Donny Warren, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0042

Donny Warren, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Commissioner of Public Safety,
Respondent.

Filed July 17, 2017
Affirmed
Rodenberg, Judge

Dakota County District Court
File No. 19AV-CV-16-2694

Donny Warren, Inver Grove Heights, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Peter Magn uson, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Jesson, Pr esiding Judge; Rodenberg, Judge; and
Toussaint, Judge.


 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of A ppeals, serving by appoi ntment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
RODENBERG, Judge
Appellant Donny Warren challenges a district court order sustaining the revocation
of his driver’s license after he refused to provide a breath sample as required by
Minnesota’s implied-consent law. We affirm.
FACTS
Shortly after 1:00 p.m. on Se ptember 3, 2016, a Minnesota State Trooper received
a dispatch report of a damage-to-property incident. The dispatcher reported that a suspect
had gotten out of his car, broke the window of another car, and then drove away. The
dispatcher provided the license plate number of the vehicle driven by the suspect. The
trooper looked up the vehicle owner’s name and address. Appellant was the registered
owner. The trooper drove to appellant’s apartment.
Upon arriving at appellant’s apartment complex, the trooper saw appellant’s car and
two people near it. The troo per talked with the two people, one of whom claimed to be
employed at the apartment complex. The two people then told the trooper where appellant
lived. They said they were just returning from appella nt’s apartment, and that appellant
had recently come home.
The trooper went to appellant’s apartment and knocked on the door. C.S.M. came
to the door. The trooper testified that C.S. M. told him appellant had only been home for
about 30 minutes. The trooper then spoke with appellant about the damage-to-property
incident. During the conversation, the troope r noticed that appellant smelled of alcohol
and his eyes were watery and glassy. The tr ooper suspected that a ppellant had recently

3
been driving while impaired (DWI) and expand ed his inquiry to i nvestigate the possible
DWI.
After a short conversation, the trooper aske d appellant to submit to field sobriety
testing, which appellant refused. Based on his training and observations, the trooper
concluded that appellant was “highly intoxicated,” and he arrested appellant for DWI. The
trooper then invoked the Minnesota Implied Consent Advisory and requested that appellant
submit to a breath test. Appellant refused. After appellant’s refusal, he was issued a Notice
and Order of License Revocation.
Appellant challenged his license revocation in district cour t. At the hearing, he
appeared pro se. He argued that he was not intoxicated by alcohol while he was driving
and only began drinking after he returned home. Both respondent’s attorney and the district
court attempted to explain to appellant that the issue before the court was whether the
trooper had probable cause to invoke the im plied-consent law, and that appellant would
not prevail by arguing post-driving consump tion of alcohol because he had refused
chemical testing. Appellant said that he did not understand these explanations of the issues.
The trooper testified and explained that, after having received the call from dispatch
and after his conversations with the apar tment employees, C.S.M., and appellant, he
believed appellant had been dr iving while impaired. On cr oss-examination, appellant
attempted to characterize the trooper’s testim ony about his conversation with C.S.M. as
“hearsay.”
In summation, respondent identified the only issue as being whether the trooper had
probable cause to believe that appellant was driving while impaired, and argued that the

4
trooper acted on probable cause. Appellant ar gued that he had not driven while impaired
and that respondent’s case was based on “hearsay” evidence.
The district court issued an order sustai ning the revocation of appellant’s license.
This appeal followed.
D E C I S I O N
I. Because appellant refused chemical test ing, the law precludes the defense of
post-driving alcohol consumption.

Appellant argues that the r ecord evidence does not suppo rt the district court’s
decision. Specifically, he argues that responde nt failed to prove that he was driving at a
time when he was impaired because of alcohol consumption.
Appellant exercised his statutory right to contest his driv er’s license revocation in
district court. The legislature has identified a list of 11 issues available to be raised during
a challenge to license revoca tion. Minn. Stat. § 169A.53, subds. 2, 3 (2016). Here,
appellant’s license was revoked because he refused to submit to an alcohol test, not because
he was driving wh ile impaired. See Minn. Stat. § 169A.52, subd. 3 (2016) (“Upon
certification by the peace officer that there existed probable cause to believe the person had
been driving . . . [while impaired], and that the person refused to submit to a test, the
commissioner shall revoke the person’s license or permit to drive . . . .”). The only
permissible argument that appellant raised to the district court was whether the trooper had
probable cause to believe that he was driving while impaired. See Minn. Stat. § 169A.53,
subd. 3(1). While appellant wanted the cour t to decide whether he had actually been
driving while impaired, that issue is not relevant to the revocation of his license after a test

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refusal. Because appellant refused testi ng, Minnesota law does not require proof of
impairment at the time of driving. The only issue is whether the trooper had probable
cause to believe appellant was driving while impaired so as to have pr operly invoked the
implied-consent law.
II. The district court had a substantial basi s for concluding that probable cause
existed.

Appellant argues that respondent did not introduce sufficient evidence to support
the district court’s finding of probable caus e to have invoked implied-consent law. He
points to the fact that the trooper did no t witness appellant dr iving while impaired,
respondent’s failure to call any eyewitnesses to his driving, and respondent’s choice to not
introduce any recording of 911 calls related to the damage-to-property incident.
“A determination of probable cause is a mixed question of fact and of law.” Groe
v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 615 N.W.2d 837, 840 (Minn. App. 2000), review denied (Minn.
Sept. 13, 2000). We review a probable cause determination for whether the trooper “had
a substantial basis for concluding that probabl e cause existed at the time of invoking the
implied consent law.” Id. (quotation omitted).
An officer may require a person to submit to an alcohol test under the implied-
consent laws if the officer has lawfully arrested that person for DWI and the person refuses
chemical testing. Minn. Stat. § 169A.51. subd. 1(b) (2016). “Probable cause exists when
all the facts and circumstances would lead a cautious person to believe that the driver was
under the influence.” Groe, 615 N.W.2d at 840 (quotation omitted). A strong smell of
alcohol, glassy eyes, slurred speech, and dilated pupils are sufficient to establish probable

6
cause that a person was driving while impaired. Davis v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety , 509
N.W.2d 380, 392 (Minn. App. 1993), aff’d, 517 N.W.2d 901 (Minn. 1994). “The fact that
there might have been an innocent explan ation for [a defendant’s] conduct does not
demonstrate that [an officer] could not re asonably believe that [the defendant] had
committed a crime.” State v. Hawkins, 622 N.W.2d 576, 580 (Minn. App. 2001).
The trooper testified that he went to appellant’s apartment after receiving
information that someone driving appellant ’s car had been involved in a damage-to-
property incident. An apartment employee told the trooper that appellant had just returned.
The trooper testified that C.S.M. later told him that appellant had only been at the apartment
“for approximately 30 minutes.” This timelin e reasonably suggested to the trooper that
appellant had been driving at the time the trooper first received the dispatch, 10 to 15
minutes before he arrived at appellant’s apartment. When the trooper spoke with appellant,
he detected a “very strong odor of alcohol,” appellant’s “eyes were extremely bloodshot,”
appellant was “very sweaty,” and his eyes were “very watery and glassy.” While this
testimony does not prove beyond question that appellant had been driving while impaired,
it is sufficient to establish probable cause fo r the trooper to have believed that appellant
had been recently driving while impaired. The district cour t concluded that the trooper
acted on probable cause, and the record supports that conclusion.
III. The evidence relied on by the district court was admissible.
Appellant argues that the trooper’s test imony about his conversation with the
apartment employees and with appellant’s roommate was inadmissible hearsay. Appellant
correctly argues that the rules of evidence apply to implied-consent hearings. See Heuton

7
v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 541 N.W.2d 361, 363-64 (Minn. App. 1995) (applying the rules
of evidence in an implied-consent hearing).
Hearsay is a “statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the
trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Minn. R.
Evid. 801(c). “The admission of evidence rests within the broad discretion of the trial court
and its ruling will not be distur bed unless it is based on an e rroneous view of the law or
constitutes an abuse of discretion.” Olson on behalf of A.C.O. v. Olson , 892 N.W.2d 837
(Minn. App. 2017) (quotation omitted). “On appeal, the defe ndant bears th e burden of
establishing that the district court abused its discretion and that the evidentiary ruling
prejudiced the defendant’s substantial rights.” State v. Chavez-Nelson, 882 N.W.2d 579,
588 (Minn. 2016).
The trooper’s statements concerning what C.S.M. and the apartment employees told
him are indeed out-of-court statements made by someone other than the person testifying
at trial. However, the statements were no t offered to prove th e truth of the matter
asserted—that appellant had recently arrived a t h o m e . T h e y w e r e offered as evidence
supporting the trooper’s probable cause to believe that appellant had been driving while
impaired. See State v. Purdy , 278 Minn. 133, 147-48, 1 53 N.W.2d 254, 263 (1967)
(holding that an officer’s testimony regarding a radio me ssage he received “was not
introduced to prove the truth of the matter stated but only to prove . . . [the officers] had
reasonable cause to believe that a felony wa s in the process of being committed”). The
testimony was not hearsay becau se it was not offered to prove the truth of the matter
asserted. The district court did not err in receiving the trooper’s testimony.

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IV. The district court did not violate appellant’s due process rights.
Appellant also argues that his trial was conducted in an “unfair and unprofessional”
manner, which violated his constitutional rights. He iden tifies three ways in which he
claims his rights were violated: (1) the district court should have given him more guidance
because he was a pro se litigant, (2) the district court judge was biased against him, and
(3) the district court denied him the right to cross-examine witnesses.
Appellant argues that, as a pro se litigant, he “was expecting a little more guidance
from the judge.” He claims this lack of guidance from the district court deprived him of
due process of law. “We review due-process challenges de novo.” Anderson v. Comm’r
of Pub. Safety, 878 N.W.2d 926, 928 (Minn. App. 2016) (quotation omitted). “Although
some accommodations may be made for pro se litigants, this court has repeatedly
emphasized that pro se litigants are generally he ld to the same standa rds as attorneys.”
Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 629 N.W.2d 115, 119 (Minn. App. 2001). While district courts
have a duty to allow reasonable accommodations to pro se litigants, they must not “permit
bending of all rules and requirements.” Liptak v. State ex re l. City of New Hope , 340
N.W.2d 366, 367 (Minn. App. 1983). The issues were explained to appellant.
Appellant next argues that the judge in his case was “very bias[ed]” and that he
refused to admit certain medical records, did not ask if appellant wanted a trial by jury, and
made a decision based on statements not made in court, again depriving him of due process
of law.
“The Due Process Clause requi res that a defendant receive a fair trial in a fair
tribunal before a judge with no actual bias against the defendant or interest in the outcome

9
of his particular case.” State v. Crow , 730 N.W.2d 272, 282 (Minn. 2007) (quotation
omitted). When reviewing the conduct of a judge, we presum e the judge properly
discharged his or her judicial duties. State v. Munt, 831 N.W.2d 569, 580 (Minn. 2013).
We are mindful that justice “should avoid the appearance of impropriety.” Id. (quotations
omitted). Adverse rulings alone are in sufficient to show actual bias. State v. Sailee, 792
N.W.2d 90, 96 (Minn. App. 2010), review denied (Minn. Mar. 15, 2011). District court
judges “should refrain from raising objections and should avoid demonstrating bias against
one party in front of the jury,” but appellate c ourts grant new trials based on judicial bias
“only in those rare cases where the remark of the trial judge was so prejudicial to one party
that it rendered a fair and impartial de termination by the jury improbable.” Moorhead
Econ. Dev. Auth. v. Anda, 789 N.W.2d 860, 894 (Minn. 2010).
While the district court did raise its own objection to appellant’s offer of medical
records as evidence, receiving those reports would not have changed the outcome of the
case, given the limited issues properly before the district court for resolution. Minn. Stat.
§ 169A.53, subd. 3(7).
Appellant finally argues that the district court violated his c onstitutional rights by
denying him the right to cross-examine witnesses. This argument is not supported by the
record. The transcript of the hearing show s that appellant did cr oss-examine the only
witness called at the hearing.
Appellant’s other arguments fail to demonstrate judicial bias. There is no jury trial
right in implied-consent hearings. Schmidtbauer v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety , 392 N.W.2d

10
668, 670 (Minn. App. 1986), review denied (Minn. Oct. 9, 1986). We see no unfairness or
error in the district court’s rulings or conduct.
Affirmed.