State of Minnesota, ex rel. Antwone Ford, petitioner, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-1895

State of Minnesota, ex rel.
Antwone Ford, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Tom Roy, Commissioner of Corrections,
Appellant.

Filed June 25, 2018
Reversed
Jesson, Judge

Washington County District Court
File No. 82-CV-16-2295

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Amy Lawler, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Lori Swanson, Attor ney General, Rachel E. Bell, Kelly S. Kemp, Assistant Attorneys
General, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Jesson, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Reyes,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
JESSON, Judge
Respondent Antwone Ford was incarcerated after he was eligible for supervised
release because he could not locate approved housing. After multiple review hearings and
release revocations, Ford fil ed a habeas corpus petition challenging his continued
2
incarceration. The petition was denied by the district court, consi dered by this court, and
remanded for further findings on the efforts the Department of Corrections made to assist
Ford in finding housing . Before the district court could consider the case on remand
however, Ford was released to complete treatment in Hen nepin County. While the
Department of Corrections argued that the case became moot with Ford’s release , the
district court disagreed , held an evidentiary hearing , and issued an order directing the
Department of Corrections to take a variety of actions to prevent Ford’s potential future re-
incarceration. The Department of Corrections appeals. Because Ford’s release renders this
case moot at this time, we reverse.
FACTS
Respondent Antwone Ford pleaded guilty to third -degree criminal sexual conduct
in 2008. He was sentenced to 36 months in prison, but the sentence was stayed and Ford
was placed on probation. After various probation violations, Ford’s sentence was executed
in 2013, and conditional release was imposed. On Ford’s supervised -release date in
February 2015, he did not yet have an approved address to go to upon release , which is a
requirement for level-III sex offenders such as Ford.1
Because Ford did not have an approved residence, he was transferred to the Blue
Earth County jail on his rele ase date, where he attempt ed to plan his release by making
phone calls. After approximately two weeks, he was unable to find a residence and the

1 Level-III sex offenders are subject to Intensive Supervised Release, and offenders on ISR
are required to have a residence approved by their supervise d-release agent in order to be
released from custody.
3
Department of Correction ’s (DOC) Hearings and Release Unit (HRU) held a hearing on
his alleged supervised -release violation—failing to find appropriate housing. The HRU
hearing officer revoked his release for 90 days. Hearing officers revoked h is release for
the same reason four more times.
During his subsequent incarceration, Ford and the DOC attempted to f ind
appropriate housing by contacting relatives who were either unwilling or unable to provide
him housing in areas throughout Minnesota, Wisconsin, and North Dakota. Ford’s county
of commitment, as well as the county in which he has historical ties, is Blue Earth County.
There is an Intensified Supervise Release (ISR) house in the county, in Mankato, which
traditionally houses offenders who struggle to find housing . But Ford was unable to stay
at the house due to a Mankato city ordinance that prohi bits housing sex offenders at that
location. Ford found a landlord in Ramse y County willing to rent to him , but Ramsey
County refused to supervise him because he had no historical ties to the area and because
of the high concentration of offenders in the zip codes of his proposed residences.
While incarcerated and after his fourth release revocation, Ford filed for habeas
corpus relief. In his habeas petition, he argued the DOC was unlawfully continuing to
incarcerate him and that the Mankato city ordinance that restricted his ability to live in the
ISR house in Mankato was preempted by state law and violated his due-process rights.
The district court held a hearing on Ford’s habeas petition. The court heard legal
arguments but did not conduct an evide ntiary hearing because it determined there w as no
dispute of material facts. The district court concluded that Ford could not challenge the
4
city ordinance since Mankato was not a party to the action and that the DOC ’s continued
incarceration of Ford was lawful.
Ford appealed the district court ’s decision to this court, and this court issued an
order opinion which reversed and remanded the case in order for the DOC to develop the
record regarding efforts made to find housing for Ford, in compliance with t his court’s
decision in State ex rel. Marlowe v. Fabian, 755 N.W.2d 792 (Minn. App. 2008). State ex
rel. Ford v. Roy, No. A16-1769 (Minn. App. Feb. 1, 2017).
Shortly after this court issued its order opinion, Ford was released from custody to
Alpha Hum an Services (Alpha House) in H ennepin County to complete sex -offender
treatment. This is a 13 - to 18 -month program, the first four stages of which are
“residential,” meaning participants live at the treatment center. While residing at the
treatment center, Ford will be supervised by a DOC agent. But in the final two stages of
treatment, participants no longer live at the treatment center and often move to another
housing option, the Portland House, also located in Hennepin County. When participants
move t o the Portland H ouse, they are considered to be living in the community and
supervised by Hennepin County. When and if Ford reach es that stage of the treatment
program, the DOC will likely request that Hennepin County supervise Ford. The county
can choose to accept or reject this supervision.
When this case returned to the district court on remand, the DOC argued the case
was moot because Ford had already been released to Alpha House. But the district court
disagreed and deter mined it could not disregard this court’s instructions on remand to
develop a record of the DOC’s efforts to find housing for Ford. It conducted an evidentiary
5
hearing where the DOC’s field -service director, the executive director of the HRU, Ford
himself, his supervise d-release agent while in Hennepin County, his supervise d-release
agent while in Blue Earth County, and his case manager from Stillwater prison, all testified.
The DOC’s field-service director, Allen Godfrey, detailed all of the DOC’s effor ts
to find housing for Ford including attempts to place him with five different relatives; the
mother of his child; numerous landlords in Mankato, St. Paul, Minneapolis, and Fairmont;
and a variety of affordable housing agencies . The DOC also assigned a mental-health
planner to assist Ford by attempting to get him into three mental health related programs .
And the DOC tried to get Nicollet County jail to house Ford three -quarter time to allow
him to leave the jail to look for employment. In total, Godfre y estimated that the DOC
made approximately 70 contacts regarding housing on Ford’s behalf.
Godfrey explained the DOC’s relationship with Community Corrections Act (CCA)
counties, which are counties that provide their own supervised release versus DOC
supervision. According to Godfrey, CCA counties can choose wheth er to supervise
offenders, and the DOC cannot force them to do so, though there are dispute resolution
processes for conflicts . And if a CCA county does not agree to supervise, the DOC
generally will not place that individual in that county under DOC supervision . Godfrey
further explained the DOC’s use of ISR houses, houses the DOC rents to provide housing
for offenders placed on ISR, but noted that individuals can only reside in these houses if
6
located in a county where the offender has historical ties, or if it is the county of
commitment.2
Ford testified and explained that he had submitted residences in Ramsey County
that wer e rejected. He discussed his current participation in sex -offender treatment at
Alpha House, and told the district court that he wanted to complete the program and felt he
was doing well in it.
Following the evidentiary hearing, the district court issued its findings and order.
The court concluded the DOC had not fulfilled its obligation under Marlowe, 755 N.W.2d
792, which requires the DOC to consider restr ucturing an individual’s release to include
viable housing options, and was not following its own policy 203.018 on the hierarchy of
county of presumptive supervision.3 It granted Ford’s petition and ordered that:
2. The DOC shall fully comply with DOC Policy 203.018.

3. When Ford submits a proposed residence, including the
Alpha House post-residential placement at Portland House in
Hennepin County, the DOC shall treat the county where that
residence is located as his presumptive release jurisdiction.

4. If that county refuses to accept supervision of Ford, for any
reason, the DOC shall engage the dispute resolution process.

2 Rebecca Holmes-Larson, the executive director of the DOC’s HRU , further explained
that her unit c annot modify conditions o f release but can accept or reject a release plan.
While her hearing officers attend review hearings, they act in a secretarial role by
documenting efforts to find housing for an individual, but they do not dictate housing
placements and thus cannot force counties to supervise offenders.
3 Policy 203.018 states that a prison case manager, who works with an offender to establish
housing, should submit requests for agent assignment in the following order: (1) the county
containing the proposed residence; (2) the county where the offender has documented
history and support; and (3) the county of commitment.
7
5. If, after dispute resolution, that county still refuses to accept
supervision, the DOC shall provide DOC supervision to Ford
in that county, or modify Ford’s conditions of release.

The DOC appeals.
D E C I S I O N
I. Ford’s habeas petition is moot.
The DOC argues that because Ford was released to the community, his habeas
petition challenging his continued incarceration is moot. We agree.
This court can only decide actual, justiciable controversies . In re Matter of
Dahlgren Twp., 906 N.W.2d 512, 520 (Minn. App. 2017) ; State v. Brooks , 604 N.W.2d
345, 347 (Minn. 2000), as modified (Mar. 15, 2000). And such a controversy only exists
when a claim “in addition to adverse interests and concrete assertions of rights, [. . .] allows
for specific relief by a decree or judgment of a specific character as distinguished from an
advisory opinion predicated on hypothetical facts.” State ex rel. Sviggum v. Hanson , 732
N.W.2d 312, 321 (Minn. App. 2007). Appellate courts do not issue advisory opinions, nor
do they decide cases merely to establish precedent. State ex rel. Leino v. Roy, 910 N.W.2d
477, 481 (Minn. 2018). When a justiciable controversy is not present, a case is moot. A
case becomes moot when an event occurs making a decision on the merits unnecessary, or
awarding effective relief impossible. Limmer v. Swanson , 806 N.W.2d 838, 839 (Minn.
2011). An issue may become moot based on circumstances occurring after remand. See
Tieso v. Hansen, 349 N.W.2d 863, 864 (Minn. App. 1984) (noting an evidentiary hearing
related to a custodial parent was ordered after remand from Minnesota Supreme Court, but
8
the issue became moot based upon a parent’s change in circumstances which rendered
hearing unnecessary).
That is precisely what occurred here: after remand, upon Ford’s release to Alpha
House, his case became moot. This is particularly true given the limited relief available in
a habeas proceeding. A court may only grant a petitioner “relief from impris onment or
restraint.” Minn. Stat. § 589.01 (2016). And here, before the district court’s decision on
remand, Ford gained the relief sought—release to Alpha House.
The district court here determined that , because this court on remand directed it to
consider whether the DOC had complied with its obligations under Marlowe, an
evidentiary hearing was needed. But Marlowe requires the DOC “to assist an offender in
finding residential placement.” 755 N.W.2d at 795 (citing Minnesota Department of
Corrections policy 203.010). Because the DOC complied with the requirements of
Marlowe when it secured housing for Ford at the Alpha House and released him, there was
no longer a need for the district court to further consider this issue pursuant to Marlowe.4
But Ford argues the case is not moot because he remains on supervised release,
which is a continuing restraint on his liberty. He takes issue with what he describes as two
“conditions” of his supervision: (1) CCA counties’ ability to refuse to supervise him in a
county and what he predicts will be the DOC’s subsequent refusal to supervise in that same
county; and (2) his inability to live at the ISR house in Mankato due to a Mankato city

4 This said, we appreciate the district court’s attempt to strictly adhere to this court’s
instructions on remand, as well as its attempt to enforce the important obligations set forth
in Marlowe, though it became inapplicable in this case.
9
ordinance. Because neither of these conditions restrain Ford’s liberty at this time, we
conclude they do not present justiciable controversies.
With regard to the first “condition,” Ford postulates that when he completes the first
four stages of the Alpha House sex-offender treatment, he will attempt to live in the
Portland House, which will require Hennepin County—a CCA county—to supervise him,
and the county will reject the request to supervise. And when the county refuses to
supervise him, Ford believes he will once again be incarcerated. But “on appeal there must
be a substantial and real controversy between the parties before a case will be considered
by this court.” State v. Murphy, 545 N.W.2d 909, 917 (Minn. 1996) (quotation omitted).
Ford’s future housing is unknown and does not pose a direct or imminent injury to Ford.
Hennepin County has n ot yet refused to supervise him. Nor had he, at the time of the
district court’s consideration, progressed to the stage of the Alpha House program that
requires alternative housing.
The same analysis applies to Ford’s second argument that the Mankato city
ordinance places an unlawful restraint on him. Ford has no current need to live at the
Mankato ISR house—he is currently housed and supervised in Hennepin County. Neither
of these “conditions,” at least at this time, place a restraint on Ford’s liberty. As a result,
Ford’s habeas petition is moot.
II. Exceptions to the mootness doctrine do not apply.
Even when a case is moot, there are exceptions to the application of the mootness
doctrine. These exceptions allow for a court’s consideration when an issue is likely to
reoccur but would co ntinue to evade judicial review or is functionally justiciable and has
10
statewide significance. Dean v. City of Winona , 868 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Minn. 2015) . Ford
argues that there are three issues that this court should decide pursuant to these exceptions.
Ford first challenges the DOC’s general use of review hearings to continue confinement
for offenders who cannot establish an approved residence. He then turns to the Mankato
ordinance that prohibits sex-offenders from living in the Mankato ISR house. And finally,
he raises the CCA counties ’ ability to refuse to supervise offenders , and the DOC
subsequent refusal to supervise, causing continued incarceration. He contends that each
issue is likely to reoccur and poses a question of statewide significance. We address each
argument in turn.
First, Ford challenges the DOC’s use of review hearings, which are used to extend
confinement of offenders on supervised and condit ional release who are unable to secure
approved housing. He asserts that these hearings violate offenders’ due-process rights. We
discern no need to apply exceptions to the mootness doctrine to the review hearings
because w e very recently addressed this issue. I n Leino, 910 N.W.2d at 483-84, we
determined the use of review hearings is lawful because the hearings are consistent with
Minnesota Statutes section 244.05, subdivision 2 (2016), which requires the commissioner
to “specify the period of revocation for each violation of release” and establish procedures
for the revocation of release that “provide due process of law for the inmate.” As a result,
the hearings provide for an offender’s due process. Id. The Leino analysis applies here.
The question Ford raises regarding review hearings is answered.
Second, Ford challenges the Mankato city ordinance that prevents him from living
in the I SR house in Mankato, arguing that this ordinance also violates his due -process
11
rights. But there is no need to address the exceptions to mootness here because Ford’s
habeas petition is not the appropriate vehicle for this challenge. The city of Mankato is not
a party to this action and cannot act on its own behalf. N or does the Commissioner of
Corrections have power over the city to modify an ordinance or declare it unconstitutional.
As the Minnesota Supreme Court noted in McCaughtry v. City of Red Wing , 808 N.W.2d
331, 337 (Minn. 2011), a declaratory judgment action “ is proper to test the validity of a
municipal ordinance, regardless of whether another remedy exists .” And this court has
established there is no “ authority that permits a district court to grant general declaratory
or injunctive relief in a habeas proceeding.” Rud v. Fabian, 743 N.W.2d 295, 304 (Minn.
App. 2007), review denied (Minn. Mar. 26, 2008). Because Ford cannot challenge the
Mankato city ordinance through his habeas petition, there is no reason to consider whether
the issue survives mootness.
Finally, Ford challenges the complex relationship between the CA A counties and
the DOC. Specifically, he takes issue with a CCA county’s ability to refuse to supervise
an offender and the DOC’s general practice to subsequently refuse to supervise that
offender in that CCA county, leading to continued incarceration. Using Ford’s case as an
example, he takes issue with the possible scenario that he could find housing in Hennepin
County—such as the Portland House —that Hennepin County c ould refused to supervise
him there, and if the county refused, it is DOC practice to then also refuse to supervise him.
And this could lead to Ford returning to prison because he lacks an approved residence.
This argument provides a sufficient basis to analyze whether any exceptions to the
12
mootness doctrine might allow its consideration. We address those exceptions, as applied
to the CCA county issue, below.
First, we address whether the CCA county issue is likely to reoccur but would
continue to evade judicial review. Such circumstances exist “when there is a reasonable
expectation that a complaining party would be subjected to the same action again and the
duration of the challenged action is too short to be fully litigated before it ceases or
expires.” Dean, 868 N.W.2d at 5 (emphasis omitted). This is a flexible exception to the
mootness doctrine. See Leino, 910 N.W.2d at 481 (quoting Brooks, 604 N.W.2d at 347).
Because this issue has been raised multiple times in cases within this past year, we
determine this is an issue that is likely to reoccur. See Leino, 910 N.W.2d at 480 (appellant
argument in his habeas petition that the DOC “impermissibly deferred to counties in
determining whether he could release predatory offenders into those counties”).5

5 We acknowledge that the Unite d States Supreme Court recently released its decision in
U.S. v. Sanchez-Gomez, which determined that, outside of a class action, the capable -of-
repetition-and-evading-review exception to the federal mootness doctrine only applies to
cases that are capable of repetition for the same complaining party. 138 S. Ct. 1532, 1540
(2018). And we acknowledge that past cases from Minnesota courts have cited the federal
standard that capable of repetition yet evading review means “(1) the challenged action
was in it s duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and
(2) there was a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party would be subjected
to the same action again.” Kahn v. Griffin, 701 N.W.2d 815, 821 (Minn. 2005) (citing
Weinstein v. Bradford , 423 U.S. 147, 149, 96 S. Ct. 347, 348 (1975)). But we also note
that Minnesota is not bound by the federal st andard for determining mootness. And the
Minnesota Supreme Court, in Brooks, determined that because an issue had reached the
court “twice in one year from two different jurisdictions ,” this indicated that “ the issue is
both significant and capable of repetition.” 604 N.W.2d at 348 . We applied the same
analysis in Leino, where we stated “this court ha[s] been asked to consider challenges to
the DOC’s administration of supervised and conditional release and re -incarceration, as
well as the DOC’s use of review hearings, in other appeals, so [Leino] has raised an issue
that is capable of repetition .” 910 N.W.2d at 481 (internal quotation mar ks omitted)
13
But a more complex question is whether the issue is also likely to evade judicial
review. And to make this determination, we look first at the duration of the action , as
traditionally cases of inherently limited duration are those likely to be found to evade
review. Dean, 868 N.W.2d at 5. In doing so, the cases of Brooks, Blilie, and Dean are
instructive. Brooks, 604 N.W.2d 345; Matter of Blilie, 494 N.W.2d 877 (Minn. 1993); see
also Dean, 868 N.W.2d 1. In Brooks, the supreme court considered the constitutionality
of cash-only bail and determined pre-trial bail issues by definition are “short -lived” and
thus likely to evade judicial review. 604 N.W.2d at 348. The court came to a similar
conclusion in Blilie, where it determined that because a guardian could admit a state ward
to a trea tment center where neuroleptic medication could be administered immediately
upon admittance, the issue of administering neuroleptic drugs was likely to evade judicial
review.6 494 N.W.2d at 880-81, see also State ex rel. Doe v. Madonna , 295 N.W.2d 356,
361, 36 5 (Minn. 1980) (determining that the use of 72 -hour mental -health emergency
hospitalizations orders is likely to evade review). But in Dean, by contrast, the Minnesota
Supreme Court determined that because the enforcement of a city ordinance was ongoing,
and because the appellants’ case spanned three years, “a duration that typically would
provide ample time for judicial review[,] ” it was not likely to evade review. 868 N.W.2d
at 5-6.

(alterations in original). Thus the fact that this issue has come before this court on multiple
occasions is an appropriate consideration here.
6 Neuroleptic drugs, because of their potentially serious physical side e ffects, now require
pre-treatment judicial review prior to administering them involuntarily. Jarvis v. Levine,
418 N.W.2d 139, 145-46, 150 (Minn. 1988).
14
Ford’s situation here is closer aligned to that of Dean than of Brooks, Blilie or
Madonna. Finding housing for an offender on supervised or conditional release, and
especially a level -III sex offender, is a proces s that is not inherently brief like the short-
lived nature of bail, neuroleptic medication administration , and 72-hour mental-health
holds.7 And in Ford’s case, he was incarcerated for much longer than 72 hours awaiting
release to an approved residence . As the supreme court determined in Dean, this time
provides sufficient time for judicial review. See 868 N.W.2d at 5-6.
This said, cases of limited duration are not the exclusive measure of when evasion
of judicial review occurs. Conduct could rise to this level as well. As we stated in Leino,
a supervised or conditional release issue may evade review “if the DOC continues to release
offenders who have been re -incarcerated during their supervised or conditional release
terms after the offenders challenge their incarceration by habeas [petition].” 910 N.W.2d
at 481 (alteration in original) (quoting this court’s order opinion in State ex rel. Leino v.
Roy, No. A17-1278 (Minn. App. Sept. 13, 2017)). Our review of recent cases reveals two
situations where appellants challenge continued incarceration due to a lack of approved
housing, but are released before the district court makes a determination on the merits of
their case. In both Leino and Martinez, cases decided by this court in the last year, the
appellants’ releases were revoked and incarceration was extended for a lack of approved
housing; appellants filed habeas petitions ; and they were released prior to the district
court’s consideration of those petitions. 910 N.W.2d at 480; State ex rel. Martinez v. Roy,

7And when finding housing is brief, it is likely not problematic—since the offender would
be released and there would be no continued incarceration to contest.
15
No. A16-1604, 2017 WL 2063009, at *1-2 (Minn. App. May 15, 2017). While these cases,
along with the current case, raise the question of whether this conduct will cause the CCA
county issue to evade review, we are not yet willing to make that determination on this
record and the limited cases to date.
Looking now at the second, separate exception to the mootness doctrine, we address
whether the CCA county issue is functionally justiciable and presents a question of
statewide significance that should be decided immediately. Dean, 868 N.W.2d at 6 (citing
Rud, 359 N.W.2d at 576). A case is justiciable when the record contains the raw material,
including an effective presentation of the interests on both sides of an issue, associated with
judicial decision-making. Id. The record here is well-developed. There was an evidentiary
hearing that addressed the CCA county supervision issue from both the perspective of the
DOC and the offender. But we apply this exception narrowly and to do so we require both
a functionally justiciable record and issue of statewide significance. Dean, 868 N.W.2d at
6. It is the second prong that we find lacking.
Previously, Minnesota appellate courts have determined that questions of cash bail;
voting and redis tricting; proper approval of a breath -testing device for possible impaired
drivers; the calling of child witnesses and victims to testify at omnibus hearings; a court -
appointed guardian’s right to consent to remove a ward from life support ; and the DOC’s
use of review hearings are all issues of statewide importance and in need of an immediate
decision. See Brooks, 604 N.W.2d at 348; Kahn, 701 N.W.2d at 823; Jasper v. Comm’r of
Pub. Safety, 642 N.W.2d 435 , 439 (Minn. 2002); Rud, 359 N.W.2d 57 5-76; In re
Guardianship of Tschumy, 853 N.W.2d 728, 731, 740 (Minn. 2014); Leino, 910 N.W.2d at
16
481. Courts made this determination for a variety of reasons including the large population
that the question affects, the potential detrimental impact of failing to deci de an issue on
future proceedings, and the agreement of the parties that the issue is significant statewide.
In Kahn, for instance, the court determined that an issue of redistricting and the
Minneapolis municipal election system required answering because other Minnesota cities
use same election procedures, and between S t. Paul and Minneapolis, the issue affected
approximately 13.6% of Minnesota’s population. 701 N.W.2d at 823. And this court in
Leino, addressed the question of the DOC’s use of review hearings in administering re -
incarceration of offenders for violations of conditional release after it determined the DOC
uses those hearings regularly “ as a decision -making tool regarding re -incarceration of
offenders for violating conditional release .” 910 N.W.2d at 482; see also In re
Guardianship of Tschumy, 853 N.W.2d at 740 (deciding a question of if a court-appointed
guardian can consent to remove a ward from life support in part based on its impact where
there were approximately 12,000 wards under state supervision in Minnesota); Jasper, 642
N.W.2d at 439 (deciding a question on the approval of a breath test because it was “the
only breath-testing instrument currently in use in this state” for suspected impaired drivers).
Similarly in Brooks, the court decided the case was a dequately important because failure
to decide the issue of cash -only bail would have a “continuing adverse impact on those
defendants who are unable to post cash only bail[,]” and would even create a class of
defendants with constitutional claims but no remedy. 604 N.W.2d at 348. And in Rud, the
parties agreed that the case raised a question of statewide significance. 359 N.W.2d at 576.
17
But the CCA county issue here does not possess the same qualities as these cases
where courts have considered questions of voting, the general use of review hearings,
breath tests and cash -only bail. Nor have the parties agreed as to the significance of t he
CCA county issue. The CCA county issue appears to reach far fewer people than those
impacted by the broad issues deemed to have statewide significance, affecting only those
who are on ISR and need an approved residence, are able to find housing in a CCA county,
the CCA county refuse s to supervise them , and the n the DOC subsequently refuses to
supervise them in that same CCA county. While the record contains no specific number
of individuals that this could include, 8 it is surely considerably less tha n 13.6% of the
population of Minnesota affected by the question in Kahn, and less than the number of
offenders who participate in review hearing as challenged in Leino, since those hearings
address any violation of supervised or conditional release. See Kahn, 701 N.W.2d at 823;
Leino, 910 N.W.2d at 483-84.
Nor is this CCA county issue as finite as those that have been deemed significant in
the past. For example, in the case of cash-only bail, a person can either pay the cash bail
or they cannot, and if they cannot, they remain incarcerated. See Brooks, 604 N.W.2d at
347-48. The CCA county issue is more attenuated , for multiple reasons. Not all
individuals who request CCA supervision will be rejected. And if an offender is rejected,
there are circumstances under which the DOC will provide supervision in that county, just

8 The DOC’s field-service director, in his testimony at the evidentiary hearing, stated that
it is “a very small number of offenders that are being held past their projected release date
because of lack of approved residence.” And not all of those offenders’ continued
incarcerations necessarily have anything to do with CCA county rejection.
18
as the DOC is providing supervision for F ord while he is at treatment at Alpha House.
Even if a CCA county refuses to supervise an offender, and the DOC subsequently refuses
to supervise that offender in that CCA county, the offender has the ability to look for other
housing options in other counties . C ontinuous incarceration is not automatic. In sum,
looking at this myriad of factual variations, we do not discern a single question of statewide
significance in need of an immediate answer.
Ford’s habeas petition sou ght release from incarceration. S ince Ford in no longer
incarcerated his case is moot. And because no is sue raised is one that is evading judicial
review, nor one that presents a question of statewide importance that requires an immediate
decision, the exceptions to the mootness doctrine do not apply.
Reversed.