Carl Jackson, Relator,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-0081

Carl Jackson,
Relator,

vs.

Crown Warehouse & Delivery Service, Inc.,
Respondent,

Department of Employment and Economic Development,
Respondent.

Filed October 22, 2018
Affirmed
Larkin, Judge

Department of Employment and Economic Development
File No. 35819281-3

Carl G. Jackson, Monticello, Minnesota (pro se relator)

Crown Warehouse & Delivery Service, Inc., Plymouth, Minnesota (respondent employer)

Lee B. Nelson, Department of Employment and Economic Development, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondent department)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Cleary, Chief Judge; and
Schellhas, Judge.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
LARKIN, Judge
In this unemployment-benefits appeal, relator-employee challenges a decision by an
unemployment-law judge (ULJ) that he is ineligible for unemployment benefits because
he quit his employment. We affirm.
FACTS
Relator Carl Jackson was employed as a full-time loader for respondent Crown
Warehouse & Delivery Service Incorporated (Crown), from April 12, 2016 , through
July 10, 2017. On August 7, 2017, Jackson applied for unemployment benefits, claiming
that his employment had been terminated . Respondent Minnesota Department of
Employment and Economic Development (DEED) determined that Jackson was ineligible
for benefits because he quit his employment.
Jackson appealed DEED’s ineligibility deter mination, and a ULJ conducted an
evidentiary hearing. One of Crown’s owners, Sheryl Ness, and a Crown employee, Kasey
Racette, testif ied on behalf of Crown. Jackson testified, but he did not call any other
witnesses. Jackson initially expressed interest in having his wife testify on his behalf.
However, when it was time for her to testify at the hearing , Jackson told the ULJ that
“[t]here’s no need.”
The ULJ found:
On June 26, 2017, a client complained to Sheryl Ness, owner, that
Jackson had requested cash from the client for some of his services. On
June 29, 2017, Jackson was absent from work and he did not not ify
management of his absence. He was sick that day and he did not have an
inhaler. Jackson was on vacation from June 30, 2017, through July 9, 2017.

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He returned to work on July 10, 2017. On July 10, 2017, Ness [approached
Jackson regarding] the complaint about Jackson asking for cash. Ness then
asked Jackson about his absence on June 29 , 2017. Jackso n stated that he
was in the hospital at midnight on June 29, 2017, and his phone did not work.
Ness told Jackson to bring in the doctor’s note. She did not tell Jackson that
he could not come to work if he did not have a doctor’s note. Jackson did
not tell Ness that he did not have a doctor’s note for June 29, 2017.

Jackson did not return to work after July 10, 2017.

During the evidentiary hearing, Ness testified that Jackson told Racette and her “that
he had gone to the hospital and he was in the hospital at midnight. He had to get the new
nebulizer and that’s why he didn’t come in. ” Ness testified that she asked Jackson, “D o
you have a doctor’s note?” and told him to “just bring that in and it ’ll be no problem .”
Jackson testified that Ness said he “needed a doctor’s note” and told him not to come back
to work until he had one. Ness testified that she “never said that.” Racette testified that
Ness said, “If you could bring a copy of [hospital paperwork] when you come in tomorrow,
then that would be fine.” Jackson testified that he did not tell Ness that he did not have a
doctor’s note and that he did not make an effort to get a doctor’s note because he “didn’t
go to the doctor.”
Ness testified that Jackson called her on July 13 “to tell [her] to bring him a check”
and meet him at a Kwik Trip convenience store . Ness testified that , when she arrived at
the Kwik Trip, she called Jackson and he said he “left the key [to Crown’s place of
business] in an envelope with the cashier.”
The ULJ based his findings of fact on Ness’s testimony , which he found more
credible than Jackson’s. The ULJ determined that “Jackson quit employment , and is

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ineligible for the payment of unemployment benefits.” Jackson requested reconsideration,
and the decision was affirmed. This certiorari appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
Jackson challenges the ULJ’s eligibility determination, arguing that he was
discharged from Crown and that the ULJ erred by determining that he quit. Review of a
ULJ’s eligibility determination is governed by Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 7(d) ( Supp.
2017), which provides:
The Minnesota Court of Appeals may affirm the
decision of the unemployment law judge or remand the
case for further proceeding s; or it may reverse or modify
the decision if the substantial rights of the petitioner may
have been prejudiced because the findings, inferences,
conclusion, or decision are:
(1) in violation of constitutional provisions;
(2) in excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction
of the department;
(3) made upon unlawful procedure;
(4) affected by other error of law;
(5) unsupported by substantial evidence in view of
the entire record as submitted; or
(6) arbitrary or capricious.

“Whether an employee has been discharged or voluntarily quit is a question of fact.”
Nichols v. Reliant Eng’g & Mfg., Inc., 720 N.W.2d 590, 594 (Minn. App. 2006) (quotation
omitted). This court vi ews the ULJ’s factual findings in the light most favorable to the
decision, defers to the ULJ’s credibility determinations, and will not disturb the factual
findings when the eviden ce substantially sustains them. Wiley v. Rober t Half Int’l, Inc.,
834 N.W.2d 567, 569 (Minn. App. 2013). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Minneapolis Van

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& Warehouse Co. v. St. Paul Terminal Warehouse Co., 180 N.W.2d 175, 178 (Minn. 1970)
(quotation omitted).
Generally, an applicant who quits employment is ineligible for u nemployment
compensation unless a statutory exception applies. Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 1 (Supp.
2017). “A quit from employment occurs when the decision to end the employment was, at
the time the employment ended, the employee’s.” Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 2(a) (Supp.
2017). “A discharge from employment occurs when any words or actions by an employer
would lead a reasonable employee to believe that the employer will no longer allow the
employee to work for the employer in any capacity.” Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 5(a)
(Supp. 2017).
The ULJ’s finding that Jackson quit is supported by the testimony of Ness and
Racette. They testified that Ness requested medical documentation regarding Jackson’s
absence on June 29, but that Ness did not tell Jackson that provision of the documentation
was a condition of continued employment. Thus, Ness’s request for documentation would
not have led a reasonable employee to believe that Crown would no lon ger allow Jackson
to work for Crown in any capacity. Ness did not otherwise communicate an intent to end
Jackson’s employment. Instead, Jackson’s failure to return to work after his meeting with
Ness establishes that he decided to end his employment with Crown.
Jackson argues that Ness and Racette “lied under oath” and that the transcript
reveals that Ness’s “story changes. ” The ULJ cre dited Ness’s testimony over Jackson’s
explaining, “ [Sheryl Ness’s] testimony was more credible than the testimony of Carl
Jackson. She has less of a vested interest in th is matter than Jackson and her testimony

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was corroborated by the te stimony of Kasey Racette.” See Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd.
1a(a) (2016) (requiring a ULJ to set forth the reasons for crediting or discrediting testimony
“[w]hen the credibility of a witn ess testifying in a hearing has a significant effect on the
outcome of a decision”).
“Credibility determinations are the exclusive province of the ULJ and will not be
disturbed on appeal.” Bangtson v. Allina Med. Grp. , 766 N.W.2d 328, 332 (Minn. App.
2009) (quotation omitted). We defer to the ULJ’s determination that Ness’s testimony was
more credible than Jackson’s. See Nichols, 720 N.W.2d at 594 (“When witness credibility
and conflicting evidence are at issue, we defer to the decision-maker’s ability to weigh the
evidence and make those determinations.”).
Jackson also a rgues that Crown terminated his employment before he started his
vacation on June 30, noting that when he returned from vacation on July 10, his routes did
not have his name on them and a new employee had been assigned to do the work he
usually did. However, Jackson worked his shift at Crown on Ju ly 1 0 and was not
approached by Ness until the end of his shift , indicating that Jackson was still employed
on July 10.
Because the ULJ’s determination that Jackson quit his employment is supported by
substantial evidence, and Jackson does not asse rt the application of a statutory exception
that would allow him to receive benefits even though he quit, we affirm t he ULJ’s
determination that Jackson is ineligible for unemployment benefits.
Affirmed.