Eric Joseph Vacko, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-0242

Eric Joseph Vacko, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Teri Ann Shults,
Respondent,

County of Anoka, Intervenor.

Filed December 10, 2018
Affirmed
Connolly, Judge

Anoka County District Court
File No. 02-F6-05-009076

Eric J. Vacko, St. Paul, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Terri A. Melcher, Fridley, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge; and
Stauber, Judge.

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
CONNOLLY, Judge
Appellant challenges his child -support obligation, arguing, pro se, that the district
court abused its discretion in including appellant’s current wife’s income in the calculation
of appellant’s income, attributing income to appellant when he was receiving public
assistance and making appellant responsible for the child’s medical support and erred in
not modifying appellant’s child -support obligation without making the required findings
of fact and in adopting the proposed findings submitted by respondent-mother’s attorney.
Because we see no abuse of discretion and no error in the child-support order, we affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Eric Vacko and responde nt Teri S hults had a son, B.V., in 2001. The
parties stipulated in 2006 that appellant would pay $200 per month in child support and
would reimburse respondent for half of B.V.’s monthly $195 health insurance payment and
half of his child-care expenses; the Anoka County District Court issued an order reflecting
this stipulation.
In 2012, appellant’s child-support obligations for B.V. and for another child, L.L.,
were suspended because appellant was receiving Minnesota Family Investment Program
(MFIP) benefits and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) benefits. 1 In

1 As to appellant’s child-support obligation for L.L., see County of Ramsey v. Vacko , No.
A16-1982, 2017 WL 3974400, (Minn. App. Sept. 11, 2017) (con cluding that the Ramsey
County District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s motion to modify
his child -support obligation for L.L., whose mother had moved to reinstate appellant’s
child-support obligation f or the period of time in which he unlawfully obtained public
assistance, i.e., May 2011-March 2015, but erred in finding that appellant did not lawfully

3
February 2016, appellant entered an Alford plea to 11 felony charges including wrongfully
obtaining public assistance from May 2011 throug h March 2015, theft by swindle, and
forgery; he was ordered to pay $141,000 in restitution and sentenced to 180 days in jail.
In April 2016, respondent moved for retroactive child support to April 2012 and for
$2,000 in attorney fees. She was granted a continuance to obtain documents from the
Ramsey County Attorney’s Office (the RCAO documents) relating to appellant’s financial
information from the file in appellant’s criminal case. In August 2016, the Anoka County
District Court ordered the Ramsey County Attorney’s office (RCAO) to release appellant’s
information and granted respondent’s request to keep her information confidential because
she alleged that appellant had accessed her social media account and her CVS account and
threatened her after he received copies of B.V.’s therapy records.
Appellant was incarcerated in October 2016. He filed an appeal from the August
2016 order, w hich stopped inspection of the RCAO documents; he later withdrew the
appeal. The district court reviewed the RCAO docum ents in camera and disclosed some,
but not all, of them to appellant and to respondent’s attorney.
In August 2017, the district court granted respondent’s request for retroactive child
support to May 2012, having found that appellant intentionally misrepresented his income
to the district court and was voluntarily underemployed. The district court determined his
potential monthly income to be $2,605 and his share of the child -support expenses to be
61% and ordered him to pay $334 monthly for child support and $127 monthly for medical

receive public assistance from April 2015 to March 2016), review denied (Minn. Nov. 14,
2017) (Vacko).

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support. His support obligations were suspended while he was incarcerated from October
2016 to February 2017.
Appellant moved for an order vacating the August 2016 order and the August 2017
order, for amended findings of fact to suspend his child-support obligation from April 2015
through March 2016 pursuant to Vacko, and for an order to reopen the record so appellant’s
doctor could testify as to appellant’s inability to work full -time. Following a hearing, the
district court in January 2017 denied appellant’s motion to vaca te the August 2016 and
August 2 017 orders, to reopen the record, and for amended findings of fact. He now
challenges the denial, arguing that the district cour t abused its discretion in denying his
motion to reopen the August 2017 order and in adopting respondent’s attorney’s proposed
findings of fact for the 2016 order.
D E C I S I O N
1. Motion to Reopen the Order
Appellant’s motion to reopen the August 2017 order is actually a motion to modify
his child-support obligation, which he claimed had been “miscalculated” in the order. The
district court has broad discretion to provide for the support of the parties’ child. Rutten v.
Rutten, 347 N.W.2d 47, 50 (Minn. 1984). Determinations of past child su pport due are
also reviewed for an abuse of discretion. LaChapelle v. Mitten , 607 N.W.2d 151, 166
(Minn. App. 2000), review denied (Minn. May 16, 2000).
Appellant argues that his child -support obligation was miscalculated because
(A) his wife’s student fi nancial aid and other financial information was included; (B) the
district court imputed potenti al income for months during which appellant lawfully

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qualified for TANF benefits; (C) appellant was ordered to pay medical support for the child
although both h e and the child were receiving medical assistance; and (D ) instead of
reinstating appellant’s 2006 child-support obligation of $200 monthly, the district court
raised the obligation to $334 monthly without making the findings required for a
modification of child support.
A. Appellant’s Wife’s Finances
The RCAO documents include information from bank accounts owned by appellant
and his wife that indicated they received substantial income from both businesses and
student loans while they were receiving publ ic assistance. Because there was no
information as to whether appellant or his wife made the cash deposits or the withdrawals,
their information could not be separated. The district court noted in its 2018 orde r that,
although it had issued a n order in Ma rch 2017 that “provided the parties with an
opportunity to present evidence regarding their income,” the only information appellant
presented was evidence from his doctor regarding his inability to work. In its 2017 order,
the district court disagreed with appellant’s statement that the RCAO document s did not
show periodic gross payments to appellant and found “that the documents submitted by the
RCAO and [appellant’s] guilty plea to the charges demonstra ted that [appellant]
intentionally misrepresented his income to [respondent] and this Court” and awarded child
support retroactive to 2012 “based on [appellant’s] fraud to the Court.”
While appellant argues correctly that his child-support obligation should not involve
his wife’s financial information, see Minn. Stat. § 518A.29(f) (2016) (noting that “gross
income” for support purposes does not include the income of the parties’ spouses), he failed

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to provide the court with any other information, such as tax reports, from which to deduce
appellant’s financial situation . The district court therefore did not abuse its discretion in
using the information provided as the basis for imputing an income to appellant. See
Eisenschenk v. Eisenschenk, 668 N.W.2d 235, 243 (Minn. App. 2003) (noting that a party
cannot complain about a district court’s failure to rule in the party’s favor when the party
failed to provide evidence that would have allowed the district court to fully address the
question), review denied (Minn. Nov. 25, 2003).
B. Imputed Income from April 2015 to March 2016
In his notice of motion and amended motion dated ten days after the release of
Vacko, appellant sought an order suspending his child-support obligation in this case from
April 2015 to March 2016. Vacko rejected appellant’s other arguments but concluded that
“the district court clearly erred in finding that [appellant] did not lawfully receive TANF
benefits from April 2015 to March 2016 and in reinstating his child -support and arrears
obligations from that time period.” Vacko, 2017 WL 3974400 at *7.
The district court did not make any findings as to why it found
that [appellant] had unlawfully received TANF benefits from
April 2015 to March 2016. . . . . Absent evidence showing
unlawful receipt of TANF benefits during this period, the 2012
order entitled [him] to suspension of his c hild-support and
arrears obligations from April 2015 to March 2016.
If the district court had found that [appellant] had
committed fraud on the court in 20 12, it would have had the
option of reopening the entirety of the 2012 order to ensure
enforcement of [his] child-support and arrears obligations from
April 2015 to March 2016. [Respondent and Ramsey C]ounty,
however, decided not to reopen the 2012 order because,
according to [respondent’s] trial attorney, fraud on the court “is
a much higher standard,” “would be a much more complex
solution,” and would have required discovery. [Respondent]

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and [Ramsey] county decided to present this case as a motion
to reinstate [appellant’s] child-support and arrears obligations,
which, while a simpler solution, limits their recourse to
circumstances in which [appellant ] did not lawfully receive
public assistance.

Id. at *6 (citation omitted).
The district court distinguished Vacko:
The [district] court in [that] case made no finding of fraud so
the Court of Appeals concluded it was error for the district
court to find that [appellant] did not ‘lawfully’ receive benefits
from April 2015 to March 2016. This case is distinguishable
from [Vacko] in that the Court [here] found fraud in its
August 2, 2017 Order.

The district court’s August 2017 order based its award of c hild support retroa ctive to
May 1, 2012, on “[appel lant’s] fraud to the Court” and concluded that “[r espondent] has
met her burden of proof to demonstrate that [appellant] intentionally misled both her and
this Court regarding the amount of h is income since April 2012.” There was no abuse of
discretion in awarding child support from April 2015 to March 2016.
C. Medical Support
The child-support-guidelines worksheet appended to the district court’s order states
that the monthly cost of healthcare insurance for B.V., paid through respondent’s employer,
is $209, of which appellant’s share, 61%, is $127. Appellant argues that , because he
receives medical assistance himself, he may not be ordered to contribute to B.V.’s medical
coverage, but he provides no legal support for this argument. Issues not briefed on appeal

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are waived. Melina v. Chaplin , 327 N.W.2d 19, 20 (Minn. 1982). Thus, appellant has
waived this issue.2
D. Failure to Make Findings
Child support may be modified if the district court finds that there has been a
substantial change in circumstances that renders the existing order unreasonable and unfair.
Minn. Stat. § 518A.39, subd. 2(a) (2016). There is a presumption of substantial change if
the calculated child support is at least 20% and at least $75 per month higher or lower than
the current support order. Minn. Stat. § 518A.39, subd. 2(b)(1) (2016). The current support
order, made in 2006, is $200 monthly; the district court’s findings that appellant’s imputed
income was $2,605. and his child -support obliga tion was $334 create a presumption of
substantial change. Because this presumption is unrebutted, we will not reverse the district
court for not making formal findings on this point.
There is no merit to appellant’s challenges to the August 2017 order.
2. Adoption of Proposed Findings
Appellant also argues that the district court abused its discretion in adopting
respondent’s proposed findings of fact for the August 2016 order. It is not clear that
appellant ever raised his objection to the adoption of respondent’s proposed findings to the

2 Appellant also objects that the district court based its finding that respondent pays $209
for healthcare for B.V. on her attorney’s brief, not on a document showing the amount. In
the August 2017 order, the district court states that appellant is liable for 61% of the
amounts that respondent paid to maintain medical insurance for B.V. from May 2012
through August 2017, but that respondent “must file proof of these amounts before the
Court will incorporate it [i.e., the amount paid for the insurance] into this Order.” Thus,
the district court addressed appellant’s objection in its order.

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district court, which precludes its being raised on appeal. See Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d
580, 582 (Minn. 1982) (holding that this court will generally address only matters presented
to and considered by the district court).
Moreover, appellant dismissed h is own appeal of that order and moved to reopen
the order almost 13 months after it was filed , violating Minn. Stat. § 518.145, subd. 2(3)
(2016) (providing that a motion to reopen for fraud must be brought within a reasonable
time or not more than a year after the order) . His appeal is based on his view that the
district court’s adoption of respondent’s attorney’s proposed findings of fact entitles him
to new findings. But adopting one party’s findings is not rever sible error per se. Bliss v.
Bliss, 493 N.W.2d 583, 590 (Minn. App. 1992), review denied (Minn. Feb. 12, 1993).
Finally, the district court noted that appellant’s motion to amend the findings
“constitutes a reargument of his prior motion so it is proper to treat it as a motion to
reconsider” and therefore likely to be granted only in the absence of i ntervening legal
developments or if the earlier decision is palpably wrong. See Minn. R. Gen. Pract. 115.11
advisory comm. cmt.
There is no basis to vacate or reverse the district court’s orders.
Affirmed.