State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0205

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Ronald James Meyer,
Appellant.

Filed January 22, 2018
Affirmed
Halbrooks, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-16-4266

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Peter R. Marker, Assistant County Attorney,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Anders J. Erickson, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Halbrooks, Judge; and
Reyes, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
HALBROOKS, Judge
Appellant challenges his convictions of assault -fear, assault -harm, and domestic
assault by strangulation arguing that the district court committed reversible error by

2
admitting relationship evidence u nder Minn. Stat. § 634.20 (2014) and that a new trial is
required because the admission of relationship evidence significantly affected the jury’s
verdict. Appellant also argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he intended
to cause H.R. fear of bodily harm or death. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Ronald James Meyer lived with two roommates, G.J. and H.R. One day,
while H.R. was lying in bed , she heard G.J. in another room, yelling at Meyer to get his
hands off him. When H.R. entered the other room to intervene, she saw Meyer standing
with his hands around G.J.’s neck. H.R. yelled at Meyer to take his hands off G.J. After
H.R. took Meyer’s hands off of G.J., Meyer grabbed a plate from the kitchen sink, held it
in a vertical position, and pushed th e plate against H.R.’s stomach with enough force to
push her backward. H.R. testified that Meyer was aware that she had recently undergone
surgery when he pushed the plate into her stomach.
After the incident, H.R. called the police. By the time the police arrived, Meyer had
left the house. He later returned, and H.R. called the police and asked them to come back.
While she was on the phone, she heard Meyer state, “I’ll kill you guys” while arguing with
G.J. The police report notes that G.J. looked “immediately relieved” upon seeing them.
The police ordered Meyer out of the house and arrested him.
Based on this incident, the prosecutor charged Meyer with two counts of threats of
violence under Minn. Stat. § 609.713, subd. 1 (2014), two counts of f elony domestic
assault under Minn. Stat. § 609.2242, subd. 4 (2014), which included an assault -harm
charge against G.J. and an assault -fear charge against H.R. , and one count of domestic

3
assault (by strangulation) under Minn. Stat. § 609.2247, subd. 2 (201 4). A jury trial was
held; the state dismissed one threats-of-violence charge, and the district court granted
Meyer’s motion for judgment of acquittal on the other threats-of-violence charge. The jury
convicted Meyer of assault -fear against H.R., assault -harm against G.J., and domestic
assault by strangulation against G.J. The district court imposed a stayed upward-durational
departure sentence of 36 months in prison for the felony domestic-assault-harm conviction
against G.J. and a stayed sentence of 21 months in prison for the felony domestic-assault-
fear conviction against H.R. After Meyer violated probation, the district court revoked his
probation and executed both sentences. This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
I. Admissibility of Relationship Evidence
Meyer challenges the admission of testimony concerning h is prior conduct toward
H.R., arguing that this evidence should not have been admitted as relationship evidence
under Minn. Stat. § 634.20. We will not reverse a district court’s decision to admit similar-
conduct or relation ship evidence under Minn. Stat. § 634.20 in a domestic -abuse
prosecution case absent a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Lindsey, 755 N.W.2d 752, 755
(Minn. App. 2008). The defendant claiming error in admitting eviden ce bears the burden
of showing error and resulting prejudice. Id.
Before trial, t he state filed a motion in limine to introduce relationship evidence
involving Meyer, H.R., and G.J. Over Meyer’s objection, the district court granted the
state’s motion at a pretrial hearing, reasoning that it would “be helpful to the jury and the
probative value is not substantially outweighed by danger of unfair prejudice.” During the

4
prosecutor’s di rect examination of H.R. in trial, H.R. testified about Meyer’s previo us
domestic-conduct incident against her:
I was in my room and I was sleeping and he kept walking
through my room because you go through my bedroom to go
to the front door and he kept coming in and saying he was
going down to check the mail and it was like 1:00 in the
morning and I kept asking him to stop coming in my room and
he said he had to go down and check the mail.

So I finally locked the door and I locked it and then he
pounded on my door and I wouldn’t open it and he kept
pounding on it and then he started punching holes in it, and
then he did punch—I mean, there was quite a few holes in the
door and then I finally opened the door up, and we ended up
kind of arguing and he ended up punching me in the stomach
that night.

Generally, evidence of a defendant’s prior bad acts may not be admitted to show
that a defendant acted in conformity with bad character. Minn. R. Evid. 404(b). But Minn.
Stat. § 634.20 governs the admissibility of domestic-conduct evidence in domestic -
violence cases. A district court may admit domestic-conduct evidence under Minn. Stat.
§ 634.20 if “(1) it is similar conduct by the accused, (2) it is perpetuated against the victim
of domestic abuse or against another family or household member, and (3) t he probative
value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. ”
State v. Meyer, 749 N.W.2d 844, 849 (Minn. App. 2008).
Meyer challenges the admission of H.R.’s statement under the third prong, arguing
that the evidence was not probative and that it prejudiced his right to a fair trial. “Evidence
presented under section 634.20 is offered to demonstrate the history of the relationship
between the accused and the victim of domestic abuse.” State v. Barnslater, 786 N.W.2d

5
646, 650 (Minn. App. 2010), review denied (Minn. Oct. 27, 2010). The supreme court has
expressly recognized “the inherent value of evidence of past acts of violence committed by
the same def endant against the same victim. ” State v. Williams , 593 N.W.2d 227, 236
(Minn. 1999).
At a pretrial hearing, the prosecutor explained that H.R. did not report the previous
domestic-conduct incident because Meyer allowed H.R. to live in the home without paying
rent, and H.R. was concerned that she would disrupt that arrangement by reporting it. The
prosecutor argued that the evidence of the previous incident provided context of H.R. and
Meyer’s relationship and would help the jury assess the credibility of the witnesses at trial.
Based on the prosecutor’s arg ument, and over Meyer’s objection, the district court
determined that the evidence would be helpful to the jury and that its probative value was
not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
Meyer argues that the ev idence was not probative because, unlike cases in which
the victim delays reporting or changes her story , H.R. called 911 shortly after Meyer
pushed the plate against her . He also argues that the evidence constituted impermissible
character evidence and did not help the jury analyze whether H.R. and G.J. fabricated their
allegations against him.
We rejected a similar argument in Meyer. 749 N.W.2d at 850 . In Meyer, the
victim’s credibility was at issue and the appellant asserted that the relationship evidence
led the jury to find him guilty based on past conduct —instead of evidence of the current
charged offenses. Id. We determined that “the three prior acts of domestic violence . . .
provided a context in which to exa mine [the victim’s] credibility.” Id.; see also Lindsey,

6
755 N.W.2d at 757 (noting that relationship evidence has “significant probative value in
assisting the jury to judge witness credibility”). Here, Meyer challenged H.R.’s credibility
and implied that she lied while testifying. At trial, Meyer’s attorney maintained in opening
statement that H.R. “set this whole thing up because [she] wanted to take [Meye r and
G.J.’s] social security checks.” Meyer also questioned H.R. about her drug use and
highlighted minor inconsistencies between her responses to law enforcement and her
testimony. Therefore, we agree with the district court’s determination that the evidence
was probative because it helped the jury determine whether H.R.’s allegations were
credible.
Meyer also argues that the evidence is not probative b ecause it did not explain the
context of their relationship but instead “merely illuminated allegations of a single prior
physical assault.” We disagree. Relationship evidence “may be offered to illuminate the
history of the relationship, that is, to put the crime charged in the context of the relationship
between the two.” State v. McCoy, 682 N.W.2d 153, 159 (Minn. 2004). H.R. testified that
she felt conflicted about their relationship. While referring to Meyer strangling G.J., H.R.
stated that
I don’t think that he really would want to hurt him and means
to hurt him, but just I don’t know what mood he was in that he
would do that.

. . . .

. . . I just know from seeing [Meyer], being around him
when he drinks and stuff he gets —he’s physical. He seems
very angry when he gets drunk a lot of times.

7
She later testified th at “I’m not really afraid of [Meyer] as a person because [Meyer] ’s
pretty cool. But when he’s drinking, when he’s under the influence, he just gets snake -y,
and I don’t understand what it’s from, but he’s been like that sinc e I met him.” And she
testified that she initially wanted Meyer to be arrested but felt conflicted about testifying
against him. Thus, H.R.’s statement provides context of the parties’ relationship that may
have helped the jury underst and her conflicted perception o f the prior domestic-conduct
incident.
Meyer contends that even if the evidence was probative, it was outweighed by its
prejudicial effect because the jury could not fairly evaluate the charge after hearing about
Meyer’s previous domestic-conduct incident against H.R. The district court determined
that the statement’s probative value was not substanti ally outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice. See Meyer, 749 N.W.2d at 849. “When balancing the probative value
against the potenti al prejudice, unfair prejudice is not merely damaging evidence, even
severely damaging evidence; rather, unfair prejud ice is evidence that persuades by
illegitimate means, giving one party an unfair advantage.” Lindsey, 755 N.W.2d at 757
(quotation omitted).
Here, the district court determined that the evidence was probative based on the
state’s argument that the evidence put Meyer’s conduct in the context of how he previously
interacted with H.R. and G.J. at home. To be sure, the district court did not give the jury a
limiting instruction before H.R. testified. But any prejudicial effect was lessened because
the district court provided a cautionary instruction during final jury instructions.

8
Although the evidence was damaging to Meyer, we agree with the district court that
its prejudicial effect did not substantially outweigh its probative value because the evidence
provided context of H.R. and Meyer’s relationship and helped the jury assess both parties’
credibility. Therefore, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by
concluding that “the probative value is not substantially outweighe d by danger of unfair
prejudice” and by admitting the evidence as relationsh ip evidence under Minn.
Stat. § 634.20.
II. Cautionary Jury Instruction
Meyer asserts, without providing any supporting authority, that the district court
erred by not providing the jury with a cautionary instruction before H.R. testified about the
prior domestic-conduct incident. An appellant waives an argument by merely alluding to
an issue without addressing it in the argument. See McKenzie v. State , 583 N.W.2d 744,
746 n.1 (Minn . 1998). Although we need not address this argument, we briefly analyze
this issue based on the record before us.
Meyer neither requested a cautionary instruction to the jury nor objected to the final
jury instructions on this ground. Generally, a defendant’s failure to request a specific jury
instruction or object to an instruction at trial results in forfeiture of the issue on appeal.
State v. Goodloe, 718 N.W.2d 413, 422 (Minn. 2006). But we may consider whether the
district court’s failure to provide a jury instruction constitutes plain error affecting Meyer’s
substantial rights. Id. “Plain error exists when the district court commits an obvious error
that affects the defendant’s substantial rights. An error affects a defendant’s substantial

9
rights if it was prejudicial and affected the outcome of the case.” Barnslater, 786 N.W.2d
at 653 (quotation and citation omitted).
In State v. Melanson, we determined that the district court did not plainly err when
it failed to sua sponte provide a limiting instruction to the jury regarding the admission of
relationship evidence. ___ N.W.2d ___, ___, 2018 WL 313074, at *8 (Minn. App. Jan. 8,
2018). But we have also stressed that a district court should “instruct the jury regarding
the proper use of relationship evidence . . . both when the evidence is received and in the
final jury instructions.” Barnslater, 786 N.W.2d at 653. Here, the state conceded that the
district court plainly erred. Even so, we need not determine whether the district cou rt’s
failure to provide a cautionary instruction constituted plain error because Meyer cannot
demonstrate that the lack of instruction affected his substantial rights. See State v. Sontoya,
788 N.W.2d 868, 873 (Minn. 2010) (“ [I]f a defendant fails to esta blish that the claimed
error affected his substantial rights, we need not consider the other factors.” (quotation
omitted)). In Barnslater, this court determined a defendant’s substantial rights were not
affected when a witness briefly commented on the defendant’s previ ous conviction, the
state did not present evidence of defendant’s conduct underlying those convictions, the
district court’s final jury instruction minimized the risk for unfair prejudice, and the other
evidence supporting the conviction was strong. Barnslater, 786 N.W.2d at 654.
Here, the district court sua sponte provided a limiting instruction before G.J.
testified about relationship evidence and, as in Barnslater, provided a final cautionary jury
instruction informing the jury that it could only consider G.J. and H.R.’s previous conduct
testimony for a limited purpose. See id. Additionally, H.R.’s testimony of the prior

10
domestic-conduct incident was brief and consisted of less than two pages of a 291 -page
trial transcript, and the prosecutor referred to this testimony only once during closing
argument in order to provide the context of the parties’ relationship. See id. The state’s
evidence was also strong. See id. H.R. testified that she witnessed Meyer with his hands
around G.J.’s neck and that Meyer pushed a plate against her stomach. G.J. also testified
that Meyer had his hands around G.J.’s neck. And a police officer testified that when he
arrived at the scene, H.R. was crying and requested medical attention because she had had
an altercation with her roommate, and another officer testified that while questioning G.J.,
G.J. informed him that Meyer was “drinking and acting crazy and wild” and he took
pictures of red marks on G.J.’s neck. Therefore, we conclude that although the district
court plainly erred by failing to provide a cautionary instruction before H.R. testified about
the prior domestic-conduct incident , the error did not affect Meyer’s substantial rights
because the relevant testimony was brief, the district court provided the jury with a final
cautionary instruction that minimized the risk of unfair prejudice, and the state’s evidence
was strong.
III. Assault-Fear
Meyer argues that we must reverse his conviction of assault-fear against H.R.
because the state did not prove that he acted with the specific intent to cause H.R. to fear
immediate bodily harm or death. In reviewing sufficiency of the evidence:
We will view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
verdict and assume that the factfinder disbelieved any
testimony conflicting with that verdict. The verdict will not be
overturned if, giving due regard to the presumption o f
innocence and the prosecution’ s burden of proving guilt

11
beyond a reasonable doubt, the [factfinder] could reasonably
have found the defendant guilty of the charged offense.

State v. Palmer, 803 N.W.2d 727, 733 (Minn. 2011) (alteration in original) (quotations and
citation omitted).
Assault-fear occurs “through ‘an act done with intent to cause fear in another of
immediate bodily harm or death.’” State v. Fl eck, 810 N.W.2d 303, 308 (Minn. 2012).
(quoting Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 10(1) (2010)). Assault-fear is a specific-intent crime,
and the defendant must intend to cause a particular result. Id. at 308-09. “An assault-fear
offense ‘does not require a finding of actual harm to the victim.’” Id. at 308 (quoting State
v. Hough, 585 N.W.2d 393, 395 (Minn. 1998)). The defendant’s intent becomes the focal
point of the inquiry. Id. Intent is generally proved by circumstantial evidence by drawing
inferences from the defendant’s words and acts in light of the totality of the circumstances,
State v. Cooper , 561 N.W.2d 175, 179 (Minn. 1997), “and the events leading up to and
immediately following the crime,” State v. Barshaw, 879 N.W.2d 356, 367 (Minn. 2016).
When a verdict is based on circumstantial evidence, we first identify the
circumstances proved , “giving deference to the jury’s acceptance of the proof of these
circumstances and rejection of evidence in the record that conflicted with the
circumstanced proved by the State.” Palmer, 803 N.W.2d at 733 (quotation omitted). We
then “independently examine the reasonableness of all inferences that might be drawn from
the circumstances proved, including inferences consistent with a hypothesis other than
guilt.” Id. (quotation omitted).

12
Here, the evidence demonstrates that Meyer acted with intent to cause fear in H.R.
The state introduced evidence at trial that Meyer knew that H.R. was recovering from
surgery when he pushed the plate into her abdomen . H.R. he ard G.J. say “Knock it off,
Motherf--ker. Get your hands off me,” immediately before Meyer pushed her. Meyer then
grabbed a plate from the sink and pushed it against H.R.’s stomach with enough force that
it pushed her backward.
Meyer testified that he did not assault H.R. or G.J. But “[a] factfinder may reject
such an exculpatory statement if the evidence as a whole supports a finding that the actor
intended the natural and probable consequences of his actions. ” Hough, 585 N.W.2d at
396. The jury heard testimony that Meyer recently strangled his roommate, previously
punched H.R. in the stomach when he became angry, grabbed a plate while appearing
frustrated, and, knowing that H.R. had recently had surgery, forcefully pushed the plate
into her abdominal region. Based on the verdict, we can infer that the jury found H.R. and
G.J. to be credible and disbelieved Meyer’s testimony.
Meyer argues that the evidence supports an inference other than guilt because the
state failed to preclude the inference th at he only intended to move H.R. away from his
personal space when he pushed the plate against her abdomen. We disagree. Neither the
state nor Meyer presented any evidence that Meyer wanted H.R. to move from his personal
space. At trial, Meyer testified that he did not even see H.R. on the day that he was arrested.
Assuming that the jury believed H.R.’s version of the incident, the only reasonable
inference the jury could draw, when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

13
verdict, is that Meyer acted with the intent to cause H.R. to fear bodily harm. The evidence
is sufficient to support Meyer’s conviction of felony domestic-assault-fear.
Affirmed.