County of Ramsey, petitioner, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-1982

County of Ramsey, petitioner,
Respondent,

Pakou Lee, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Eric J. Vacko,
Appellant.

Filed September 11, 2017
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-F1-00-051006

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Fue Lo Thao, Assistant County Attorney, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondent County of Ramsey)

Pakou Lee, St. Paul, Minnesota (pro se respondent)

Eric J. Vacko, St. Paul, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Considered and decided by Peterson, Presiding Judge; Halbrooks, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.

2
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
In 2012, a child support ma gistrate (CSM) suspended appellant Eric Vacko’s child-
support and arrears obligations for any month he receives public a ssistance. In 2016,
Vacko was convicted of wrong fully obtaining assistance. Respondent Pakou Lee moved
to reinstate the previously suspended obliga tions, arguing that Va cko had not lawfully
received public assistance and, therefore, wa s not entitled to have had his support and
arrears obligations suspended. Vacko oppo sed Lee’s motion and moved to modify child
support. The district court reinstated Va cko’s support and arrears obligations beginning
June 2012, denied Vacko’s motion to modify , and awarded Lee conduct-based attorney
fees.
Vacko argues that the district court erre d in (1) denying his motion to modify child
support, (2) concluding that he had not lawfully received public assistance from June 2012
to present and reinstating his obligations, and (3) awarding Lee attorney fees. We conclude
that (1) Vacko failed to meet his burden to show a substantial change in circumstances
warranting modification of child support, (2) the district court properly interpreted the 2012
order as requiring Vacko to have lawfully received public assistance and properly
reinstated Vacko’s obligations from a portion of the time at issue, and (3) the district court
did not abuse its discretion in awarding Lee attorney fees. But we conclude that the district
court clearly erred in finding that Vacko did not lawfully receive public assistance from
April 2015 to March 2016. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

3
FACTS
Vacko and Lee are the parents of L.L. The parties were never married. In December
2000, a CSM determined Vacko’s gross income to be $1,733 a month and ordered Vacko
to pay child support of $250 a month—a downward deviation—and medical support.
In 2012, Vacko moved to modify child support based on his receipt of temporary-
assistance-for-needy-families (TANF) benefits. Vacko’ s child-support obligation had
increased to $328 per month due to cost-of-living adjustments. The CSM found that Vacko
was not employed, received TANF benefits, and had no potenti al income that could be
imputed to him. The CSM therefore su spended Vacko’s child-support and arrears
obligations “for any month he receives cash public assistance.” The CSM also determined
that all other provisions of the 2000 order remained in full force and effect.
In January 2016, Vacko a nd his wife were charged with multiple counts of
wrongfully obtaining assistance, theft by sw indle, and forgery in connection with TANF
benefits they received from May 2011 to March 2015. According to the criminal
complaint, Vacko was employed at an auto dealership despite his representations that he
was not working. Vacko entered an Alford plea 1 and was convicted of wrongfully
obtaining assistance, theft by swindle, and forg ery. Vacko and his wi fe were ordered to

1 An Alford plea allows a defendant to plead guilty, while main taining innocence of the
charged offense, in order to take advantage of a plea bargai n because there is sufficient
evidence for a jury to fi nd him guilty at trial. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37,
91 S. Ct. 160, 167 (1970). Minnesota formally recognized the validity of Alford pleas in
State v. Goulette, 258 N.W.2d 758, 760 (Minn. 1977).

4
pay restitution of more than $141,000 for the public assist ance they had wrongfully
obtained. Vacko stopped receiving TANF benefits on March 31, 2016.
Lee moved to either (1) reopen the 2012 order based on Vacko’s fraud on the court
or (2) reinstate the obligations that were suspended under the 2012 order on the grounds
that Vacko had not lawfully received TANF benefits. Vacko countered that he had actually
received TANF benefits and wa s not able to work during th is time because of several
medical conditions. Vacko also moved for a decrease in his child-support and arrears
obligations because of his medical conditions.
At a hearing before a CSM, Lee and the co unty agreed to purs ue reinstatement of
the obligations under the 2012 order instead of reopening the order based on fraud on the
court. In its order, the CSM concluded that “[i]t is reasonable to infer that cash assistance
is not received, for purposes of the [2012] order, when it is wrongfully obtained and is
required to be repaid by cour t order.” The CSM rejected Vacko’s argument that he was
unable to work because the CSM found Vacko’s medical records not credible. The CSM
reinstated Vacko’s child-support and arrears obligations beginning June 2012. The CSM
also denied Vacko’s motion to modify child support, finding that Vacko did not produce
sufficient evidence to show that he is unable to work on a full-time basis. The CSM found
that Vacko is voluntarily unemployed, imputed a potential gross monthly income of $1,733
to Vacko based on the 2000 order, and concluded that Vacko did not demonstrate that his
child-support obligation would be at least 20% or $75 lower than the current support order.
Finally, the CSM granted Lee’s motion for attorney fees.

5
Vacko requested that the district court re view the CSM’s order. The district court
affirmed the decision of the CSM.
Vacko appeals.2
D E C I S I O N
The district court reviews a CSM’s decision de novo. Davis v. Davis, 631 N.W.2d
822, 825 (Minn. App. 2001). To the extent that the district court affirms the CSM’s
decision, the CSM’s decision becomes th e decision of the district court. Kilpatrick v.
Kilpatrick, 673 N.W.2d 528, 530 n.2 (M inn. App. 2004). We revi ew the district court’s
decision affirming the CSM’s order for an abuse of discretion. Davis, 631 N.W.2d at 826.
We review questions of stat utory interpretation de novo. Lee v. Lee, 775 N.W.2d
631, 637 (Minn. 2009). The goal of statutory interpretation is to ascertain the intent of the
legislature. Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2016). The legislature does not intend absurd or
unreasonable results. Minn. Stat. § 645.17 (2016).
We will not set aside the district court’s findings of fact unless clearly erroneous.
Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01. Under rule 52.01, fi ndings are clearly erroneous only if they are
not reasonably supported by the evidence. City of Golden Valley v. One 1998 Pontiac
Grand Prix, 616 N.W.2d 780, 782 (Minn. App. 2000). We defer to the district court’s
credibility findings and weig hing of the evidence. Id.; Eisenschenk v. Eisenschenk , 668
N.W.2d 235, 241 (M inn. App. 2003), review denied (Minn. Nov. 25, 2003). We ignore

2 The county filed a responsive brief in this appeal. Lee did not file a responsive brief.

6
harmless error and de minimis error. Minn. R. Civ. P. 61 (harmless error); Wibbens v.
Wibbens, 379 N.W.2d 225, 227 (Minn. App. 1985) (de minimis error).
I. The district court did not abuse its disc retion in denying Vacko’s motion to
modify child support.

Vacko argues that the district court abused its discretion in finding that there has not
been a substantial change in circumstances for purposes of modifying child support.
The district court may modify the terms of a support order if the moving party shows
that there has been a substan tial change in circumstances th at renders the existing order
unreasonable and unfair. Minn. Stat. § 518A.39, subd. 2(a) (2016); Bormann v. Bormann,
644 N.W.2d 478, 480-81 (Minn. App. 2002). The moving party has the burden of proof in
support-modification proceedings. Id. at 481. We review the district court’s decision for
an abuse of discretion and will reverse only if the district court reached a conclusion that
is against logic and the facts in the record. Haefele v. Haefele, 837 N.W.2d 703, 708 (Minn.
2013).
Vacko submitted medical records allegedly sh owing that he is unable to work and
has no income. The district court found Vacko’s medical records not credible for two
reasons. First, the district court found that the records were stale because they were over
one year old. Second, the district court found that the records were dated from the period
regarding which Vacko was convicted of forg ery. Vacko did not produce newer records
or testimony from his treating physicians, and he abruptly left the hearing as the parties

7
were discussing his medical records.3 Vacko submitted no other credible evidence related
to his change in income. We defer to the credibility findings of the district court.
Eisenschenk, 668 N.W.2d at 241. In light of these credibility findings, Vacko did not
demonstrate a substantial change in circumstances. See Minn. Stat. § 518A.39, subd. 2(a).
Vacko argues that the district court erre d in finding that he was not entitled to a
presumption of substantial change. There is a presumption of substantial change if the
moving party can demonstrate that the calculat ed child support is at least 20% or $75 per
month higher or lower than the current support order. See Minn. Stat. § 518A.39, subd.
2(b)(1) (2016). It is rebuttably presumed that a parent can be gainfully employed on a full-
time basis. See Minn. Stat. § 518A.32, subd. 1 (2016). Because Vacko moved to modify
child support, it was his burden to produce ev idence showing that he is entitled to the
presumption of substantial change. Bormann, 644 N.W.2d at 480-81. In order to benefit
from the presumption, Vacko needed to produce credible evidence of his income to show
that his presumptive child-support obligation would be at least 20% or $75 lower than the
current order. See Minn. Stat. § 518A.34(b)(1) (2016) (requiring gross monthly income to
determine the obligor’s basic support obligation). Vacko did not meet his burden.

3 Vacko argues that the district court erred in denying his request to submit newer medical
records that he obtained for purposes of the district court’s review of the CSM’s order. On
a motion to review a CSM’s order, a party may request an order authorizing the party to
submit new evidence. Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 377. 03, subd. 2(e). But “the parties shall not
submit any new evidence unless the child support magistrate or district court judge, upon
written or oral notice to all parties, requests additional evidence.” Minn. R. Gen. Prac.
377.09, subd. 4. Neither the CSM nor the district court requested Vacko’s additional
medical records, and Vacko was not entitled to submit them.

8
While the district court recognized that Va cko failed to meet his burden, the court
nevertheless imputed $1,733 of potential income to Vack o based on the 2000 order,
calculated Vacko’s guideline child-support obligation, and concluded that Vacko failed to
demonstrate a presumptive substantial change in circumstances. When calculating a
parent’s guideline child-support obligation, a district court must determine a parent’s
potential income if there is no direct evidence of income. Minn. Stat. § 518A.32, subd. 1.
Vacko argues that the district court did not follow one of the three prescribed methods to
calculate his potential income in determining whether he wa s entitled to the presumption
of substantial change. See Minn. Stat. § 518A.32, subd. 2 (2016). But, because this issue
arises from Vacko’s motion to modify child support, the burden was on Vacko to produce
credible evidence of his actua l income to establish that his guideline child-support
obligation would be at least 20% or $75 lower than the current order. See Bormann, 644
N.W.2d at 481. He did not do so. Beca use Vacko did not meet hi s burden, the district
court was under no obligation to calculate Vacko’s guideline child-support obligation using
his potential income. Thus, any errors stemming from the calculation of Vacko’s potential
income are harmless. Minn. R. Civ. P. 61.
We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Vacko’s
motion to modify child suppor t because Vacko failed to prov e a substantial change in
circumstances.

9
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion in reinstating Vacko’s suspended
obligations for the period of time in which the record shows that he unlawfully
obtained public assistance , but clearly erred in fi nding that Vacko did not
lawfully receive public assistance from April 2015 to March 2016.

Vacko argues that the district court abused its discretion in find ing that he did not
receive TANF benefits from June 2012 to March 2016. The di strict court interpreted the
2012 order to require Vacko to have lawfully received public assist ance and found that
Vacko was not entitled to suspension of his child-support and arrears obligations from June
2012 onward. The district court reinstated Vacko’s suspended obligations from June 2012
to March 2016.
A. The district court properly interpreted the 2012 order to require Vacko
to have lawfully received public assistance.

A district court may interpret and clarif y a judgment that is ambiguous on its face,
but may not interpret an unambiguous judgment. Halverson v. Halverson, 381 N.W.2d 69,
71 (Minn. App. 1986); Robertson v. Robertson , 376 N.W.2d 733, 735-36 (Minn. App.
1985). An interpretation of a judgment is not an amendment or modification to the
judgment’s terms or a challenge to its validity. Edelman v. Edelman, 354 N.W.2d 562, 563
(Minn. App. 1984). The interpretation of a judgment is a legal question reviewed de novo.
Gray v. Farmland Indus., Inc. , 529 N.W.2d 514, 51 6 (Minn. App. 1995), review denied
(Minn. June 14, 1995).
A district court may suspend an obligor’s child-support and arrears obligations if
the obligor receives public assistance. Minn. Stat. § 518A.32, subd. 4 (2016) (“If the parent
of a joint child is a recipient of [TANF benefits], no potential income is to be imputed to
that parent.”); Minn. Stat. § 548.091, subd. 1a(c) (2016) (permitting suspension of interest

10
on child-support arrears for “a recipient of . . . public assistance based upon need”). These
statutes further the legislature’s intent of ensuring that child-support orders do not exceed
the obligor’s ability to pay. Minn. Stat. § 518A.42, subd. 1 (2016). But it would be absurd
to construe the statutes to authorize susp ension of child-support and arrears obligations
when the obligor unlawfully receives public assistance because it would encourage obligors
to fraudulently obtain public assistance in order to avoid child support. See Minn. Stat.
§ 645.17. We therefore conclude that the st atute requires an obligor to have lawfully
received public assistance in order for a district court to suspend the obligor’s child-support
and arrears obligations. Because the statutes require the lawful receipt of public assistance
for suspension of child-support and arrears obligations, and because the 2012 order is
premised on these statutes, the district court properly interpreted the 2012 order to require
Vacko to have lawfully received public assistance in order for his child-support and arrears
obligations to be suspended. Halverson, 381 N.W.2d at 71.
Vacko argues that the district court’ s interpretation constitutes a retroactive
modification of child support. A modificati on of support may be made retroactive only
with respect to any period during whic h the moving party has a pending motion for
modification. Minn. Stat. § 518 A.39, subd. 2(f) (2016). In Martin v. Martin , this court
held that a district court did not retroactiv ely modify child support when it ordered child
support to commence on the date of a previ ous order. 401 N.W.2d 107, 110-11 (Minn.

11
App. 1987).4 On January 17, the district court in Martin denied a father’s motion for child
support because the mother was attending school. Id. at 109. But the district court ordered
that, when the mother returned to full-time employment, she was to pay support according
to the statutory child-support guidelines. Id. Unbeknownst to the district court at the time
of its January 17 order, the mother had already returned to full-time employment. Id. The
father again moved for child support, which the district court, in a July order, granted and
made effective back to January 17. Id. This court affirmed, concluding that the July order
did not retroactively modify child support. Id.
This case is similar to Martin because the 2012 order requires Vacko to pay the
previously set child-support and arrears obligations in months that he did not receive public
assistance. The 2012 order concluded that Vacko’s child-support and arrears obligations
would be suspended for any month he receives public assistance. Vacko was still required
to pay child support and arrears when he di d not receive public assistance. Here, Lee
effectively sought enforcemen t of the 2012 order, not modifi cation. For purposes of
enforcement, the 2012 order requires the fact-finder to determine whether Vacko received
public assistance in each month for which he claims to be entitled to suspension. The 2016
order is not a retroactive modification of child support; it is an inte rpretation of whether
Vacko received TANF benefits in particular months. See Edelman, 354 N.W.2d at 563.

4 We note that the statutory limits on retroactive modification of support at issue in Martin
are different than those currently in effect. Compare Minn. Stat. § 518.64, subd. 2 (Supp.
1985), with Minn. Stat. § 518A.39, subd. 2(f) (2016). But because the relevant portion of
Martin addressed whether the change in support constitu ted a retroactive modification,
rather than the date to which a modification could be retroactive, the differences in the
statutes are not dispositive here.

12
B. The district court did not clearly err in finding that Vacko did not
lawfully receive public assistance from June 2012 to March 2015.

Vacko argues that, even if the 2012 orde r required him to lawfully receive TANF
benefits, the district court clearly erred because sufficient evidence did not show that Vacko
did not lawfully receive TANF benefits from June 2012 to March 2015.5 We will set aside
the district court’s findings as clearly erroneous only if they are not reasonably supported
by the evidence. Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01; City of Golden Valley, 616 N.W.2d at 782.
Sufficient evidence supports the district court’s finding that Vacko did not lawfully
receive TANF benefits from June 2012 to March 2015. The criminal complaint shows that
Vacko was charged with wrongfully obtaining assistance from May 2011 to March 2015.
A warrant of commitment shows that Vacko wa s convicted of two counts of wrongfully
obtaining assistance. Vacko and his wife we re ordered to pay re stitution for amounts of
public assistance wrongfully received. A fraud schedule shows that Vacko and his wife
received over $128,000 in public-benefit overpayments from May 2011 to March 2015 and
that Vacko and his wife failed to report a substantial amount of income during this period.
A rental application dated December 2013 stat es that Vacko was employed by an auto
dealership as a sales mana ger, worked over 40 hours per week, and earned $5,000 per
month. The district court did not clearly err in finding that Vacko did not lawfully receive

5 The county argues that Vacko’s arguments should be precluded as a result of his criminal
convictions. Minnesota courts have not considered whether an Alford plea is admissible
for issue preclusion in a civil case. Doe 136 v. Liebsch, 872 N.W.2d 875, 885 (Minn. 2015)
(Lillehaug, J., dissenting). We need not consider whether an Alford plea results in issue
preclusion because sufficient evidence in this record shows that Vacko unlawfully received
TANF benefits from June 2012 to March 2015.

13
TANF benefits from June 2012 to March 2015 because suffi cient evidence supports its
finding. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01; City of Golden Valley, 616 N.W.2d at 782.
Vacko argues that the evid ence about his convictions is inadmissible because he
entered an Alford plea. “A conviction based upon an Alford plea generally carries the same
penalties and collateral consequences as a conventional guilty plea.” Id. at 880. Evidence
that a party has entered a guilty plea is admi ssible in a subsequent civil trial, and the
Minnesota Supreme Court has never held that a conviction resulting from an Alford plea
cannot be admitted as substantive evidence. See Glens Falls Grp. Ins. Corp. v. Hoium, 294
Minn. 247, 251, 200 N. W.2d 189, 191-92 (1972); see also Doe 136, 872 N.W.2d at 881-
82 (stating with respect to an Alford plea that a district court may admit evidence of a guilty
plea but is not required to do so). As the Minnesota Supreme Court noted in Doe 136,
other courts have permitted the admission of evidence of Alford pleas “‘for any legitimate
purpose.’” Doe 136, 872 N.W.2d at 880 (quoting Armenakes v. State, 821 A.2d 239, 242
(R.I. 2003)). The district court did not err in admitting evidence of Vacko’s Alford plea.
Vacko also argues that he submitted suffici ent evidence to show that he lawfully
received TANF benefits and, in any event, was unable to work during this time period.
Vacko submitted documents showing that he received TANF benefits from March 2012 to
March 2016. Vacko submitted an affidavit from the owner of the auto dealership, denying
that Vacko was an employee of the dealership. Vacko also submitted an affidavit from his
wife, stating that she filled out the rental a pplication and was dishonest about the income
that Vacko received. Finally, Vacko submitted his medical records, which allegedly show
that he is unable to work. Vacko’s evidence is contradicted by evidence submitted by Lee.

14
The district court exercised its discretion in weighing this evidence and concluding that
Vacko had not lawfully received assistance from June 2012 to March 2015. See Minn. R.
Civ. P. 52.01; Eisenschenk, 668 N.W.2d at 241.
We conclude that the district court did no t clearly err in finding that Vacko did not
lawfully receive public assistance from June 2012 to March 2015.
C. The district court clearly erred in finding that Vacko did not lawfully
receive public assistance from April 2015 to March 2016.

Vacko argues that the evid ence does not support a finding that he did not lawfully
receive TANF benefits from April 2015 to Ma rch 2016 because he was not convicted of
wrongfully receiving assistance for this period. The county concedes that Vacko received
TANF benefits from April 201 5 to March 2016 and was not convicted of wrongfully
obtaining assistance for this time but argues that the district court was not required to limit
Vacko’s obligation to the period for which he was convicted.
The 2012 order unambiguou sly provides that Vacko’s child-support and arrears
obligations are suspended “for any month he receives cash public assistance.” The district
court concluded that Vacko “is deemed to have not received ca sh assistance for the
purposes of the [2012 order.]” The district c ourt did not make any findings as to why it
found that Vacko had unlawfully received TANF benefits from April 2015 to March 2016.
Evidence shows that Vacko received TANF benefits from April 2015 to March 2016, and
nothing in this record shows that Vacko’s receipt of TANF benefits during this period was
unlawful. Absent evidence showing unlawful receipt of TANF benefits during this period,

15
the 2012 order entitled Vacko to suspension of his child-sup port and arrears obligations
from April 2015 to March 2016.
If the district court had found that Vac ko committed fraud on th e court in 2012, it
would have had the option of reopening the entirety of the 2012 order to ensure
enforcement of Vacko’s child-support and ar rears obligations from April 2015 to March
2016. Alam v. Chowdhury, 764 N.W.2d 86, 89 (Minn. App. 2009). Lee and the county,
however, decided not to reopen the 2012 orde r because, according to Lee’s trial attorney,
fraud on the court “is a much higher standard,” “would be a much more complex solution,”
and would have required discovery. Lee and th e county decided to present this case as a
motion to reinstate Vacko’s child-support and arrears obligations, which, while a simpler
solution, limits their recourse to circumstances in which Va cko did not lawf ully receive
public assistance.
We conclude that the district court cl early erred in finding that Vacko did not
lawfully receive TANF benefits from April 2015 to March 2016 a nd in reinstating his
child-support and arrears obligations from that time period.
III. The district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Lee attorney fees.
Vacko argues that the district court abused its discretion in awarding Lee attorney
fees because he was not criminally charged or convicted for misrepresentations or forgeries
in relation to any of these proceedings.
6 The district court aw arded Lee attorney fees

6 The county takes no position on whether the district court erred in awarding Lee attorney
fees.

16
because Vacko’s conduct necessitated Lee’s motion to reinstate Vacko’s child-support and
arrears obligations that were suspended under the 2012 order.
A district court may award conduct-base d attorney fees against a party “who
unreasonably contributes to the length or expense of the proceeding.” Minn. Stat. § 518.14,
subd. 1 (2016). Conduct-based attorney-fee awards “are disc retionary with the district
court.” Szarzynski v. Szarzynski, 732 N.W.2d 285, 295 (Minn. App. 2007). Vacko moved
to modify child support in 2012 based on his re ceipt of TANF benefits. From June 2012
onward, Vacko did not pay child support even though he was not lawfully receiving TANF
benefits from June 2012 to March 2015. The district court found that Vacko’s nonpayment
unreasonably contributed to the length and expense of the proceeding by requiring Lee to
bring a motion to reinstate Vacko’s child-support and arrears obligations. The district court
did not abuse its discretion in awarding Lee attorney fees. Id.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.