Irv’s Boomin’ Fireworks, LLC, et al., Appellants,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-1189

Irv’s Boomin’ Fireworks, LLC, et al.,
Appellants,

vs.

John J. Muhar, et al.,
Respondents.

Filed April 18, 2022
Affirmed
Reilly, Judge

Itasca County District Court
File No. 31-CV-17-1538

Erick G. Kaardal, Vincent J. Fahnlande r, Mohrman, Kaardal & Erickson, P.A.,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellants)

Matti R. Adam, Itasca County Attorney, Michael J. Haig, Chief Assistant County Attorney,
Grand Rapids, Minnesota (for respondents)

Considered and decided by Reilly, Pres iding Judge; Connolly , Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REILLY, Judge
Appellants challenge the dismissal of this action for failure to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted, arguing that their proposed sales of fireworks fall within an
exception to the statutory ban of firework sales. Because the district court did not err in
dismissing the action, we affirm.
2
FACTS
Appellant Irving Seelye (Seelye) is an enrolled member of the Leech Lake Band of
Ojibwe (the Band). Seelye is the managing member of appellant Irv’s Boomin’ Fireworks,
LLC, located within the Band’s reservation. This dispute stems from respondent county’s1
attempts to enforce a statutory ban on firewo rk sales after the Band granted appellants a
tribal permit to sell explosive fireworks on th e Band’s reservation. The facts are largely
undisputed and have been detaile d in prior cases before this c ourt and the district court.
See Irv’s Boomin’ Fireworks, LLC v. Muhar , No. A17-1416, 2018 WL 1702862 (Minn.
App. Apr. 9, 2018) ( Irv’s I ); Irv’s Boomin’ Fireworks, LLC v. Muhar , No. A18-1930
(Minn. App. May 20, 2019) (Irv’s II); Irv’s Boomin’ Fireworks, LLC v. Muhar, No. A20-
0029, 2020 WL 4932787 (Minn. App. Aug. 24, 2020) rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 25, 2020)
(Irv’s III). Thus, we merely summarize the procedural posture of this matter.
In June 2017, appellants sued the county, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief
to prevent the county from criminally pr osecuting appellants for selling explosive
fireworks on tribal land. After the district court found that it did not have subject matter
jurisdiction, appellants appealed to this court, and we reversed because appellants’ action
did not offend separation-of-powers principles. Irv’s III, 2020 WL 4932787, at *4.
On remand from this court, the district court conducted a hearing in May 2021 to
consider appellants’ motion for summary judgment and respondents’ motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Appellants argued that they were

1 Respondent John J. Muhar was the Itasca County Attorney when appellants filed this
case.
3
entitled to summary judgment b ecause the Minnesota fireworks statutes, which generally
ban the sale of explosive fireworks, allowed an exception for sales of explosive fireworks
“out of the state.” Appellants argued that selling fireworks within the Band’s reservation
to people who took the explos ive fireworks off the reserva tion constitutes selling “out of
the state” under the statute. The district court disagreed and found that appellants were not
entitled to summary judgment because their reading of the fireworks statute “would result
in an absurd and unreasonable interpretation.” Concluding that appellants’ sole claim was
meritless, the district court granted respondents’ motion to dismiss.
This appeal follows.
DECISION
Appellants challenge the district court’s di smissal of their complaint for failure to
state a claim. We review de novo a distri ct court’s decision to dismiss a complaint for
failure to state a claim upon which relief ma y be granted and limit our review to whether
the complaint sets forth legally sufficient claims for relief. Hebert v. City of Fifty Lakes ,
744 N.W.2d 226, 229 (Minn. 2008). Appellant s’ claims involve an issue of statutory
interpretation, which we also review de novo. State v. Peck, 773 N.W.2d 768, 771 (Minn.
2009).
A. Statutory interpretation of “out of the state” under Minnesota Statutes
Section 624.23

Appellants argue that the district court erred in its interpretation of the term “out of
the state” under Minn. Stat. § 624.23. The goal of statutory interpretation is to “ascertain
and effectuate the intention of the legislature.” Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2020). “The threshold
4
issue in any statutory interpretation analys is is whether the statute’s language is
ambiguous.” Peck, 773 N.W.2d at 772. A statute is ambiguous only when it is reasonably
susceptible to more than one interpretation. Id. But “[i]f a statute is unambiguous, we
apply the statute’s plain meaning.” In re Welfare of Child. of J.L.G. , 924 N.W.2d 9, 14
(Minn. App. 2018).
Minnesota Statutes sections 624.20 to 624.25 (2020) (the fireworks statutes) set
forth Minnesota’s firework laws. Minnesota law criminalizes the sale of explosive
fireworks: “it shall be unlawful for any person to offer for sale, expose for sale, sell at retail
or wholesale, possess, advertise, use, or e xplode any fireworks.” Minn. Stat. § 624.21. 2
But there is an exception to fireworks sales:
Nothing in sections 624.20 to 624.25 shall be construed to
prohibit any resident wholesaler, dealer, or jobber, from
possessing or selling at wholesale fireworks which are not
prohibited; or the possession or sale of any kind of fireworks
for shipment directly out of the state . . . .

Minn. Stat. § 624.23 (emphasis added).

2 In the district court’s 2017 order denying appellants’ motion for a temporary restraining
order and injunction, the district court determined that the Minnesota fireworks statutes are
criminal and that the state ma y enforce them if a violati on occurs within the Band’s
reservation under Public Law 280. See California v. Cabazo n Band of Mi ssion Indians,
480 U.S. 202, 208 (1987) (reco gnizing that “when a [s]tate se eks to enforce a law within
an Indian reservation under the authority of Pub. L. 280, it must be determined whether the
law is criminal in nature, and thus fully app licable to the reservation under § 2”). Public
Law 280 is a federal statute granting Minnesota , among other states, “broad criminal and
limited civil jurisdiction over all Indian country within the state, with the exception of Red
Lake Reservation.” State v. Stone , 572 N.W.2d 725, 728 (Minn. 1997). On appeal,
appellants do not dispute that the Minnesota fireworks statute is criminal and that the state
has jurisdiction over criminal violations oc curring on the reservation of the Leech Lake
Band of Ojibwe under Public Law 280.
5
Because the fireworks statutes do not define “the state,” appellants urge us to apply
the definition of “state” found in Minnesota Chapter 645 which governs statutory
interpretation. Minn. Stat. § 64 5.44, subd. 11, provides that “[w]hen applied to a part of
the United States, ‘state’ extends to and includes the District of Columbia and the several
territories. ‘United States’ embraces the District of Columbia and territories.” Appellants
contend that the Band’s reservation exists within the United States as an independent,
sovereign entity—or “state”—wi thin, but apart from, the st ate of Minnesota. Thus,
appellants argue that the “out of the state” exception allows the sale of fireworks to persons
not living within the Band’s territorial boundaries. Appellants also argue that if the
legislature intended to modify the terms “t he state” with “Minnesota,” it would have
defined the term explicitly in the statute.
We agree with the district court that the only logical meaning of the term “the state”
in the statute is “the State of Minnesota.” The definition of “state” that appellants urge us
to use, found in Minnesota Statutes section 645.44, defines “state,” not “the state.” Section
645.44 defines “state” to include the District of Columbia and the several territories. The
statute specifically notes that this definition of “state” should be us ed “when applied to a
part of the United States.” Minn. Stat. § 645.44, subd. 11. Thus, if we were to adopt
appellants’ interpretation of “out of the state,” the statutory exception would allow the “sale
of any kind of fireworks for shipment directly out of [the District of Columbia and the
several territories].” In other words, reading criminal statute section 624.21 this way would
unlawfully expand Minnesota’s criminal jurisdiction to territories outside the state. Such
a broad reading of the statute leads to absurd and unreasonable results, as the district court
6
correctly found. And it contradicts Supreme Court caselaw that “an Indian reservation is
considered part of the territory of the State.” Nevada v. Hicks , 533 U.S. 353, 361-62
(2001). Thus, because there is only one reasonable interpretation of the statute, the statute
is not ambiguous.
This analysis also aligns with existing caselaw. For example, in In re M.D. ,
appellants argued that “state correctional facility” within Mi nn. Stat. § 2 44.052 was not
limited to state of Minnesota correctiona l facilities because it contained no limiting
language. 766 N.W.2d 325, 327 (Minn. App. 2009). The statute in that case provided that
“[t]he commissioner of corrections shall es tablish and administer [End-of-Confinement
Review Committees] at each state correctional facility.” Id. (emphasis added). This court
determined that interpreting “state correcti onal facility” to mean any state correctional
facility, regardless of the stat e in which it was located, would lead to “absurd and
impossible results.” Id. And this court determined that the term “state” unless modified
by the terms “other” or “another” refers only to Minnesota. Id. at 328. Like the statutory
language at issue in M.D., “out of the state” within Minn. Stat. § 624.23 refers only to the
state of Minnesota.
Finally, appellants cite the Uniform Inte rstate Family Support Act, Minnesota
Statutes chapter 518C, which reads: “‘State’ means a state of the United States, the District
of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, or any territory or insular
possession under the jurisdiction of the United States. ‘State’ includes an Indian nation or
tribe.” Minn. Stat. § 518C.101( z) (2020). Appellants argue th at, if the legislature meant
“state” to include Indian count ry in the fireworks statute, it would have defined the term
7
and expressly included “Indian na tion or tribe” within the de finition. The argument is
unpersuasive. The exception to the fireworks statute permits a seller inside the state of
Minnesota to sell to persons ou tside the state of Minnesota. The legislature could have
also explained that “outside of the state” means outside the borders of the state of
Minnesota, which includes Indian country. But it did not need to do so to make its meaning
clear. As explained above, in terpreting “out of the state” to mean out of the state of
Minnesota is the only reasonable interpretation of the fireworks statute.
B. We decline to address appellants’ remaining arguments.
Appellants raise two more arguments. First, appellants urge us to look to Uniform
Commercial Code section 2.504 to define “shipment” under the Minnesota fireworks sales
exception for “shipment out of th e state.” Minn. Stat. § 336. 2-504. They contend that
“shipment” does not require appellants to send the fireworks “out of the state” but merely
requires the customer to pick up and trans port the fireworks off the reservation. But
appellants failed to develop this argument before the district court, and the district court
did not address it in its order granting the coun ty’s motion to dismiss. Thus, because of
the limited record, we too decline to address appellants’ arguments about the definition of
“shipment.” Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) (“A reviewing court must
generally consider only those issues that the record shows were presented and considered
by the trial court in deciding the matter before it.”). Further, even if appellants had properly
developed this argument, this court need not reach a conclusion on this argument based on
the analysis in section A.
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Second, appellants urge this court to hold that the tribal permit is a constitutionally
protected property interest and determine that they are entitled to procedural due process.
But again, appellants did not ad equately develop this argument before the district court,
and the district court did not analyze it. Th us, for the same reasons as above, we decline
to address it based on the limited facts in the record and the inadequa te analysis in their
brief to this court. Id.; see also Melina v. Chaplin, 327 N.W.2d 19, 20 (Minn. 1982) (stating
that inadequately briefed issues are not properly before an appellate court).
In conclusion, we determine that the Minnesota fireworks statute is not ambiguous,
and the district court correctly interpreted and applied the statute. Thus, the district court
did not err in dismissing appellants’ action.
Affirmed.