State of Minnesota, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0786

State of Minnesota,
Appellant,

vs.

Nicolee Marie Holmgren,
Respondent.

Filed April 24, 2023
Affirmed
Wheelock, Judge

Mower County District Court
File No. 50-CR-21-1657

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Kristen Nelsen, Mower County Attorney, Heather Kjos Schmit, Assistant County
Attorney, Austin, Minnesota (for appellant)

Drake D. Metzger, Metzger Law Firm, LLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Gaïtas, Judge; and Wheelock,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WHEELOCK, Judge
The state appealed from the district court’s order granting respondent’s motion for
judgment of acquittal, arguing that the district court erred because the evidence was
sufficient to support the jury’s guilty verdict for domestic assault. Because the
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circumstances proved at trial are consistent with a rational hypothesis of innocence, we
affirm.
FACTS
Appellant State of Minnesota charged respondent Nicolee Marie Holmgren with one
count of misdemeanor domestic assault with intent to cause fear, in violation of Minn. Stat.
§ 609.2242, subd. 1(1) (2020). The district court held a jury trial in March 2022, at which
the following facts were established.
Holmgren, an adult, lived with her parents, L.H. and T.H., in Red Rock Township.
On the morning of September 1, 2021, L.H. was getting ready to go to a doctor’s
appointment. He had been hospitalized two days prior because his atrial fibrillation caused
his heart to beat uncontrollably fast, especially when he was agitated.
L.H. encountered Holmgren as he was coming down the stairs to the main floor.
L.H. testified that he and Holmgren had argued the night before, and that morning,
Holmgren “just blew up” at him, calling L.H. names and becoming “really frustrated, really
angry, red in the face.” Holmgren stood in front of L.H. on the stairs and did not let him
by when he asked to pass by her.
L.H. was eventually able to pass by Holmgren and went to the basement. Holmgren
followed “right behind” him and continued to scream at him. L.H. testified that Holmgren
“physically postured” at him and yelled so hard that “spit was coming out of her mouth.”
Both T.H. and L.H. testified that they carried pepper spray with them and kept
pepper spray in their bedroom because they did not feel safe with Holmgren living in their
home due to her mental-health issues, hostility, and frustration. L.H. pulled out his pepper
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spray when he got to the bottom of the basement stairs and told Holmgren he would use it
if she touched him. L.H. testified that Holmgren stopped yelling and stood at the bottom
of the basement stairs when he showed her the pepper spray.
After retrieving clothes from the basement, L.H. began to climb the basement stairs,
but Holmgren stood in his way again and would not let him pass her. L.H. asked to pass
by Holmgren, and she moved to the top of the basement stairs. L.H. testified that he had
to hang on to the stair rail because his heart “was going fast.” He then stated to Holmgren,
“Nic, you gotta stop this. You’re gonna kill me.”
At this point, T.H. came out of the bedroom and downstairs to the main floor and
informed L.H. and Holmgren that she had called law enforcement. T.H. handed the phone
to L.H.; he exited the house and sat in his truck while speaking to the dispatcher. L.H.
testified that the entire encounter with Holmgren lasted between two to five minutes.
T.H. testified that she woke up on the morning of September 1 to the sound of
Holmgren “yelling and screaming” at L.H. T.H. further testified that her first thought was
for L.H.’s health because he had just been in the hospital for atrial fibrillation. T.H. stated
that Holmgren “just kept escalating and escalating her . . . yelling and screaming,” and T.H.
“didn’t know what else to do” and “didn’t know what was happening,” so T.H. called law
enforcement.
The responding deputy who arrived first on the scene in response to T.H.’s report
testified that he interviewed L.H. and T.H. in the driveway and then entered the house and
spoke to Holmgren. During the interview, the deputy and L.H. discussed how L.H. and
T.H. were afraid for their safety, there was a possibility that Holmgren was not taking her
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medication, and L.H. and T.H. wanted Holmgren out of the house. The deputy informed
L.H. that “the only way we’re gonna get [Holmgren] out is through a domestic with a
DANCO.” The deputy testified that after interviewing her, he arrested Holmgren for
domestic assault with intent to cause fear.
Holmgren testified on her own behalf. She testified that L.H. had directed
“explosive angry outbursts” at her in the past and that she was “tearful” on the morning of
September 1 because L.H. had recently yelled at her. She became upset because L.H. “shut
[her] down” when she tried to speak to him about it. Holmgren admitted that she raised
her voice during the ensuing argument. She testified that she did not intend to block L.H.
from moving and explained that she may have inadvertently been in L.H.’s way when
standing in the basement doorway because she and L.H. are “on the larger side of people.”
She further testified that she did not intend to cause L.H. fear.
At the conclusion of trial, the jury returned a guilty verdict for the single count of
domestic assault with intent to cause fear. Holmgren moved for judgment of acquittal,
arguing that the state presented insufficient evidence of Holmgren’s intent to cause fear in
L.H. The district court held a hearing on Holmgren’s motion, then filed an order granting
the motion. The district court determined that the evidence was insufficient to support a
conviction because the circumstances proved were consistent with a reasonable hypothesis
other than guilt— Holmgren did not intend to cause L.H. fear of bodily harm.
The state appeals.
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DECISION
Holmgren’s motion for judgment of acquittal asserted that the state presented
insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she intended to cause L.H.
to fear immediate bodily harm or death. In deciding Holmgren’s motion, the district court
correctly applied the same standard appellate courts use to review the sufficiency of
circumstantial evidence. See State v. Sam, 859 N.W.2d 825, 831 (Minn. App. 2015) (first
citing State v. Al- Naseer, 788 N.W.2d 469, 474 (Minn. 2010) ; and then citing State v.
Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d 594, 599 (Minn. 2013)) (stating that the district court is required to
apply the Al-Naseer/Silvernail analysis to decide a motion for judgment of acquittal in a
circumstantial-evidence case). This court reviews de novo the district court’s decision on
a motion for judgment of acquittal. State v. DeLaCruz, 884 N.W.2d 878, 890 (Minn. App.
2016).
When reviewing a sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim, appellate courts “carefully
examine the record to determine whether the facts and the legitimate inferences drawn from
them would permit the [fact-finder] to reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Griffin, 887 N.W.2d 257, 263 (Minn. 2016)
(quotation omitted). Appellate courts review a conviction with “heightened scrutiny,”
however, when the conviction is based on circumstantial evidence. Al-Naseer, 788 N.W.2d
at 473. Circumstantial evidence is evidence that requires a fact-finder to “infer whether
the facts in dispute existed or did not exist.” State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 599 (Minn.
2017) (quotation omitted). Circumstantial evidence differs from direct evide nce in that it
“always requires an inferential step to prove a fact.” Id.
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The jury found Holmgren guilty of domestic assault with intent to cause fear , as
prohibited by Minn. Stat. § 609.2242, subd. 1(1). Domestic assault with intent to cause
fear is a specific-intent crime; it requires the actor to intend, through their actions, to cause
the victim to fear immediate bodily harm or death, although the crime does not require
actual harm. State v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 303, 308-09 (Minn. 2012). Evidence of intent is
typically circumstantial because “[i]ntent is generally proved by inferences drawn from a
person’s words or actions in light of all the surrounding circumstances.” Nelson v. State,
880 N.W.2d 852, 860 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted); see also State v. Fardan,
773 N.W.2d 303, 321 (Minn. 2009) (noting that the jury draws an inference of intent “from
the totality of the circumstances” (quotations omitted)).
When a conviction is based on circumstantial evidence, appellate courts apply a
two-step standard of review. Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d at 598. First, the reviewing court
identifies the circumstances proved at trial. Id. In doing so, it defers to the fact-finder’s
“acceptance of the proof of these circumstances and rejection of evidence in the record that
conflicted with the circumstances proved by the State.” State v. Andersen, 784 N.W.2d
320, 329 (Minn. 2010) (quotation omitted). In other words, it reviews conflicting evidence
in the light most favorable to the verdict. See id. at 330; State v. Tscheu, 758 N.W.2d 849,
858 (Minn. 2008).
Second, appellate courts “determine whether the circumstances proved are
consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt.”
Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d at 599 (quotations omitted). At this step of the analysis, appellate
courts “give no deference to the fact finder’s choice between reasonable inferences.” Id.
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(quotation omitted). The court considers the circumstantial evidence “as a whole” when
completing this step of the analysis. Id.; see also Andersen, 784 N.W.2d at 332 (“[W]e do
not review each circumstance proved in isolation. Instead, we must consider whether the
circumstances presented are consistent with guilt and inconsistent, on the whole, with any
reasonable hypothesis of innocence.” (quotation omitted)).
To assess the sufficiency of the evidence in this case, we first determine the
circumstances proved at trial. And we defer to the jury’s credibility determinations and
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. See Andersen, 784 N.W.2d at
329; Tscheu, 758 N.W.2d at 858. Thus, we assume that the jury credited L.H.’s testimony.
The following circumstances were proved at trial:
• Holmgren and L.H. had an argument the night before the
incident, and Holmgren confronted L.H. the following
morning.

• Holmgren repeatedly yelled and blocked L.H.’s way on the
stairs to the main floor, then followed him while yelling as L.H.
walked down the basement stairs.

• L.H. asked Holmgren to move out of his way and to stop
arguing with him multiple times.

• Holmgren “physically postured” at L.H. and yelled so
forcefully that spit came out of her mouth.

• L.H. felt fearful and pulled out his pepper spray to prevent
Holmgren from touching him.

• Holmgren stopped yelling when L.H. pulled out the pepper
spray, and she moved to the top of the basement stairs.

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• L.H. had trouble climbing the basement stairs due to his rapid
heartbeat and said to Holmgren, “Nic, you gotta stop this.
You’re gonna kill me.”

• As L.H. was making that statement, T.H. approached L.H. and
Holmgren with her phone in hand and informed both of them
that she had called law enforcement.

• L.H. exited the house and waited in his truck for law
enforcement to arrive.

• According to L.H., the entire encounter with Holmgren lasted
about two to five minutes.

The second step of the analysis is to determine whether the circumstances proved
are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with a reasonable alternative hypothesis of
innocence. Here, the state argues that the evidence was sufficient to convict Holmgren
because the circumstances proved supported a reasonable hypothesis that Holmgren
intended to cause L.H. fear and did not support any reasonable hypothesis of innocence.
The state points to the evidence presented at trial to support its contention that this
encounter was “more hostile” and “more aggressive” than previous arguments between
Holmgren and L.H. The state emphasizes that Holmgren continued to scream and block
L.H.’s path despite L.H.’s multiple requests for her to stop, including his statement, “Nic,
you gotta stop this. You’re gonna kill me.” While we agree that the circumstances proved
supported a reasonable hypothesis that Holmgren intended to cause L.H. fear, we disagree
that the circumstances proved do not support a reasonable alternative hypothesis of
innocence.
First, we note that cases in which intent to cause fear is proved typically include
evidence of the defendant’s use of a verbal threat, weapon, or physical contact. See, e.g.,
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State v. Kastner, 429 N.W.2d 274, 275 (Minn. App. 1988) (concluding that defendant’s
intent to cause victim fear of immediate bodily harm could be reasonably inferred from
defendant’s threatening statements and brandishing of scissors and screwdriver), rev.
denied (Minn. Nov. 16, 1988); State v. Nelson, No. A14-0810, 2015 WL 853492, at *3-4
(Minn. App. Mar. 2, 2015) (concluding that evidence supported reasonable inference of
intent to cause fear because defendant grabbed and pushed victim), rev. denied (Minn.
May 19, 2015).1 There is no evidence in the record that Holmgren verbally threatened L.H.
or touched him in any way. The only behavior Holmgren displayed was yelling and
“physically posturing” at L.H., and the record does not indicate what words Holmgren
yelled or what type of movements Holmgren made that constituted physical posturing.
L.H.’s testimony established that Holmgren was “prone to having abrupt and hostile
arguments,” and the argument that day “was escalating to the point where it just couldn’t
continue.” L.H. also testified that he feared for his safety. However, a reasonable inference
can be drawn from this testimony that this incident involved an argument that was worse
than previous arguments, but Holmgren did not intend to cause fear in L.H. L.H.’s
subjective fear is not inconsistent with the reasonable hypothesis that Holmgren did not
intend to cause him to fear immediate bodily harm or death. There is no indication in the
trial evidence that Holmgren was aware of how fearful L.H. was before L.H. pulled out his
pepper spray, and at that point, Holmgren stopped yelling and moved up the basement stairs
when L.H. asked her to move out of his way. L.H. did not inform Holmgren that his

1 We recognize that nonprecedential opinions may be cited only as persuasive authority.
See Dynamic Air, Inc. v. Bloch, 502 N.W.2d 796, 800 (Minn. App. 1993).
10
heartbeat had increased or indicate that the argument was affecting him until after
Holmgren stopped yelling, when L.H. walked to the top of the stairs and stated, “Nic, you
gotta stop this. You’re gonna kill me.”
The state cites State v. Meyer to argue that the evidence in this case excludes a
rational hypothesis of innocence. No. A17-0205, 2018 WL 492623 (Minn. App. Jan. 22,
2018), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 17, 2018). 2 In Meyer, this court concluded that Meyer
intended to cause fear of bodily harm when Meyer knew that the victim had recently had
surgery on her stomach and pushed a plate against the victim’s stomach during an
argument. Id. at *5. However, the instant case can be distinguished from Meyer because
there was no evidence presented at trial that Holmgren intentionally exacerbated L.H.’s
atrial fibrillation in an attempt to harm L.H. or cause L.H. to fear bodily harm.
The state further argues in its reply brief that “the jury rightly established that
[Holmgren] had the purpose to do the thing or cause the result specified . . . in other words,
the jury found [Holmgren] had the requisite intent,” and it contends that this court should
defer to the jury’s determination here. The state is correct that this court must defer to the
jury’s “rejection of evidence in the record that conflicted with the circumstances proved by
the State.” Andersen, 784 N.W.2d at 329 (quotation omitted). However, this court is not

2 In the following discussion, we note that the state cites three nonprecedential opinions to
support its argument: Meyer, 2018 WL 492623; State v. Caruthers, No. A16-0587,
2017 WL 164417 (Minn. App. Jan. 17, 2017); State v. Clancy, No. C9 -01-710, 2002 WL
233913 (Minn. App. Feb. 19, 2002), rev. denied (Minn. May 14, 2002). Nonprecedential
opinions may be cited only as persuasive authority. See Dynamic Air, Inc., 502 N.W.2d at
800. However, we are not persuaded by these cases because they are factually inapposite
to the instant case.
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required to defer to the jury’s choice between reasonable inferences drawn from the
evidence, see Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d at 599, and Holmgren’s intent to cause L.H. fear is
only one reasonable inference that can be drawn from the evidence here.
The state also argues in its reply brief that the district court ignored the circumstance
proved that Holmgren “physically postured” toward L.H. It cites Clancy, an
obstruction-of-legal-process case, for the proposition that “angry words” combined with
“physical postures and movements” satisfy the element of force. Therefore, the state
argues, the term “physical posturing” is “well understood in the context of an assaultive
encounter” to mean that Holmgren displayed aggressive behavior “intending to impress
threats upon the recipient.” The instant case can be distinguished from Clancy because the
record in that case indicated that Clancy “clenched and raised his fists” in addition to
stating, “You’re mine,” and advancing toward the complainant while shouting obscenities.
Clancy, 2002 WL 233913, at *4. Here, the evidence did not establish with specificity what
Holmgren was shouting or what movements she made to “physically posture” toward L.H.
Therefore, the circumstance proved that Holmgren “physically postured” toward L.H. does
not preclude a reasonable hypothesis that Holmgren did not intend for her actions to cause
fear in L.H.
3

3 Holmgren submitted a pro se supplemental brief that further explained her view of the
encounter with L.H. In the supplemental brief, Holmgren refers to facts outside the record
and does not cite any legal authority. As such, Holmgren does not raise any issue in her
pro se supplemental brief that merits relief. See State v. Meldrum, 724 N.W.2d 15, 22
(Minn. App. 2006) (stating that an allegation is considered waived if it is outside the record
and an issue is waived if the brief does not develop an argument or contain legal authority),
rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 24, 2007).
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The state finally argues that physical contact or use of a weapon is not necessary to
prove intent to cause fear. It argues that the evidence was sufficient to show that Holmgren
intended to cause harm in the form of “cardiac arrest or other physical ailment due to L.H.’s
severe atrial fibrillation.” The state analogizes the instant case to Caruthers. In Caruthers,
this court concluded that the defendant intended to cause fear without the use of physical
force or a weapon via verbal threats that included yelling profanity and the phrase, “Let’s
go outside,” to the complainant in addition to previously threatening to “kick [the
complainant’s] a--.” 2017 WL 164417, at *3. This analogy is inaccurate, however,
because the instant case does not involve similar threatening language. Rather, the record
here does not reflect any verbal threat Holmgren made to L.H. that would indicate her
intent to cause L.H. fear of immediate bodily harm or death.
Although the circumstances proved are consistent with the jury’s determination that
the state established the intent element by circumstantial evidence, the circumstances
proved are also consistent with a reasonable hypothesis of innocence—that Holmgren
engaged in an argument with L.H., as was a common occurrence in the household, but did
not intend to cause L.H. fear of immediate bodily harm or death. Thus, we conclude that
the evidence was insufficient to support the guilty verdict against Holmgren because the
circumstances proved supported a reasonable hypothesis of innocence.
Affirmed.