State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0191

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Shawn Elson Randall,
Appellant.

Filed December 6, 2021
Affirmed
Frisch, Judge

Carlton County District Court
File No. 09-CR-19-2503

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Peter Magnuson, Assistant A ttorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Lauri A. Ketola, Carlton County Attorney, Carlton, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Steven P. Russett, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appella nt)

Considered and decided by Connolly , Presiding Judge; Frisch , Judge; and Smith,
John, Judge.

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
FRISCH, Judge
On appeal from a conviction for violating a harassment restraining order, appellant
argues that the district court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over him, violated his Sixth
Amendment right to a speedy trial and to confront an opposing witness, failed to prove a
necessary element of the crime, and committed a prejudicial discovery violation. Appellant
raises additional issues in his pro se supplemental brief. We affirm.
FACTS
On June 12, 2019, appellant Shawn Elson Randall’s grandfather petitioned the
district court for a harassment restraining order (HRO) ag ainst Randall. The following
day, the district court issued an HRO prohibiting Randall from coming within two blocks
of grandfather’s house. Randall was served with the HRO three days later. Ran dall never
contested the HRO. Randall and grandfather are members of the Fond du Lac Band of
Lake Superior Chippewa. Grandfather lives on the Fond du Lac reservation.
On December 7, 2019, grandfather heard yelling and swearing outside his house. 1
He looked through the window and saw three people, including Randall, arguing in his
backyard. Grandfather went onto the deck attached to the back of his house “to see what
was going on.” Grandfather watched as Randall and the two other men moved toward hi s
driveway. Grandfather “thought there might be some kind of a fight getting started,” so he
went inside and called 9 -1-1, and then returned to the deck. Randall came onto the deck

1 The state’s initial complaint listed the date of the offense as December 8. The state
amended this date to December 7. The change in date does not impact Randall’s appeal.
3
and walked toward grandfather, “shaking his finger at [him].” Randall wa s six or seven
feet away from grandfather. Randall then turned around and, after “a few minutes,” left
the property.
On December 20, 2019, respondent State of Minnesota charged Randall with
violating the HRO. At his January 22, 2020 initial hearing, Ra ndall demanded a speedy
trial and notified the district court that he would move to dismiss the charge for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction. On March 20, in response to the COVID -19 pandemic, the
Chief Justice of the Minnesota Supreme Court issued an o rder which prohibited the
commencement of new jury trials. 2 Continuing Operations of the Courts of the State of
Minnesota Under a Statewide Peacetime Declaration of Emergency , No. ADM20 -8001
(Minn. Mar. 20, 2020). Six days later, Randall formally moved to dismiss. The district
court denied Randall’s motion.
Randall’s first trial date was scheduled for May 11. However, the district court
found good cause to continue Randall’s trial to July 7, concluding that “the case[] would
have otherwise gone ahead, but for the pandemic . . . and unfortunately, can’t go ahead.”

2 The Chief Justice extended this jury-suspension order through July 6, except for a limited
number of pilot programs. Order Governing the Operations of the Minnesota Judicial
Branch Under Emergency Executive Order Nos. 20 -53, 20-56, No. ADM20 -8001 (Minn.
May 15, 2020). Thereafter, the Judicial Council allowed district courts to restart jury trials
upon the submission and approval of plans to safely host jury trials. Minnesota Judicial
Branch COVID-19 Preparation Plan, Minn. Jud. Council (May 15, 2020); June 16, 2020,
Judicial Council Meeting Minutes , Minn. Jud. Council (June 25, 2020). The Judicial
Council approved six counties to participate in the pilot p rogram. First Four Counties
Approved to Hold Criminal Jury Trial Pilots , Minn. Jud. Council (June 3, 2020); Two
Additional Counties Approved for Criminal Jury Trial Pilots, Minn. Jud. Council (June 15,
2020).
4
On June 5, the district court continued Randall’s trial a second time because of the
COVID -19 pandemic, again finding good cause. The district court rescheduled the trial to
August 4.
On July 2, the state requested that Randall undergo a Rule 20 prescreen competency
evaluation. Randall’s counsel did not object to the evaluation, and the district court ordered
that Randall complete the same. The prescreen report recommended that Randall undergo
a Rule 20 competency evaluation. Randall’s counsel again did not object and instead
advocated for Randall to complete the full evaluation, noting that Randall had completed
a Rule 20 screening “less than a year ago” which “did not recom mend any further
examination, so clearly something has changed in the eyes of the professional, and I would
respect that opinion.” The district court ordered that Randall undergo a Rule 20 evaluation.
The first Rule 20 report was submitted on July 20, 2 020. However, Randall did not
cooperate with the evaluator, “refus[ing] to even come to the phone.” At a hearing on July
28, the district court concluded that the report did not “me[e]t any of the standards required
by the rule” and ordered a new Rule 20 evaluation. Randall’s counsel did not object to a
new evaluation, and again encouraged the completion of a n evaluation, stating that
“Randall does appear to be quite dysregulated in his behavior” and “there’s been increased
behavioral issues at the jail. . . . I think it is crucial to get the results of that Rule 20 before
deciding, um, what to do.” The district court ordered a second Rule 20 evaluation. 3 The
district court continued the trial date for the third time, concluding that “I don’t believe that

3 In light of Randall’s speedy -trial demand, the district court appointed a new evaluator to
facilitate a quick turnaround in issuing the Rule 20 report.
5
we can be ready to try a case on this coming Tuesday . . . August 4th” and rescheduled the
trial for September 1.
The second Rule 20 report was filed on August 5. Randall again refused to speak
with the evaluator. On August 14, Randall’s counsel filed a motion objecting to the second
report because Randall did not speak with the evaluator, specifically expressing concern
about “Randall’s ability to consult with his attorney and contribute to his defense.”
Randall’s counsel requested an update to t he second report so that Randall could speak
with the evaluator. On August 18, the district court ordered the evaluator to attempt to
meet with Randall again. The district court continued Randall’s trial date for the fourth
time “because we will not be able to have [the evaluator’s] response back” by September 1
and rescheduled the trial to September 15.
At the third Rule 20 evaluation, Randall did meet with the evaluator. The evaluator
published an updated report concluding that Randall was competent to stand trial.
Randall’s counsel stated that he was satisfied with the updated competency report. Randall
acknowledged to the district court that “I do have mental health issues” and apologized for
his “bizarre behavior.”
The trial started on September 15. That day, the parties conducted voir dire. At the
end of the day, a prospective juror made prejudicial statements about Randall in the
presence of other jurors. The district court struck all the jurors who could have overheard
that juror’s statements. After striking these jurors, the district court learned that the jury
pool was insufficient to immediately move forward with the trial and continued the trial to
the following week.
6
A jury was empaneled on September 22. The trial occurred over the next two days.
The jury found Randall guilty of violating the HRO. Randall moved for a new trial and
the district court denied the motion. The district court convicted Randall of violating the
HRO and sentenced him to 30 months in prison.
Randall appeals.
DECISION
Randall challenges his conviction, arguing that (1) the district court lacks
subject-matter jurisdiction over him, (2) his speedy-trial right was violated , (3) his
prior-conviction stipulation was insufficient to establish a nece ssary element of the crime,
(4) the state committed a discovery violation necessitating a new trial, and (5) improper
testimony violated Randall’s constitutional rights. Randall makes three additional
arguments in his pro se supplemental brief. We addres s each in turn.
I. The district court has subject-matter jurisdiction over Randall.

Randall argues that the district court lacks jurisdiction over his criminal charges for
violating an HRO based on his presence within a two -block radius inside the reservation
for three reasons: (1) he is a member of an Indian tribe, (2) the HRO is a civil order, and
(3) the HRO attempts to prohibit his access to tribal lands. We disag ree.
“The Supreme Court has consistently recognized that Indian tribes retain attributes
of sovereignty over both their members and their territory.” State v. Stone , 572 N.W.2d
725, 728 (Minn. 1997) (quotation omitted). This sovereignty is subordinate to the federal
government, not state governments. Id. However, state laws may be applied to tribal
Indians where Congress expressly provides. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission
7
Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 207 (1987); see also McGirt v. Oklahoma , 140 S. Ct . 2452, 2478
(2020). Thus, a state’s authority to exercise subject -matter jurisdiction over Indians on a
reservation is governed by federal law. State v. Jones, 729 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. 2007). We
review de novo whether a state has jurisdiction to enforce a statute against an Indian tribe
member on a reservation. Id.
Public Law 280 grants the state broad criminal jurisdiction over Minnesota’s
“Indian country.”4 Pub. L. No. 83-280, § 2(a), 67 stat. 588, 588 (1953) (codified in relevant
part at 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a) (2018)). Public Law 280, however, grants the state only limited
jurisdiction “over private civil litigation . . . [and not] general civil regulatory authority.”
Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 208 (citing Bryan v. Itasca County, Minn., 426 U.S. 373, 385, 388-90
(1976)).
Accordingly, when a State seeks to enforce a law within an
Indian reservation . . . it must be determined whether the law is
criminal in nature, and thus fully applicable to the reservation
. . . or civil in nature, and applicable only as it may be relevant
to private civil litigation.

Id.
In Cabazon, the United States Supreme Court set forth the test for determining
whether a state law is civil or criminal in nature within the meaning of Public Law 280,

4 “Indian country” is defined by statute and includes “all land within the limits of any
Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States Government.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 1151 (2018); see DeCoteau v. Dist . Cnty. Court, 420 U.S. 425, 427 n.2 (1975). Public
Law 280 excludes the Red Lake Reservation and the Bois Forte Reservation at Nett Lake.
18 U.S.C. § 1162(a) (2018); Stone, 572 N.W.2d at 728 n.3.
8
and thus whether the state has ju risdiction to charge an Indian tribe member on a
reservation with violating the state law:
[I]f the intent of a state law is generally to prohibit certain
conduct, it falls within Pub. L. 280’s grant of criminal
jurisdiction, but if the state law general ly permits the conduct
at issue, subject to regulation, it must be classified as
civil/regulatory and Pub. L. 280 does not authorize its
enforcement on an Indian reservation.

Id. at 209. The Court also established a “shorthand” test for this jurisdicti onal question,
which focuses on “whether the conduct at issue violates the State’s public policy.” 5 Id.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has identified four non -exhaustive factors to
evaluate “whether an activity violates the state’s public policy in a nature serious enough
to be considered ‘criminal.’” Stone, 572 N.W.2d at 730. Those factors include (1) “the
extent to which the activity directly threatens physical harm to persons or property or
invades the rights of others,” (2) the extent that the law allows for exceptions and
exemptions, (3) “the blameworthiness of the actor,” and (4) “the nature and severity of the
potential penalties for a violation of the law.” Id.
Minnesota courts apply “a two -step approach” to the Cabazon test. Id. First, we
determine “the focus” of the analysis; that is, “whether to analyze the broad conduct or the
narrow conduct at issue.” Jones, 729 N.W.2d at 5. By default, we focus on the broad
conduct, and only focus on the narrow conduct if “the narrow conduct presents

5 In light of Public Law 280’s purpose “to combat lawlessness,” public policy refers to
public criminal policy. Stone, 572 N.W.2d at 730. “Public criminal policy goes beyond
merely promoting the public welfare. It seeks to protect society from serious breaches in
the social fabric which threaten grave harm to persons or property.” Id.
9
substantially different or heightened public policy concerns.” Stone, 572 N.W.2d at 730.
Second, after determining the focus, we examine whether “the conduct at issue is generally
permitted but subject to regulation, or if it is generally prohibited.” Jones, 729 N.W.2d
at 5. Where the conduct is generally permitted, “then the law controlling the conduct is
civil/regulatory”; where the co nduct is generally prohibited, “the law is
criminal/prohibitory.” Stone, 572 N.W.2d at 730. We utilize the “shorthand” public-policy
test in close cases. Jones, 729 N.W.2d at 5.
Here, the broad conduct at issue is Randall’s unrestricted ability to trave l, while the
narrow conduct at issue is Randall’s specific ability to travel within two blocks of his
grandfather’s house. The restrictions on Randall’s ability to travel within two blocks of
his grandfather’s house present heightened public-policy concerns. Randall is not a generic
person with respect to his grandfather’s property —he was specifically prohibited from
traveling within two blocks of his grandfather’s residence because his presence caused
grandfather concern for his safety. Randall’s proxim ity to his grandfather’s property
therefore presents heightened public-policy concerns, and we focus on the narrow conduct.
We next analyze whether “the conduct at issue is generally permitted but subject to
regulation, or if it is generally prohibited.” Id. Here, the narrow conduct —Randall’s
ability to travel near his grandfather’s property —was generally prohibited because the
HRO expressly restricted him from being within two blocks of the residence. Nothing
about the HRO or the relevant HRO statute af fords Randall an exception to enter the
property. See Minn. Stat. § 609.748 (2018). Nor did grandfather grant Randall permission
10
to enter the property. The HRO thus generally prohibited Randall from coming within two
blocks of his grandfather’s property and constitutes a criminal/prohibitory law.
This conclusion is consistent with our holding in State v. LaRose. 543 N.W.2d 426
(Minn. App. 1996). There, defendant was cited with criminal trespass on a rental unit. Id.
at 426. Defendant moved to dismis s for lack of jurisdiction because the trespass occurred
on a reservation and was committed by an Indian tribe member. Id. at 427. We reasoned
that Minnesota’s trespass statute “serves punitive and deterrent ends not served by the
regulatory property law s” and held that the statute “prohibits, rather than regulates, entry
or occupancy of another’s dwelling or building.” Id. at 427-28. We concluded that the
district court had subject -matter jurisdiction over charges related to the defendant’s
criminal trespass. Id. at 428.
Like the trespass statute in LaRose, the HRO statute at issue here “serves punitive
and deterrent ends” and seeks to prohibit, not regulate, conduct. Id.; see Minn. Stat.
§ 609.748, subd. 6(b) -(d) (providing criminal penalties for violating an HRO). The HRO
statute contains no exceptions. Minn. Stat. § 609.748. We hold that the HRO statute is
criminal/prohibitory and subject-matter jurisdiction exists over Randall’s criminal charges
for a violation of that order.
The four-part public-policy shorthand test confirms our conclusion. See Stone, 572
N.W.2d at 730. First, Randall’s violation of the HRO “directly threaten[ed] physical harm
to persons or property or invade[d] the rights of others.” Id. Grandfather obtained the
HRO because he was fearful of Randall and did not want Randall near him or his property.
Grandfather believed that a fight was breaking out between Randall and the other two
11
individuals, and Randall later came within six feet of grandfather on the deck, “shaking his
finger” at grandfather. Randall’s conduct was the exact conduct that grandfather sought to
prevent by obtaining the HRO. Grandfather was forced to call the police to protect his
person and property because Randall did not abide by the HRO. Second, there is no
exception to the HRO statute or the HRO itself. Third, Randall is blameworthy for his
conduct. Randall was served with the HRO and knew that he was prohibited from being
within two blocks of his grandfather’s home. He never opposed or challenged the HRO
after its issuance. Nonetheless, Randall entered his grandfather’s property and approached
grandfather while shaking a finger at him. Fourth , a violation of an HRO carries a
potentially severe penalty, as an H RO violation is chargeable as a felony if the person
violating the HRO has two or more “domestic violence-related offense convictions” within
ten years from the HRO violation. Minn. Stat. § 609.748, subd. 6(d)(1). All four factors
support the conclusion that the HRO statute is a criminal/prohibitory law and that the
district court has jurisdiction over criminal charges related to Randall’s violation of the
HRO.
The district court did not err by determining that it possesses subject -matter
jurisdiction over this matter.
II. Randall’s speedy-trial right was not violated.
Randall argues that his speedy -trial right was violated because his trial occurred
more than 200 days after he requested a speedy trial. Randall claims that any delay caused
by his motion to dismiss should not be attributed to him and that the state is responsible for
12
delays related to the COVID -19 pandemic, the Rule 20 competency evaluations, and the
insufficient jury pool. We disagree.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides an accused “the
right to a speedy and public trial.” U.S. Const. amend. VI; see also Minn. Const. art. 1,
§ 6. “Whether a defendant has been denied a speedy trial is a constitutional question
subject to de novo review.” State v. Osorio, 891 N.W .2d 620, 627 (Minn. 2017).
“[T]he central question we must answer when assessing a Sixth Amendment speedy
trial claim is this: Did the State bring the accused to trial quickly enough so as not to
endanger the values that the right to a speedy trial protec ts?” State v. Mikell, 960 N.W.2d
230, 244 (Minn. 2021). “While the speedy trial right protects the individual interests of
the accused, the speed with which an accused must be brought to trial must be considered
with regard to the practical administratio n of justice.” Id. (quotation omitted ). “Criminal
prosecutions are designed to move at a deliberate pace to protect the rights of the accused
and to ensure the ability of society to protect itself by allowing for thorough and prepared
prosecutions; wheth er a trial is prompt enough must be assessed in light of both interests.”
Id. (quotation omitted ). “[A]ny inquiry into a speedy trial claim necessitates a functional
analysis of the right in the particular context of the case.” Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514,
522 (1972). “Accordingly, whether delay in completing a prosecution amounts to an
unconstitutional deprivation of rights depends on the circumstances.” Mikell, 960 N.W.2d
at 244 (quotation omitted).
In determining whether a defendant’s right to a speedy trial has been violated,
Minnesota courts apply the four-factor balancing test set forth in Barker. State v. Windish,
13
590 N.W.2d 311, 315 (Minn. 1999) (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 530-33). The four fa ctors
are: (1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the defendant’s assertion
of his right to a speedy trial, and (4) the prejudice to the defendant. Barker, 407 U.S. at
530. None of these factors are dispositive, “[r]ather, they a re related factors and must be
considered together with such other circumstances as may be relevant.” State v. Taylor ,
869 N.W.2d 1, 19 (Minn. 2015) (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 533). “ This balancing test
allows the court to accommodate the sometimes com peting interests between the orderly
prosecution of crimes that is fair to both sides and the prompt resolution of the case by
trial.” Mikell, 960 N.W.2d at 245.
This is not a check -the-box, prescriptive analysis; rather, we
assess how the factors interact with each other in a difficult and
sensitive balancing process to answer the essential question of
whether the State brought the accused to trial quickly enough
to avoid endangering the values that the right to a speedy trial
protects.

Id. (quotation omitted).
A. Length of the Delay
We begin by considering the length of the delay. Randall argues that presumptive
prejudice occurred because more than 60 days elapsed between the time that he demanded
a speedy trial and when his trial commenced. “A def endant must be tried as soon as
possible after entry of a plea other than guilty. . . . [T]he trial must start within 60 days
unless the court finds good cause for a later trial date.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 11.09(b). The
supreme court has interpreted the rule “to mean that delays beyond the 60-day limit simply
raise the presumption that a violation has occurred and require the trial court to conduct a
14
further inquiry to determine if there has been a violation of the defendant’s right to a speedy
trial.” State v. Friberg, 435 N.W.2d 509, 513 (Minn. 1989). “We determine whether good
cause exists for a later trial date under Rule 11.09 by applying the Barker factors.” Mikell,
960 N.W.2d at 246 (quotation omitted).
It is true that more than 60 days elapsed between the date that Randall demanded a
speedy trial and the commencement of his trial. But the “threshold conclusion that a delay
is presumptively prejudicial does not end our consideration of the length of the delay in the
weighing of the Barker factors.” Id. at 250. We instead consider the reasons for the delay,
noting that “[a] longer delay may be justified if there are good reasons for the delay.” Id.
B. Reason for the Delay
We next consider who bears responsibility for the delay. “[I]f there is good cause
for the delay —for instance, a key witness of the State is unavoidably unavailable or the
government takes a good faith, well-supported appeal from a pretrial ruling—the delay will
not be held against the State.” Id. at 251. The following chart depicts the delays in bringing
Randall’s case to trial:
Delay Time Frame

Reason for Delay Number of Days
(245 total)
Jan. 22 – Mar. 206 Motion to dismiss for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction
59

Mar. 21 – Aug. 4 COVID -19 & prohibition on new
jury trials
137
Aug. 5 – Sept. 14 Rule 20 evaluations 41
Sept. 15 – Sept 22 Insufficient jury pool 8

6 Although Randall’s motion to dismiss was not resol ved until June, the COVID -19
pandemic served as a superseding delay because the Chief Justice’s March 20 order made
it impossible for the district court to host a new jury trial.
15
1. Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction
Randall is responsible for the 59-day delay caused by his motion to dismiss for lack
of subject-matter jurisdiction. “Delays caused by defense motions generally weigh against
the defendant.” State v. Hahn, 799 N.W.2d 25, 32 (Minn. App. 2011), rev. denied (Minn.
Aug. 24, 2011). In State v. DeRosier, the supreme court found that the “delay in bringing
the matter to trial was occasioned by defense motions” and held that, “[w]hen the overall
delay in bringing a case to trial is the result of the defendant’s actions, there is no speedy
trial violation.” 695 N.W.2d 97, 109 (Minn. 2005). Similarly, in State v. Johnson , the
supreme court denied defendant’s speedy -trial claim, concluding that defendant’s “own
motions were the primary reason for much of the delay.” 498 N.W.2d 10, 16 (Minn. 1993).
Randall’s motion to dismiss caused a 59 -day delay in his trial —from January 22,
when he raised his initial jurisdictional challenge, until March 20, when the Chief Justice
prohibited new jury trials. This delay is solely attributable to Randall. 7
2. The COVID-19 Pandemic
Neither party is responsible for the 137 -day delay caused by the COVID -19
pandemic and the Chief Justice’s prohibition on new jury trials. In State v. Jackson, we
held that when the “delay occurred solely because of public -safety co ncerns due to the
COVID -19 pandemic and when the district court was prohibited from holding a jury trial
by order of the Chief Justice” neither party was responsible for the delay . ___ N.W.2d

7 The state concedes that it is responsible for 16 days of the delay because it requested a
continuance in February to brief Randall’s motion. We need not credit this delay, however,
because Randall’s unmeritorious motion to dismiss was not resolved until April 16 and
would have delayed his trial beyond March 20 even without the continuance.
16
___, ___, No. A21-0126, slip op. at 6-7 (Minn. App. Nov. 8, 2021). Here, the district court
twice found that the pandemic constituted good cause to delay Randall’s trial. We therefore
conclude that the circumstances of the pandemic “rendered a trial unsafe and did not reflect
a deliberate attempt by the state to ham per the defense.” Id. at 6.
Randall argues that the implementation of the COVID -19 pilot program for
restarting jury trials shows that his trial could have been held at an earlier date. We observe
that Randall did not make this argument before the dist rict court. Regardless, it is
untenable. Of the 87 Minnesota counties, only six were approved for the pilot program
and there is no evidence in the record that Carlton County could have been approved as a
pilot county. Even so, Randall’s trial was the very first post-COVID -19 jury trial in Carlton
County.
COVID -19 created, and still presents, a significant public -health crisis. District
courts attempted to restart jury trials as soon as safely possible, balancing the need to
protect the participants, court employees, counsel, jurors, and the public. While Randall
wanted his trial to occur sooner than it did, the delay caused by the pandemic was
“unavoidable.” Id. Any delay attributable to the COVID-19 pandemic cannot be attributed
to either party.
3. Rule 20 Evaluations
The delay caused by the series of Rule 20 competency evaluations is attributable to
Randall. “When the overall delay in bringing a case to trial is the result of the defendant’s
actions, there is no speedy trial violation.” DeRosier, 695 N.W.2d at 109. In DeRosier,
the supreme court found that no speedy -trial violation existed where the delay was caused,
17
in part, by defendant’s own Rule 20 motion. Id. Delays in the completion of competency
evaluations because of a defendant’s lack o f cooperation are also legitimate reasons to
delay a trial and are attributable to the defendant, rather than to the state, for speedy -trial
purposes.8
Here, the record shows that Randall was nonresponsive and uncooperative
throughout the evaluative proc ess. Although Randall’s claims that these were
“eleventh-hour” evaluations, he omits that his own counsel supported each evaluation and
that Randall himself caused the delay in completing the evaluations because he refused to
meet with the evaluators. Indeed, Randall’s counsel stated that completion of a complete
Rule 20 evaluation was “crucial” to ensure that Randall was competent to consult with
counsel, assist with his defense, and stand trial. Any delay caused by Randall’s
intractability and refusal to cooperate with the Rule 20 evaluations is attributable solely to
him.
4. Insufficient Jury Pool
Randall asserts that the state delayed his trial by a week due to an insufficient jury
pool. We again disagree. “The interpretation of the Minnesota Rules o f Criminal
Procedure is a question we review de novo.” Reynolds v. State , 888 N.W.2d 125, 129
(Minn. 2016). Rule 11.09 provides that “[o]n demand of any party after the entry of [a
not-guilty] plea, the trial must start within 60 days.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 11.09(b). Rule 26

8 In the nonprecedential case of State v. Jones , where defendant refused to cooperate in
the Rule 20 evaluation, we held there that the “proceedings were legitimately delayed by
at least three weeks while the court awaited the results of the evaluation.” No. A11 -2145,
2012 WL 5381834, at *1, 3 (Minn. App. Nov. 5, 2012), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 29, 2013).
18
describes the process for conducting a trial, including procedures for jury selection and
voir dire. Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.02. Subdivision 4 of that rule, for example, provides
detailed instructions on jury -selection methods. Id., subd. 4(3)(a). And while the
Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure do not define when a trial “starts,” the inclusion
of numerous, specific jury -selection instructions for the voir dire process compels us to
determine that a trial “starts,” for speedy-trial purposes, at the commencement of voir dire.
Because Randall’s trial started on September 15, there was no legally cognizable delay
when voir dire was continued to September 22. 9
C. Assertion of Speedy-Trial Right
We next consider the nature of the assertion of the speedy -trial right. Although a
“defendant’s assertion of his speedy trial right is entitled to strong evidentiary weight in
determining whether the defendant was deprived of the right,” the inquiry “is n ecessarily
contextual.” Mikell, 960 N.W.2d at 252 (quotation omitted). Minnesota courts consider
“other signals in the case to assess whether a demand for a speedy trial is serious,” id., and
consider “the frequency and force of a demand” which is likely to reflect the “seriousness
and extent of the prejudice which has resulted” from an alleged violation, Friberg, 435
N.W.2d at 515.

9 Even if Randall’s trial did not “start” until September 22, the continuance of voir dire
occurred because of an unforeseen and unfortuna te statement by a juror. Without striking
the jurors who overheard the statement, Randall would have been unfairly prejudiced at
trial. Such a delay cannot be attributed to the state. See Mikell, 960 N.W.2d at 251 ( “[I]f
there is good cause for the dela y . . . the delay will not be held against the State.”).
19
Here, Randall asserted his demand for a speedy trial on January 22, 2020. Randall
repeated his speedy -trial demand four m ore times, stating on September 3, “[t]his is my
fifth speedy trial demand and I —and I can’t wait.” We do not question whether the
demands for speedy trial were serious —Randall asserted his demand throughout his
proceedings. But the context of the demand s illustrate that all parties were aware that a
safe trial could not occur precisely within 60 days following the demand because of the
pandemic. We also observe that, notwithstanding his speedy -trial demands, Randall’s
counsel conceded that a trial could not occur until a competency evaluator determined that
Randall could effectively consult with counsel and participate in his own defense. While
this factor weighs in Randall’s favor, these circumstances weaken the strength of the
demand for a speedy trial in our overall balancing.
D. Prejudice by the Delay
We next consider whether Randall was prejudiced by the delay, focusing on three
interests: “(1) preventing oppressive pretrial incarceration; (2) minimizing the anxiety and
concern of the accused; and (3) preventing the possibility that the defense will b e
impaired.” Mikell, 960 N.W.2d at 253 (quotation omitted). An impairment of the defense
is the “most serious” of these interests and is typically “suggested by memory loss by
witnesses or witness unavailability.” Taylor, 869 N.W.2d at 20 (quotation omi tted).
Randall argues that he suffered all three forms of prejudice but acknowledges that
our caselaw instructs us that “[i]f a defendant is already in custody for another offense . . .
[oppressive pretrial incarceration and anxiety] are not implicated.” Id. Because Randall
20
was already in custody for other offenses, we only consider whether the delay impaired
Randall’s ability to defend the merits of the charge.
Randall suggests that his defense was impaired because “by the time of trial
grandfather’s memory had faded and his story completely changed.” We are not
persuaded. At trial, the state produced definitive evidence establishing that Randall was
physically present on grandfather’s property in violation of the HRO. Although
grandfather could not remember certain specific details from the day of Randall’s alleged
HRO violation, any impairment to grandfather’s memory did not undermine the
substantive defense to the charge. Because Randall was not prejudiced by the delay, this
factor weighs against him.
E. Balancing the Factors
Our final step in the analysis consists of “the delicate and sensitive balancing
required to answer” whether the state brought Randall to trial “quickly enough so as not to
endanger the values that the speedy trial right protects.” Mikell, 960 N.W.2d at 255. The
supreme court, extrapolating from the Barker factors, identified “a series of commonsense
questions . . . to determine whether the values embedded in the speedy trial right were
protected.” Id. at 244-45. These questions are:
Who is responsible for the delay? Is the justification for the
delay good or bad? Is the length of the delay consistent with,
and proportionate to, the justification for the delay? Were the
defendant’s interests harmed by the delay its elf and did that
harm increase as the delay lengthened? Was the defendant
serious about getting to trial promptly, which is good evidence
that he perceived the delay as harmful?

Id. at 245.
21
Here, the delays in bringing Randall to trial were either caus ed by Randall or the
pandemic. These delays were justified. Randall was responsible for the unmeritorious
motion to dismiss and the delays caused by his uncooperative behavior regarding the Rule
20 examinations. The delay caused by the pandemic was just ified by public -safety
concerns. See Jackson, slip op. at 6-7. The length of these delays was consistent with, and
proportionate to, the justification for the delay. Randall’s interests were not harmed by the
delay itself and any harm did not increase a s the delay lengthened. None of the delays are
attributable to the state. We therefore agree with the district court that Randall’s
speedy-trial right was not violated.
III. Randall stipulated to his prior convictions and cannot collaterally attack the
validity of those prior convictions in this action.

A person may be convicted of felony violation of a restraining order if he or she
violates an HRO “within ten years of . . . two or more previous qualified domestic
violence-related offense convictions.” Minn. Stat. § 609.748, subd. 6(d)(1). In 2016,
Randall was convicted of third - and fourth -degree assault. 10 State v. Randall , No.
A17-0444, 2018 WL 1040727, at *1 (Minn. App. Feb. 26, 2018), rev. denied (Minn. Apr.
25, 2018).
Prior to trial, Randall stipula ted to these convictions in order to preclude the jury
from learning about his criminal history. But now Randall claims that he only stipulated

10 Randall appealed this conviction in 2018, arguing that the district court provided
improper jury instructions and improperly denied his motion for a mistrial. Randall, 2018
WL 1040727, at *2-3. We affirmed. Id. at *3. Randall did not challenge his fourth-degree
conviction as being a lesser-included offense.
22
to an exhibit containing a certified copy of the convictions and not to the element of having
had two previous qualifying convictions. Randall also argues that his fourth -degree
conviction from the 2016 assault was a lesser -included offense of his third -degree-assault
conviction and is thus invalid under Minn. Stat. § 609.04, subd. 1(1) (2018) (providing that
one cannot be convicted of a “lesser degree of the same crime”). Randall therefore
contends that the state failed to prove that he had two prior qualifying convictions, a
necessary element to a felony conviction for violation of an HRO.
As a thres hold matter, Randall’s argument constitutes an impermissible collateral
attack on the validity of his prior conviction. We allow collateral attacks on prior
convictions in only “unique cases.” State v. Schmidt , 712 N.W.2d 530, 538 n.4 (Minn.
2006) (quota tion omitted). For example, we allow collateral attacks to challenge an
underlying conviction when a defendant pleaded guilty without the benefit of counsel.
State v. Nordstrom , 331 N.W.2d 901, 904 -05 (Minn. 1983); see also State v. Simon , 339
N.W.2d 907, 907 (Minn. 1983) (rejecting defendant’s collateral attack when his guilty plea
was counseled). Randall does not claim that his prior conviction was the product of unique
circumstances. And Randall did not challenge the validity of his prior conviction on direct
appeal. We therefore do not consider the collateral attack on the validity of his prior
conviction in this postconviction appeal.
Moreover, we disagree with Randall’s contention that he only stipulated to an
exhibit containing information abou t his prior convictions as opposed to stipulating to the
existence of his two prior convictions. Our review of the record shows that Randall agreed
23
to stipulate to the fact that he had two prior qualifying convictions during extensive
colloquies with the district court. We see no error by the district court.
IV. The district court acted within its discretion by denying the motion for mistrial.
Randall argues that he is entitled to a new trial because of a prejudicial discovery
violation by the state. The parties agree that the state committed a discovery violation by
failing to disclose part of grandfather’s testimony in advance of trial. See Minn. R. Crim.
P. 9.01, subd. 1(2)(b) (mandating that the state disclose any written summaries of oral
statements to the defense).
“The imposition of sanctions for violations of discovery rules and orders is a matter
particularly suited to the judgment a nd discretion of the trial court.” State v. Lindsey, 284
N.W.2d 368, 373 (Minn. 1979). We review a district court’s decision to impose discovery
sanctions for an abuse of discretion. State v. Palubicki, 700 N.W.2d 476, 489 (Minn. 2005).
We do not order a new trial to remedy a discovery violation unless there is a reasonable
probability that the evidence would have affected the outcome of the trial. State v. Clobes,
422 N.W.2d 252, 255 (Minn. 1988).
At trial, grandfather testified that, after Randall and the two other individuals moved
from the backyard to the driveway, Randall “came up on the—on the deck, started walking
towards me and he stopped and he was saying something. I couldn’t understand it, but he
was shaking his finger at me.” Randall argued, and the state agreed, that the state failed to
disclose that grandfather would testify that Randall approached him on the deck, shaking
his finger. Randall claimed that the failure to disclose this information prejudiced him
because his defense centered around grandfather’s inability to properly identify him.
24
The district court concluded that, although the state committed a discovery violation
by failing to disclose this evidence, the testimony did not prejudice Randall because
Randall’s HRO violati on stemmed from his being within two blocks of grandfather’s
property and the undisputed evidence showed that Randall did enter grandfather’s property.
Even so, the district court blunted any prejudice to Randall by allowing defense counsel to
impeach grandfather at trial with his inconsistent statement to the police officer.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Randall’s motion for a
mistrial. Even though the state committed a discovery violation by failing to disclose a
portion o f grandfather’s testimony, Randall failed to establish that there is a reasonable
probability that the evidence would have affected the outcome of the trial. Grandfather
testified that he identified Randall in the backyard, other supporting evidence showe d that
Randall entered the property, and the HRO prohibited Randall from being within two
blocks of grandfather’s house.
V. The police officer’s testimony did not violate Randall’s constitutional rights.
Randall next argues that the Fond du Lac police offic er’s testimony violated his
Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause right because the officer testified to statements
made by Randall’s father. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Minn. Const. art. I, § 6. The
Confrontation Clause prohibits the admission of testimonial statements made by an
out-of-court witness unless that witness was unavailable and the defendant had a prior
opportunity to cross-examine him. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 (2004). Both
parties agree that father’s statements, as told by the pol ice officer at trial, were testimonial
out-of-court statements.
25
We review unobjected-to testimonial statements for plain error . State v. Rossberg ,
851 N.W.2d 609, 618 (Minn. 2014). “In order to meet the plain error standard, a criminal
defendant must sho w that (1) there was an error, (2) the error was plain, and (3) the error
affected the defendant’s substantial rights.” State v. Myhre, 875 N.W.2d 799, 804 (Minn.
2016) (citing State v. Griller, 583 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Minn. 1998)). “With respect to the
substantial-rights requirement, [the defendant] bears the burden of establishing that there
is a reasonable likelihood that the absence of the error would have had a significant effect
on the jury’s verdict.” State v. Horst, 880 N.W.2d 24, 38 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted).
This is a “heavy burden.” Rossberg, 851 N.W.2d at 618.
Even assuming the existence of plain error here, Randall has not shown that any
violation of the Confrontation Clause affected his substantial rights. See id. The officer’s
testimony about father’s statements was innocuous. Grandfather was the eyewitness who
saw Randall on his property and his was the central testimony of the case. The officer’s
reference to Randall’s father spans less than a page of the trial transcript and the identity
of the referenced individual is not clear from the officer’s testimony. Randall failed to
meet his heavy burden to demonstrate how any plain error affected his substantial rights.
VI. Randall’s pro se arguments fail.
Randall makes three pro se arguments in his supplemental brief. He argues that
(1) his trial would have turned out differently if two additional Fond du Lac police officers
had testified, (2) his pretrial incarceration and postponed trial caused hi s witnesses to be
26
unavailable, and (3) grandfather’s petition for the HRO was “forged under perjury without
home owners authorization, knowledge or consent.”
Because Randall did not raise his first two arguments in the district court, they are
forfeited on appeal.11 We “will not decide issues which were not raised before the district
court.” Roby v. State , 547 N.W.2d 354, 357 (Minn. 1996). Even so, plain error is not
discernable from this record.
Randall’s remaining claim that grandfather forged the pe tition for the HRO is an
impermissible collateral attack on the validity of the HRO. “As a general rule, a party’s
failure to appeal the issuance of a court order precludes a collateral attack on that order in
a subsequent proceeding.” State v. Romine, 757 N.W.2d 884, 889 -90 (Minn. App. 2008),
rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 17, 2009). Randall did not appeal from the HRO proceedings. See
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 104.01, subd. 1 (providing 60-day time frame to appeal an appealable
order). Instead, Randall now challenges the HRO for the first time on direct appeal from
his criminal conviction for violating the HRO. Because the criminal proceeding is a
subsequent and separate matter, we do not consider his arguments regarding the validity of
the HRO. State v. H arrington, 504 N.W.2d 500, 503 (Minn. App. 1993) (refusing to
consider collateral attack on HRO in reviewing an appeal taken from appellant’s criminal
conviction for violating the HRO), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 30, 1993).
Affirmed.

11 We note that both of these issues stem from Randall’s argument that subpoenaed
witnesses did not testify. The record contains no evide nce of the issuance or existence of
any such subpoenas. Nor does the record contain any information about what these officers
might have testified to at trial.