State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-1589

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Emanuel Chol Alfred,
Appellant.

Filed August 20, 2018
Affirmed
Reyes, Judge

Olmsted County District Court
File No. 55-CR-17-1579

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mark A. Ostrem, Olmsted County Attorney, Jennifer D. Plante, Assistant County Attorney,
Rochester, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Ap pellate Public Defender, Rochelle R. Winn, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presid ing Judge; Worke, Judge; and Johnson,
Judge.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
REYES, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction of first-degree aggravated robbery, 1 arguing
that the evidence is insufficient to prove that the victim suffered bodily harm. We affirm.
FACTS
On the evening and early morning of Marc h 9 and 10, 2017, J.P. hosted a party at
his home for his friend, S.V., who planned to turn himself in to jail the next day. S.V. and
appellant Emanual Chol Alfred attended the party and were contacted by the victim, their
mutual friend, whom they invited over.
At trial, testimony by the victim and J.P. established the following. The victim
arrived at J.P.’s home with a backpack of ma rijuana for sale. S.V. improvised a plan to
pay the victim a partial sum of $400 for the marijuana and then rob him of both the $400
and the marijuana with appellant’s assistance. J.P. provided S.V. with $400, and he, S.V.,
and appellant discussed S.V.’s plan to rob the victim. The victim subsequently agreed to
sell the marijuana to S.V. for $750. S.V. paid the victim $400 and convinced him to wait
at the party to collect the rest of the money.

1 Appellant also challenges his “conviction” of fifth-degree assault. However, the district
court did not enter a conviction of fifth-degree assault because it is a lesser-included offense
of first-degree aggravated robbery. Appellate courts do not consider sufficiency-of-the-
evidence challenges to charges on which a defendant was found guilty but neither formally
adjudicated nor sentenced. See State v. Ashland, 287 N.W.2d 649, 650 (Minn. 1979); see
also State v. Hoelzel, 639 N.W.2d 605, 609 (Minn. 2002) (concluding that verdict of guilt,
without recorded judgment of conviction, is not final, appealable judgment).

3
The victim stayed at the party, where he consumed Xanax and alcohol and gambled
on games of beer pong. The victim and S. V. each wagered $80 on one game and placed
their money on the table. After the victim won the game, S.V. took the money and ran to
the bathroom. When the vic tim noticed that the money wa s missing, he announced that
whoever took his money was a “b—h.”
S.V. and appellant then confronted the victim. Appellant approached and restrained
the victim from behind while the others punched him, reached into his pockets, and stole
his money.2 At some point, the victim was on the ground. S.V. grabbed a rifle from another
room and pointed it at the vic tim. Appellant told S.V. to put the gun away. The victim
was made to remove some of his clothing to show that he was not wearing a wire, and then
he was released. Appellant walked the victim outside. The victim left in his vehicle and
then called the police to report being robbed of approximately $400. The police executed
a search warrant on J.P.’s home later that day and found an AR- 15 rifle along with a
backpack containing marijuana, cocaine, and pills.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged ap pellant with aiding and abetting first-
degree aggravated robbery in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.245, subd. 1 (2016), aiding and
abetting simple robbery in violation of Mi nn. Stat. § 609.24 (2016), with both charges

2 Despite admitting that he knew the robber y was going to occur, J.P. denied any
involvement in the physical altercation or the robbery itself, and testified that, as he
witnessed the robbery, “me and the girls were just sitting down talking – all three of us was
talking saying that’s kind of messed up.”

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referencing Minn. Stat. § 609.05, subd. 1 (2016) (liability for crimes of another),3 and fifth-
degree assault in violation of Minn. Stat. § 6 09.224, subd. 1(2) (2016). The jury found
appellant guilty on all counts . The district court convict ed appellant of first-degree
aggravated robbery, entere d no conviction on the lesser-included offenses of simple
robbery and fifth-degree assault, and sentenced appellant to 78 months in prison.
This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
Appellant argues that the evid ence is insufficient to prov e that the victim suffered
bodily harm during the robbery because the victim did not sp ecifically testify that he
experienced pain and provided minimal testimony on his injuries. We disagree.
Our review of a sufficiency-of-the-evidenc e challenge is “limited to a painstaking
analysis of the record to determine whether the evidence, when view ed in a light most
favorable to the conviction, wa s sufficient to permit the jurors to reach the verdict which
they did.” State v. DeRosier, 695 N.W.2d 97, 108 (Minn. 2005) (quotation omitted). The
reviewing court will not disturb the verdict if the jury, in ac ting with due regard for the
presumption of innocence and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could
reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty of the charged offense. Bernhardt v.
State, 684 N.W.2d 465, 476-77 (M inn. 2004). “[We] construe the record most favorably
to the state and will assume the evidence supporting the co nviction was believed and the

3 A defendant is criminally liable for the crim e of another if the defendant “intentionally
aids, advises, hires, counsels, or conspires with or otherwise procures the other to commit
the crime.” Id.

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contrary evidence disbelieved.” State v. Pieschke , 295 N.W.2d 580, 584 (Minn. 1980).
This is particularly true with conflicting testimony because weighing the credibility of
witnesses is the exclusive function of the jury. State v. Thao, 649 N.W.2d 414, 421 (Minn.
2002). Evidence presented through a single witness may be sufficient to sustain a
conviction. State v. Johnson , 811 N.W.2d 136, 149 (Minn. App. 2012), review denied
(Minn. Mar. 28, 2012) (citing State v. Miles, 585 N.W.2d 368, 373 (Minn. 1998)).
First-degree aggravated robbery is defined as:
Whoever, while committing a robbery, is armed with a
dangerous weapon or any article used or fashioned in a manner
to lead the victim to reasonably believe it to be a dangerous
weapon, or inflicts bodily ha rm upon another, is guilty of
aggravated robbery in the first degree . . . .
Minn. Stat. § 609.245. “Bodily harm” is defined as “physical pain or injury, illness, or any
impairment of physical condition.” Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 7 (2016). Either a
“minimal amount of physical pain,” State v. Jarvis, 665 N.W.2d 518, 522 (Minn. 2003), or
a “minimal injury [is] su fficient to establish bodily harm under section 609.02,” State v.
Bowser, 307 N.W.2d 778, 779 (Minn. 1981). The evidence of bodily harm is sufficient if,
for example, “the jury could find that the victim suffered physical pain.” State v. Johnson, 277 Minn. 230, 237, 152 N.W.2d 768, 773 (1967). Even sc ratches establish “physical
injury, sufficient to sustain a co nviction of aggravated robbery.” State v. Slaughter , 691
N.W.2d 70, 76 (Minn. 2005).
At trial, the state alleged that appellant aided and abetted an aggravated robbery in
which he or another inflicted bodily harm on the victim. The victim testified that S.V. first
threatened him with the rifle and that appellant then rest rained him by holding his arms

6
behind his head so that he did not try to fight. The victim st ated that, “I kind of felt like
[appellant] was somewhat protecting me [from being shot].” He was “hit a couple times”
with “weak punches” by others while appellant restrained him and then was dragged to the
ground or let go, but he did not remember appellant slamming him to the ground. The
victim did not testify that he experienced any pain during the robbery, and he denied being
choked, but he stated that, following the robbery, “I think I had one mark on my eye.” The
victim also testified extensively about consuming a combination of Xanax, marijuana, and
alcohol that night, which he acknowledged could have affected his memory, and he
admitted that he felt the effects of the drug s, could not remember every detail, and was
“caught up in [his] own little world.”
J.P. testified that the robbery began when appellant choked the victim from behind
by wrapping his arm around the victim’s neck while S.V. “s[u]cker punched” the victim in
the face. S.V. continued to punch the victim as he went to the ground, and appellant then
placed his knee on the victim’s neck near his throat and applied pressure, to the point that
the victim said he couldn’t breathe. Appella nt held his knee on the victim’s neck while
S.V. went through the victim’s pockets, picked up a rifle, and pointed it at the victim. S.V.
then hit the victim with the bottom of the rifle.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the conviction, the jury could
reasonably conclude that the victim, at the very least, suffered “a minimal amount of
physical pain” during the robbery sufficient to prove bodily harm, based on J.P.’s testimony
that the victim was punched multiple times, c hoked by appellant, and hit with a rifle.
Because we defer to the jury’s credibility determinations, the victim’s testimony in which

7
he denied being choked and described the punches as “weak,” is contrary evidence that we
may assume the jury disbelieved. Additionally, the victim’s testimony that he sustained a
mark on his eye during the robb ery is evidence of minimal in jury sufficient to establish
bodily harm. See Bowser, 307 N.W.2d at 779. Therefore, the evidence is sufficient to
support the jury’s verdict that appellant aided and abetted a first-degree aggravated robbery
in which he or another inflicted bodily harm on the victim.4
Affirmed.

4 The state also argues that me re physical restraint is suffi cient to satisfy the statutory
definition of bodily harm by impairment of physical condition under Minn. Stat. § 609.02,
subd. 7. See generally Jarvis , 665 N.W.2d at 522 (definin g impairment of physical
condition as “any injury that weakens or dama ges an individual’s physical condition”).
Because we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to establish that the victim suffered
bodily harm by physical pain or injury, we need not address this argument.