Irv’s Boomin’ Fireworks, LLC, et al., Appellants,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-1416

Irv’s Boomin’ Fireworks, LLC, et al.,
Appellants,

vs.

John J. Muhar, et al.,
Respondents.

Filed April 9, 2018
Affirmed
Reilly, Judge

Itasca County District Court
File No. 31-CV-17-1538

Erick G. Kaardal, Vincent J. Fahnlande r, Mohrman, Kaardal & Erickson, P.A.,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellants)

John J. Muhar, Itasca County Attorney, Michael J. Haig, Chief Assistant County Attorney,
Grand Rapids, Minnesota (for respondents)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Halb rooks, Judge; and
Reilly, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
REILLY, Judge
Appellants Irving Seelye and Irv’s Boomin’ Fireworks, LLC, challenge the district
court’s denial of their motion for temporary injunctive relief to preclude respondent Itasca
County Attorney’s Office and its officers fr om enforcing Minnesota ’s fireworks law,

2
codified at Minnesota Statutes sections 624.20 to 624.25 (2016), against appellants.
Because we discern no abuse of discretion, we affirm.
FACTS
Irving Seelye is a Native American and an enrolled member of the Leech Lake Band
of Ojibwe (the Band). Seelye is the managing officer of Irv’s Boom in’ Fireworks, LLC.
In June 2015, the Band issued Irv’s Boomin’ Fireworks a permit to sell both safe-and-sane1
and explosive fireworks from its business lo cation inside the Band ’s territory. The
company sold fireworks for approximately ten days. Shortly thereafter, the Itasca County
Sheriff’s Office investigated Irv’s Boom in’ Fireworks and held a meeting with
representatives of Itasca County, Cass County, and the Band to discuss the fireworks sales.
The county attorney’s office informed the Band that Seelye would be subject to criminal
prosecution if the company did not stop se lling explosive fireworks. Irv’s Boomin’
Fireworks stopped selling explosive firework s and limited its sales to safe-and-sane
fireworks. Two years later, in June 2017, appellants filed a complaint for declaratory and
injunctive relief seeking to prevent the county attorney’s office from criminally prosecuting
them for selling explosive fireworks. Appell ants filed a motion for temporary injunctive
relief, which the district court denied the following day. This appeal follows.

1 Safe-and-sane fireworks are non-explosive fireworks such as certain wire or wood
sparklers or sparkling items, snakes and glow worms, smoke devices, or trick noisemakers.
Minn. Stat. § 624.20, subd. 1(c) (2016).

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D E C I S I O N
I. The complaint asserts a justiciable controversy.
Appellants sought a declaratory judgment under Chapter 555 of the Minnesota
Statutes, which permits “[a]ny person . . . whose rights, status, or other legal relations are
affected by a statute” to “have determined any question of construction or validity arising
under the . . . statute . . . and obtain a declarat ion of rights, status, or other legal relations
thereunder.” Minn. Stat. § 555.02 (2016). “Declaratory judgment actions allow parties to
be relieved of an uncertainty and insecurity arising out of an actual controversy about their
legal rights before those rights actually have been invaded.” Harstad v. City of Woodbury,
902 N.W.2d 64, 71 (Minn. App. 2017), aff’d (Minn. Nov. 28, 2017) (citation and quotations
omitted). However, a district court has no jurisdiction over a declaratory judgment action
absent a justiciable controversy. See McCaughtry v. City of Red Wing , 808 N.W.2d 331,
337 (Minn. 2011). Justiciability is an issue of law reviewed de novo. Id.
A declaratory judgment claim is ripe if the complaining party “is possessed of a
judicially protectible right or status which is placed in jeopardy by the ripe or ripening
seeds of an actual controversy with an adversary party. . . .” Id. at 339 (quotation omitted).
There is no mechanical test to determine whether a justiciable controversy exists and courts
must consider the specific facts of each case. See Holiday Acres No. 3 v. Midwest Fed.
Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Minneapolis, 271 N.W.2d 445, 447-48 (Minn. 1978). A declaratory
action is a justiciable controversy if it “(a) involves definite and concrete assertions of right
that emanate from a legal source, (b) involve s a genuine conflict in tangible interests
between parties with adverse interests, and (c) is capable of specific resolution by judgment

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rather than presenting hypothetical facts that would form an advisory opinion.” Cincinnati
Ins. Co. v. Franck, 621 N.W.2d 270, 273 (Minn. App. 2001) (citations omitted).
The three-factor test for justiciability is satisfied here. First, appellants’ declaratory-
judgment action involves a definite and concre te assertion of a right (to sell fireworks)
emanating from a legal source (the permit to se ll fireworks). Second, the action involves
a genuine conflict of interests between appellants, who claim a protectable property interest
in the fireworks permit issued by the Band, and respondent s, who are authorized to
prosecute violators of Minnesota law. Third, this matter is capable of specific resolution
by judgment because it involves the interpreta tion of a Minnesota st atute. Because the
complaint asserts that appellants’ “rights, stat us, or other legal relations are affected by a
statute,” Minn. Stat. § 555.02, and because each of the justiciable-controversy factors is
present, we determine that the complaint asserts a justiciable controversy.
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellants’
motion for a temporary injunction.
Appellants argue that the district cour t abused its discretion by declining to
temporarily enjoin respondents from prosecu ting appellants for the sale of explosive
fireworks in violation of Minnesota Statutes sections 624.20-.25. A temporary injunction
is an extraordinary equitable remedy used to preserve the status quo pending adjudication
of a case on its merits. See Miller v. Foley, 317 N.W.2d 710, 712 (Minn. 1982). The party
seeking injunctive relief must demonstrate that there is an inadequate remedy at law and
that an injunction is necessary to prevent great and irreparable injury. See Cherne Indus.,
Inc. v. Grounds & Assocs., Inc ., 278 N.W.2d 81, 92 (Minn. 1979). We review the denial

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of temporary injunctive relief for abuse of discretion and we will not set aside the district
court’s factual findings unless clearly erroneous. See Softchoice, Inc. v. Schmidt , 763
N.W.2d 660, 665-66 (Minn. App. 2009).
This case centers on whether Minnesota may exercise jurisdiction over the Band’s
territory to enforce Minnesota ’s fireworks statute against an enrolled member who has a
permit from the Band to sell fireworks. Relevant caselaw in this area is sparse, and there
are no cases in which a Minnesota court ha s addressed a request to enjoin a county
attorney’s office from enforcing state fireworks laws against a tribal member selling
fireworks on tribal land.
The district court began its analysis by determining that the state’s fireworks statutes
are criminal/prohibitory in nature, such that the state could “enforce [the fireworks law]
where violation occurs on the Leech Lake Re servation, pursuant to Public Law 280.”
Traditionally, native tribes have retained “attributes of sovere ignty over both their
members and their territory.” California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians , 480 U.S.
202, 207, 107 S. Ct. 1083, 1087 (1987) (quotation omitted). This sovereignty is dependent
on, and subordinate to, the federal government. Id. And “state laws may be applied to
tribal Indians on their reservations if Congress has expressly so provided.” Id. Public Law
280 grants Minnesota jurisdictio n over certain criminal matte rs on Indian country within
the state. 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2016) (recogn izing state criminal ju risdiction over “[a]ll
Indian country within the State . . . .”); Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 207, 107 S. Ct. at 1087. Under
Public Law 280, a state has jurisdiction to enfo rce its laws on Indian land if the intent of
the law “is generally to prohib it certain conduct. . . .” Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 209, 107 S.

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Ct. at 1088 (distinguishing between criminal/prohibitory and civil/regulatory laws). At the
hearing, appellants’ counsel conceded that Minnesota’s fireworks law is
criminal/prohibitory in nature because its general effect is to prohibit the sale of fireworks.
Having determined that Minnesota’s fire works law was crimin al/prohibitory in
nature, the district court reviewed whether appellants were entitled to injunctive relief.
Five factors are relevant in considering whether injunctive relief is warranted: (1) the nature
of the relationship between the parties preexis ting the dispute; (2) the balance of harms;
(3) the likelihood of success on the merits; (4 ) public-policy consid erations; and (5) the
administrative burden of supervising and enforcing an injunction. See Dahlberg Bros. v.
Ford Motor Co., 272 Minn. 264, 274-75, 137 N.W.2d 314, 321-22 (1965). Of these factors,
the most important to the analysis is the lik elihood that the moving party will prevail on
the merits. See Minneapolis Fed’n of Teachers v. Minneapolis Pub. Schs., Special Sch.
Dist. No. 1, 512 N.W.2d 107, 110 (Minn. App. 1994), review denied (Minn. Mar. 31, 1994).
Failure to establish the likelih ood of success on the merits is dispositive of a motion for
injunctive relief. Sanborn Mfg. Co. v. Currie , 500 N.W.2d 161, 165 (Minn. App. 1993).
Our analysis therefore turns on a consideration of this factor.
The district court declined to grant te mporary injunctive relief on the ground that
appellants were unlikely to prevail on the meri ts. This decision wa s based on the court’s
interpretation of Minnesota’s fireworks law. “Fireworks” are defined as “any substance or
combination of substances or article prepared for the purpose of producing a visible or an
audible effect by combustion, ex plosion, deflagration, or deto nation. . . .” Minn. Stat.
§ 624.20, subd. 1(a). “Explo sive fireworks” are “any fire works that contain pyrotechnic

7
or flash powder, gunpowder, black powder, or any other explosive compound constructed
to produce detonation or deflagration.” Id., subd. 2. With certain exceptions, Minnesota
law criminalizes the sale of explosive firework s, stating that “it shall be unlawful for any
person to offer for sale, expose for sale, sell at retail or wholesale, possess, advertise, use,
or explode any fireworks. ” Minn. Stat. § 624.21; see also Minn. Stat. §§ 624.23
(articulating exceptions), 624.24 (authori zing law-enforcement officers to remove
fireworks offered for sale in violation of these sections), 624.25 (providing criminal
penalties for violations).
The district court determined, based upon its interpretation of the statute, that
appellants had not established a likelihood of success on the merits because appellants were
engaged in the sale of explosive firework s and did not meet one of the enumerated
exceptions. A district court’s denial of an injunction is generally within its discretion, and
we will not reverse unless the record as a whole reveals an abuse of discretion. See Cherne,
278 N.W.2d at 91. We cannot say, based on the scant record before us, 2 that the district
court abused its discretion by determining that appellants failed to carry their burden of
demonstrating the propriety of injunctive relief because they failed to establish a likelihood
of success on the merits. See id . at 92 (placing burden on pa rty seeking injunction).
Because appellants failed to establish a likelihood of success on the merits “and the absence
of proof of any one factor is dispositive,” we need not address the remaining four
[Dahlberg] factors. In re Commitment of Hand , 878 N.W.2d 503, 50 9 n.4 (Minn. App.

2 For example, the record do es not even contain the perm it issued by the Band to Irv’s
Boomin’ Fireworks.

8
2016), review denied (June 21, 2016). Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did
not abuse its discretion by denying appellants’ motion for temporary injunctive relief.3
Affirmed.

3 Appellants also argue that the county attorney’s office deprived them of their due-process
rights because the fireworks perm it issued by the Band is a pr otected property interest.
Appellants do not identify any cases supporting this argument and we decline to recognize
such a right at this time on the limited facts of this case.