Prince Lashone Holt, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0483

Prince Lashone Holt, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed September 30, 2019
Affirmed
Larkin, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-16-27297

Prince Lashone Holt, Bayport, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Jonathan P. Schmidt, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Rodenberg, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and
Stauber, Judge.

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
LARKIN, Judge
Appellant challenges the postconviction court’s summary den ial of his petition for
relief. Appellant also challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to remove the
judge assigned to preside over his postconviction proceeding. We affirm.
FACTS
In 2016, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Prince Lashone Holt with
third-degree controlled-substance sale. At the omnibus hearing, Holt’s counsel moved to
dismiss the charge for lack of probable cause. Defense counsel informed the district court
that the parties had discussed submitting surveillance video and police reports as the factual
record for the motion and that “the defense [was] in agreement that the facts alleged in the
police reports are stipulated to and can be understood as tru e for the purposes of [the
probable-cause] motion,” except for a police report describing the contents of the
surveillance video. Soon after informing the district court of the stipulation, defense
counsel stated that Holt was no longer comfortable with the stipulation, and Holt informed
the district court that he wanted to challenge certain evidence at a hearing. In concluding
the omnibus hearing, the district court clarified that “[t]here’s . . . no stipulation right now.”
After the hearing, Holt subm itted a written motion to dismiss for lack of probable cause ,
along with a supporting memorandum stating, “Shortly after the omnibus hearing, the
parties agreed to the proposed stipulations.”

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The district court denied Holt’s motion, noting that the facts on which it relied were
“discerned from the two exh ibits submitted by th e parties: the video of the incident and
the documents from law enforcement.”
The case was tried to a jury. Although the surveillance video was admitted as
evidence at trial, the police reports that were included in the factual stipulation for the
omnibus hearing were not. Holt did not object to the admission of the surveillance video.
The jury found Holt guil ty as charged. The district court entered judgment of conviction
and sentenced Holt to serve 60 months in prison.
Holt appealed his conviction and made the following arg uments in his principal
brief: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his co nviction, (2) the prosecutor
engaged in misconduct by eliciting inadmissible character evidence from a witness, and
(3) his trial counsel was ineffective because he conceded guilt on an element of the offense.
State v. Holt, No. A17-0617, 2018 WL 1997072, at *1 (Minn. App. Apr. 30, 2018), review
denied (Minn. July 17, 2018). This court rejected those claims. Id. at *2-4. Holt made the
following arguments in his pro se supplemental brief : (1) the district court violated his
due-process rights by denying him a hearing to challenge statements made by the police,
(2) the factual stipulation was “forced on [him]” against his wishes, (3) the state’s case was
based on fabricated evidence, and (4) the district court judge who presided over the
omnibus hearing and trial was biased. This court rejected Holt’s pro se arguments, stating
that they “fail[ed] on various legal and factual grounds, and none warrant [ed] a detailed
discussion.” Id. at *4. This court affirmed Holt’s conviction. Id.

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In January 2019, Holt petitioned for postconviction relief and set forth the following
claims: (1) “the district court failed to honor [his] request . . . for an Evidentiary Hearing”
regarding the factual stipu lation, (2) “the district court violated [his] 5th [A]mendment
privilege against Self -Incrimination” by “unconstitutionally compel[ling] and forc[ing
him] to a gree to a self incriminating stipulation against his will and enter[ing] the
stipulation into evi dence without his consent,” (3) “the district court used the Invalid
Stipulation as a vehicle to bar [ him] from challenging the evidence and receiving the
Evidentiary Hearing he requested,” (4) he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel,
and (5) he received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Holt sought to remove the
judge assigned to preside over his postconviction proceeding , arguing that the assigned
judge had presided over Holt’s omnibus hearing and trial and was therefore not impartial
because she “fail[ed] to adhere to the safeguards of Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01 requiring
personal waiver from [him] of . . . his trial rights” when accepting a factual stipulation.
The chief judge of the district court denied Holt’s request for removal, and t he
postconviction court summarily denied Holt’s request for relief. The postconviction court
reasoned that Holt’s claims regarding the lack of an evidentiary hearing, the factual
stipulation, and ineffective assistance of trial counsel were procedurally barred and
“fail[ed] to raise a cognizable claim.” The postconviction court also reasoned that Holt’s
ineffective-assistance-of-appellate-counsel claim failed on the merits. This appeal follows.

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D E C I S I O N
I.
Minnesota’s postconviction statute provides that
a person convicte d of a crime, who claims that: (1) the
conviction obtained or the sentence or other disposition made
violated the person’s rights under the Constitution or laws of
the United States or of the state . . . may co mmence a
proceeding to secure relief by filing a petition in the district
court in the county in which the conviction was had to vacate
and set aside the judgment and to discharge the petitioner or to
resentence the petitioner or grant a new trial or corre ct the
sentence or make other disposition as may be appropriate.

Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1 (2018).
A postconviction court may summarily deny a petition for relief without a hearing
if “the petition and the files and records of the proceeding conclusi vely show that the
petitioner is entitled to no relief.” Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 1 (2018). “An evidentiary
hearing upon a petition for postconviction relief is not required unless the petitioner alleges
such facts which, if proved by a fair preponder ance of the evidence, would entitle him or
her to the requested relief.” Roby v. State, 547 N.W.2d 354, 356 (Minn. 1996). Allegations
in a postconviction petition must be “more than argumentative assertions without factual
support.” State v. Caldwell, 803 N.W.2d 373, 388 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted). This
court reviews a denial of postconviction relief for an abuse of discretion. Reed v. State ,
925 N.W.2d 11, 18 (Minn. 2019). In doing so, this court reviews the postconviction court’s
legal determinations de novo and its factual findings for clear error. Brown v. State, 895
N.W.2d 612, 617 (Minn. 2017).

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Stipulation-Related Claims
Holt contends that he is entitled to postconviction relief based on errors related to
the factual stipulation that followed the omnibus hearing. He argues that the district court
failed to obtain a valid waiver of his trial rights under Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01 before
“proceeding to trial on a set of stipulated facts,” that the district court violated his due -
process rights by denying him an opportunity to contest the evidence submitted as
stipulated, that the district court violated his Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-
incrimination by “forcing stipulations of facts,” and that his trial attorney was ineffective
because he “stipulate[d] to the facts of the case without first obtaining a valid waiver from
[him] in open court.”
The postconviction court determined that Holt’s claims regarding the stipulation
were procedurally barred under State v. Knaff la, 243 N.W.2d 737, 741 (Minn. 1976) .
Under Knaffla, “where direct appeal has once been taken, all matters raised therein, and all
claims known but not raised, will not be considered upon a subsequent petition for
postconviction relief.” 243 N.W.2d at 74 1; see Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1 (“A petition
for postconviction relief after a direct appeal has been completed may not be based on
grounds that could have been raised on direct appeal of the conviction or sentence.”). Any
claim that was not raised, but should have been known, is also barred by Knaffla. Andersen
v. State, 830 N.W.2d 1, 8 (Minn. 2013). “A claim is not Knaffla-barred, however, if (1) the
defendant presents a novel legal issue or (2) the interests of justice require the court to
consider the claim.” Buckingham v. State, 799 N.W.2d 229, 231 (Minn. 2011).

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In Holt’s pro se supplemental brief in his direct appeal, Holt argued that the district
court violated his due -process rights by denying him a hearing to challenge statements
made by the police and that a factual stipulation was “forced on [him]” against his wishes.
We rejected those arguments, stating that we “carefully considered all of the supplemental
arguments Holt [had] forwarded” and that “[e]ach argument plainly fail[ed] on v arious
legal and fa ctual grounds, and none warrant[ed] a detailed discussion.” Holt, 2018 WL
1997072, at *4.
Because Holt argued , in his direct appeal, that the district court denied him an
opportunity to challenge certain information in the factual stipulation and that the
stipulation was “forced on him,” those issues are Knaffla-barred. See Knaffla, 243 N.W.2d
at 741. To the extent that Holt’s stipulation -related claims in his postconviction petition
were different than the issues raised in his di rect appeal, they are nonetheless Knaffla-
barred because Holt was aware of them, but did not raise them, in his direct appeal. As the
postconviction court reasoned, all issues based on the stipulation should have been raised
in the direct appeal.
Holt does not argue that his stipulation -related claims fall within either the novel -
legal-issue or interests-of-justice exceptions to the Knaffla bar. To satisfy the novel-legal-
issue exception, “a claim must be so novel that its legal basis was not reasonably available
to [the] petitioner at the time the direct appeal was taken.” Powers v. State, 695 N.W.2d
371, 374 (Minn. 2005). The interests-of-justice exception applies only “if fairness requires
it and the petitioner did not deliberately and inexcus ably fail to raise the claim on direct
appeal.” Perry v. State , 731 N.W.2d 143, 146 (Minn. 2007). The claim must also have

8
substantive merit. Anderson v. State , 81 1 N.W.2d 632, 634 (Minn. 2012). The
postconviction court correctly determined that neither Knaffla exception applies, reasoning
that Holt’s petition “largely lacks any factual or legal basis for relief that is comprehensible,
let alone a basis that did not exist formerly” and that “[n]ot only has there not been a
colorable explanation for why [Holt] di d not make [the stipulation-related] claims earlier,
but also some of the claims were already denied by the Court of Appeals.”
Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel
Holt contends that his appellate attorney was ineffective because he “ignore[d] the
Constitutional core issues of the district court failing to obtain a valid waiver from [him]
in accordance with Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01” before “proceeding to trial on a set of
stipulated facts when he was well aware of [those] issue[s].”
A determination whether a defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel
involves a mixed question of law and fact that is reviewed de novo. Dereje v. State, 837
N.W.2d 714, 721 (Minn. 2013). Appellate courts generally analyze ineffective-assistance-
of-counsel claims under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984).
Id. To prevail under Strickland, a defendant “must show that counsel’s representation fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness” and that “there is a reasonable probabilit y
that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have bee n
different.” 466 U.S. at 68 8, 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2064, 2068; see also State v. Rhodes , 657
N.W.2d 823, 842 (Minn. 2003) (applying Strickland to a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel). Appellate courts apply “a strong presumption that [an attorney’s] performance

9
falls within the wide range of ‘reasonable professional assistance.’” State v. Jones , 392
N.W.2d 224, 236 (Minn. 1986).
“Appellate counsel is not required to raise all possible claims on direct appeal, and
counsel need not raise a claim if [he] could have legitimately concluded that it would not
prevail.” Arredondo v. State, 754 N.W.2d 566, 571 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted). A
claim of ineffect ive assistance of appellate counsel is “properly raised in a first
postconviction petition, because the petitioner could not have known of such a claim at the
time of direct appeal.” Zornes v. State, 880 N.W.2d 363, 370-71 (Minn. 2016).
Holt argues that it was objectively unreasonable for his appellate counsel to “totally
ignore[] the omnibus [hearing]” and the stipulation because the district court “stated on the
record in the omnibus hearing the stipulation was the reason why [he] couldn’t have any
type of evidentiary hearing or ascertain any other issues outside of the stipulations before
trial that would promote a fair and expeditious trial.”
It was not objectively unreasonable for Holt’s appellate attorney to focus on the
concession of guilt that defense counsel made at trial, instead of the alleged erroneous
admission of documents that impacted the district court’s probable-cause determination.
Moreover, because Holt challenged the stipulation in his pro se appellate brief and this
court rejected his challenge, it is unlikely that the failure to raise such arguments affected
the result of Holt’s direct appeal. Holt, 2018 WL 1997072, at *2-3. In sum, Holt’s claim
of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel fails both the performance and prejudi ce
prongs of Strickland, and the postconviction court did not err by rejecting it.

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Because the petition, files, and records of the proceeding conclusively show that
Holt is not entitled to relief, the postconviction court did not abuse its discretion by denying
Holt’s petition for relief without a hearing.1
II.
Holt contends that the district court erred by denying his motion to remove the judge
assigned to preside over his postconviction proceeding . “A judge must not preside at a
trial or other proceeding if disqualified under the Code of Judicial Conduct.” Minn. R.
Crim. P. 26.03, subd. 14 (3). Under the Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct, a judge is
disqualified “in any proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be
questioned.” Minn. Code Jud. Conduct Rule 2.11 (A). “A judge is disqualified due to an
appearance of partiality if a reasonable examiner, with full knowledge of the facts and
circumstances, would question the judge’s impartiality.” State v. Finch, 865 N.W.2d 696,
703 (Minn. 2015) (quotation omitted).
“A motion to remove for cause is committed to the discretion of the [district] court
and [an appellate court] will reverse only for an abuse of that discretion.” Hooper v. State,
838 N.W.2d 775, 790 (Minn. 2013) (q uotation omitted). We “presume that a judge has
discharged her duties properly.” Hannon v. State , 752 N.W.2d 518, 522 (Minn. 2008).

1 In his reply brief, Holt argues, for the first time, that “the district court, prosecutor and
the public defender failed to adhere to the criminal procedure along with the standards for
determining the admissibility of . . . impeachment evidence.” Issues raised “for t he first
time in [an] appellant’ s reply brief [in a criminal case],” havin g not been raised in
respondent’s brief, are “not proper subject matter for [the] appellant’s reply brief,” and they
may be deemed waived. State v. Yang, 774 N.W.2d 539, 558 (Minn. 2009). Because Holt
raised his impeachment argument for the first time in his reply brief, we do not consider it.

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“[B]ias must be proved in light of the record as a whole” and “[p]revious adverse rulings
by themselves do not demonstrate judicial bias.” Id.
In denying Holt’s removal motion, the chief judge of the Fourth Judicial District
reasoned that Holt generally “failed to provide any information substantiating his . . . claim
of judicial prejudice.” Holt’s removal motion was based entirely on his belief that the
district court erred in accepting the probable-cause stipulation and that the stipulation was
adverse to him. Assuming without deciding that the stipulation was adverse to Holt, the
district court’s acceptance of it by itself does not demonstrate judicial bias. See Hannon,
752 N.W.2d at 522 (“Previous adverse rulings by themselves do not demonstrate judicial
bias.”). And Holt does not point to any other evidence of bias. Lastly, in his direct appeal,
Holt argued in his pro se supplemental brief that the district court judge who accepted the
stipulation was biased. This court rejected that argument on the merits . Holt, 2018 WL
1997072, at *4. On this record, the chief judge did not abuse her discretion by denying
Holt’s motion to remove the judge assigned to preside over his postconviction proceedings.
Affirmed.