Adam James Hockenson, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-1933

Adam James Hockenson, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed June 25, 2018
Affirmed
Smith, John, Judge*

Beltrami County District Court
File No. 04-CV-17-783

Coley J. Grostyan, Law Office of Coley J. Grostyan, PLLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
appellant)

David L. Hanson, Beltrami County Attorney, Bemidji, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and d ecided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Smith,
John, Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointme nt pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SMITH, JOHN, Judge
We affirm the denial of appellant Adam James Hockenson’s motion to restore his
right to possess firearms and ammunition because the district court did not abuse its
discretion.
FACTS
In July 2001, Hockenson, along with three other people, attacked a person with a
golf club. He was charged with second-degree assault in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.222,
subd. 1 (2000). In May 2002, Hockenson pleaded guilty to third-degree assault in violation
of Minn. Stat. § 609.223, subd. 1 (2000). Hockenson was sentenced to a stay of imposition
for five years, and was discharged from probation in August 2006, having met the
conditions of his sentencing order. As a result of his conviction, Hockenson is prohibited
from possessing firearms or ammunition for the remainder of his life. State v. Anderson ,
733 N.W.2d 128, 134 -36 (Minn. 2007) (holding that Minnesota’s firearms prohibition
statute applies to offenders who commit a crime of violence but receive a stay of imposition
as well as prohibiting people convicted of “a crime of violence” from possessing firearms);
see Minn. Stat. § 624.712, subd. 5 (2016) (including third -degree assault within the
definition of “crime of violence”).
In March 2017, Hockenson petitioned the court to restore his ability to possess
firearms and ammunition under Minn. Stat. § 609.165, subd. 1d (2016). He argued that
good cause existed to restore his rights because: he accepted responsibili ty for his actions
and cooperated with law enforcement; he was 19 at the time of the offense and it did not

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involve a firearm; he successfully completed the terms of his probation and has not
committed any offenses since; his other civil rights have been r estored; he has maintained
full-time employment almost continuously since the offense; he has been married for six
years and now has a child; he served in the Army National Guard and is currently on
inactive reserve; he has a need to possess firearms and a mmunition to protect himself and
his family, to hunt and recreate, to accept a family heirloom, and to teach his child how to
use a firearm; and he is not a risk to public safety.
The state opposed Hockenson’s petition, arguing that the facts of his unde rlying
offense were “egregious” and that a desire to hunt and recreate were not good cause to
restore rights to possess firearms.
In July 2017, the district court held a hearing on Hockenson’s petition. Both sides
primarily rested on the arguments articulated in their written submissions. The district court
took the matter under advisement.
In a written order, the district court denied Hockenson’s petition. It stated that “a
desire to hunt [is] not a good cause for restoration of rights” and determined that Hockenson
had not shown good cause based on any of his other proffered reasons. It also found that
the “violent facts surrounding [Hockenson’s] conviction do not demonstrate the maturity
of judgment necessary for the Court to find a significant level of comfort” with restoring
Hockenson’s firearm rights. Hockenson appeals.1

1 The state did not file a responding brief and so the case proceeds under Minn. R. Civ.
App. P. 142.03.

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D E C I S I O N
When a petitioner asks the district court to restore the right to possess firearms, the
court may do so if the petitioner shows “good cause.” Minn. Stat. § 609.165, subd. 1d.
Determining if the petitioner has shown good cause is a mixed question of law and fact.
Averbeck v. State , 791 N.W.2d 559, 560 -61 (Minn. App. 2010). Determining what facts
the petitioner has shown is a question of fact and determining if those facts amount to good
cause is a question of law. Id. Under this standard, this court will defer to the district court’s
factual findings, unless clearly erroneous, but will not defer to the district court’s legal
decisions. Id. at 561. “Good cause” is “a reason for taking an action that, in legal terms, is
legally sufficient, and, in ordinary terms, is justified in the context of surrounding
circumstances.” Id. “[T]he most significant surrounding circumstance in the context of
restoring the right to possess firearms is the interest in public safety” when weighed against
the private interest of the petitioner. Id.
But, even if the petitioner shows good cause, “the district court has discretion to
grant or deny the petition,” and so this court reviews the district court’s decision for abuse
of discretion. Id. The district court may use its discretionary authority to deny a petition if
it determines that the petitioner has not overcome the “clear legislative presumption s
against the possession of firearms by persons convicted of serious crimes” and the district
court does not have “a significant level of comfort with respect to the maturity of judgment
in those seeking a restoration of firearm rights.” Id. at 562.
In Averbeck, the petitioner was convicted of third-degree assault, and petitioned for
restoration of his firearm rights 19 years later. Id. at 560. The district court in that case

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found that the petitioner did not show good cause to restore his firearm rights . Id. at 560-
62. In doing so, the district court rejected three arguments the petitioner argued showed
good cause, and this court affirmed on appeal. First, the petitioner argued that a lifetime
ban for one incident was unjust. Id. at 561. The district court rejected that argument because
the petitioner lacked “remorse” for his crime and still felt as though he was innocent. Id.
Second, he argued that he needed a firearm to “handle situations arising in his part -time
job as a process server.” Id. at 562. The district court rejected this reason because the
presence of firearms could escalate the risks in these already “emotionally charged
situations.” Id. Third, he argued that “his inability to possess a firearm interferes not only
with his ability to go hunting with family a nd friends but also with his employment
prospects as a private investigator.” Id. The district court rejected this argument because
the petitioner had not yet applied to be a private detective and did not offer any authority
supporting his view that he could not become one without a firearm. Id. Neither the district
court nor this court explicitly addressed whether hunting was good cause for restoration of
firearm rights. Id. The district court in Averbeck also determined that, even if the petitioner
had shown good cause, the court did not have the “significant level of comfort with respect
to the maturity of [the petitioner’s] judgment” necessary to restore his rights. Id. This court
held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in coming to that conclusion. Id.
Good Cause
Hockenson argues that the district court abused its discretion in determining that he
did not show good cause for restoring his rights. He first argues that the district court “failed
to take into consideration all of the reas ons” Hockenson offered to establish good cause.

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Specifically, he points out that the district court did not explicitly consider and dismiss all
of the reasons that Hockenson offered to establish good cause. It is true that the district
court did not explic itly mention all of Hockenson’s reasons, but he does not point to any
authority stating that the district court must explicitly consider and reject every reason the
petitioner offers. Proper district court findings may be implicit. See P echovnik v.
Pechovnik, 765 N.W.2d 94, 99-100 (Minn. App. 2009) (holding the district court ’s
credibility determination and fact finding could be implicit). By determining that
Hockenson “ha[d] not shown good cause to grant the relief,” the district court implicitly
rejected Hockenson’s proffered reasons.
Hockenson also argues that in determining that the desire to hunt was “not a good
cause for restoration of rights,” the district court misconstrued this court’s ruling in
Averbeck. Hockenson points out that Averbeck noted that the district court had several
justifying reasons to deny the petitioner the restoration of rights, and did not explicitly say
that hunting can never be good cause for restoration of rights. 791 N.W.2d at 562. He also
notes an unpublished decision from this court supporting this reasoning. See Anderson v.
State, No. A15-1254, 2016 WL 1619367 at *2 (Minn. App. Apr. 25, 2016).2
But while Hockenson is correct that Averbeck did not hold that hunting can never
be good cause to restore firearm rights, t hat case also did not hold that hunting is good
cause for restoration of rights, nor did it hold that a desire to hunt overrules reasons for not
restoring firearm rights. In fact, Averbeck’s clearest holding is that a district court does not

2 Unpublished decisions are not precedential. See Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3(c) (2016);
Vlahos v. R&I Constr. of Bloomington, Inc., 676 N.W.2d 672, 676 n.3 (Minn. 2004).

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abuse its discretion in denying a petition to restore rights, even if hunting is cited as good
cause, when other circumstances justify denying the petition. 791 N.W.2d at 561-62.
Ultimately, the district court did not err in its overall conclusion that Hockenson did
not present good cause to restore his firearm rights. There is no binding authority stating
that any of Hockenson’s reasons are good cause for restoring his firearm rights, and
Averbeck suggests that good cause is particular to each case. Id. at 561.
Here, all but one of Hockenson’s stated purposes for owning firearms are
recreational or sentimental. Hockenson points out that the Minnesota Constitution
describes hunting as “a valued part of our heritage.” Minn. Const. art. XIII, § 12. While
recreation and hunting are important, they do not necessarily outweigh the public’s safety
interest. See State v. McTague, 173 Minn. 153, 154, 216 N.W. 787, 788 (1927) (stating that
good cause in the context of a speedy trial “means a substantial reason”). Further,
Hockenson has not stated why he could not hunt or recreate with different means, such as
a bow. See Minn. Stat. § 609.165, subd. 1a (prohibiting possession of firearms). His
remaining reason is protection from “wolves, bears, and the occasional cougar” on his rural
property. But Hockenson has provided no evidence that firearms would provide protection
that other cautionary measures would not. See Averbeck, 791 N.W.2d at 562 (holding that
the district court did not abuse its discretion by stating that a reason for possessing firearms
was not good cause when it “was not corroborated by a neutral source and lacked sufficient
specificity to be probative”). Further, he has lived on his property for five years and does
not mention a specific incident where a firearm was necessary for his protection.

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Significant Comfort
But even if Hockenson successfully showed good cause to restore his firearms, such
a showing would be irrelevant. Averbeck held that even if a petitioner has shown good
cause, the district court mu st have “a significant level of comfort with respect to the
[petitioner’s] maturity of judgment” for the petitioner “to overcome the clear legislative
presumptions against the possession of firearms by persons convicted” of crimes of
violence. Id.
Here, the district court specifically found that it did not have that level of comfort.
It stated that “[t]he violent facts surrounding [Hockenson’s] conviction do not demonstrate
the maturity of judgment necessary” for the court to restore his rights. The district court’s
determination finds support in the record in that Hockenson attacked a person with a golf
club. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Hockenson’s
petition.
Hockenson argues that the district court misconstrued Averbeck’s use of the term
“maturity of judgment.” He argues that in Averbeck, “maturity of judgment” was used to
evaluate the petitioner’s maturity since the crime, not the facts of the underlying crime. As
a result, he argues that the district court abuse d its discretion in evaluating Hockenson’s
maturity of judgment based on the facts surrounding his assault conviction.
But Hockenson’s argument fails for two reasons. First, the district court in Averbeck
interpreted the petitioner’s behavior since the un derlying crime in the context of whether
the petitioner had shown good cause, not whether the district court had abused its discretion
in denying the petition because it was not significantly “comfort[able]” with granting the

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petition. Id. Second, the dist rict court in Averbeck did analyze the facts regarding the
underlying crime as a part of its good cause analysis and noted that it was a felony offense
in which the victim suffered “substantial bodily harm.” Id. at 561. Ultimately, nowhere in
Averbeck did we state that a district court could not evaluate the facts of the underlying
crime to determine if it was comfortable with restoring firearm rights.
Hockenson also cites reasons why he has shown he has the required “maturity of
judgment,” including his s table family and work life, his military service, and his clean
criminal record since his conviction. But, under the applicable standard of review, these
reasons do not undermine the district court’s determination that , based on the facts of the
underlying crime, it was not comfortable restoring Hockenson’s firearm rights.
Affirmed.