State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0641

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Lucas Cosme Roman-Vargas,
Appellant.

Filed March 5, 2018
Affirmed
Reyes, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR16-10117

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Jonathan P. Schmidt, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Pub lic Defender, Jennifer Workman Jesness,
Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presid ing Judge; Peterson, Judge; and Bjorkman,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
REYES, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, arguing
that the district court erred when it limited di rect- and cross-examination of the witnesses
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and excluded evidence of the victim’s family ’s immigration status to show a motive to
fabricate the allegations. Additionally, appellant makes a number of factual arguments in
his pro se supplemental brief. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant sexually abused his cousin, E. V-A., from when sh e was approximately
four to eight years old while liv ing with E. V-A. and her fam ily. E. V-A. was nine years
old and appellant was 34 years old at the time of appellant’s jury trial.
When E. V-A. was approximately eight year s old, she told appellant to stop sexually
abusing her. E. V-A. told her sister abou t the sexual abuse when she was approximately
nine years old. Sister told their mother what had happened, and mother told their father.
After that, father kicked appellant out of the house. Father spoke w ith their priest about
the sexual abuse, and their priest notified the Archdiocese, which notified the county,
which in turn notified the police. During th e police investigation, the Cornerhouse Child
Advocacy Center conducted a recorded interview with E. V-A.
On April 14, 2016, the state filed a complaint in the district court charging appellant
with two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct in viol ation of Minn. Stat.
§ 609.342, subd. 1(a), 1(h)(iii) (2012). Appellant’s jury trial took place on December 5-
12, 2016. The state’s witnesses included E. V-A., sister, mother, and father, among others.
Although E. V-A. testified ab out the sexual abuse, the state did not present physical
evidence. The state played the Cornerhouse interview for the jury.
Appellant raised the issue of inquiring into E. V-A.’s family’s immigration status
for the first time during the motion hearing on the first day of trial. Over the next few days,
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appellant raised the immigration issue, ar guing it was highly pr obative of motive to
fabricate the allegations. Appellant also claime d that he had a witness, the aunt of both
appellant and E. V-A., that would testify that father, who is her brother, told her that mother
and sister fabricated the allegation in order to obtain a U-visa.1
The state objected and sought to exclude evidence of the family’s immigration status
from the defense’s cross-examination of father. The state questioned the relevance of the
testimony and argued that it was highly prejudicial for counsel to comment on the family’s
immigration status or to imply that the family is not in the United States legally.
Outside of the jury’s presence, the district court called father to testify about whether
he had spoken to aunt about E. V-A.’s allegation against appellant. Father testified that he
had not spoken to aunt when appellant was a rrested and had not sp oken to aunt about
appellant, immigration papers, or E. V-A.’s allegations. After that, the district court
permitted appellant to ask father, in the jury’s presence, whether he told aunt that mother
and sister falsified the allegations, but wo uld not allow references to U-visas or
immigration status. The district court also allowed appellant to inquire into what E. V-A.
may have told father. During father’s cros s-examination, defense counsel asked father,
“have you had any discussion about this incident regarding [defendant] to [aunt?]” Father

1 A U-visa is an immigration benefit that is available to an alien who both falls victim to a
serious crime and provides meaningful assistance to law enforcement. See Immigration
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U) (2012). The benefits are also available to
the victim’s family members if the victim is under the age of 16. Id. For purposes of
immigration law, the term alien means any pe rson who is not a citizen or national of the
United States. Id. (a)(3); see also United States ex rel Claussen v. Day, 279 U.S. 398, 400,
49 S. Ct. 354, 354 (1929).
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replied that he had not. Appellant did not as k father whether mother and sister fabricated
the allegations or what E. V-A. had told father.
After the close of the state’s case-in-ch ief and outside of the jury’s presence,
appellant stated that he wanted to ask aunt what father told her about appellant. Despite a
lack of foundation, the state, in a showing of good faith, asked the district court to permit
appellant to elicit testimony from aunt about the substance of her conversation with father
for impeachment. Appellant sought to examin e aunt because she claimed that father had
told her that he believed mother and sister were fabricating the allegations to gain an
immigration benefit. During his direct-e xamination of aunt, a ppellant asked her if:
(1) father, who is her brother, told her in March or April of 2016 that his wife and daughter
were making up E. V-A.’s allegations; (2) he had told her that he did not support what wife
and daughter were doing but that he had to go al ong with it; (3) he had told her that he
believed his wife and daughter were making false allegations against an innocent man; and
(4) she chose to testify because she wanted the jury to hear the truth. Aunt answered “yes”
to each question.
On December 12, 2016, the jury found ap pellant guilty on both counts of first-
degree criminal sexual conduct. The district court senten ced appellant to 160 months
imprisonment, followed by a ten-year conditional release term. This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
Appellant argues that the district court violated his right to introduce evidence in his
defense and his right to confront witnesses. Both alleged constitutional errors are subject
to harmless-error review. State v. Taylor, 869 N.W.2d 1, 12 (2015) (applying harmless-
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error review to Confrontation Clause errors) (citation omitted); State v. Blom, 682 N.W.2d
578, 621 (Minn. 2004) (applying harmless-erro r review to an “err oneous exclusion of
evidence that violates the defe ndant’s right to present eviden ce”). “A district court’s
exclusion of evidence is error if the exclusion is based on an abuse of discretion.” State v.
Larson, 787 N.W.2d 592, 597 (Min n. 2010). “When an error implicates a constitutional
right, we will award a new trial unless the er ror is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”
State v. Davis , 820 N.W.2d 525, 533 (Minn. 2012) (citation a nd quotation omitted).
Harmless beyond a reasonable doubt means th at the reviewing court “must be satisfied
beyond a reasonable doubt that an average jury (i.e. a reasonable jury) would have reached
the same verdict ‘if the evid ence had been admitted and th e damaging potential of the
evidence fully realized.’” State v. Greer, 635 N.W.2d 82, 90 (Minn. 2001) (quoting State
v. Post, 512 N.W.2d 99, 102 (Minn. 1994)).
I. Any error made by the district court when it limited appellant’s cross-
examination of E. V-A.’s family was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Appellant argues that the district court erred in not permitting him to cross-examine
E. V-A.’s family members about their immigr ation status as a motive to fabricate sexual-
abuse allegations to obtain an immigration benefit. We are not persuaded.
In criminal cases, the defe ndant’s right to cross-exam ine witnesses for motive or
bias is secured by th e Sixth Amendment. Davis v. Alaska , 415 U.S. 308, 315, 317, 94
S. Ct. 1105, 1110 (1974) (“We have recognized that the exposure of a witness’ motivation
in testifying is a proper and important function of the cons titutionally protected right of
cross-examination.”). Nevertheless, trial c ourts “retain wide latitude insofar as the
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Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination
based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the
issues, the witness’ safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.”
Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679, 106 S. Ct. 1431, 1435 (1986).
Here, the district court determined that the family’s immigration status was only
marginally relevant and that evidence of im migration status was more prejudicial than
probative. Although appellant argues that the district cour t erred in these evidentiary
determinations, we need not address this issue because any error by the district court was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. A reas onable jury would have reached the same
conclusion even if the evidence had been admitted and its damaging potential realized. See
Greer, 635 N.W.2d at 90 (citation omitted).
Appellant fails to connect the family’s immigration status to E. V-A. herself making
a false allegation against appellant. His only connection between the abuse falsifications
and the family’s alleged receipt of an immigr ation benefit was throu gh aunt’s testimony.
Her testimony was predicated on an alleged conversation that she had with father, wherein
he told her that he thought mother and sister were fabricating the allegations for an
immigration benefit. Appellant was permitted to ask aunt ab out the alleged fabrication,
absent any reference to immigrat ion status, and also asked fath er if he had had spoken to
aunt about E. V-A.’s allegations, to which he replied that he had not. In finding appellant
guilty, the jury necessarily determined both that father’s testimony was more credible and
that aunt’s conversation with father did not create a reasonable doubt relevant to its inquiry
of appellant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Because appellant’s argument rests solely
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on what father allegedly told aunt, and we defer to the jury ’s credibility determinations,
appellant’s argument that the district court erred does not affect our decision because any
error by the district court was harmless beyon d a reasonable doubt. We are satisfied that
the jury would have reached th e same verdict even if the district court had not limited
appellant’s cross-examination of father.
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the scope of
appellant’s direct-examination of aunt.

The district court permitted appellant to question aunt about father’s statement that
he thought mother and daughter were fabr icating the allegations despite a lack of
foundation. Appellant now argues that the dist rict court abused its discretion when it did
not permit him to question aunt specifically about the conten t of her conversation with
father regarding the family’s immigration status. We disagree.
Due process requires that every defendant be “afforded a meaningful opportunity to
present a complete defense.” See State v. Smith , 876 N.W.2d 310, 331 (Minn. 2016)
(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). But “the ev idence proffered in
support of the defense must still comply with the rules of evidence.” State v. Nissalke, 801
N.W.2d 82, 102 (Minn. 2011). And evidence of “a statement, other than one made by the
declarant while testifying at the trial or heari ng, offered in evidence to prove the truth of
the matter asserted” is inadmi ssible hearsay unless otherwise permitted. Minn. R. Evid.
801-802.
Aunt’s testimony about the substance of father’s statement to her, including mother
and sister fabricating the abuse allegations to obtain an immigrati on benefit, is hearsay
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because it was offered for the tr uth of the matter asserted. See id. Because none of the
exceptions to the hearsay rule apply, father’s hearsay statement to aunt is admissible only
as impeachment testimony.
A witness may be impeached if it is esta blished through foundation testimony that
he made a prior inconsistent stat ement that was given under oath. State v. Barber , 494
N.W.2d 497, 500 (Minn. App. 1993); see Minn. R. Evid. 801(d)(1 )(A). Here, aunt’s
testimony that appellant sought to elicit, including on immigration status and U-visas, was
inadmissible hearsay because father made no prior statement about the content of his
conversation with aunt. If appellant had questioned father on cross-examination about this,
he would have laid the proper foundation for father’s impeachment using aunt’s testimony
about the substance of their conversation. Based on a lack of foundation and father’s denial
of any such conversation, father had no prior inconsistent st atement for aunt to impeach.
Therefore, her testimony regarding the conten t of her conversation with father, including
fabricating the abuse allegations to obtain an immigration benefit, was inadmissible
hearsay. The district court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the scope of appellant’s
direct examination of aunt.
III. Appellant’s pro se arguments lack merit.

In his pro se supplemental brief, appellant questions the credibility of a number of
the state’s witnesses. “[A] conviction can rest on the uncorroborated testimony of a single
credible witness.” State v. Foreman , 680 N.W.2d 536, 539 (Minn. 2004) (quotation
omitted); see also Minn. Stat. § 609.347, subd. 1 (2016). The determination of whether a
witness is reliable is a matter for the factfinder. See State v. White, 357 N.W.2d 388, 390
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(Minn. App. 1984). Accordingly, we defe r to the jury’s credibility determinations, State
v. Watkins, 650 N.W.2d 738, 741 (Minn. App. 2002 ), and assume that “the jury believed
the state’s witnesses and disbelieve d any evidence to the contrary,” State v. Moore , 438
N.W.2d 101, 108 (Minn. 1989). After carefully reviewing th e record, we conclude that
appellant’s arguments lack merit.
Affirmed.