State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0617

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Prince Lashone Holt,
Appellant.

Filed April 30, 2018
Affirmed
Ross, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-16-27297

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Brittany D. Lawonn, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Roy G. Spurbeck, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Peterson, Judge; and Ross,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
ROSS, Judge
A jury watched a video recording and heard police testimony describing the
following events occurring on the sidewalk in downtown Minneapolis: Prince Holt talked
2
to a woman seconds before the woman purchased crack cocaine from a drug dealer; Holt
nodded to several pedestrians at the crosswalk while he was standing next to the drug
dealer; and Holt nodded toward, talked to, and handed a crack pipe and lighter to another
crack buyer while Holt stood immediately beside the dealer. A jury found Holt guilty of
third-degree aiding and advising in the sale of cocaine. Holt appeals his conviction, arguing
that the evidence was insufficient to convict him, that prosecutorial misconduct made his
trial unfair, and that his trial attorney improperly conceded guilt on an element of the crime.
He adds other arguments in a supplemental brief. None of these arguments is convincing,
and we affirm.
FACTS
Minneapolis Police Officer Mark Lanasa was watching part of downtown
Minneapolis covertly by camera from the police department’s surveillance room on an
evening in October 2016. Officer Lanasa saw a woman approach a man later identified as
Prince Holt near Hennepin Avenue and 8th Street. Police know the area as a place where
cocaine dealers frequently operate in the evenings. The woman spoke to Holt. Holt looked
at his phone. The woman then turned and walked to Andre Parker , who was standing
nearby. Parker dropped a small white object on the sidewalk and the woman picked it up.
The woman appeared to be holding folded cash. She walked past Holt and into a tobacco
shop, out of view of the surveillance cameras.
Officer Lanasa, who has extensive experience observing and investigating drug
deals, believed that the woman had purchased crack cocaine from Parker. Soon Holt and
Parker stood together, talking. Holt nodded his head to pedestrians as they passed by. One
3
of them —a man —walked by, and Holt walked after him, talking to him. After a brief
discussion between Holt and the man, Holt, Parker, and the man entered a recessed
doorway. Parker reach ed to his mouth and showed a white substance to the man. Holt
handed the man a pipe and seemed to load it with a white substance. The three then moved
to a different recessed doorway. Holt handed the man a lighter and the man lit and smoked
from the pipe. After several minutes, the man handed the pipe and the lighter back to Holt,
who also smoked from it.
Officer Lanasa directed Officers San Roman and Joshua Henninger to arrest Parker
and Holt. The officers found 19 bindles of crack cocaine on Parker and they found a glass
pipe on Holt. The state charged Holt with third-degree aiding and advising in the sale of
cocaine in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 152.023, subdivision 1(1) (2016). A jury
found him guilty. This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
Holt makes three principal arguments. He argues that the evidence was insufficient
to convict him , that the prosecutor committed misconduct by eliciting inadmissible
character evidence, and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his
attorney conceded guilt on an element of the charged offense. Holt offers additional
arguments in his supplemental brief. None of his arguments leads us to reverse his
conviction.
I
We are not persuaded by Holt’s argument that the evidence was not sufficient to
convict him. When we address an insufficient-evidence argument, we review the record
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for evidence that, viewed in a light favorable to the conviction, would allow the jury to find
the defendant guilty. State v. Ortega, 813 N.W.2d 86, 100 (Minn. 2012). We assume that
the jury believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any contrary evidence. Id. The
evidence supporting the intent element here is circumstantial. We apply heightened
scrutiny to convictions based on circumstantial evidence. See S tate v. Al–Naseer, 788
N.W.2d 469, 473 (Minn. 2010). This includes any element that was proved by
circumstantial evidence. State v. Porte, 832 N.W.2d 303, 309 (Minn. App. 2013) (citing
Al–Naseer, 788 N.W.2d at 473–75).
The state charged Holt under a statute establishing that “[a] person is criminally
liable for a crime committed by another if the person intentionally aids, advises, hires,
counsels, or conspires with or otherwise procures the other to commit the crime.” Minn.
Stat. § 609.05, subd. 1 (2016). Proving that Holt intentionally aided Parker required the
state to establish two elements: the first is that Holt knew that Parker was “going to commit
a crime” (in this case selling cocaine) and the second is that he “intended his presence or
actions to further the commission of that crime.” See State v. Mahkuk, 736 N.W.2d 675,
682 (Minn. 2007).
Reviewing whether the circumstantial evidence sufficiently proved that Holt knew
that Parker was going to commit a crime involves tw o steps. We first identify the
circumstances proved. State v. Hanson , 800 N.W.2d 618, 622 (Minn. 2011). We then
independently examine the reasonableness of the inferences that can be made from these
circumstances, including inferences consistent with innocence. Id. We maintain a guilty
5
verdict only if “there are no other reasonable, rational inferences that are inconsistent with
guilt.” Id. (quotation omitted).
We identify the circumstances proved by deferring to the jury’s implied finding of
these circumstances as well as to its rejection of any conflicting evidence. Id. The
circumstances proved here are all those details and observations outlined above. Holt
argues that one might reasonably infer that, instead of assisting Parker in selling the
cocaine, he was actually trying to purchase cocaine. This may be a possible interpretation
of the circumstances, but it is not a reasonable one. Holt’s nodding repeatedly to passersby,
engaging with a woman who immediately received drugs from Parker in a surreptitious
exchange, and his nodding toward and following the man and talking with him immediately
before the man stopped to receive drugs from Parker, add to the other circumstances for a
total picture depicting complicity in sale, not in purchase. The evidence supports the
verdict.
II
We similarly are not persuaded by Holt’s claim of prosecutorial misconduct. Holt
argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct by eliciting inadmissible character
evidence from Officer Lanasa:
Prosecutor: Did you see anything else that drew your attention?
Officer Lanasa: I observed Mr. Holt.
Prosecutor: Are you familiar with Mr. Holt?
Officer Lanasa: I am.
Prosecutor: How is that?
Officer Lanasa: From prior incidents.

6
Holt did not object to this questioning at trial. We review unobjected-to prosecutorial
misconduct under a modified plain-error test. State v. Milton, 821 N.W.2d 789, 802 (Minn.
2012). This places the burden on Holt to show that an error was made and that it was plain.
See id. If Holt establishes these things, then the burden shifts to the state to prove that the
error did not affect Holt’s substantial rights. See id.
The prosecutor engaged in misconduct. When a defendant’s identity is not at issue,
a prosecutor may not draw a police officer to reveal that he knows the defendant from prior
contacts. State v. Valentine, 787 N.W.2d 630, 641 (Minn. App. 2010) (citing State v.
Strommen, 648 N.W.2d 681, 688 (Minn. 2002)). It is also improper for a prosecutor to
elicit evidence of prior bad acts to taint the defendant’s character. State v. Harris, 521
N.W.2d 348, 354 (Minn. 1994); see also Minn. R. Evid. 404(b) (2017) (“Evidence of
another crime, wrong, or act is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to
show action in conformity therewith.”). Holt’s attorney acknowledged in opening
statements that Holt was one of the men depicted on the surveillance footage, and the state
concedes that Holt’s identity was never disputed at trial. In fact, the state does not dispute
that eliciting the testimony constituted an error. The prosecutor compounded the error by
having the officer elaborate about his extensive felony -drug-arrest experience. In this
context, the officer ’s testimony that he knew Holt “[f ]rom prior incidents” essentially
informed the jury that Holt had multiple previous drug-enforcement encounters with
police. The prosecutor engaged in misconduct by eliciting this evidence of Holt’s bad
character, and it was error to allow the testimony.
7
We also conclude that the error was plain. Again, the state does not argue otherwise.
An error is plain if it is clear or obvious, and “[u]sually this is shown if the error contravenes
case law, a rule, or a standard of conduct.” State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294, 302 (Minn.
2006). Given the clear principles from caselaw and the evidentiary rules, there could be no
mistaking the prosecutor’s improper questioning for valid questioning. The error was plain.
But Holt’s substantial rights were not affected. Substantial rights are affected when
there is “a reasonable likelihood that the error had a significant effect on the jury’s verdict.”
Milton, 821 N.W.2d at 809 (quotation omitted). Because there was plain error, the burden
is on the state to prove that this was not the case. See id. at 802. The state introduced
considerable evidence against Holt, and the jury saw much of it unfiltered by means of the
video recording. Because the jurors knew that Parker was selling drugs and because we
have already established that no reasonable, innocent interpretation explains Holt’s
involvement with Parker’s drug dealing, we conclude that there is no reasonable likelihood
that Officer Lanasa’s improper reference to his prior involvement with Holt affected the
verdict. Holt’s substantial rights were therefore not affected.
III
We turn to Holt’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. To receive a new trial for
ineffective assistance, Holt must establish that his attorney performed beneath an objective
standard of reasonableness and that it is reasonabl y probable that, but for the deficiency,
the proceeding would have resulted differently. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
687–88, 104. S. Ct. 2052, 2065 (1984); Opsahl v. State, 677 N.W.2d 414, 420– 21 (Minn.
2004). Holt argues that his trial counsel was ineffective b y conceding guilt on one of the
8
elements of the aiding -and-assisting drug sales charge—that the principal (Parker) was
selling drugs—without Holt’s consent to the concession. The defendant, not his attorney,
has the choice whether to concede guilt. State v. Prtine, 784 N.W.2d 303, 318 (Minn.
2010). So a defense attorney’s performance is deficient and prejudice is presumed if the
attorney admits his client’s guilt unless the def endant consented to or acquiesced in the
admission of guilt. Id. at 317–18.
It is clear that Holt’s attorney conceded guilt on an element of the offense. During
opening statements, Holt’s attorney said the following:
But from the context, it seems likely that the man with the
ponytail and the man in black, Mr. Parker, seem to exchange a
small amount of cash for drugs.
At that point, Mr. Parker . . . leaves the scene, leaving
Mr. Holt with his crack pipe and this buyer who just bought
this small amount of crack together. And the man with the
ponytail loads Mr. Holt’s crack pipe and then they walk
together, and the man with the ponytail smokes the crack.

The concession continued during questioning. Cross-examining Officer Lanasa, Holt’s
attorney replayed some of the surveillance video and, at one point, asked, “And then
turning to when the individuals used the cocaine . . . . [I]t appears that he started smoking
at about 6:50:07; is that correct?” The concession culminated in the attorney’s closing
argument, which included the plain statement, “There’s no real dispute that Mr. Parker was
selling cocaine.”
It is also clear, however, that Holt acquiesced in the concession. A defendant
acquiesces in his trial counsel’s concession “when trial counsel uses the same strategy from
beginning to end of trial and the defendant does not object.” Prtine , 783 N.W.2d at 318
9
(citing State v. Provost, 490 N.W.2d 93, 97 (Minn. 1992)). The concession of Parker’s drug
dealing began in the opening statement and continued throughout the trial. Holt
demonstrated his resolve to object to those things he found objectionable. For example,
immediately before the trial began, Holt objected to having his attorney and informed the
district court that he wanted a new one. Later he objected to part of Officer Lanasa’s
testimony on his own rather than through his attorney. Given Holt’s proven ability and
willingness to object to things he found objectionable, and given his failure to object
throughout his attorney’s multiple statements conceding that Parker was engaged in drug
dealing, we must infer Holt’s acquiescence to the concession. Holt’s attorney therefore was
not ineffective by conceding the element on Holt’s behalf.
IV
We have carefully considered all of the supplemental arguments Holt has
forwarded. Each argument plainly fails on various legal and factual grounds, and none
warrants a detailed discussion.
Affirmed.