Chester Vernon Jones, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-0139

Chester Vernon Jones,
Appellant,

vs.

Drew Evans, Superintendent,
Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension in his official capacity,
Respondent.

Filed August 6, 2018
Affirmed
Bratvold, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CV-16-6425

Bradford Colbert, Legal Assistance to Minnesota Prisoners, Lora Fike (certified student
attorney), St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Angela Helseth Kiese, Assistant Attorney General,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and
Kalitowski, Judge.*

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
BRATVOLD, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s dismissal of his civil claims against
respondent Drew Evans, in his official capacity as superintendent of the Minnesota Bureau
of Criminal Apprehension (BCA). In 2016, appellant filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (2012) seeking declaratory and injunctive relief for substantive and procedural due
process violations, as well as for promissory estoppel. Appellant’s claims arise from his
2005 plea agreement, in which the state allegedly promised he would not have to register
as a predatory offender. Because the district court correctly determined that the six-year
limitations period expired before appellant commenced his legal action, we affirm.
FACTS
In August 2005, the state charged appellant Chester Vernon Jones with third-degree
criminal sexual conduct. In September 2005, Jones entered into a ple a agreement with the
state and pleaded guilty to, and was adjudicated delinquent of, fifth-degree criminal sexual
conduct. Sometime before February 24, 2006, Jones was assigned a new probation officer
who noticed that Jones had not registered as a predatory offender. After the BCA confirmed
that Jones was required to register, Jones’s probation officer told him to register, which
Jones did in March 2006. In 2007 and 2016, Jones was convicted of failure to comply with
various aspects of the predatory -offender registration statute; specifically, Jones twice
failed to notify law enforcement of a new address.
3
In November 2016, Jones sued Evans, alleging that the BCA had wrongfully
required him to register because, as a part of his 2005 plea agreement, the state had agreed
that he “would not have to register as a predatory offender.”
Jones moved for summary judgment. The BCA filed a motion to dismiss and a cross
motion for summary judgment, refuting Jones’s claims on the merits and arguing that his
claims should be dismissed under the statute of limitations. In November 2017, the district
court dismissed Jones’s complaint after determining that his claims were commenced after
the limitations period had expired. Jones appeals.
D E C I S I O N
Before analyzing the district court’s decision that Jones’s claims were commenced
untimely, we must address the applicable standard of review. The district court granted the
BCA’s motion to dismiss Jones’s complaint under Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(e) , and both
parties contend that the standard is that for a rule 12.02(e) motion. 1 But under Minn. R.
Civ. P. 12.02, “[i]f, on a motion asserting the defense that the pleading fails to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not
excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment.” See
Antone v. Mirviss, 720 N.W.2d 331, 334 n.4 (Minn. 2006). Because t he parties submitted

1 The practical difference between the rule 12.02(e) standard and the summary judgment
standard is minimal in this case. First, our standard of review is de novo for both types of
motions. In re Individual 35W Bridge Litig., 806 N.W.2d 811, 815 (Minn. 2011) (stating
that appellate courts review dismissals under rule 12.02(e) de novo). Second, while we
review properly-supported facts under rule 56 and we consider alleged facts in a complaint
under rule 12.02, the material facts are not in dispute in this case. See generally id. (stating
for suits dismissed under Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(e), the appellate court may consider “only
those facts alleged in the complaint”).
4
evidence that addressed matters outside of Jones’s complaint, and the district court
considered this evidence in reaching its decision, we conclude that the BCA’s motion
became one for s ummary judg ment under Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.01 and we apply that
standard of review. See State v. Hannuksela, 452 N.W.2d 668, 673 n.7 (Minn. 1990)
(stating that “it is the responsibility of appellate courts to decide cases in accordance with
law,” despite whether a party makes a particular argument).
This court reviews summary judgment decisions de novo. Riverview Muir Doran,
LLC v. JADT Dev. Gr p., LLC, 790 N.W.2d 167, 170 (Minn. 2010). In its review, “[this
court] determine[s] whether the district court properly applied the law and whether there
are genuine issues of material fact that preclude summary judgment.” Id. The evidence is
viewed in the light most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment was
granted. STAR Ctrs., Inc. v. Faegre & Benson, L.L.P., 644 N.W.2d 72, 76-77 (Minn. 2002).
Further, “the construction and applicability of a statute of limitation or repose is a question
of law subject to de novo review.” State Farm Fire & Cas. v. Aquila Inc., 718 N.W.2d 879,
883 (Minn. 2006).
Minnesota law requires registration for certain offenders who are charged with
criminal sexual conduct even if convicted of another offense “arising out of the same set
of circumstances.” Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 1b(a)(1)(iii) (2016) (registration statute). 2

2 We apply the 2016 version of the applicable statute, but note that it has not changed in
ways material to this case since 2005, when Jones was adjudicated delinquent of fifth-
degree criminal sexual conduct. See Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subds. 1, 1b, 3, 4, 5, 6 (Supp.
2005); Minn. Stat. § 299C.093 (Supp. 2005).

5
With some exceptions, those subject to the registration statute must “continue to register”
for ten years after their initial registration.3 Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 6(a) (2016). More
specifically, the registration statute imposes requirements in addition to initial registration,
such as periodic verification, see Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 4(e) (2016), and notice to
local authorities upon change of address, see Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 3(b) (2016).
Failure to comply with the registration statute is a felony. Minn. Stat. § 243.166,
subd. 5(a) (2016). Also, failure to comply with the registration statute will lead to an
additional five- year period, during which the individual must continue to register. See
Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 6(b) (stating that a required registrant must “continue to
register for an additional period of five years” if he violates certain provisions of the
registration statute). Further, if an individual required to register is “incarcerated due to a
conviction for a new offense or following a revocation of probation, supervised release, or
conditional release for any offense,” then that individual must continue to “register until
ten years have elapsed since the person was last released from incarceration or until the
person’s probation, supervised release, or conditional release period expires, whichever
occurs later.” Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 6(c) (2016).
As a result of Jones’s delinquency adjudication in 2005, he was required to register
as a predatory offender. See Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 1b(a)(1)(iii) (2016) (requiring

3 While the predatory-offender registration statute contemplates an offender registering as
a predatory offender at the outset of the ten -year period, it also states an offender must
“continue to register,” which appears to be shorthand for requiring an offender to comply
with the ongoing provisions of the statute. See Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subds. 3(a), 6(b)
(2016).
6
registration for person charged with felony criminal sexual conduct and adjudicated
delinquent for the offense of another arising out of that circumstance). Because Jones was
later convicted in 2016 of failing to comply with the registration statute, as well as
convicted of other new offenses, the record indicates that Jones is required register until
2032.
I. Jones commenced his legal action after the applicable limitations period had
expired and the district court correctly dismissed his claims as untimely.

In his complaint, Jones asked for judgment declaring that he is not subject to the
registration statute and for an injunction preventing the BCA from requiring him to register.
His complaint asserted a civil claim for deprivation of his constitutional rights under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, claiming (1) the BCA violated his substantive- due-process rights because
it required him to register despite the state’s promise that he did not have to register as part
of the 2005 plea agreement; and (2) the BCA violated of his procedural-due-process rights
because it did not provide sufficient process before it required him to register. Additionally,
Jones asserted a promissory estoppel claim based on the state’s alleged representations
during Jones’s plea agreement.
The statute of limitations for each of Jones’s three claims is six years. See Minn.
Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(5) (2016) (providing six-year statute of limit ations for any injury
“to the person or rights of another, not arising on contract”); see also Jacobson v. Bd. of
Trs. of Teachers Ret. Ass’n, 627 N.W.2d 106, 110 (Minn. App. 2001) (holding limitations
period for promissory estoppel is six years), review denied (Minn. Aug. 15, 2001); Berg v.
7
Groshen, 437 N.W.2d 75, 77 (Minn. App. 1989) (holding six- year limitations period
applies to section 1983 claims).
Generally, the statute of limitations begins to run when a cause of action accrues.
Park Nicollet Clini c v. Hamann, 808 N.W.2d 828, 832 (Minn. 2011). “Accrual refers to
the point in time when a plaintiff can allege sufficient facts to survive a motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Sec. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Larkin,
Hoffman, Daly & Lindgren, Ltd., __ N.W.2d __, __, 201 8 WL 3131140, at *3 (Minn.
June 27, 2018) (quotations omitted). To accrue, “a cause of action requires the existence
of operative facts supporting each element of the claim.” Id.
Here, Jones’s causes of action accrued in 2006 when he was initially required to
register as a predatory offender because the operative facts existed to support each element
of his three claims at that time. Thus, Jones’s claims expired in 2012. 4 Jones’s complaint
was served in 2016, meaning, he commenced his suit four years after the limitation period
expired.
Nonetheless, Jones contends that the district court incorrectly dismissed his suit for
two reasons: (A) the BCA’s wrongful acts we re continuing violations that toll the statute

4 The district court, citing Minn. Stat. § 541.15(a)(1) (2016), determined that the statute of
limitations was tolled until Jones turned 18 on June 23, 2006, meaning that the statute of
limitations expired six years after Jones’s 18th birthday, on June 23, 2012. We note that
the district court misconstrued section 541.15. In D.M.S. v. Barber, the supreme court
stated that, under section 541.15(a)(1) when an action “accrues during a plaintiff’s infancy,
the plaintiff must commence the action either within one year of reaching the age of
majority or within the six- year period of limitation, whichever is later.” 645 N.W.2d 383,
387 (Minn. 2002). Accordingly, Jones’s 18th birthday would have been relevant only if the
six-year statute of limitations had expired before he reached majority. Regardless, the
limitation period expired in 2012.
8
of limitations; and (B) the BCA’s wrongful acts include ongoing requirements for Jones,
and each ongoing requirement gives rise to a new cause of action, for which the limitations
period has not yet expired. We address each argument in turn.
A. The continuing-violation theory is not applicable to Jones’s claims.

Some causes of action do not expire under the statute of limitations if the allegedly
wrongful act by the defendant was “a continuing violation.” Sigurdson v. Isanti County,
448 N.W.2d 62, 66 (Minn. 1989). For example, in the context of employment, the supreme
court held that gender discrimination may be a continuing violation that extends the statute
of limitations. Id. at 68. The supreme court explained that, “[m]ere continuity of
employment, without more, is insufficient to prolong the life of a cause of action for
employment discrimination.” Id. at 67. Sigurdson emphasized that the correct analysis is
“whether any present violation exists.” Id. (citation omitted) (quoting United Air Lines,
Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 558, 97 S. Ct. 1885, 1889 (1977)). In performing this analysis,
a court must distinguish between discriminatory acts and discriminatory effects: “[ t]he
proper focus is upon the time of the discriminatory acts, not upon the time at which the
consequences of the acts became most painful.” Sigurdson, 448 N.W.2d at 67 (alteration
in original) (quoting Lorance v. AT & T Techs., Inc., 490 U.S. 900, 907, 109 S. Ct. 2261,
2266 (1989), superseded by statute, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(2) (2012)).
We conclude that the statute of limitations for Jones’s claims is not tolled for two
reasons. First, Minnesota courts have applied the continuing-violation theory in
employment-discrimination cases, in part, because these claims “involve[e] wrongful acts
that manifest over a period of time, rather than in a series of discrete acts.” Davies v. West
9
Publ’g Co., 622 N.W.2d 836, 841 (Minn. App. 2001), review denied (Minn. May 29, 2001).
While Minnesota courts have applied the theory in other contexts, see id., we have done so
very rarely. No Minnesota appellate court has held that the continuing-violation theory
applies to due-process or estoppel claims. Given the unique nature of the continuing-
violation theory, and its particular applicability to employment -discrimination claims, we
decline to apply it to the claims asserted in this case.
Second, even if we were to assume that the continuing-violation theory applies to
Jones’s claims, it would not have tolled the statute of limitations under the facts he alleged.
Jones argues that he is challenging the BCA’s continuous requirement that he register as a
predatory offender. The BCA responds that Jones’s claims challenge the initial
determination that Jones must register, and that the continuous requirements are merely
effects of that initial determination. The district court agreed with the BCA and determined
that the allegedly wrongful acts were discrete and “occurred one time.”
We agree with the district court’s conclusion. Sigurdson is instructive in
determining whether the BCA’s alleged wrongful acts are continuing or discrete . In
Sigurdson, the supreme court determined that an employer’s failure to promote an
employee, based on a discriminatory union contract, over the course of several years, was
a continuing act of employment discrimination, thereby tolling the statute of limi tations.
Sigurdson, 448 N.W.2d at 68. The supreme court distinguished the employer’s multiple
decisions not to promote an employee from an employer’s single decision to adopt a policy.
Id. In doing so, Sigurdson relied on United States Supreme Court precedent to conclude
that an employer’s facially neutral policy is not a continuing violation even though, in
10
practice, the policy discouraged women f rom seeking traditionally male jobs. Id. at 67
(discussing Lorance, 490 U.S. at 905, 109 S. Ct. at 2265).
Sigurdson supports our conclusion that Jones’s complaint does not allege continuing
violations. First, Jones’s substantive-due-process claim rests on a single, wrongful act by
the BCA. To prevail, Jones must prove that the BCA has violated his right to be protected
“from ‘certain arbitrary, wrongful government actions regardless of the fairness of the
procedures used to implement them.’” In re Linehan, 594 N.W.2d 867, 872 (Minn. 1999)
(quoting Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125, 110 S. Ct. 975, 983 (1990)). Based on our
review of the statutory requirements, we conclude that the alleged “wrongful” or
“arbitrary” act underlying Jones’s substantive -due-process claim occurred in 2006 when
the BCA determined Jones was required to register as a predatory offender.
It is true that the registration law imposes ongoing requirements that apply to Jones.
See Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 4(e) (periodic verification); Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd.
3(b) (notice to local authorities upon change of address). But these ongoing requirements
pertain to Jones because the BCA determined in 2006 that he was an offender subject to
registration under subdivision 1b. See Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 1b. The BCA’s
determination was a single, discrete act; in contrast, the ongoing registration requirements
that apply to Jones are the effects of that initial determination.5 See Minn. Stat. § 243.166,

5 Jones argues that “[h]ad the initial requirement to register been a singular event, and the
subsequent requirements merely consequences of that action, then the statute would treat
those who initially failed to register differently from those who fail to comply with the
subsequent requirements.” This argum ent fails because Jones draws an irrelevant
distinction between registering and being required to register . Whether Jones actually
registered is not material to his claims. Jones’s claims turn on the fact that the BCA
11
subds. 3, 4. Just as Sigurdson stated that ongoing employment did not give rise to a
continuing violation, we conclude that ongoing registration requirements did not give rise
to a continuing violation.
Second, Jones’s procedural-due-process claim also rests on a single wrongful act by
the BCA. This claim requires Jones to show that the BCA has deprived him of a protected
life, liberty, or property interest and followed procedures that were constitutionally
deficient. Mertins v. Comm’r of Nat. Res., 755 N.W.2d 329, 336 (Minn. App. 2008). Jones
alleges the BCA did not provide sufficient notice and process before determining that he
must register as a predatory offender. Because the BCA made this determination once, in
2006, we conclude that Jones’s second cause of action does not allege a continuing
violation.
Third, Jones’s estoppel claim fails for similar reasons. The elements of promissory
estoppel are (1) there was a clear and definite promise, (2) the promisor intended to induce
reliance, and such reliance occurred, and (3) the promise must be enforced to prevent
injustice.6 Hous. & Redev. Auth. of Chisholm v. Norman, 696 N.W.2d 329, 336 (Minn.

determined he was a predatory offender required to register. See Minn. Stat. § 243.166,
subd. 1(b). Also, Jones mistakenly relies on our decision in Longoria v. State, in which we
described a conviction for failing to adhere to the requirements of the predatory offender
statute as a “continuing offense.” 749 N.W.2d 104, 106-07 (Minn. App. 2008), review
denied (Minn. Aug. 5, 2008). But Longoria did not consider the statute of limitations for a
claim arising from the BCA’s initial determination that an individual is required to register
as a predatory offender. Id.

6 Jones’s summary-judgment memorandum described his claim as equitable estoppel, but
in his appellate brief and at oral arguments to this court, he asserted promissory estoppel.
Based on our analysis of the elements of each cause of action, we determine there are no
relevant differences between promissory and equitable estoppel that would have led to a
12
2005). Here, Jones alleges that the BCA wrongly determined that Jones must register after
the state’s purported promise during the 2005 plea negotiations that he would not have to
register. As discussed above, and without deciding whether the BCA may be estopped
based on the prosecutor’s promises, we conclude that the BCA’s 2006 determination that
Jones must register was a single event and not a continuous violation.
In sum, even if we were to apply the continuing-violation theory to the claims
asserted in Jones’s complaint, he failed to allege continuing violations and we conclude
that the statute of limitations was not tolled for any of Jones’s claims.7
B. The ongoing requirements of the predatory-offender registration statute
do not give rise to new causes of action.

Jones argues that the “enforcement of the ongoing requirements found in [the
predatory-offender registration statute] create a new cause of action within the statute of
limitations.” This argument is substantively similar to Jones’s continuing-violation
argument. Because Jones cites cases that do not rely on the continuing-violation theory, we
address his cited authorities separately.
Jones relies on the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Bazemore v. Friday,
in which an employer enacted a racially discriminatory policy that resulted in paying some
employees less than others. 478 U.S. 385, 394-95, 106 S. Ct. 3000, 3006-07 (1986). The

different result in this case had Jones argued equitable estoppel on appeal. See
Transamerica Ins. Grp. v. Paul, 267 N.W.2d 180, 183 (Minn. 1978) (listing elements of
equitable estoppel).

7 The parties also discuss unpublished decisions, which are not precedential. See Minn.
Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3(c) (2016); Vlahos v. R&I Constr. of Bloomington, Inc. , 676
N.W.2d 672, 676 n.3 (Minn. 2004).
13
policy did not become illegal until Congress passed Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. Id. The United States Supreme Court held that, after the passage of the Civil Rights
Act, each paycheck reflecting a salary discrepancy pursuant to the racially discriminatory
policy was a separate cause of action. Id.
Jones argues that the same analysis applies to his case, contending that “[t]he fact
that Jones was initially required to register outside the statute of limitations does not change
that [the BCA] is still acting unlawfully and unconstitutionally.” We disagree. While the
plaintiffs in Bazemore challenged repeated acts of racial discrimination, Jones contests the
BCA’s determination requiring him to register as a predatory offender. The BCA’s
determination occurred at one time in 2006 and was not repeated. 8 Jones also does not
allege that his liability for failing to maintain his predatory offender registration, or the
subsequent extensions of his registration period, involved an additional, discrete act by the
BCA.9
We agree with the BCA’s position that Jones’s claims are governed by the supreme
court’s decision in Hamann, 808 N.W.2d at 830. There, a medical clinic adopted a policy
providing that physicians who met certain criteria would be exempted from taking night

8 Jones also attempts to support his argument by asking the court to look to the “continual
trespass doctrine.” See Herbert v. City of Fifty Lakes, 744 N.W.2d 226, 234 (Minn. 2008).
Because Jones cites no case law applying this doctrine outside of trespass, we reject it.

9 Although not raised by Jones, we note that under the registration statute, the BCA is
tasked with multiple responsibilities, including mailing and receiving the verification
forms, as well as maintaining a data system of offenders required to register. Minn. Stat.
§ 243.166, subd. 4(e); Minn. Stat. § 299C.093 (2016). Because Jones’s complaint does not
assert that his claims arise from any of the BCA’s ongoing responsibilities, we do not
further consider these statutory provisions.
14
call without facing a decrease in salary. Id. In early 2004, Hamann, a physician at the clinic
who met the policy criteria, informed the clinic department chair that he would like to
exercise his rights and be exempted from night call with no salary reduction. Id. The
department chair asked Hamann to postpone his rights under the policy for a year to prevent
short staffing. Id. Hamann agreed, but when he again sought to exercise his rights in April
2005, the department chair told Hamann the policy no longer existed and would not be
honored. Id. at 830-31. As a result, Ham ann continued taking night call until 2008 when
he needed to stop for health reasons, at which point the clinic reduced his salary. Id. at 831.
Hamann sued the clinic, alleging breach of contract and promissory estoppel. Id.
The district court dismissed Hamann’s claim, determining that the two- year statute of
limitations began to run in April 2005 when the clinic informed Hamann it would not honor
its obligations under the policy. Id. This court reversed, concluding that while the clinic
repudiated the policy in April 2005, each pay period during which the clinic did not satisfy
its obligations under the policy “gave rise to a new cause of action.” Id. The supreme court
reversed the court of appeals, holding that Hamann’s causes of action accrued in 2005 and
that each new pay period was not a new br each because Hamann challenged a single
instance of conduct: the one-time “decision to require that physicians over age 60 take
night call.” Id. at 828, 834-36.
Hamann’s reasoning is instructive here. Jones’s complaint challenges the BCA’s
one-time decision. Thus, Jones’s causes of action accrued no later than 2006 when the BCA
determined he must register as a predatory offender.
15
Jones makes three arguments in an attempt to distinguish Hamann. First, he argues
that Hamann is inapplicable because he is seeking declaratory relief, while Hamann sought
monetary damages. See id. at 831. But Hamann did not suggest that its ruling might have
been different if the plaintiff sought different relief. Accrual of a cause of action turns on
the existence of operative facts related to the elements and not the relief sought. Secon d,
Jones argues that, unlike in Hamann, Jones must comply with the predatory -offender
registration requirements or risk criminal penalties, while Hamann could have quit his job
or refused to take the night call. He argues that “[t]he use of such compulsion dictates a
different result when it comes to a continuing violation.” But nothing in Hamann, or related
caselaw, suggests that compulsion, or the absence thereof, has any effect on the statute of
limitations.10 Third, Jones points out that Hamann addressed an estoppel claim and not
constitutional claims. Jones also alleges an estoppel claim and we discern no principled
basis to depart from Hamann’s reasoning for Jones’s constitutional claims.
As a final matter, Jones argues that if this court determines that Jones “cannot
challenge the validity of being required to register as a predatory offender after six years
of being informed that he has to register,” then it is possible that a person could face a
“lifetime of unjustified government intrusion.” We are not persuaded. Statutes of

10 Jones also argues that this court should analogize his case to a criminal sentence and
points out that a court “may at any time correct a sentence not authorized by law.” See
Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9; Vazquez v. State, 822 N.W.2d 313, 318 (Minn. App.
2012). We disagree. Rule 27.03, subd. 9, applies only to criminal sentences. Also, the
predatory-offender registration requirement is not a “punitive consequence” but rather a
“regulatory” requirement. Kaiser v. State, 641 N.W.2d 900, 907 (Minn. 2002).
Accordingly, we conclude rule 27.03 has no bearing on the limitations period for Jones’s
civil claims.
16
limitations, by definition, include the possibility that an injustice w ill go unresolved. “If
the result now seems harsh, it is a criticism that may be levelled against many statutes of
limitation.” Anderson v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 878 N.W.2d 926, 930 (Minn. App. 2016).
The decision to establish statutes of limitations is for the legislature; this court “is limited
in its function to correcting errors [and] it cannot create public policy.” LaChapelle v.
Mitten, 607 N.W.2d 151, 159 (Minn. App. 2000), review denied (Minn. May 16, 2000).
Affirmed.