Preservation Project One LLC, et al v. Jamika Davis

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A26-0014

Preservation Project One LLC, et al.,
Respondents,

vs.

Jamika Davis,
Appellant.

Filed August 10, 2026
Affirmed
Johnson, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-HG-CV-25-3628

Patricia A. E. Whitney, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondents)

Jamaka Davis, St. Paul, Minnesota (self-represented appellant)

Considered and decided by Rasmusson, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and
Bond, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JOHNSON, Judge
A landlord sought to evict a residential tenant for non-payment of rent. After a trial
in which the tenant represented herself, the district court found in favor of the landlord.
We conclude that the district court did not violate the tenant’s constitutional right to
procedural due process or her rights under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act.
Therefore, we affirm.

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FACTS
In April 2025, Jamaka Davis 1 entered into a written lease agreement with
Preservation Project One LLC (hereinafter PPO) for the rental of an apartment in the city
of St. Paul. Davis agreed to pay rent of $1,190 per month, on the first day of each month,
for the period of May 2025 to April 2026.
In September 2025, PPO filed an eviction complaint in which it alleged that Davis
paid only part of the rent due for June 2025 and did not pay any rent for July and August
of 2025. The district court administrator scheduled an initial hearing for October 9, 2025.
See Minn. Stat. § 504B.321, subd. 4 (2024). Davis appeared at the hearing on a self-
represented basis.
After the initial hearing, the district court filed an order stating that Davis “raised a
Fritz defense as well as defenses related to wrongful entry and privacy violations. ” See
Fritz v. Warthen, 213 N.W.2d 339, 342 (Minn. 1973) ( holding that tenant may assert
defense of breach of statutory covenant of habitability in eviction action). In the same
order, the district court scheduled a court trial for November 14, 2025. The trial order
stated, “All evidence you present must be filed with the court and shared with your
opponent prior to trial.” The trial order required each party to file and serve on the opposing
party a witness list and an exhibit list “at least four days prior to trial.” The trial order also

1The caption of this opinion matches the caption used in the district court, as
required by the rules of appellate procedure. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 143.01. Both
captions identify appellant as “Jamika Davis. ” In her own brief, appellant spells her first
name “Jamaka.” Accordingly, we use that spelling of appellant’s first name in the body of
this opinion.

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stated that the parties must upload their respective exhibits to MNDES, the court’s online
exhibit system, at least four days before trial, and the order included instructions for doing
so. The trial order further stated that Davis “shall provide [PPO] with an itemized list in
support of their Fritz defense” at least two weeks before trial.
On November 5, 2025, Davis filed a motion requesting a 30-day continuance of the
trial so that she could, among other things, “complete my Fritz defense itemization and
supporting evidence” and find an attorney. On November 13, 2025, the district court
granted the motion and rescheduled the trial to December 15, 2025.
The case was tried to the district court on that date. Davis represented herself. PPO
called one witness, the property manager of the apartment building, who testified about
Davis’s non -payment of rent and the management company’s resolution of her
maintenance requests. The district court did not allow Davis to offer exhibits or call
witnesses because she had not disclosed exhibits or a witness list before trial. In closing
arguments, PPO’s attorney urged the district court to enter an eviction judgment because
Davis had failed to pay rent and had not submitted any evidence in support of her Fritz
defense. Davis argued, in essence, that she disputed the amount of rent due because the
apartment building was unsafe and her “resulting trauma and mental and emotional state”
made her unable to communicate to PPO her reasons for not paying rent.
The district court ruled from the bench. The district court acknowledged that Davis
may be struggling with “personal issues” but stated that she had not offered any evidence
to explain why she had not paid the rent due. The district court acknowledged Davis’s
evidence of incidents that arose after the commencement of the eviction action (which were

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elicited by Davis during cross-examination of the property manager) but noted that none
of those incidents justified her earlier failure to pay rent. Two days later, the district court
filed an order in which it concluded that PPO is entitled to recover possession of the
premises because Davis did not pay rent for the months of July and August of 2025.
Davis appeals on a self-represented basis. We construe her appellate brief to make
two arguments.
DECISION
I. Due Process
Davis first argues that the district court violated her constitutional right to
procedural due process by enforcing its prior orders and procedural rules in a way that
prevented her from offering evidence.
Both the United States Constitution and the Minnesota Constitution provide that no
person may be deprived of “life, liberty, or property without due process of law.” U.S.
Const. amend. XIV, § 1; see also Minn. Const. art. I, § 7. To determine whether a
governmental entity has violated a person’s right to procedural due process, this court
conducts a two-step analysis. Sawh v. City of Lino Lakes, 823 N.W.2d 627, 632 (Minn.
2012). “First, we must identify whether the government has deprived the individual of a
protected life, liberty, or property interest.” Id. Second, if such a deprivation has occurred,
we must “ determine whether the procedures followed by the government were
constitutionally sufficient.” Id. (quotation omitted). At the second step, we typically apply
a three-part balancing test, which inquires into

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[f]irst, the private interest that will be affected by the official
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if
any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and
finally, the Government’s interest, including the function
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.

Id. (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)). To satisfy the requirements
of procedural due process, “[t]he procedures afforded by the government must provide an
individual with notice and an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner.” Id. (quotation omitted).
In this case, the parties do not dispute that Davis was deprived of a protected
property interest. But t he parties dispute whether the district court’s procedures were
constitutionally sufficient. Accordingly, we apply the Mathews three-factor balancing test.
With respect to the first Mathews factor, Davis has a substantial property interest,
namely, a tenancy in residential property. See Federal Nat’l Mortgage Ass’n v. LeMaster,
No. A16-1962, 2017 WL 2920288, at *3 (Minn. App. July 10, 2017) (reasoning that
property right of residential tenant is “important interest” of which tenant was deprived in
eviction case), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 27, 2017); see also Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01,
subd. 1(c) (providing that nonprecedential opinions are “not binding authority” but “may
be cited as persuasive authority”).
With respect to the second Mathews factor, there is a small risk of an erroneous
deprivation of Davis’s property interest under the procedures utilized by the district court.
The district court issued a trial order that specified the requirements and deadlines for
disclosing the evidence that each party intended to offer at trial. Despite being granted a

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continuance, Davis did not disclose any evidence before trial. At trial, the district court
nonetheless allowed Davis to extensively cross-examine PPO’s sole witness. The district
court gave Davis leeway during the cross-examination and overruled numerous objections
asserted by PPO’s attorney. As a result, the district court learned that the evidence Davis
wished to offer was not relevant to her Fritz defense because it related to incidents that
occurred after she failed to pay rent for July and August of 2025.
With respect to the third Mathews factor, the district court has a strong interest in
administering trials fairly, according to procedural rules, and in enforcing pre-trial orders
in an even-handed manner. See LeMaster, 2017 WL 2920288, at *4 (reasoning that district
court has “strong interest in judicial economy and in resolving cases quickly,” without
undue delay and expense, in eviction proceedings). To require more process—such as a
trial in which one party does not have prior notice of the other party’s evidence— would
impose additional burdens on district courts and would disadvantage parties that abide by
pre-trial orders.
Our balancing of the three Mathews factors leads to the conclusion that Davis
received the process to which she was due under the Due Process Clause. Davis had clear
notice of the requirements imposed on a party who wishes to present evidence at an eviction
trial, and she had an opportunity to be heard at trial in a meaningful way. See G ams v.
Houghton, 884 N.W.2d 611, 618 (Minn. 2016) (stating that “foundational principle of the
right to due process is an opportunity to be heard upon such notice and proceedings as are
adequate to safeguard the right for which the constitutional protection is invoked”
(quotation omitted)).

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Thus, the district court did not violate Davis’s constitutional right to procedural due
process.
II. Americans with Disabilities Act
Davis also argues that the district court violated her rights under the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA).
Title II of the ADA provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by
reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the
services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any
such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2018). The United States Supreme Court has recognized
that Title II of the ADA protects a person’s right of access to a state court. Tennessee v.
Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 5 33-34 (2004). But Title II “does not require States to compromise
their essential eligibility criteria for public programs.” Id. at 532. Rather, Title II “requires
only ‘reasonable modifications’ that would not fundamentally alter the nature of the service
provided, and only when the individual seeking modification is otherwise eligible for the
service.” Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (Supp. 2003)). A f ailure to provide a
reasonable accommodation of a disability may give rise to a cause of action under Title II.
See, e.g., Mobley v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Inc., 53 F.4th 452, 455-56 (8th Cir. 2022). In a
civil action, the disabled plaintiff would bear the burden of showing that a requested
accommodation is reasonable. One Love Housing, LLC v. City of Anoka, 93 F.4th 424,
432-33 (8th Cir. 2024).
Davis contends that she has a disability that affect ed her “ability to understand
procedures, respond to deadlines, . . . present relevant evidence, [and] navigate complex

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procedural requirements.” The record is unclear concerning the existence, nature, or extent
of Davis’s disability, but both the district court and PPO assume it to be a disability that is
protected by the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A) (2018) (defining “disability” for
purpose of ADA). Davis contends that the district court violated the ADA by “proceed[ing]
with trial without . . . considering whether procedural accommodations were necessary.”
For the purpose of this nonprecedential opinion, we assume without deciding that a district
court’s failure to reasonably accommodate a disability in the manner required by Title II
of the ADA in an eviction trial is a procedural error warranting relief in an appeal from the
eviction judgment.
PPO argues in response that Davis did not expressly request an accommodation of
a disability. The district court expressed that rationale in its post-trial order, stating that
“Davis made no requests for any accommodations during the two months the case was
scheduled for trial,” despite “ample opportunity to do so.” The district court made a similar
statement during trial, when it ruled that Davis could not introduce any exhibits or call any
witnesses because she had not made the pre-trial disclosures required by the trial order.
Davis stated in response that she had not disclosed her evidence before trial because of a
disability. The district court replied by stating that, “if there are ADA concerns, those are
things that you raise not the day of the trial, but in advance so that they may be addressed.”
The district court also stated to Davis on the record that she had not “made clear how it is
that you are unable to participate in this process as a result of whatever the disability may
be.” Davis responded by stating that her disability (along with her lack of legal training )
“may have” prevented her “from understanding the nuanced details as to when, where, and

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how I may present evidence.” The district court reiterated its ruling that Davis could not
offer any evidence because she did not comply with the trial order, which required her to
disclose her evidence before trial.
Davis has not cited any authority for the proposition that a state trial court is required
by Title II of the ADA to accommodate a disabled self-represented litigant by making
exceptions to procedural rules or pre-trial orders. Our independent research indicates that
Title II of the ADA does not impose a duty on trial courts to make such accommodations.
See Bedford v. Michigan, 722 Fed. App’x. 515, 519-20 (6th Cir. 2018) (concluding that
disabled self-represented litigant’s request for representation by non-attorney “disability
advocate” in family- law case was not reasonable accommodation); Alvarez v.
Pennsylvania, No. 25 -CV-4941, 2026 WL 499936, at *4 (E.D. Penn. Feb. 23, 2026)
(concluding that disabled self-represented litigant’s request for “directions on how to fix
[his] errors” in state-court case was not reasonable accommodation and would be undue
burden on court). Davis’s requested accommodation was not a reasonable accommodation
because it would have been substantively unfair to the opposing party, PPO, which
complied with the pre- trial order by disclosing its evidence to Davis but did not have an
opportunity to review and consider Davis’s evidence before trial. Such an accommodation
would not be reasonable because it would “fundamentally alter the nature of the service
provided,” a fair trial. See Lane, 541 U.S. at 532; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (2018).
In addition, an untimely request for an accommodation under Title II of the ADA precludes
a claim for relief. See Audette v. Lake of the Woods Cnty., No. 24-CV-944, 2025 WL
1736932, at *5 (D. Minn. June 23, 2025) (citing cases). Furthermore, the district court did

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accommodate Davis by granting her pre-trial motion for a continuance, in which she sought
more time to gather “supporting evidence.” Moreover, Davis was not prejudiced by the
district court’s evidentiary ruling because, as the district court stated, the evidence she
sought to offer was not relevant to her Fritz defense or to her non- payment of rent. See
Minn. R. Civ. P. 61.
For all of these reasons, the district court did not violate Davis’s rights under Title
II of the ADA.
Affirmed.