Eureka Township, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0020

Eureka Township,
Appellant,

vs.

Teresa Lynn Petter, et al.,
Respondents.

Filed September 5, 2017
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded; motion dismissed
Hooten, Judge

Dakota County District Court
File No. 19HA-CV-15-2725

Chad D. Lemmons, Martin H.R. Norder, Kelly & Lemmons, P.A., St. Paul, Minnesota (for
appellant and cross-respondent)

Erik F. Hansen, Martin C. Melang, Elizabeth M. Cadem, Burns & Hansen, P.A.,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondents and cross-appellants)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and Hooten,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
HOOTEN, Judge
Appellant township challenges the decision of the district court invaliding its exotic
animal ordinance, Eureka, Minn. Ordinance Code (EOC) 3, Chapter 7, Section 3 (2017),
on the basis that it conflicts with state law. In their related appeal, respondents challenge
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the district court ’s order: (1) barring respondents from conducting exhibitions and sales
relating to their possession of exotic animals ; (2) determining that respondent Daniel
Storlie is not an animal control officer within the meaning of an exception to the ordinance;
and (3) limiting respondents’ horticultural sales to only products produced on the property.
We reverse the invalidation of the township’s exotic animal ordinance and reverse
the injunction prohibiting respondents from having exotic animal exhibitions and related
retail sales on their property. But we affirm the district court’s order limiting respondents’
horticultural sales to only products produced on the pro perty. Relative to respondents’
possession of exotic animals, we affirm the district court’s application of the grandfathered
ownership exception to the exotic animal ordinance, but we reverse the district court ’s
decision that Storlie is not an animal control officer within the meaning of that exception
to the ordinance and hold that he may possess exotic animals in conjunction with his work.
We therefore remand to the district court for the issuance of an order enjoining respondents
from possessing exotic animals except those identified within the exceptions to the
township’s exotic animal ordinance and from exhibiting exotic animals except as allowed
under the township’s legal, nonconforming use provision.
FACTS
Appellant Eureka Township (the township) is a Minnesota political subdivision. It
enacted a zoning ordinance in 1978 that classifies the use of land within the township. In
June 2005, the township adop ted an exotic animal ordinance , which prohibits the
possession of exot ic animals within the township unless the possessor fits into one of
several exceptions. EOC 3, ch. 7, § 3. These exceptions include animal control officers,
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licensed veterinary hospitals or clinics, any state licensed wildlife rehabilitator with
temporary possession of exotic animals, and any persons whose possessio n is a legal,
nonconforming use. EOC 3, ch. 7, § 3(C).
Respondent Teresa Petter owns agriculturally zoned property in the township. Both
Petter and respondent Daniel Storlie live on the property. Petter operates a nonprofit
corporation called Wolves, Woods & Wildlife on the property. She a lso runs an animal
exhibition business called Fur -Ever Wild Ltd. Over the years, Petter has acquired and
possessed, and exhibited to the public, several species of animals that the township
describes as exotic. Storlie is a wildlife specialist for the United States Department of
Agriculture (USDA), and part of his duties include removing animals from a Metropolitan
Airport Commission (MAC) airport located in the township.
In 2006, Petter requested a building permit from the Eureka Township Board (the
board) for a structure that could house exotic animals. The board approved the permit in
2007 for the building of a barn for horses and other farm-type animals allowed under the
township ordinances. The board also requested that an inventory of Petter’s animals be
taken to determine whether the property complied with the township’s zoning ordinance.
In 2008, after numerous requests by the board, Petter submitted an inventory listing
estimates of the number of animals possessed on the property. This inventory included
wolves, foxes , raccoons, lynx es, bobcats, skunks, fishers, porcupines, beavers, coyotes,
woodchucks, minks, badgers, wolverines, and otters. Petter noted that the number of
animals fluctuated during the year because of breeding and peltin g seasons. The board
expressed concern about the considerable ranges in the number of animals listed in the
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inventory and its discrepancies with a related Minnesota Department of Natural Resources
(DNR) report.
In 2010, Petter applied for a permit with an agricultural building exemption to build
a fox shelter. The board perceived the shelter as a permissible commercial agricultural use
for fur-bearing animals and approved the permit with the agricultural exemption. In 2011,
Petter filed for another agricultural building exemption for a building that would house fur-
bearing animals, store agriculture products, and include a food preparation shelter,
quarantine room, and office space. But, the board questioned whether the building would
be used to hold public tours and suggested that Petter move forward without attempting to
claim the agricultural exemption.
In 2008, the board began receiving citizen complaints about Petter’s possession of
exotic animals. In response to a complaint from August 2013, the board held a meeting
and ultimately determined that Petter’s possession of the animals complied with the exotic
animal ordinance. C itizens sued the board, seeking enforcement of the exotic animal
ordinance against Petter and Storlie. See Fredlund v. Eureka Twp. Bd. of Supervisors, No.
A14-0945, 2015 WL 1880218, at *3 (Minn . Apr. 27, 2015) . That lawsuit was later
resolved.
In July 2015, the township filed suit against Petter, Storlie, Wolves, Woods &
Wildlife, and Fur -Ever Wild Ltd (collectively, respondents). The township sought to
enjoin respondents from possessing exotic animals, operating an animal exhibition, and
operating a business pelting exotic animals. The district court denied the parties’ motions
for summary judgment, and the case proceeded to trial.
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After holding a three-day bench trial, the district court issued an order for judgment
in October 2016. The district court invalidated the exotic animal ordinance, concluding
that it conflict ed with Minn. Stat. §§ 17.351, .352 (2016). The district court also
determined that an animal exhibition was not a permissible use under the zoning ordinance.
The district court therefore permanently enjoined respondents from operating an animal
exhibition and conducting any retail sales, except f or horticultural products, within the
township. The township moved to amend the order, requesting that the order be altered to
limit respondents’ retail sales to horticultural products produced on the property. The
district court granted the motion and m ade the amendment in an order filed in December
2016. Both the township and respondents appeal.
D E C I S I O N
I.
The township contends that the district court erred by invalidating the exotic animal
ordinance, EOC 3, ch. 7, § 3. We presume that ordi nances are valid and will not set an
ordinance aside unless its “invalidity is clear. ” Lyons v. City of Minneapolis , 241 Minn.
439, 443, 63 N.W.2d 585, 588 (1954) (quotation omitted).
A. The exotic animal ordinance does not conflict with Minnesota statutes.
The parties first dispute whether the exotic animal ordinance conflicts with
Minnesota statutes , specifically Minn. Stat. §§ 17.351, .352 (2016) and Minn. Stat.
§§ 97A.001–.56 (2016). We review de novo the interpretation of state statutes and local
zoning ordinances. Buss v. Johnson, 624 N.W.2d 781, 784 (Minn. App. 2001).
6
An ordinance is invalid when it directly and irreconcilably conflicts with a statute.
Mangold Midwest Co. v. Village of Richfield, 274 Minn. 347, 352, 143 N.W.2d 813, 816
(1966). This is because municipalities have no inherent powers and can only enact an
ordinance when the authority is expressly conferred by statute or implied as necessary to
support powers which are expressly conferred. Bicking v. City of Minneapolis, 891 N.W.2d
304, 312 (Minn. 2017). Mi nnesota caselaw has established four guiding principles to
determine whether an ordinance conflicts with a statute: “(a) As a general rule, conflicts
which would render an ordinance invalid exist only when both the ordinance and the statute
contain express or implied terms that are irreconcilable with each other ”; “(b) More
specifically, it has been said that conflict exists where the ordinance p ermits what the
statute forbids”; “(c) Conversely, a conflict exists where the ordinance forbids what the
statute expressly permits”; and “(d) It is generally said that no conflict exists where the
ordinance, though different, is merely additional and complementary to or in aid and
furtherance of the statute.” Mangold Midwest Co., 274 Minn. at 352, 143 N.W.2d at 816.
Our analysis begins with the ordinance’s language. “A zoning ordinance should be
construed (1) according to the plain and ordinary meaning of its terms, (2 ) in favor of the
property owner, and (3) in light of the ordinance’s underlying policy goals.” Watab Twp.
Citizen All. v. Benton Cty. Bd. of Com m’rs, 728 N.W.2d 82, 94 (Minn. App. 2007)
(quotation omitted), review denied (Minn. May 15, 2007). The pertinent language of the
exotic animal ordinance provides:

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B. Keeping of Exotic Animals Prohibited

1. It shall be unlawful for any person to own,
possess, keep, harbor, bring, or have in one’s
possession an exotic animal within Township
limits.

EOC 3, ch. 7, § 3(B). The plain and ordinary meaning of the ordinance is to prohibit
possession of exotic animals within the township. The township’s zoning ordinance
defines “Exotic Animal” as:
Any animal that is not normally domesticated in the United
States or is wild by nature. Exotic animals include, but are not
limited to, any of the following orders and families, whether
bred in the wild or captivity, and also any of their hybrids with
domestic species. The animals listed in parentheses are
intended to act as examples and are not [to] be construed as an
exhaustive list or limit the generality of each group of animals,
unless otherwise specified:
A. Non-human primates and prosimians (monkeys,
chimpanzees, baboons)
B. Felidae (lions, tigers, bobcats, cougars, leopards,
jaguars, not domesticated cats)
C. Canidae (wolves, coyotes, foxes, jackals, not
domesticated dogs)
D. Ursidae (all bears)
E. Repitilia (all venomous snakes, all constricting
snakes, iguanas, turtles, lizards)
F. Crocodilia (alligators, crocodiles)
G. Proboscidae (elephants)
H. Hyanenidae (hyenas)
I. Artiodactyla (hippopotamuses, giraffes, camels,
not cattle or swine or sheep or goats)
J. Procyonidae (raccoons, coatis)
K. Marsupialia (kangaroos or possums)
L. Perissodactylea (rhinoceroses, tapirs, not horses
or donkeys or mules)
M. Edentata (anteaters, sloths, armadillos)
N. Viverridae (mongooses, civets, genets)

8
EOC 1, ch. 4 (2017). We first address whether the ordinance conflicts with Minnesota’s
fur farming statutes.
1. The ordinance does not conflict with Minn. Stat. §§ 17.351, .352.

The district court concluded that the exotic animal ordinance directly conflicts with
two Minnesota statutes, Minn. Stat. §§ 17.351 and .352, which concern fur farming for
agricultural purposes. Respondents claim that the ordinance’s definition of “exot ic
animals” directly conflicts with the term “fur -bearing animal” as defined in Minn. Stat.
§§ 17.351, .352 because the ordinance’s broad definition would prohibit them from
possessing many of the fur-bearing animals, such as foxes, which they assert are permitted
under the statutes. Minn. Stat. § 17.351, subd. 3 defines “fur -bearing animal” as “a fox,
mink, fitch, chinchilla, karakul, marten, nutria, or fisher that is the second or later
generation raised in captivity.” Minn. Stat. § 17.352 further clari fies that, “Fur -bearing
animals are domestic animals and products of fur -bearing animals are agricultural
products.”
While the list of animals in the exotic animal ordinance encompass es some of the
fur-bearing animals enumerated in Minn. Stat. § 17.351, subd. 3, this alone does not result
in a conflict. A conflict occurs when “the ordinance forbids what the statute expressly
permits.” Bicking, 891 N.W.2d at 313 (emphasis in original) (quotation omitted). Minn.
Stat. § 17.351 and Minn. Stat. § 17.352 ar e merely definition statutes. The operative
language that explains how these definitions apply is within Minn. Stat. § 17.353 (2016),
a statute that the district court did not consider in any significant detail. That statute
provides that “a fur farmer may register” (emphasis added) with the commissioner of
9
natural resources (DNR) and that such registration requires registered fur farmers to report
the number of pelts sold each year.
The express purpose of the ordinance is “to protect the public against the health and
safety risks that exotic animals pose to the community and to protect the welfare of
individual animals that are held in private possession.”1 EOC 3, ch. 7, § 3(A) (2017). The
fur farming statutes, however, do not relate to community safety or animal welfare but
rather outline a voluntary registration system as well as transportation and sale procedures
for registered fur farmers. 2 And, Minn. Stat. § 17.354 (2016) states th at the fur farming
statutes, sections 17.351 to 17.353, do not affect any statutory provision “relating to wild
animals.” Because the exotic animal ordinance regulates possession for the purposes of
public safety and animal welfare and the fur farming sta tutes govern a voluntary
registration system for fur farmers, the ordinance does not forbid any activity that these
statutes expressly permit. We conclude that the district court erred in invalidating the
exotic animal ordinance on the basis that it conflicts with Minn. Stat. §§ 17.351, .352.

1 This is consistent with state law that explicitly confers upon townships the authority to
promote health, safety, order, convenience, and the general welfare. See Minn. Stat.
§ 365.10, subd. 17(a)(6)–(7) (2016).
2 We have previously held that a prior fur farming statute, Minn. Stat. § 17.35, “was not
intended to regulate the tre atment of animals.” Friends of Animals & Their Env’t v.
Nichols, 350 N.W.2d 489, 492 (Minn. App. 1984), review denied (Minn. Dec. 20, 1984).
We note, however, that this case has limited value because Minn. Stat. § 17.35 was repealed
and replaced by the current statutory scheme regarding fur farming. See 1985 Minn. Laws
ch. 44, § 5, at 120.
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2. The ordinance does not conflict with Minn. Stat. §§ 97A.001–.56.

Respondents claim that the exotic animal ordinance conflicts with the state’s game
and fish laws, Minn. Stat. §§ 97A.001–.56. The district court did not specifically address
whether the exotic animal ordinance conflicts with any of the state’s game and fish laws.
Respondents’ argument relies on Minn. Stat. § 97A.105, which establishes game
and fur farming licensing requireme nts for implementation by the DNR. The statute
provides that “[a] person may breed and propagate fur -bearing animals, game birds, bear,
or mute swans only on privately owned or leased land and after obtaining a license.” Minn.
Stat. § 97A.105, subd. 1(a) . A game farm license may be issued to an applicant who is
responsible, has adequate knowledge of how to care for the animals, and has adequate
fencing, facilities, and necessities to care for and protect the animals. Minn. R. 6242.0600
(2015). For purp oses of the game and fish laws, “fur -bearing animals” are defined as
“mammals that are protected wild animals, except big game.” Minn. Stat. § 97A.015, subd.
22. The statute explains that the definition of “protected wild animals” includes both big
game and small game. Id., subd. 39. The statute further defines small game as “game
birds, gray squirrel, fox squirrel, cottontail rabbit, snowshoe hare, jack rabbit, raccoon,
lynx, bobcat, wolf, red fox and gray fox, fisher, pine marten, opossum, badger, cou gar,
wolverine, muskrat, mink, otter, and beaver.” Id., subd. 45.
As with the fur farming statutes, the game and fish laws list certain “fur-bearing
animals,” such as foxes and wolves, which are specifically prohibited under the exotic
animal ordinance. But, definitions that appear incompatible alone cannot create a conflict;
we must look to the operative language of Minn. Stat. § 97A.105 and the corresponding
11
agency rules to determine whether a conflict exists between the game and fish laws and the
ordinance. See Mangold Midwest Co., 274 Minn. at 352, 143 N.W.2d at 816. As discussed
previously, a conflict exists when “the ordinance forbids what the statute expressly
permits.” Bicking, 891 N.W.2d at 313 (emphasis in original) (quotation omitted). Similar
to the fur farming statutes, the aim of the state’s game and fish laws––establishing licensing
and permit requirements––is different than the polic ies underlying the exotic animal
ordinance––protecting the public and animal welfare. The prohibition o f exotic animals
under the township’s ordinance therefore does not prohibit the DNR from issuing a game
farm license. We conclude that the exotic animal ordinance does not conflict with Minn.
Stat. §§ 97A.001–.56.
In addition to the lack of a conflict, we note that the DNR is not authorized to
override the broad grant of authority given to municipalities and townships in zoning
matters. Respondents’ argument implies that because their possession and care of exotic
animals at their farm has been approved by the licensing authority of the DNR, the
township is prohibited from enacting and enforcing a zoning ordinance that would prohibit
such possession. But, this ignores the legislature’s broad grant of zoning authority to
townships under Minnesota’s Municipal Planning Act. See Minn. Stat. § 462.357, subd. 1
(2016); see also Altenburg v. Bd. of Supervisors of Pleasant Mound Twp., 615 N.W.2d 874,
878 (Minn. App. 2000), review denied (Minn. Nov. 21, 2000). “Zoning ordinances were
established to control land use, and development in order to promote public health, safety,
welfare, morals, and aesthetics.” In re Stadsvold, 754 N.W.2d 3 23, 329 (Minn. 2008)
(quotation omitted). As a result, municipalities and townships have broad discret ion in
12
enacting zoning ordinances. Odell v. City of Eagan , 348 N.W. 2d 792, 796 (Minn. App.
1984).
Respondents have not provided any legal authority that would support their implicit
claim that the legislature intended that its grant of licensing authority to the DNR could be
used to invalidate a zoning ordinance enacted pursuant to the grant of authority by another
state statute. The DNR, as an administrative agency, only has the power given to it by the
legislature and “[n]either an agency nor the courts may enlarge the agency’s powers beyond
which was contemplated by the legislative body.” In re Hubbard, 778 N.W.2d 313, 318
(Minn. 2010) (quotations omitted). The DNR, which is authorized to issue game and fish
licenses, does not have either the express or implied statutory authority to ignore, impede,
or circumvent the township’s zoning ordinance . See id. at 321 ( holding that because
statutes did not unambiguously grant authority for DNR to certify city’s variance decision
and there is no implied authority for such certification , DNR did not have express or
implied authority to do so); see also Siewart v. N. States Power Co., 793 N.W.2d 272, 282
n.2 (Minn. 2011) ( applying Hubbard analysis in deciding whether Minnesota Publi c
Utilities Commission had express or implied authority to exercise jurisdiction over
common law tort claims against public utilities).
Respondents’ interpretation would result in an absurd situation where a township’s
enactment of a zoning ordinance for the public health and safety of its citiz ens could be
invalidated merely by the DNR’s issuance of a game license to a single individual in the
township, thereby nullifying or making conditional the broad statutory grant of zoning
authority to the township . Applying the presumptions set forth in Minn. Stat. § 645.17
13
(2016) in determining the legislature’s intent relative to this interaction, we conclude that
the legislature did not intend for this absurd result, that it expected that its broad grant of
zoning authority to the township would be effective, and that the zoning ordinance enacted
for the public health and safety of its citizens take precedence over the DNR’s issuance of
a game license to a single individual.
Therefore, the issuance of a game and fish license to an individual is subject to local
zoning ordinances enacted by townships to protect the health and public safety of its
citizens. See Canadian Connection v. New Prairie Twp. , 581 N.W.2d 391, 396 (Minn.
App. 1998) (noting that permit from state’s pollution control agency must conform to local
permit requirements), review denied (Minn. Sept. 30, 1998). Presumably, in recognition
of these statutory and caselaw limitations on its authority in issuing licenses, the DNR form
application comp leted by Petter for a game and fur farming licen se provides that
“[i]ssuance of this license does not exempt [the applicant] from compliance with other
pertinent laws, ordinances, and regulations,” and even more specifically that “[i]ssuance of
this licens e does not exempt [the applicant] from compliance with local ordinance or
zoning laws.” (Emphasis added.)
We conclude that not only is there no conflict between the township’s exotic animal
ordinance and the state’s game and fish laws but also that the legislature did not intend to
grant authority to the DNR which could override the authority given to townships in
creating their zoning laws.3

3 The township proposed that if we determined that the exotic animal ordinance conflicts
with Minn. Stat. §§ 17.351, .352, only a portion of the ordinance, specifically the inclusion
14
B. The exotic animal ordinance is not otherwise preempted by state law.
Respondents assert that regardless of whether the exotic animal ordinance conflicts
with state law, the ordinance is preempted under the doctrine of field preemption. Field
preemption occurs when state law fully occupies a particular field of legislation and “leaves
no room for local regulation. ” Altenburg, 615 N.W.2d at 880. When field preemption
occurs, any local law that governs, regulates, or controls an aspect within that field is
deemed void, even if the local law and state law do not conflict. In re Appeal of Rocheleau,
686 N.W.2d 882, 890 (Minn. App. 2004), review denied (Minn. Dec. 22, 2004). Whether
an ordinance is preempted by state law is a question which appellate courts review de novo.
Bicking, 891 N.W.2d at 312.
In deciding whether state law preempts a local ordinance, we consider four factors:
(1) the subject matter regulated; (2) whether the subject matter is so fully covered by state
law that it has become solely a matter of state concern; (3) whether any partial legislation
on the subject matter evinces an intent to treat the subject matter as being solely a state
concern; and (4) whether the nature of the subject matter is such that local regulation will
have an adverse effect on the general state population. Rocheleau, 686 N.W.2d at 890.
Regarding the first factor, the district court determined that the subject matter at
issue is the possession of certain animals within the township. For the second and third

of foxes as an exotic animal, need be struck down. Respondents claimed that the township
waived this severability theory because it was not presented to the district court. Prior to
oral argument, the township moved to strike the section of respondents’ reply brief
pertaining to this waiver argument. Because we conclude that the exotic animal ordinance
does not conflict with any Minnesota statute, this severability issue and the motion to strike
are moot.
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factors, the district court determined that the legislature does not indicate that animal
possession is a matter solely of state concern and that Minnesota statutes do not explicitly
prohibit local regulation. For these reasons, the district court concluded that state law does
not preempt the exotic animal ordinance. We agree.
Respondents argue that the licensing scheme set forth in the se statutes extensively
covers the ownership and possession of the animals relevant to this case. We recognize
that the ownership and preservation of wild animals has historically been a matter of state
interest. See State v. Rodman, 58 Minn. 393, 400, 59 N.W. 1098, 1099 (1894) (“ [T]he
ownership of wild animals . . . is in the state, not as proprietor, but in its sovereign capacity,
as the representative, and for the benefit, of all its people in common. The preservation of
such animals . . . is within the police power of the state.”); see also Minn. Stat. § 97A.025
(2016) (codifying concept).
But, respondents do not provide any persuasive authority that the legislature
intended the game licensing statutes to exclu sively cover the entire field regarding the
possession and retailing of these exotic animals to the exclusion of the zoning ordinance
enacted by the township pursuant to its statutory zoning authority. Our construction of the
fish and game licensing statutes in conjunction with the statutory grant of zoning authority
to municipal governments for the purpose of promoting the public health, safety, and
general welfare leads us to the conclusion that the legislature did not intend that game and
fish licensing statutes preempt zoning ordinances relative to the possession and retailing of
exotic animals. For these reasons, we conclude that state law does not preempt the exotic
animal ordinance.
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C. The exotic animal ordinance is consistent with the township’s zoning ordinance
as a whole.

Respondents also allege that the township’s zoning ordinance as a whole are
internally inconsistent. They assert that the exclusi on of exotic animals prohibits
respondents from raising fur-bearing animals, which is a permissible agricultural operation.
This argument is based on the district court’s conclusion that a conflict exists between the
ordinance provisions themselves because the township permits raising fur-bearing animals
as an agricultural operation but prohibits possessing many of the species of animals used
for fur-bearing operations as exotic animals.
The zoning ordinance permits “[a]ny and all forms of commercial agriculture and
commercial horticulture, as defined by th is Ordinance.” EOC 3, ch. 2, § 1 (B)(1) (2017).
The definition of “Commercial agriculture” includes:
The exclusive use of ten (10) or more contiguous acres of land
for the production . . . of livestock products, livestock. For
purposes of this section, the term . . . livestock products and
livestock shall include, but not be limited to:

B. . . . [F]urs.

C. Livestock as defined herein.
EOC 1, ch. 4. The ordinance defines “agricultural operations” as “[o]perations operating
for a profit which include, but [are] not limited to . . . the raising of livestock, fur-bearing
animals . . . .” Id. The definition of “livestock” includes but is not limited to “poultry,
cattle, swine, sheep, goats and horses, but shall not include . . . [e]xotic animals.” Id.
Respondents claim that the exotic animal ordinance’s prohibition is too broad to
allow for any fur -bearing operations. We disagree. That statute lists animals that un der
17
the ordinance are not prohibited exotic animal s but could be used for fur -bearing
operations. For example, Minn. Stat. § 17.351 defines a karakul as a fur -bearing animal.
A karakul is explicitly omitted from the ordinance’s exotic animal prohibition but would
fall within the definition of livestock. 4 See EOC 1, ch. 4 (explaining that “cattle or swine
or sheep or goats” are not exotic animals) (emphasis added). We conclude that the exotic
animal ordinance is consistent with the township’s zoning ordinance as a whole.
II.
Because we conclude that the ordinance does not conflict with any state statute and
is not preempted by state law , we turn next to whether respondents’ exhibition and
possession of these animals fits within any of the enumerated exceptions to the exotic
animal ordinance.
A. Respondents’ exhibition of animals is a legal, nonconforming use.

Respondents challenge the district court’s order prohibiting them from exhibitin g
animals and conducting retail sales on the property. The district court determined that
exhibiting animals was not a permitted, conditional, or interim use under the zoning
ordinance. The township’s zoning ordinance governs the use of all land located within the
township and lays out the forms of permitted uses and conditional uses. The exhibition of
animals is not listed as a permitted use, conditional use, or interim use , and the zoning
ordinance provides that “[a]ll other uses and structures which are not specially permitted
as a right or by Conditional Use Permit or Interim Use Permit . . . shall be prohibited in the

4 A “karakul” is “[a]ny of a breed of Central Asian sheep .” The American Heritage
Dictionary of the English Language 957 (5th ed. 2011).
18
Agricultural District.” EOC 3, ch. 2, § 1(E). But, respondents claim that their possession
and exhibition of these animals constitutes a legal, non conforming use that they may
continue to exercise on their property.
Minnesota statute and caselaw has established the general principle that a property
use or structure that is in existence at the time of an adverse zoning change may continue
to exist unless removed or discontinued. See Minn. Stat. § 462.357, subd. 1e (2016); see
also Freeborn Cty. v. Claussen, 295 Minn. 96, 99, 203 N.W.2d 323, 325 (1972) (“A
residential zoning ordinance may constitutionally prohibit the creation of uses which are
nonconforming, but existing nonconforming uses must either be permitted to remain or be
eliminated by use of eminent domain.”). In 2005, the township enacted an ordinance titled
“Non-Conforming Uses and Structures,” which provides that any existing use or structure
as of September 7, 2004 may co ntinue as a legal non conforming use (also known as a
grandfathered use) subject to certain conditions. EOC 3, ch. 1, § 4 (2017).
In this case, the district court explicitly found that respondents began exhibiting
animals as early as 2003. Based upon this finding, we agree with respondents that to the
extent that they legally possessed exotic animals under the township’s ordi nance, the
exhibition of such animals is a legal, nonconforming use under Minnesota law , as well as
the township’s own ordinance. Accordingly, we must look to the ordinance to determine
whether respondents fit into any of the enumerated exceptions which would allow them to
continue to possess the exotic animals.

19
B. Respondents’ possession of exotic animals is limited to one exotic animal under
the ordinance.

The township enacted the exotic animal ordinance in June 2005. One of the
exceptions t o the exotic animal ordinance addresses grandfathered ownership . This
exception applies to:
Any person who owned, possessed, kept or harbored exotic
animal(s) on or before the effective date of this Chapter,
provided that all federal, state, and local licensing and/or
approval requirements are met. Any person who falls within
this paragraph shall be permitted to hold, keep, harbor or
maintain the number of exotic animals that person was legally
permitted to hold, keep, harbor or maintain as of the date of
adoption of this chapter but shall not be permitted to increase
the number of exotic animals held, kept, harbored or
maintained within the Township.

EOC 3, ch. 7, § 3 (C)(4). The district court found that Petter possessed one wolf before the
ordinance’s enactment. The district court thereby concluded that possession of any exotic
animal other than one wolf does not qualify for this exception.
Petter testified at trial that the total number of animals has not expanded since 2005.
But, the evidence shows that respondents did not obtain their first game farm license until
August 2006 and that they did not begin purchasing “starter” animals for exhibition until
June 2006. And, the most definitive evidence in the record is a DNR licensing application
in which Petter reported that she possessed only one wolf as of March 1, 2006. The
evidence is sufficient to support the district court’s finding that Petter only possessed one
wolf at the time the exotic animal ordinance was enacted and that this animal may have
been exhibited as early as 2003.
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One of the conditions to the legal, nonconforming use provision states that “no such
use shall be expanded or enlarged except in conformity with the provisions of this
Ordinance.” EOC 3, ch. 1, § 4 (A). Any exhibition that includes more than one exotic
animal would amount to an improper expansion of the legal, nonconforming use under the
ordinance. For these reasons, we reverse the district court’s injunction against respondents’
animal exhibitions on their p roperty within the township and remand for entry of an
injunction to exclude the possession and exhibit ion of one wolf as a n exception and legal
nonconforming use under the township’s zoning ordinance.
C. Storlie is an animal control officer.
Respondents also argue that Storlie qualifies as an animal control officer and
therefore his possession of exotic animals is exempt from the exotic animal ordinance.
Another of the five exceptions to the ordinance is for animal control officers. EOC 3, ch.
7, § 3(C)(1). Because the ordinance does not define the term “animal control officer,” we
will construe the term (1) according to its plain and ordinary meaning, (2) in a light
favorable to the property owner, and (3) in consideration of the ordin ance’s underlying
policy goals. Watab Twp. Citizen All., 728 N.W.2d at 94 . Additionally, we may apply
general principles of statutory construction to an ordinance’s terms. Chanhassen Estates
Residents Ass’n v. City of Chanhassen, 342 N.W.2d 335, 339 n.3 (Minn. 1984).
The district court applied Minn. Stat. § 343.20, subd. 5 (2016) to conclude that
Storlie is not an animal control officer under the ordinance. But that statute’s definition of
“animal control officer” is limited to Minn. Stat. §§ 343.20–.36 (2016), statutory provisions
relating to the prevention of animal cruelty. See Minn. Stat. § 343.20, subd. 1. Even though
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Storlie is not under contract with the township or any other state governmental subdivision,
the undisputed evidence demonstrates that he works as a wildlife specialist for the USDA
and performs animal control duties. Using the plain and ordinary meaning of the term, in
a light most favorable to respondents, we conclude that Storlie is an animal control officer
under the ordinance.
But, viewed in light of other exceptions to the ordinance, particularly the exception
for licensed veterinary hospital or clinics, we believe it is reasonable to conclude that this
exception a pplies to temporary possession of exoti c animals in conjunction with one’s
work as an animal control officer. It would be an absurd result if the township intended to
allow animal control officers to possess a potentially unlimited number of exotic animals,
especially those species completely unrelated to their job duties. See Minn. Stat. § 645.17
(explaining that Minnesota courts should presume that legislature does not intend absurd,
impossible, or unreasonable results).
Therefore, even though we conclude that Storlie is an animal control officer under
the ordinance, respondents’ argument that Storlie’s employment permits them to
permanently harbor exotic animals i s unpersuasive because Storlie may possess these
animals only to the extent that such possession is associated with his duties as an animal
control officer.
III.
Respondents contend that, even if the township’s exotic animal ordinance is valid,
the township is estopped from prohibiting their possession and showing of their exot ic
animals. Estoppel is an equitable doctrine in which the district court may exercise its
22
discretion to prevent a party from taking advantage of its own wrongs by asserting its legal
rights against another party. Nelson v. Comm’r of Revenue, 822 N.W.2d 654, 660 (Minn.
2012). In order to estop the township from enforcing the ordinance, respondents must
establish four elements: (1) that the township exercised wrongful conduct; (2) respondents
reasonably relied on this wrongful conduct; (3) respondents inc urred unique expenditures
in their reliance; and (4) the balance of equities weigh in favor of estoppel. Id.
Respondents must satisfy a “heavy burden of proof” to prevail on their estoppel claim. Id.
(quotation omitted). “Wrongful conduct is not establ ished by simple inadvertence,
mistake, or imperfect conduct.” Id. (quotation omitted). Rather, the wrongful conduct
must equate to an affirmative misrepresentation because any court applying estoppel
against a government entity must consider the public’s interest. Concept Props., LLP v.
City of Minnetrista, 694 N.W.2d 804, 821 (Minn. App. 2005), review denied (Minn. Jul.
19, 2005).
As to th e first factor in determining whether respondents are entitled to estoppel,
respondents assert, and the district court determined, that the township repeatedly made
representations that respondents’ use of the property was permissible under the exotic
animal ordinance. For instance, in August 2013 , the board passed a motion concluding
that “[t]he animals Terri Petter has are within line with the exotic animal ordinance of the
Township.” The record also supports the district court’s finding with regard to the second
factor that respondents reasonably relied on the board’s representations that the use of the
property complied with the ordinance as evinced by the building and repair of structures,
including a fox shelter, on the property.
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But, there is also support in the record for the district court’s finding that
respondents failed to show that they made any “uniqu e” expenditures on the property, the
third factor supporting the equitable relief of estoppel. The district court determined that
the buildings could continue to have other approved commercial agricultural purposes
because the buildings were located on an agriculturally-zoned property. Respondents
argue that the district court’s analysis is flawed because the township failed to provide any
evidence that the buildings could be repurposed. But the burden is on respondents, not the
township, to prove that t hese buildings could not be used in other profitable ways. And,
Petter admitted that the animal exhibition was a “secondary use” of the property.
Furthermore, the balance of equities does not weigh in favor of estoppel. Minnesota
courts have establishe d that estoppel should be used “sparingly” against governmental
entities. Ridgewood Dev. Co. v. State, 294 N.W.2d 288, 293–94 (Minn. 1980). A township
cannot be estopped from correctly enforcing an ordinance, even if a property owner relied
on the township’s prior representations. Frank’s Nursery Sales, Inc. v. City of Roseville,
295 N.W.2d 604, 607 (Minn. 1980).
In sum, w e conclude that the district court d id not abuse its discretion by
determining that respondents failed to demonstrate their entitlement to equitable relief.
IV.
Finally, respondents argue that the district court e rred in amending the judgment.
Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.02 allows the district court to amend its findings and to amend the
judgment once judgment has already been entered. Appellate courts review de novo the
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district court’s interpretation and the application of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure.
In re Skyline Materials, Ltd., 835 N.W.2d 472, 474 (Minn. 2013).
After the district court issued its order in October 2016, the township moved to
amend one paragraph in the conclusions of law, which originally stated that, “Retail sales,
except for horticultural products, is not a permitted, conditional or interim use p ursuant to
the Eureka Township Zoning ordinance since the time Petter began retail sales on the . . .
Property.” The township requested that the district court amend its order to limit
respondents’ horticultural sales to produ cts produced on the property. The district court
granted the township’s request, amending the order to state that, “Retail sales, except for
horticultural products produced on [Respondents’] . . . Property, is not a permitted,
conditional or interim use pursuant to the Eureka Townshi p Zoning ordinance since the
time Petter began retail sales on the . . . Property.” (Emphasis added.)
Respondents claim that the initial order accurately reflected the law because the
property is within the township’s agricultural district and the zoni ng ordinance permits
“[a]ny and all forms of commercial agriculture and commercial horticulture, as defined by
this Ordinance.” EOC 3, ch. 2, § 1(B)(1). “Horticulture” is defined as “[t]he use of land
for production and sale of fruits, including apples, grapes, and berries, vegetables, flowers,
and nursery stock, including ornamental shrubs and trees and cultured sod.” EOC 1, ch. 4.
Respondents ask that this court read the “use of land for production and sale” language
disjunctively, rather than conjunctively. We may construe “and” as a disjunctive to ensure
legislative intent, but only if a conjunctive reading of the word “and” would lead to an
absurd result. See Benton Co. v. Kismet Investors, Inc., 653 N.W.2d 193, 197 (Minn. App.
25
2002). Here, interpreting the ordinance’s language to require sale of horticultural products
from the land itself is not inherently unreasonable.5 We conclude that the district court did
not err by amending the judgment.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded; motion dismissed

5 Respondents also assert that the district court’s amended judgment results in an unfair
interpretation of “horticulture” when compared to how the township has applied the
ordinance to other business es in the township. But in those other circumstances, the
township either did not hold a hearing on the issue or had determined that the business ’
retail sales were a legal, nonconforming use. We cannot say that the township has unfairly
interpreted the “horticulture” definition against respondents.