The State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0444

The State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Shawn Elson Randall,
Appellant

Filed February 26, 2018
Affirmed
Worke, Judge

Carlton County District Court
File No. 09-CR-16-1233

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Thomas Pertler, Carlton County Attorney, Michael J. Boese, Assistant County Attorney,
Carlton, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief A ppellate Public Defender, Jodi Proulx, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reilly, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Rodenberg,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
WORKE, Judge
Appellant challenges his third -degree assault conviction, arguing that the district
court committed reversible err or by instructing the jury on a correctional officer’s
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“authorized use of force,” and d enying appellant’s motion for a mistrial after a witness
testified on a matter ruled inadmissible. We affirm.
FACTS
On June 21, 2016, Correctional Officer (CO) Johnson was monitoring cameras in
the control center of the jail. CO Johnson viewed appellant Shawn Elson Randall’s mother
end a visit with Randall and deposit money as she exited. CO Johnson disco vered that
Randall’s mother deposited the money in another inmate’s acc ount, which is in viola tion
of a circumvention policy.1 CO Johnson provided this information to his supervisor, D.K.
Randall was in the shower when D.K. initiated discussion about the rule violatio n.
Randall became “agitated and started swearing and kind of yelling.” Randall threatened to
“f---ing kick [D.K.’s] ass and f ---ing kill [him].” Randall emerged from the shower and
reached for D.K., and D.K. grabbed Randall’s arm. Randall struggled and D.K. deployed
his chemical agent. Randall hit D.K. in the face at least once causing a bone fracture.
Jail administrator, Paul Coughlin, immediately responded to the cell block and
attempted to talk to Randall. Randall was “irate, screaming, hollering, talking about being
maced [and] yelling.” Randall was transferred to an isolation cell.
Sergeant Rotta of the Carlton County Sheriff’s Office arrived at the jail shortly after
the assault. Sergeant Rotta took a statement from L.C., an inmate in the cell block during
the incident. L.C. stated that Randall became angry after D.K. told him that his mother

1 Inmates receive a handbook that warns of sanctions if money is deposited into another
inmate’s account . Evidence from Randall’s trial indicated that inmates will attempt
avoiding paying fees by utilizing deposits into another inmate’s account.
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should not put money in L.C.’s account. L.C. stated that he heard D.K. discuss the issue
with Randall and observed Randall strike D.K. and D.K. spray Randall with mace.
On June 22, Sergeant Rotta received a message from the jail that Randall wanted to
speak with someone. Randall reported to Sergeant Rotta that D.K. “groped” his penis when
he was in the shower. Sergeant Rotta attempted a fo llow-up question , but Randall
terminated the interview. Once he ha d the information of an alleged assault by a staff
member, Sergeant Rotta contacted the Pine County Sheriff’s Office to eliminate the
possibility of a conflict of interest.
The same day, Pine County Investigator Layon reviewed reports and video of the
incident. The video showed D.K. enter an area where he is unobservable and return to
view approximately 6-7 seconds later with Randall engaged in a fight. Investigator Layon
interviewed Randall who reported that D.K. reached in the shower and “groped [his] penis
and then maced [him].” Randall, again, refused to further discuss the matter.
Randall was charged with third- and fourth-degree assault. At Randall’s trial, the
jury heard testimony from D.K., CO Johnson, Coughlin, Sergeant Rotta, Investigator
Layon, and L.C. The jury found Randall guilty as charged, and the district court sentenced
him to 30 months in prison. This appeal followed.
D E C I S I O N
Jury instructions
Randall first challenges the district court’s jury instructions. This court reviews “a
district court’s jury instructions for an abuse of discretion,” and recognizes that the district
court has “considerable latitude in selecting jury instructions.” State v. Peltier, 874 N.W.2d
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792, 797 (Minn. 2016). This court r eviews the jury instructions in their entirety to
determine if they “fairly and adequately explain the law.” Id.; State v. Kuhnau, 622 N.W.2d
552, 555-56 (Minn. 2001). An instruction is erroneous if it materially misstates the law,
or confuses or misleads the jury on fundamental points of law. State v. Larson, 787 N.W.2d
592, 601 (Minn. 2010); State v. Ihle, 640 N.W.2d 910, 916 (Minn. 2002). Even if a jury
instruction is erroneous, it does not merit a new trial if the error was “harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.” State v. Mahkuk, 736 N.W.2d 675, 683 (Minn. 2007). “An error in jury
instructions is not harmless and a new trial should be granted if it cannot be said beyond a
reasonable doubt that the error had no significant impact on the verdict.” State v. Pendleton,
567 N.W.2d 265, 270 (Minn. 1997).
Randall requested a self-defense jury instruction. Although concluding that it was
a “close question,” the district court gave the jury a self -defense instruction. The district
court instructed the jury that self -defense means that Randall used force against D.K. to
resist an assault. The district court instructed the jury that Randall was not guilty of a crime
if he acted in self-defense and that the state had the burden of proving that Randall did not
act in self-defense.
The district court also instructed the jury on authorized use of force, stating:
If any inmate . . . assaults any [CO] . . . the [CO] may use force
in defense of the assault. If any inmate . . . resists the lawful
authority of any [CO], [or] refuses to obey the [CO]’s
reasonable demands . . . the [CO] ma y enforce obedience and
discipline . . . by the use of force. If any inmate resisting lawful
authority is wounded . . . by the use of force by the [CO] . . .
that conduct is authorized under Minnesota Statute.

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See Minn. Stat. § 243.52 (2014). Randall objected to this instruction, and now argues that
the district court erred in instructing the jury on “authorized use of force” because the
instruction was irrelevant, confusing, and allowed the jury to convict him even if the state
failed to disprove self-defense.
Randall concedes that D.K. was “ authorized to use force ” to enforce discipline
according to law, but claims that the district court “failed to clarify whether this
‘presumption’ was rebutted if [Randall] acted in self-defense because D.K.’s conduct was
excessive or unreasonable.” Randall asserts that the jury was forced to presume that if
D.K.’s use of force was authorized, Randall’s self-defense claim could not be considered.
Here, D.K. testified that he raised the money issue with Rand all and Randall
“verbally threaten[ed]” him. D. K. testified that Randall came out of the shower with his
arm extended, “reaching and grabbing for” him, and yelling that he was going t o “f---ing
kill” D.K. D.K. testified that he grabbed Randall’s arm to control his reach.
Based on D.K.’s testimony, he made the first physical contact by grabbing Randall’s
extended arm. The jury instruction on “authorized use of force” explained that this use of
force was authorized if the jury believed that D.K. was defending against Randall or
enforcing obedience. See id.
Because there was evidence that Randall accused D.K. of groping him, the district
court instructed the jury on self-defense. A defendant has the burden of producing evidence
to support his claim of self-defense. State v. Penkaty, 708 N.W.2d 185, 207 (Minn. 2006).
If the defendant meets this burden, the burden shifts to the state to disprove one or more of
the elements of self -defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.; see State v. Columbus , 258
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N.W.2d 122, 123 (Minn. 1977) (stating that the burden of proof is on the state to convince
the jury beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant did not act in self -defense). Randall
asserts that the “presumption of ‘authorized use of force’ in the jury instruction effectively
obliterated [his] self-defense claim and/or removed the state’s burden to prove that [he] did
not act in self-defense.” But the state presented evidence to disprove Randall’s self-defense
claim.
L.C. reported that Randall was angry, but he did not state that Randall said anything
about D.K. groping him. Other inmates in the cell block declined to make a statement.
D.K. testified that he never groped Randall. Coughlin testified that immediately after the
incident Randall was very agitated about being maced, but never complained that D.K.
groped him. Sergeant Rotta similarly testified that shortly after the incident, Randall was
agitated and shouting but never alleged that D.K. groped him.
It was not until the next day that Randall alleged that D.K. groped him. Sergeant
Rotta testified that other th an Randall’s statement, there wa s no evidence of a sexual
assault. Investigator Layon testified that Randall’s report was “very vague” and stated that
after watching the video, h e was left with the impression “that [D.K.] was viciously
attacked by . . . Randall while performing th e duties of his job.” And D.K. testified that
Randall later apologized to him for what transpired.
The jury was to determine whether (1) D.K. discussed the rule violation with
Randall; Randall became upset, verbally threatened D.K., and emerged from the shower
with his arm extended toward D.K.; D.K. grabbed Randall’s arm, which was an authorized
use of force; and Randall struck D.K. in the face, or (2) D.K. groped Randall in the shower,
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which was not an authorized use of force; and Randall acted in self-defense when he struck
D.K. in the face. The jury instructions on authorized use of force and self -defense
accurately described the law; thus, the district court’s jury instructions were appropriate.
Mistrial
Randall moved for a mistrial following the direct examination of D.K. The district
court denied the motion. Randall argues that the district court committed reversible error
when it denied his motion. This court applies an abuse-of-discretion standard of review to
a district court’s denial of a motion for a mistrial. State v. Manthey, 711 N.W.2d 498, 506
(Minn. 2006).
A district court should grant a motion for a mistrial if there was an error or defect in
trial procedure that would deny a defendant a fair trial. Id. “A mistrial should not be
granted unless there is a reasonable probability that the outcome o f the trial would be
different if the event that prompted the motion had not occurred.” Id. (quotation omitted).
When conducting the likelihood-of-prejudice analysis, this court considers both the event
that prompted the mistrial motion in the context of the case and the presumably mitigating
effect of the district court’s curative jury instructions. See State v. Budreau, 641 N.W.2d
919, 926 (Minn. 2002) (presuming that jurors follow curative instructions); State v. McNeil,
658 N.W.2d 228, 232 (Minn. App. 2003) (considering whether impermissible testimony
substantially affected the jury’s decision).
Here, the district court ruled that it would not permit evidence regarding Randa ll’s
history of incarceration. The supreme court has determined that “ references to prior
incarceration of a defendant can be unfairly prejudicial.” Manthey, 711 N.W.2d at 506.
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Randall claims that D.K. twice referenced Randal l’s history of incarceration.
Randall claims that the first reference occurred when the prosecutor asked D.K. if he knew
Randall and D.K. answered, “Yeah. I’ve dealt with him throughout the years in the jail.”
Randall objected and the district court instructed the jury to disregard the a nswer. While
this statement likely indicated that D.K. dealt with Ran dall in the jail while Randall was
incarcerated, D.K. did not state that Randall was incarcerated when he dealt with him
throughout the years in the jail. Randall could have been a visitor to the jail. Randall could
have been brought to the jail, booked, and released. Randall concedes that his “criminal
history was not specifically delineated.” And the district court immediately corrected the
reference by instructing the jury to disregard the statement. See Budreau, 641 N.W.2d at
926 (stating presumpti on that jurors follow the district court’s instruction s). The district
court also twice asked Randall’s attorney if he wished to have an additional curative
instruction, which Randall’s attorney declined.
Randall claims that the second reference occu rred when D.K. testified that he
wanted to discuss the money issue with Randall, intending to “ tell him that it was an
incident where we’ve discussed it before that he can’t do that.” The district court overruled
Randall’s objection to this testimony. The state followed up by asking D.K., “So, as you’re
aware, Mr. Randall had been previously specifically told putting money on other people’s
books is a rule violation?” D.K. agreed that Randall k new that this was a violation. The
district court stated that this statement was not problematic because the state was allowed
to elicit testimony regarding Randall’s knowledge of the rule. Also, the jury was aware
that Randall was incarcerated during the incident. D.K.’s statement that “we’ve discussed
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it before” does not necessarily refer to a prior incarceration because the issue could have
been discussed during Randall’s current incarceration. See Manthey, 711 N.W.2d at 506
(stating that “references to prior incarceration of a defendant can be unfairly prejudicial”).
Because there is no reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have been
different without these statements, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying
Randall’s motion for a mistrial.
Affirmed.