to the eviction action “in deta il during the hearing.”

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Because the court allowed LeMaster to pres ent her defenses during the hearing, and
because LeMaster has not articulated any likel y benefit of requiring the district court to
address her defenses in the eviction order or delay ruling on the motion, the second
Mathews factor weighs against LeMaster.
As to the third Mathews factor, the government has a strong interest in judicial
economy and in resolving cases quickly. Prohibiting the district court from utilizing form
orders and requiring the district court to issue detailed orders in all summary eviction
proceedings would cause delay and likely considerable expense. The third Mathews factor
therefore weighs against appellants. See Mitchell, 862 N.W.2d at 72; see also Minn. Stat.
§ 504B.001, subd. 4 (2016) (defining evictio n action as a “summary court proceeding to
remove a tenant or occupant from or otherwise recover possession of real property”).
We conclude that the district court di d not violate appellant s’ procedural due-
process rights by using a standardized eviction template for the order or by ruling from the
bench on appellants’ summary-judgment motion, even if such ruling occurred before the
court reviewed their pleadings.
Affirmed.