State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-1151

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Daniel Salvador Niola Agudo,
Appellant.

Filed June 26, 2023
Affirmed
Hooten, Judge*

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-21-14263

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Linda M. Freyer, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jennifer Workman Jesness,
Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Jesson, Presiding Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge; and
Hooten, Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
HOOTEN, Judge
In this appeal from the final judgment of conviction for first-degree criminal sexual
conduct, appellant argues that the district court violated his constitutional rights to
confrontation and to present a complete defense by denying his motion to introduce
evidence of the immigration status of the victim and her mother as a motive for fabricating
allegations against him. Because the district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding
the immigration-status evidence, we affirm.
FACTS
On July 30, 2021, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Daniel Salvador
Niola Agudo1 with one count of first-degree criminal sexual conduct in violation of Minn.
Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(g) (2020). The complaint alleged that the thirty-four- year-old
Niola had engaged in sexual penetration and sexual contact with a person (the child) who
was under sixteen years old at the time of the offense and that Niola had a significant
relationship to the child.
Before trial, Niola gave notice of his intent to rely on a defense of bias by the child
and her mother. Specifically, Niola alleged that the child and her mother made false
allegations against Niola so that the child could qualify for U nonimmigrant status (also
known as a U visa). See generally 8 C.F.R. § 214.14 (2022) (providing for different types

1 Appellant’s last name is stated multiple ways in the district court record. Because
appellant used Niola in his pro se supplemental brief, and because the record indicates that
he often goes only by Niola, we refer to him as Niola in this opinion.

3
of U visas). Niola alleged that the child’s mother was “present in the US illegally,” and
explained that a U visa can confer legal status upon victims of certain crimes and their
family members. When asked on the first day of trial for an offer of proof, Niola’s counsel
also alleged the following: that (1) Niola had been in the process of applying for a U visa
for himself when the child made the allegations against him; (2) Niola had discussed the U
visa application process with the child and her mother days before the allegations; and
(3) one of the owners of the house where Niola, the child, and her mother all lived was a
U visa holder.
Niola also provided notice that he intended to call a private investigator and former
police officer to testify as an expert witness. Niola stated that the investigator would testify,
among other things, about “U visas, including how they work, the application process, and
derivative U visas for parents of minor victims.” According to Niola, the investigator
would also testify that “the benefits of obtaining a U visa can incentivize undocumented
immigrants to make false allegations of crime.” Niola argued that this evidence was
relevant because the U visa application process was not “within the average juror’s
experience.”
The state sought to exclude evidence of any witness’s immigration status as well as
expert testimony about the U visa process. It argued that the immigration evidence was
highly prejudicial and minimally relevant because there was no evidence that the child
intended to apply for a U visa or was motivated to fabricate allegations against Niola in
order to do so.

4
The district court agreed with the state and ruled that Niola could not “delve into
any possible witnesses’ immigration status” or offer “evidence regarding the U visa
process.” The district court reasoned that while the immigration evidence is “arguably . . .
relevant, given a broad interpretation . . . of the rule,” in this case “[t]here’s nothing in the
offer of proof that was made . . . that leads this [c]ourt to believe that such evidence is
relevant.” In particular, the district court observed that while “the witnesses in this case
had a discussion about U visas days before these allegations were made,” there was “no
other connection made as to the allegations and the U visa status or that process.” The
district court determi ned that “[w]ithout a more specific connection, . . . there’s no
relevance to this evidence or . . . the jury hearing this evidence could lead to unfair
prejudice or misleading of the jury.”
2
The district court then held a four-day jury trial. At trial, the child testified that she
moved to Minnesota from Ecuador in March 2021 and initially lived in an apartment with
Niola and three other people. According to the child, fifteen days after she arrived in

2 After the district court’s evidentiary rulings, Niola supplemented his offer of proof to
include the following: (1) evidence that a police officer turned off his body camera during
a conversation with the child and her mother where a U visa could have been discussed;
and (2) general assertions that the child was employed and therefore may have lied about
her age or used fake identification. Niola also suggested giving the jury a limiting
instruction stating that “a person’s immigration status is not, in and of itself, a basis for not
believing their testimony.” The district court stated that “if you have information regarding
[the child’s] age . . . or the use of a false ID . . . [t]hat’s totally relevant to delve into. But
I think my ruling is pretty clear regarding immigration status or the U visa process.” Niola
also asserted that his own immigration status could be relevant to explain why certain text
messages on his phone had been deleted. The district court clarified that Niola could talk
about his own immigration status if he chose to testify, and that the district court’s ruling
only prevented Niola from “delving into the immigration status of the [s]tate’s witnesses.”

5
Minnesota, Niola sat down next to her on the couch when she got home from school, began
touching her body, and told her, “when you’re with me, you will have it all.” When the
child tried to resist, Niola grabbed her wrists, took off her clothes, and forced her to have
vaginal intercourse. The child testified that, after this first incident, “[i]t was almost every
day that he would abuse [her]” during April and May of 2021 —generally when she got
home from school and no one else was home.
The child’s mother arrived from Ecuador in May 2021 and also moved into the
apartment. In June 2021, the same group of people moved to a house in Richfield and
continued living together. The child testified that, after her mother moved in, Niola began
a romantic relationship with her mother and stopped abusing her every day. But she
testified that the abuse continued, and that “when my mom wouldn’t pay attention to him,
then he would go back to me.” The child stated that the last time Niola assaulted her
occurred in his car after he had driven her and his son home from a family party. She
stated, however, that Niola continued to send her numerous text messages.
The child testified that in late July 2021 she was at home watching videos with her
mother when she began receiving text messages from Niola saying that he wanted to be
with her, that she was “the woman of his life,” and that age should not matter.
3 The child
showed her mother the texts and told her about the abuse. They called the police and
officers came to the house, interviewed the child, and arrested Niola. The child told the
interviewing officer about three incidents of abuse. She explained that she was afraid to

3 The original text messages are in Spanish; the descriptions in this opinion are taken from
the child’s testimony regarding the text messages during cross-examination.

6
tell the officer about more times because the others who lived in house were present for the
interview. On cross-examination, Niola’s counsel questioned the consistency of the child’s
accounts but did not ask if she had fabricated the allegations or had been told to lie.
The state also called several other witnesses. The child’s mother confirmed that she
had been in a relationship with Niola and that she called the police when she saw the texts
from Niola on the child’s phone. A pediatric nurse practitioner who examined the child in
September 2021 testified that she observed the child to be “experiencing severe
symptom[s] of post-traumatic stress” and that the child reported being “raped several
times” and experiencing vaginal pain and bleeding afterward. A forensic nurse testified as
an expert about protocols for interviewing children about sexual abuse and explained that
children often delay or minimize their disclosures of sexual abuse. Three officers involved
with the investigation also testified, including the officer who interviewed the child and
her mother.
Niola called several family members as witnesses. Niola’s son testified that he
never saw Niola alone with the child in the car, while Niola’s stepmother’s son testified
that he once saw Niola, Niola’s son, the child, and the child’s mother leave a party together.
Three other family members testified generally that Niola treated young women and
children with respect. Niola also called the same investigator who would have testified
about U visas to testify about protocols for forensic interviews with children. The
investigator testified regarding the issues involved with using leading questions and having
others in the room when conducting interviews.

7
Finally, Niola testified on his own behalf. He acknowledged that he had been in a
relationship with the child’s mother but asserted that he never touched or had sex with the
child, had treated the child like a daughter, had “been a good person to” the child and her
mother, and “[did] not know why they’re doing this or for what.” He also admitted that he
had sent the texts that the child discussed but asserted that he had sent them to the child’s
mother rather than the child.
The jury found Niola guilty of the charged offense. The district court imposed a
150-month prison sentence followed by ten years of conditional release. Niola appeals.
DECISION
Niola argues that the district court violated his rights to confrontation and to present
a complete defense by excluding evidence regarding a possible immigration motive for
fabricating the child’s allegations. We begin with a brief discussion of our standard of
review and then address each piece of evidence in turn.4
The United States and Minnesota constitutions guarantee criminal defendants the
right to confront the witnesses against them. State v. Greer, 635 N.W.2d 82, 89 (Minn.
2001); U.S. Const. amends. VI, XIV, § 1; Minn. Const. art. I, § 6. “The essence of
confrontation is the opportunity to cross- examine opposing witnesses.” Greer, 635
N.W.2d at 89. But district courts “have broad discretion to control the scope of cross-

4 Niola also filed a one-page pro se supplemental brief in which he argues that the district
court violated his federal due-process rights “[b]y not allowing evidence (immigration
information) relevant/material to my criminal case that would influence the jury in my
favor.” Because Niola’s pro se brief raises the same issue as the brief submitted by his
counsel, we need not address it separately.

8
examination.” Id. Although the Confrontation Clause protects the rights of defendants to
reveal a witness’s bias through cross-examination, “not everything tends to show bias, and
courts may exclude evidence that is only marginally useful for this purpose.” State v. Lanz-
Terry, 535 N.W.2d 635, 640 (Minn. 1995); see also Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S.
673, 679 (1986) (noting that district courts have “wide latitude” to reasonably limit cross-
examination “based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice,
confusion of the issues, the witness’ safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only
marginally relevant”); State v. Ferguson, 742 N.W.2d 651, 657 (Minn. 2007) (noting that
cross-examination may be limited “so long as the jury is presented with sufficient
information from which to appropriately draw inferences as to the witness’s reliability”).
Criminal defendants also have the “right to a meaningful opportunity to present a
complete defense,” which includes the right to present witness testimony. Loving v. State,
891 N.W.2d 638, 646 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted); see also U.S. Const. amend. XIV,
§ 1; Minn. Const. art. I, § 7. This right, however, “is subject to rules of procedure and
evidence designed to assure fairness and reliability in the determination of guilt.”
5 State v.
Hannon, 703 N.W.2d 498, 506 (Minn. 2005) ; see also State v. Mosley, 853 N.W.2d 789,
798 (Minn. 2014) (“A criminal defendant has the constitutional due process right to call
and examine witnesses, including expert witnesses, subject to the limitations imposed by

5 The application of an evidentiary rule may violate the right to present a complete defense
if “the rule infringes upon a weighty interest of the accused and is arbitrary or
disproportionate to the purposes the rule is designed to serve.” State v. Pass, 832 N.W.2d
836, 841-42 (Minn. 2013) (quotation omitted). But “evidentiary rules designed to permit
the exclusion of unfairly prejudicial, confusing, or misleading evidence are unquestionably
constitutional.” Id. at 842 (quotation omitted).

9
the rules of evidence.”). A defendant bears the burden of showing that objected-to evidence
is relevant and admissible. State v. Svoboda, 331 N.W.2d 772, 775 (Minn. 1983).
Thus, even when an appellant argues that a district court’s evidentiary ruling
deprived them of a constitutional right, we review that evidentiary ruling for an abuse of
discretion. State v. Zumberge, 888 N.W.2d 688, 694 (Minn. 2017) (applying abuse-of-
discretion standard to claim that evidentiary ruling deprived appellant of his right to present
a complete defense); State v. Tran, 712 N.W.2d 540, 551 (Minn. 2006) (applying abuse-
of-discretion standard to claim that evidentiary ruling limiting cross-examination violated
appellant’s right to confront witnesses). A district court abuses its discretion when its
decision “is against logic and the facts in the record.” State v. Hallmark, 927 N.W.2d 281,
291 (Minn. 2019) (quotation omitted). If we determine that the district court abused its
discretion by excluding evidence, “and that error deprived the defendant of a constitutional
right, we then review whether that exclusion of evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.” State v. Munt, 831 N.W.2d 569, 583 (Minn. 2013).
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by preventing Niola from cross-
examining witnesses about their immigration status.

Niola first argues that the district court abused its discretion by preventing him from
cross-examining the child and her mother about their alleged immigration motive for
fabricating the allegations against him.
Generally, “[a]ll relevant evidence is admissible” unless otherwise provided by law.
Minn. R. Evid. 402. Evidence is relevant if it tends to make the existence of any fact of
consequence more or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Minn. R. Evid.

10
401. In particular, “[f]or the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence of
bias, prejudice, or interest of the witness for or against any party to the case is admissible.”
Minn. R. Evid. 616. But relevant evidence, including evidence of bias, “may be excluded
if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury.” Minn. R. Evid. 403. As with other
evidentiary rulings, a district court has “discretion in balancing the probative value of
evidence against its prejudicial effect.” State v. Gassler, 505 N.W.2d 62, 70 (Minn. 1993).
The district court excluded evidence of the child’s and her mother’s immigration
status as both irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial. Niola asserts that the evidence was
relevant because if the child and her mother were eligible for a U visa and knew about their
eligibility, “it would affect their credibility by revealing a motive to lie.” He also argues
that the evidence was not prejudicial because the jury already knew that the child and her
mother were immigrants and spoke Spanish. We are not persuaded that the district court
abused its discretion.
In State v. Larson, 787 N.W.2d 592, 598-99 (Minn. 2010), the supreme court
examined a district court’s decision to exclude evidence of a witness’s “immigration status
and deportation hearing.” Like here, the defendant in Larson argued that the witness’s
immigration status was probative of bias. Noting that evidence of bias “must not be so
attenuated as to be unconvincing,” the supreme court affirmed the exclusion of the
immigration evidence. Id. at 598-99 (quotation omitted). The supreme court reasoned that
because it was “undisputed that [the witness] was not given any consideration for his

11
testimony,” the district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that the evidence
was not sufficiently probative of bias to overcome its potential for prejudice. Id. at 599.
We similarly conclude that the district court here did not abuse its discretion by
limiting cross-examination regarding the child’s and her mother’s immigration status. The
district court acknowledged Niola’s offer of proof that the witnesses knew about U visas
because they had discussed them recently, but it correctly noted that there was “no other
connection made as to the allegations and the U visa status or that process.” As in Larson,
nothing in the record suggests that the witnesses received —or sought to receive —any
consideration for their testimony. Niola did not allege, for example, that the child or her
mother discussed fabricating the allegations, actually applied for a U visa, or intended to
do so. Moreover, to the extent Niola showed that the immigration evidence had some
minimal relevance, the district court also noted the danger for unfair prejudice or
misleading of the jury. This analysis is consistent with Larson and reflects a proper
balancing of probative value and prejudice as required by rule 403.
6

6 Although nonprecedential decisions of this court are not binding authority, Minn. R. Civ.
App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c), we note that our decision here is consistent with several recent
nonprecedential decisions addressing similar evidentiary rulings. In four cases, this court
has affirmed a district court’s exclusion of immigration-related bias evidence under rule
403 because defendants failed to establish sufficient relevancy. State v. Ontiveros-Silverio,
No. A22-0419, 2023 WL 2230351, at *3-4 (Minn. App. Feb. 27, 2023); State v. Rodriguez,
No. A21-0875, 2022 WL 1617887, at *5-6 (Minn. App. May 23, 2022); State v. Love, No.
A19-1153, 2020 WL 3957240, at *2-3 (Minn. App. July 13, 2020); State v. Guzman-Diaz,
No. A17-1231, 2018 WL 3520535, at *2-4 (Minn. App. July 23, 2018), rev. denied (Minn.
Oct. 16, 2018). In another case, where a defendant offered actual evidence that a victim
had discussed reporting a crime to obtain a U visa, the district court allowed evidence
regarding that victim’s alleged bias but excluded evidence of the victim’s mother’s
immigration status because the defendant had not shown that the mother was involved with

12
Niola also argues that by determining that more was needed for the witnesses’
immigration status to be relevant, the district court treated evidence of bias “as if it were
an affirmative defense by requiring [him] to make a showing beyond relevancy.” This
argument, however, misconstrues the district court’s decision. The district court did not
treat Niola’s bias argument as an affirmative defense that carried a burden of production;
the district court simply determined, based on Niola’s offer of proof, that certain evidence
of bias was minimally probative. This is consistent with the general principle that the
proponent of objected-to evidence must establish its admissibility. Svoboda, 331 N.W.2d
at 775; see also State v. Brown, 739 N.W.2d 716, 720 (Minn. 2007) (stating that proponent
of evidence had not established relevance “either by extrinsic evidence or by offer of
proof”); Santiago v. State, 644 N.W.2d 425, 442 (Minn. 2002) (noting that “[a]n offer of
proof provides an evidentiary basis” for a district court’s evidentiary ruling); Minn. R.
Evid. 103 (explaining that an offer of proof occurs when “the substance of the evidence
[is] made known to the court by offer or [is] apparent from the context within which
questions were asked”).
On this record, we cannot conclude that the district court ruled against logic and the
facts in the record when it limited cross-examination regarding the child’s and her mother’s
immigration status. Because we discern no error in the exclusion of the evidence, we need
not address whether such exclusion was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
7

the alleged plan; this court affirmed. State v. Velasquez- Lazo, No. A20-0801, 2021 WL
318263, at *2-4 (Minn. App. Feb. 1, 2021).
7 Although we do not address harmless error here, we note two instances in which this court
declined to address whether it was error to exclude similar immigration evidence because,

13
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding expert testimony
regarding the U visa process.

Niola also argues that the district court abused its discretion by excluding his
proffered expert testimony from a private investigator regarding the U visa process.
Minnesota Rule of Evidence 702 provides that “[i]f scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine
a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.” “The basic
consideration in admitting expert testimony under [rule 702] is whether it will assist the
jury in resolving the factual questions presented.” State v. Myers, 359 N.W.2d 604, 609
(Minn. 1984). But rule 403 still applies to expert testimony, and “[e]ven helpful, relevant
evidence may be excluded if the trial court concludes that its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice or of misleading the jury.” Id.;
see also State v. Obeta, 796 N.W.2d 282, 289 (Minn. 2011) (recognizing that “an expert
with special knowledge has the potential to influence a jury unduly” (quotation omitted)).
According to Niola, the investigator would have testified about “U visas, including
how they work, the application process, and derivative U visas for parents of minor
victims,” and would have opined that “the benefits of obtaining a U visa can incentivize
undocumented immigrants to make false allegations of crime.” Niola argues that this

based on the entire record in those cases, any error was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. State v. Diaz, No. A21-1543, 2022 WL 17748077, at *4 (Minn. App. Dec. 19,
2022); State v. Roman -Vargas, No. A17-0641, 2018 WL 1145863, at *2-3 (Minn. App.
Mar. 5, 2018), rev. denied (Minn. May 15, 2018).

14
testimony would assist the jury because “immigration law and U visas are not within the
common knowledge or experience of the average juror,” and that it was relevant because
it was probative of the child’s alleged motive to falsely accuse Niola.8
For the same reasons discussed above, we conclude that the district court did not
abuse its discretion by excluding expert testimony regarding the U visa process. As the
district court observed, Niola failed to establish any connection between the U visa process
and the child’s allegations that would make immigration evidence more than minimally
relevant to this case. Because the district court excluded evidence of the child’s and her
mother’s immigration status, the investigator’s testimony was not needed to help the jury
understand Niola’s bias argument. Additionally, the investigator’s testimony about the U
visa process—particularly his opinion that U visas can incentivize undocumented
immigrants to falsely report crimes —would have been significantly prejudicial. Without
a greater showing of relevancy, it was not against logic and the facts in the record to exclude
the investigator’s testimony. Because the district court did not err in excluding the
evidence, we need not address whether the exclusion of the evidence was harmless.
Affirmed.

8 Although Niola spends a portion of his brief arguing that the investigator was qualified
as an expert and that his opinion had a reasonable basis, we note that the state does not
contest those issues, nor did the district court conclude that the investigator was not
qualified. We therefore need not address the investigator’s qualifications.