State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-0088

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

LC Monroe Johnson,
Appellant.

Filed February 4, 2019
Affirmed
Bratvold, Judge

Meeker County District Court
File No. 47-CR-16-882

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Peter Magnuson, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Brandi Schiefelbein, Meeker County Attorney, Litchfield, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sara L. Martin, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reilly, Presiding Judge; Cleary, Chief Judge; and
Bratvold, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
BRATVOLD, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction for first-degree criminal sexual conduct on two
grounds. First, appellant argues that the district court deprived him of his right to present a
2
complete defense by prohibiting him from eliciting testimony and introducing evidence
about a witness’s prior conduct, which he would have offered to prove bias. Second,
appellant argues that the district court committed plain error “by responding to a jury
question without consulting the parties and suggesting the jury could not return a partial
verdict.” We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the
offered evidence. But the district court plainly erred when it responded to the jury’s
question outside the presence of the appellant and without consulting the parties. Because
appellant was not prejudiced by the district court’s plain error, we affirm.
FACTS
Appellant LC Monroe Johnson and S.B. were in a romantic relationship, and lived
together in Litchfield with S.B.’s 13- year-old daughter, D.B. Johnson and S.B. met in
Mississippi and had been together for eight years, but had a rocky relationship. D.B.
considered Johnson to be her stepdad.
On October 24, 2016, D.B. came home from school, ate dinner, and played video
games with Johnson. S.B. was at work, and D.B. and Johnson were alone. Later, D.B. and
Johnson watched a movie in S.B.’s bedroom. D.B. fell asleep watching the movie and when
she woke up, Johnson was “[ o]n top of [her].” D.B.’s pants and underwear were pulled
down by her ankles, and Johnson was not wearing any clothes. D.B. felt pain in her vagina,
and “pushed [Johnson] off of [her] and ran downstairs to the bathroom.”
D.B. texted S.B. from the bathroom and told her that Johnson could not stay at their
house anymore because he “put his thing in mine.” S.B. called the police before she left
work and reported an assault. Officer Rueckert of the Litchfield Police Department
3
responded to the home, where he found Johnson and D.B. alone. Rueckert told D.B. he
would take her to the law enforcement center . Rueckert testified that D.B. “just kind of
broke down and kind of visibly like started to shake” and it appeared D.B. “had been
crying.”
At the law enforcement center, Rueckert interviewed D.B., who said that she woke
up with Johnson on top of her. D.B. said that, after she ran into the bathroom, Johnson
followed and “kept saying that he was sorry, and that he was . . . drunk.” Based on D.B.’s
statement, officers went to D.B.’s home and retrieved the bed sheets, a cell phone, and
alcohol. D.B.’s clothing and bedding were collected and sent to the Bureau of Criminal
Apprehension (BCA) for testing. In a later interview conducted by Detective Hanson,
Johnson denied any inappropriate contact with D.B.
S.B. took D.B. to Children’s Hospital in Minneapolis. A nurse interviewed and
examined D.B., who stated that Johnson “put his thing . . . in her private.” The nurse
testified that D.B. had a “normal” anal and genital exam, she did not find any bruising on
D.B., but that a lack of injur y “does not undermine a clear disclosure of abuse.” At trial,
the nurse opined that D.B.’s disclosure and exam were consistent with sexual abuse. A
Meeker County social worker also interviewed D.B. 1 Using anatomically correct dolls,
D.B. demonstrated what happened and described that Johnson’s penis was in her vagina
when she woke up.

1 The social worker testified that she conducted a “Cornerhouse interview,” which she
explained is a method of interviewing children about instances of abuse and “set up in a
way so as to minimize erroneous information coming in” and make the child feel more
“comfortable” to share information about the abuse.
4
The state charged Johnson with two counts stemming from the October 24 incident:
(1) first-degree criminal sexual conduct (position of authority) under Minn. Stat. § 609.342,
subd. 1(b) (2016) and (2) first-degree criminal sexual conduct (significant relationship to
complainant) under Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(g) (2016). Later, the state added a third
charge: second-degree criminal sexual conduct (significant relationship) under Minn. Stat.
§ 609.343, subd. 1(g) (2016).
The state filed motions in limine, arguing that the district court should prohibit
Johnson from introducing evidence of “any prior bad act” by any state witnesses. In
response, Johnson filed an affidavit seeking to admit evidence of the “deteriorating”
relationship between him and S.B. Johnson also sought to introduce evidence of specific
prior bad acts by S.B., for example, (1) S.B.’s assault of Johnson, which took place
approximately five years ago in Mississippi, during which she used a box cutter, and
permanently scarred Johnson’s chest; (2) S.B. had “stalked” and harassed Johnson’s
former girlfriend to “convince her to give up her relationship with” Johnson; (3) S.B. stole
and “cleaned out” Johnson’s debit card after his arrest; and (4) text messages between S.B.
and Johnson, sent before D.B.’s assault, “which show[ed] a deteriorating relationship.”
After hearing the parties’ arguments, the district court granted the state’s motion, in
part. In a written order, the district court explained additional reasoning for its evidentiary
rulings. The district court ruled that Johnson could not admit evidence about the five-year-
old assault, the claimed harassment of Johnson’s girlfriend, the allegedly stolen debit card,
and the text m essages between Johnson and S.B. The order stated that Johnson was
5
permitted to examine S.B. about the nature of her relationship with Johnson in the months
preceding the assault.
At a jury trial, D.B., S.B., the Children’s Hospital nurse, the social worker, Officer
Rueckert, and Detective Hanson testified to the facts described above. S.B. testified that
she and Johnson had broken up “two or three times,” and that Johnson had lived with
another woman during one of these break-ups, but that this did not bother her. S.B. also
testified that things were going well in her relationship with Johnson before the incident,
the relationship was not “tense, ” and that the couple had not recently argued about the
“amount of time that” they were spending together.
After S .B. testified, the district court discussed the testimony outside the jury’s
presence, stating that S.B. had contradicted the “screen shots of some texts” between
Johnson and S.B., and therefore, Johnson was permitted to offer the texts for impeachment
purposes. When S.B.’s testimony resumed, Johnson’s trial counsel questioned her about
the texts. S.B. agreed that she and Johnson had argued in September and October 2016,
and that Johnson had moved out previously. S.B. also testified that Johnson had texted her
that he was looking for “an alternative relationship.”
The state also presented testimony from Alice Swenson, M.D., a child-abuse
pediatrician from Children’s Hospital. Dr. Swenson reviewed the nurse’s report and made
a diagnosis of sexual assault and sexual abuse. Next, a BCA scientist testified that D.B.’s
underwear tested positive for the presence of semen. The BCA scientist also testified that
semen was not detected in D.B.’s vaginal or perineal swabs. A second BCA scientist
testified that the “sperm cell” on D.B.’s underwear matched Johnson’s DNA sample.
6
The jury began to deliberate at approximately 3:00 p.m. on August 24. At 5:00 p.m.,
the jury asked to listen to Detective Hanson’s recorded interview with Johnson. The district
court, in the presence of Johnson and the attorneys, played the recording for the jury. At
8:05 p.m., the jury asked to listen to D.B.’s interview with the social worker. Again, with
Johnson and the attorneys present, the district court played the recording. The jury
continued deliberating.
At approximately 9:10 p.m., the district court received a note from the jury which
stated, “If we’re not agreeable on [counts one and two], but have a verdict on [count three],
what does that mean for us? Where do we go from here?” The district court responded in
writing: “You keep deliberating.” The district court did not consult the parties before
responding. At 9:30 p.m., the district court retired the jury for the night.
On August 25, 2017, the following morning, the jury convicted Johnson of all three
counts. On October 18, 2017, the district court denied Johnson’s motion for a downward
durational departure, and sentenced Johnson to 144 months and committed him to the
Commissioner of Corrections. Johnson appeals.
D E C I S I O N
I. The district court’s evidentiary rulings were not an abuse of its discretion and
did not deprive Johnson of his right to present a complete defense.

Every defendant has the right to present a complete defense under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and under Article I,
section 7, of the Minnesota Constitution. State v. Richards, 495 N.W.2d 187, 191 (Minn.
1992). Defendants have a right to present their theory of the case, including presenting
7
evidence describing the defense’s version of the facts. Id. at 194. The defendant’s evidence
is subject to the rules of evidence. State v. Mosley, 853 N.W.2d 789, 798 (Minn. 2014); see
also State v. Pass, 832 N.W.2d 836, 840-41 (Minn. 2013). The right to present a complete
defense yields to the application of evidentiary rules. See id. at 841-42. After an objection,
the defendant has the burden to establish that evidence is relevant and admissible. State v.
Svoboda, 331 N.W.2d 772, 775 (Minn. 1983). Evidentiary rulings—even those that invoke
constitutional rights— are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Penkaty, 708
N.W.2d 185, 201 (Minn. 2006).
On appeal, Johnson argues that the district court deprived him of his right to present
a defense because the excluded evidence of S.B.’s prior bad conduct supported his theory
that D.B.’s allegations were fabricated. Johnson also argues that the excluded evidence
would have proved S.B.’s bias against him. We discuss each argument in turn.
A. Evidence of S.B.’s prior bad conduct to prove D.B. fabricated
Johnson argues that the evidence of S.B.’s prior bad acts— the five-year-old assault,
the claimed harassment of Johnson’s girlfriend, the allegedly stolen debit card, and the text
messages between Johnson and S.B.—supported his defense. Johnson contended that D.B.
was motivated to “fabricate or embellish her story based upon her mother’s past problems
with Johnson.” The state argues that the disputed evidence was not relevant to “the core
issue of the case,” which is whether D.B. testified truthfully about the assault.
“The threshold test for the admissibility of evidence is the test of relevancy.” Minn.
R. Evid. 401 1977 comm. cmt. Generally, evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to
make the existence of any [material] fact . . . more probable or less probable.” Minn. R.
8
Evid. 401. All parties are entitled to present relevant evidence at trial so long as the
probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect.
Minn. R. Evid. 403. When determining whether any piece of evidence should be
introduced, the court must weigh the probative value of that evidence against the “ danger
of unfair prejudice.” Id.
In its written order, the district court explained that the five-year-old assault was not
admissible because it was “removed in time from the acts involved in this matter, and since
that time, the parties had resumed living together.” At the hearing, t he district court also
explained that evidence regarding the allegedly stolen debit card was irrelevant because it
took place after the October 24 assault, and thus, could not have played a role in D.B.’s
alleged motivation to fabricate the assault. The district court did not expressly discuss its
reasons for excluding evidence of S.B.’s claimed harassment of Johnson’s girlfriend.
We conclude that the district court’s evidentiary rulings were not an abuse of
discretion. First, the five-year-old assault, the allegedly stolen debit card, and the claimed
harassment of Johnson’s girlfriend did not involve D.B. Therefore, the evidence does not
support Johnson’s theory that these incidents—or other relationship problems between S.B.
and Johnson—motivated D.B. to fabricate the assault. In fact, Johnson never even alleged,
and there is no evidence in the record that shows, that D.B. was aware of these incidents.
Second, evidence that S.B. allegedly stole Johnson’s debit card and withdrew money from
his account after the October 24 assault is not relevant to Joh nson’s theory that D.B.
“fabricated or embellished” the assault, even if we assume that D.B. knew about the debit
card. See State v. Lanz-Terry, 535 N.W.2d 635, 641 (Minn. 1995) (noting that events that
9
took place after the victim reported the incident “would not have affected” the victim’s
decision to report). Third, while the five- year-old assault and claimed harassment of
Johnson’s girlfriend tend to prove that relationship problems existed between S.B. and
Johnson, the probative value is limited because the events are remote in time and S.B. and
Johnson moved on, stayed in a relationship, and lived together for five years after the
assault.
Because the evidence at issue was only tangential to Johnson’s theory of the case,
did not involve the victim, and presented a risk of confusing the jury, we conclude that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding it. See id. at 640-41 (district courts
“may exclude evidence of extraneous matters based on concerns about such things as
harassment, decision making on an improper basis, confusion of the issues, and cross-
examination that is repetitive or only marginally relevant”).
B. Evidence of S.B.’s bias against Johnson
Johnson argues that the five-year-old assault, the claimed harassment of Johnson’s
girlfriend, the allegedly stolen debit card, and the text messages between Johnson and S.B.
were admissible to show S.B.’s bias against him. Johnson has a right to confront witnesses
under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and under Article I,
section 6, of the Minnesota Constitution. State v. Byers, 554 N.W.2d 744, 748 (Minn. App.
1996), aff’d as modified, 570 N.W.2d 487 (Minn. 1997). These rights afford the defendant
the opportunit y to reveal witness bias. See Lanz-Terry, 535 N.W.2d at 640. “Bias is a
catchall term describing attitudes, feelings, or emotions of a witness that might affect her
testimony, leading her to be more or less favorable to the position of a party for reasons
10
other than the merits.” Id. Extrinsic evidence may be admitted to show that a witness is
motivated by bias, but “the extent to which extraneous matters are permitted into a criminal
case . . . rests largely in the discretion of the trial court.” Id. at 640-41. A defendant must
“establish the relevance and admissibility of the evidence” they wish to introduce to show
bias. Svoboda, 331 N.W.2d at 775.
We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to admit
the disputed evidence for two reasons. First, Johnson was afforded an opportunity to reveal
S.B.’s bias. At trial, Johnson’s attorney asked S.B. about her relationship with Johnson,
and she admitted that they had recently fought, they had broken up “two or three” times,
and Johnson was looking for an alternative relationship. In addition, several text messages
between Johnson and S.B. were received into evidence, from which Johnson’s attorney
argued that animosity existed between S.B. and Johnson.
Second, the district court determined that the additional evidence that Johnson
sought to admit was only “marginally us eful” to show witness bias. Courts may exclude
cumulative evidence in these instances. Lanz -Terry, 535 N.W.2d at 640. Johnson was
permitted to elicit testimony that he and S.B. had recently fought and Johnson told her he
would end their relationship. Although the additional evidence may have further
demonstrated the soured relationship between Johnson and S.B., the district court did not
abuse its wide discretion by excluding the evidence. Id. at 640-41 (“[T]he extent to which
11
extraneous matters are permitted into a criminal case . . . rests largely in the discretion of
the trial court.”).2
In sum, we conclude that the district court’s evidentiary rulings did not prevent
Johnson from presenting a complete defense and were not an abuse of its discretion.
II. The district court did not affect Johnson’s substantial rights when it
communicated with the jury outside Johnson’s presence and told the jury to
“keep deliberating.”

Johnson argues that the district court committed plain error when it
“communicat[ed] with the jury about a substantive matter without consulting the parties
and by implying the jury could not return a partial verdict.” Johnson contends that the
district court erred in instructing the jury to “keep deliberating ,” and that this error
prejudiced him. The state responds that the district court did not plainly err.
Johnson concedes that he did not object when the district court informed him that it
told the jury to “keep deliberating.” We generally do not consider an alleged error unless

2 Even assuming that the district court abused its discretion in excluding this disputed
evidence, Johnson was not prejudiced by the exclusion of the disputed evidence and is not
entitled to a new trial. When an error implicates a constitutional right, this court will “award
a new trial unless the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Davis, 820
N.W.2d 525, 533 (Minn. 2012). An error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt “if the
jury’s verdict was ‘surely unattributable’ to the error.” Id.
Here, as stated, Johnson was permitted to elicit testimony about the relationship and
S.B.’s bias against him. The state’s case against Johnson relied “almost exclusively on the
testimony of D.B. that she awoke to find [Johnson’s] penis in her vagina.” D.B.’s
statements consistently described what happened to Rueckert, the nurse, the Meeker
County social worker, and in her testimony to the jury. D.B.’s testimony regarding the
assault does not depend on S.B.’s credibility. In fact, S.B. only testified that on October 24
D.B. texted her about the assault. Because the state relied on D.B.’s testimony in its case
against Johnson, and D.B.’s credibility is not undermined by the disputed evidence, we
conclude that Johnson was not prejudiced by the district court’s evidentiary rulings.
12
the appellant objected at trial. See State v. Baird, 654 N.W.2d 105, 113 (Minn. 2002) (jury
instructions). But, e ven without an objection, we review trial procedure and jury
instructions for plain error affecting an appellant’s substantial rights or an error of
fundamental law. Id.; see also Minn. R. Crim. P. 31.02.
Plain error requires the appellant to show: “1) error, 2) that is plain, and 3) t hat
affects substantial rights.” Baird, 654 N.W.2d at 113. A d istrict court error is plain “when
it contravenes a rule, case law, or a standard of conduct, or when it disregards well-
established and longstanding legal principles.” State v. Brown, 792 N.W.2d 815, 823
(Minn. 2011). A defendant’s substantial rights are affected when “there is a reasonable
likelihood that the error substantially affected the verdict.” State v. Strommen, 648 N.W.2d
681, 688 (Minn. 2002). If the first three prongs are met, this court “ may correct the error
only if it seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.” State v. Crowsbreast, 629 N.W.2d 433, 437 (Minn. 2001) (quotation
omitted).
A. Plain error
1. Communicating with the jury without the parties present
A defendant in a criminal proceeding has a due process right to be present at all
critical stages of trial. State v. Martin, 723 N.W.2d 613, 619 (Minn. 2006); see also Minn.
R. Crim. P. 26.03, sub. 1. Generally, a communication with the jury by the district court
after deliberations have begun is a critical trial stage at which a defendant has a right to be
present. State v. Sessions, 621 N.W.2d 751, 755-56 (Minn. 2001). Absent a waiver, it is
13
improper for the district court to communicate with the jury on a non-housekeeping matter
outside the presence of the defendant. See Martin, 723 N.W.2d at 619-21.
After six hours of deliberating, the district court received a note from the jury
asking: “If we’re not agreeable on [counts one and two], but have a verdict on [count three],
what does that mean for us? Where do we go from here?” The district court responded in
writing to the jury’s note: “You keep deliberating.” The district court did not inform the
parties and did not consult the parties before responding.3
The state does not argue, and it does not appear in the record, that Johnson waived
his right to be present. Further, the district court’s instruction to “keep deliberating” is not
a housekeeping matter. See State v. Kelley, 517 N.W.2d 905, 908 (Minn. 1994) (holding
that court’s instruction to “keep working” to the jury during deliberations was plain error
and took place during a critical stage of trial). We conclude, therefore, that the district court
plainly erred when it responded to the jury’s question without consulting or informing
Johnson. See Brown, 792 N.W.2d at 823 (noting an error is plain “when it contravenes a
rule, case law, or a standard of conduct, or when it disregards well-established and
longstanding legal principles”).
2. Inaccurately stating the law
In general, a district court must instruct a jury in a way that “fairly and adequately
explain[s] the law of the case” and does not “materially misstate[ ] the applicable law.”

3 Before this question, the jury had asked twice to review testimony during its deliberation.
On both of these occasions, the district court properly recalled Johnson and both attorneys,
and communicated with the jury once the parties were present.
14
State v. Koppi, 798 N.W .2d 358, 362 (Minn. 2011). “If the instructions, when read as a
whole, correctly state[] the law in language that can be understood by the jury, there is no
reversible error.” State v. Laine, 715 N.W.2d 425, 432 (Minn. 2006) (quotation omitted).
If a jury is unable to agree, the district court “may require the jury to continue their
deliberations and may give or repeat an instruction. . . . The court shall not require or
threaten to require the jury to deliberate for an unreasonable length of time or for
unreasonable intervals.” Kelley, 517 N.W.2d at 909. “[I]t is reversible error in Minnesota
to coerce a jury towards a unanimous verdict. A court, therefore, can neither inform a jury
that a case must be decided, nor allow the jury to believe that a ‘deadlock’ is not an
available option.” State v. Jones, 556 N.W.2d 903, 912 (Minn. 1996) (citations omitted).
Our caselaw has referred to this as an impermissible “dynamite” instruction. See State v.
Peterson, 530 N.W.2d 843, 846 (Minn. App. 1995).
Johnson correctly notes that Minnesota allows a partial jury verdict in some
instances. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.03, subd. 20(7) (“The court may accept a partial verdict
if the jury has reached a verdict on fewer than all of the charges and is unable to reach a
verdict on the rest.”). But we do not agree with Johnson that the district court’s written
response materially misstated the applicable law. First, the district court properly instructed
the jury before it began its deliberation by stating: “[I]n this case, [Johnson] has been
charged with multiple offenses. You should consider each offense, and the evidence
pertaining to it, separately. The fact that you may find [Johnson] guilty or not guilty as to
one of the charged offenses should not control your verdict as to any other offense.” Thus,
the jury was adequately informed that it could return a partial verdict. See State v. Buggs,
15
581 N.W.2d 329, 338 -39 (Minn. 1998) (reasoning that an earlier instruction reduced
prejudicial effect of subsequent potentially coercive instruction).
Second, the district court did not threaten or coerce the jury to deliberate for an
unreasonable length of time. In Buggs, the supreme court held that the district court’s
instruction for the jury to continue deliberating was not coercive when the jury
communicated to the district court that it was at an impasse. Id. In this case, the jury had
only been deliberating for six hours when the district court told them to continue
deliberating. This timeframe was “not excessive in light of the length and complexity of
the trial.” See i d. Also the district court allowed the jury to retire for the evening at 9:30
p.m., only twenty minutes after it instructed them to keep deliberating. The district court
“may require the jury to continue their deliberations,” and did not err in requiring the jury
to continue in this case. Kelley, 517 N.W.2d at 909. In short, we conclude that the district
court did not materially misstate the law and did not coerce or threaten the jury to deliberate
for an unreasonable amount of time when it instructed the jury to “keep deliberating.”
B. Affecting substantial rights
Because we conclude that the district court committed plain error by communicating
with the jury without the parties present, we must next consider whether the district court’s
error was prejudicial. State v. Hurd, 763 N.W.2d 17, 31 (Minn. 2009) (“[A] defendant is
not entitled to a new trial . . . unless the error was prejudicial.”). An appellant has the
burden to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the error. Id.; Leake v. State, 737 N.W.2d
531, 537 (Minn. 2007) (noting that it is appellant’s burden to demonstrate that he was
prejudiced by the district court’s erroneous communication with the jury).
16
Johnson argues that the district court’s communication with the jury prejudiced him
because if the jury had been “properly instructed that it was possible to return a partial
verdict, there is a reasonable likelihood it would have done so.” We disagree. First, the
district court properly instructed the jury on this subject before it began deliberating and
the jury was adequately informed that it could return a partial verdict. See Buggs, 581
N.W.2d at 338-39.
Second, the district court’s comments to the jury in this case are similar to those in
Buggs, where the judge encouraged the jury to keep deliberating after they indicated they
were at an impasse. Id. at 338. The supreme court concluded that Buggs was not prejudiced
because the district court did not instruct or imply that the jury must deliberate until it
reached a verdict. Id. Similarly, in Hurd, the supreme court held that the appellant was not
prejudiced because the jury did not indicate that it was deadlocked when it reached out to
the district court. Hurd, 763 N.W.2d at 32. Here, the jury did not state that it was
deadlocked. Additionally, the district court’s instruction did not suggest that the jury must
deliberate until a verdict was achieved. Because Johnson has not demonstrated that he was
prejudiced by the district court’s error of communicating wi thout him present, he is not
entitled to relief.
To be clear, the district court should have called the jury, attorneys, and Johnson
into open court to read the jury’s question and discuss the answer. Alternatively, the district
court should have specifically obtained Johnson’s waiver of his right to be present. While
it was not a plain error to instruct the jury to keep deliberating, better practice would have
17
been, after consulting with the parties, to provide a repeat instruction. See Kelley, 517
N.W.2d at 909.
In sum, the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding disputed evidence.
Additionally, Johnson has failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced when the district
court plainly erred by communicating with the jury without consulting the parties. Thus,
we affirm his conviction for first-degree criminal sexual conduct.
Affirmed.