State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-0329

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Rondell Russell Camp,
Appellant.

Filed January 22, 2019
Affirmed
Florey, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-17-2680

Keith M. Ellison, Minnesota Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Jonathan P. Schmidt, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Steven P. Russett, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reilly , Presiding Judge; Florey, Judge; and Kalitowski,
Judge.
*

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by ap pointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
FLOREY, Judge
In this direct appeal from a conviction and sentence for second -degree intentional
murder, appellant argues that the state failed to disprove his claim of self-defense and that
the prosecutor engaged in prejudi cial misconduct both by questi oning appellant’s expert
about his remuneration and by asserting, without a factual basis, that appellant “stomped”
on the victim’s head. Appellant also raises a number of pro se arguments. Because the
evidence was sufficient, the prosecutor’s questioning of the expert’s remuneration was not
plain-error misconduct, the assert ions that appellant “stomped” on the victim’s head did
not affect appellant’s substantia l rights, and appellant’s pro se arguments are unavailing,
we affirm.
FACTS
On January 29, 2017, appellant R ondell Russell Camp killed S.P. in a residential
garage in North Minneapolis by cutting him with a knife and bea ting him with a blunt
object multiple times. A loaded handgun was recovered from the scene, and S.P.’s palm
print was found on the magazine of the gun. Appellant claimed at trial that he acted in self-
defense after S.P. held him at gunpoint.
S.P. worked out of the garage as a freelance mechanic and had w orked on
appellant’s vehicles in the past. On January 29, appellant and another man, D.E., went to
the garage to get an oil change. S.P. discovered an oil leak a nd asked appellant to return
for a repair. Later that day, S.P. contacted appellant and tol d him that he had enlisted
another person to help fix the leak. Appellant returned to the garage by himself.

3
S.P. received an incoming call from appellant at 4:13 p.m. B.B., a neighbor, heard
two men arguing loudly in the garage at around 4:20 p.m. and recognized one of the voices
as S.P.’s. Soon after, an indiv idual, J.S., heard appellant sc reaming. J.S. went out to
investigate and saw appellant d ragging himself along the ground , “screaming for help,
saying, ‘Somebody was trying to kill me.’” Appellant’s leg was injured, and he had blood
on his forehead, hands, and clothing. J.S. called 911.
Officers responded at around 4:30 p.m. S.P.’s body was discove red on the garage
floor. The body was lying face up near the driver’s side of ap pellant’s car, parallel to the
car. Steam was rising from the body, indicating that it had no t cooled; in other words,
S.P.’s body had not been lying there long. Salt and grime on t he exterior of the car was
disturbed in several places. The keys were in the car, and the driver’s-side window was
down. A winter jacket was draped over S.P.’s body. A loaded handgun was sitting on the
passenger-side windshield of the car. The gun did not have blo od on it. A bloody knife
was on the ground near the wall of the garage and partially cov ered by some items. A
bloody wrench was underneath S.P.’s head.
An ambulance was dispatched at 4:33 p.m. An officer rode with appellant to the
hospital. The officer asked appellant, “Who did this to you?” and after a long pause,
appellant responded, “I’ve already told you.” Appellant did not mention a gun and did not
indicate that his life had been threatened. At the hospital, appellant was treated for a large
bruise and small abrasion on his forehead, and a fractured and partially dislocated right
ankle. The ankle injury was severe, and appellant had torn ligaments. There was no other

4
significant trauma. Appellant told his sister to write down a telephone number and relay
that he was going to jail.
The state charged appellant with one count of second-degree int entional murder.
The matter proceeded to trial. A medical examiner testified about S.P.’s extensive injuries.
S.P. suffered blunt-force and shar p-force injuries. His sharp- force injuries were of a
cutting, rather than a stabbing nature, though he suffered a deep incision on his neck. The
frontal bones of his head were “completely pulpified by a blunt force injury.” He suffered
major tissue damage to the brain, which, at a minimum, would ha ve caused a loss of
consciousness. The medical examiner could not determine the order of the injury pattern.
S.P. had incision injuries to hi s fingers, which could have bee n caused from a bite. The
medical examiner opined that S.P. suffered a minimum of 29 inci sion injuries,
predominately located on his head, with one on the neck. The m edical examiner noted at
least 38 cutaneous groups of injuries, though she could not conclude how many individual
blunt-force blows were delivered. The cause of death was “multiple blunt force and sharp
force injuries to the head and ne c k, ” wi t h t he pr e d om i na nt c a use being the blunt force
injuries.
DNA testing on the grip portion of the handgun revealed DNA fro m four or more
individuals, and appellant and S.P. could not be excluded as possible contributors, though
83.9 percent of the general popul ation could be excluded. Late nt-print testing revealed a
right palm print from S.P. on the handgun’s magazine. DNA testing revealed that the blood
on the garage floor, garage wall, knife blade, and knife handle were from S.P. There was
DNA from both individuals on appellant’s hands and on S.P.’s fingernails.

5
One of the doctors who treated appellant on January 29 testified that appellant would
not have been able to put weight on his foot and that the ankle injury was likely caused by
simultaneous twisting and trauma to the foot. She was of the o pinion that stepping down
on an unstable or slippery surface could cause the injury. A t rauma surgeon testified that
appellant said at the hospital that he was assaulted, he thought that he was hit in the head,
and he may have heard the click of a gun, but appellant did not really remember anything
afterward.
Appellant testified in his own d efense. According to appellant , at 4:13 p.m., he
called S.P. and told him that he was down the street. S.P. ope ned the garage door, and
appellant pulled in and turned off his car. Appellant asked S. P. where the other guy was
who was going to help fix the car and informed S.P. that he had other things to do that day.
S.P. said that the other guy was on his way. Appellant asked S.P. to open the garage door
so that he could leave. S.P. walked around the driver’s side, like he was going to open the
garage door. Appellant started the car, and when he looked up, he was struck in the head
with an object, which turned out to be a gun. S.P. told appellant to turn off the car and get
out. Appellant complied. S.P. told appellant to turn around a nd lie face down on the
ground. Appellant tur ned around and saw, out of the corner of his eye, S.P. stepping
towards him, so he turned around and lunged for the gun. Appellant was able to grab S.P.’s
wrist, and he started backing him towards the wall of the garag e.1 The two struggled for
the gun. S.P. pulled appellant’s jacket over appellant’s head, and appellant “swooped out

1 Both men weighed around 150 pounds.

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of it,” but his arms were still inside of the sleeves. The gun was still in S.P.’s right hand.
At some point, the two fell to the ground with appellant on top, and at that point appellant
injured his ankle. Appellant tried to get up to escape, but hi s “leg wasn’t cooperating.”
S.P. (apparently seeing the injury) then said, “Yes. Yes. I g ot you now. I got you now.”
The two men began punching each other. Appellant did not know where the gun was
located. S.P. put his fingers in appellant’s mouth, and appellant bit his fingers. Appellant
grabbed what he believed to be a paint chipper, but what turned out to be a knife, and struck
S.P. S.P. was able to knock the knife out of appellant’s hand. S.P. continued to attack
appellant, so appellant grabbed another nearby object. Appellant hit S.P. four to six times,
and S.P. then knocked that second weapon out of appellant’s hand. According to appellant,
“at that point, the fight was pretty much over.” Appellant tri ed to get up again, and S.P.
grabbed him “with both hands,” and said, “listen to me, listen to me, . . . [t]hey’re going to
come back for you and try to k ill you. Don’t let them do like they did the rest. Don’t let
them do like they did the rest.” Appellant asked S.P., “Why wo uld you do this? Who
wants me dead?” And, according to appellant, S.P. “kept shaking his head” and “repeating
the same things.” Appellant then left, screaming for help. Ac cording to appellant, S.P.
was still alive when he left the garage.
The defense called an expert in biomechanics, who testified tha t appellant’s
forehead injury was consistent w ith being hit with the handgun. He testified that
appellant’s ankle injury was likely not caused by stomping down . He testified that S.P.’s
laceration injuries were caused by a chopping motion, and the i njuries to S.P.’s fingers

7
were consistent with bite marks. He believed that the wrench was used to cause the blunt-
force trauma, which would be “likely incapacitating.”
The jury found appellant guilty of second-degree intentional murder. The jury was
asked to answer special interr ogatories and found that appellan t acted with particular
cruelty and that S.P. was particularly vulnerable, and appellant knew or should have known
of that vulnerability. However, the jury found that appellant did not lack remorse for
committing the crime. Appellant was sentenced to 367 months’ imprisonment. This appeal
followed.
D E C I S I O N
I. The evidence was sufficient to disprove appellant’s claim of self-defense.

Appellant contends that the evid ence was insufficient because t he state failed to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he did not act in self-defense. In considering a claim
of insufficient evidence, this court’s review is limited to a thorough analysis of the record
to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the light mos t favorable to the
conviction, was sufficient to allo w the jurors to reach the ver dict that they did. State v.
Webb, 440 N.W.2d 426, 430 (Minn. 1989).
The parties agree that a circumstantial-evidence standard is applicable. Under that
standard, we review the evidence using a two-step analysis. We first identify the
circumstances proved, deferring “to the jury’s acceptance of th e proof of these
circumstances and rejection of evidence in the record that conflicted with the circumstances
proved by the [s]tate.” State v. Robertson, 884 N.W.2d 864, 871 (Minn. 2016) (quotations
omitted). Second, we “independently examine the reasonableness of all inferences that

8
might be drawn from the circumstances proved, including inferen ces consistent with a
hypothesis other than guilt.” Id. (quotations omitted). “In order to sustain a conviction
based on circumstantia l evidence, the reasonable inferences tha t can be drawn from the
circumstances proved as a whole must be consistent with the hyp othesis that the accused
is guilty and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt.” Id. (quotation
omitted).
At trial, appellant asserted that he acted in self-defense. 2 Minnesota permits the
intentional taking of a life when necessary to resist or prevent “an offense which the actor
reasonably believes exposes th e actor . . . to great bodily har m o r d e a t h . ” M i n n . S t a t .
§ 609.065 (2016). The absence of aggression or provocation by the actor is generally
required before this defense may be claimed. State v. Edwards, 717 N.W.2d 405, 410-11
(Minn. 2006). The defendant bea rs the burden of presenting evi dence to support a self-
defense claim. State v. Johnson, 719 N.W.2d 619, 629 (Minn. 2006). Once that burden is
satisfied, the state bears the ultimate burden of disproving one of the self-defense elements
beyond a reasonable doubt:
(1) the absence of aggression or provocation on the part of the
defendant; (2) the defendant’s actual and honest belief that he
was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm; (3) the
existence of reasonable grounds for that belief; and (4) the
absence of a reasonable possibi lity of retreat to avoid the
danger.

2 At trial, appellant approved of using a justifiable-taking-of-a-life instruction, rather than
the more general self-defense instruction, and although appella nt argued at trial that the
killing of S.P. was not intentional, on appeal, he does not challenge the instruction that was
given. See State v. Carridine, 812 N.W.2d 130, 143-44 (Minn. 2012) (concluding that the
justifiable-taking-of-life instruction was given in error where the defendant’s defense was
that the death was unintended).

9

State v. Radke, 821 N.W.2d 316, 324 (Minn. 2012); Johnson, 719 N.W.2d at 629. For the
defense to apply, the defendant must have a subjective fear of death or great bodily harm,
and there must be objectively re asonable grounds for that fear and the actions taken. See
Johnson, 719 N.W.2d at 630-32 (stating that the second self-defense element “is subjective
and depends upon the defendant’s state of mind,” and the third element requires “an
objective test” and an assessment of “whether the killing was n ecessary”). Stated
differently, the following conditions must be met:
(1) The killing must have been done in the belief that it was
necessary to avert death or grievous bodily harm.

(2) The judgment of the defendant as to the gravity of the peril
to which he was exposed must have been reasonable under the
circumstances.

(3) The defendant’s election to kill must have been such as a
reasonable man would have made in light of the danger to be
apprehended.

Edwards, 717 N.W.2d. at 413; State v. Boyce, 170 N.W.2d 104, 112 (Minn. 1969); State v.
Pollard, 900 N.W.2d 175, 178-79 (Minn. App. 2017).
We first address the circumstances proved. Appellant and S.P. were familiar with
each other. On January 29, they argued and then fought in a residential garage. Appellant
hacked at S.P. with a knife a minimum of 29 times and bludgeone d him multiple times,
causing 38 cutaneous groups of injuries. S.P. suffered devasta ting injuries to his head,
which would have rendered him unc onscious. At some point durin g or after the fray,
appellant seriously injured his ankle. Appellant also had a small injury to his forehead, but
was otherwise not seriously hurt. A loaded handgun was recovered from the scene, on the

10
passenger-side windshield of appellant’s car, and the gun had S.P.’s print on the magazine.
The gun did not have blood on it. S.P.’s body was found face up on the floor of the garage
by the driver’s side of the car. A knife covered in S.P.’s blood was on the ground near the
wall of the garage, and a bloody wrench was underneath S.P.’s head. After appellant exited
the garage, he claimed that he had been attacked.
The circumstances are consistent with appellant’s guilt and inc onsistent with self-
defense. We focus our analysis on two particular elements of s elf-defense, whether it is
reasonable to infer that appella nt subjectively feared death or great bodily harm and
whether there were objective gro unds for that fear and the acti ons taken.3 See Johnson,
719 N.W.2d at 630-32. Viewed in a light most favorable to the conviction, the
circumstances render such inferences unreasonable. Even under a circumstantial-evidence
analysis, “possibilities of innocence do not require reversal of a jury verdict so long as the
evidence taken as a whole makes such theories seem unreasonable.” State v. Hughes, 749
N.W.2d 307, 313 (Minn. 2008) (quotations omitted).
By returning a guilty verdict, t he jury rejected appellant’s te stimony that S.P.
continued to be the aggressor and remained conscious and talking even after the final blows
were struck. Indeed, this testimony was inconsistent with the medical testimony that S.P.
would have, at a minimum, been rendered unconscious by his injuries. Setting aside those

3 We acknowledge that there is less support for the conviction on self-defense elements one
and four. The handgun with S.P.’s print arguably allows for a reasonable inference that
S.P. was the initial aggressor, that is, S.P. pulled a gun on a ppellant. Though, it seems
equally possible that S.P. pulled the gun in self-defense. Lik ewise, appellant’s severely
injured ankle allows for a reasonable inference that, to some d egree, retreat was not
possible. Though, it is unclear when the ankle injury occurred.

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portions of appellant’s testimony that are inconsistent with th e verdict, we focus on the
circumstances proved. One of those circumstances is that the handgun was recovered from
the passenger-side windshield of the car, away from S.P.’s body . The gun did not have
blood on it, though there was a g reat deal of blood near S.P.’s body. Despite the lack of
any firearm near S.P., the condition of S.P.’s body shows that appellant maintained a
sustained attack, at some point switched weapons, and then cont inued the attack, causing
38 cutaneous groups of injuries. The injuries were devastating and effectively pulpified
the frontal bones of S.P.’s head, rendering him unconscious. In contrast, although appellant
suffered a serious ankle injury, his injuries were otherwise su perficial. Given the lack of
an accessible firearm, there wer e not objectively reasonable gr ounds for appellant’s
sustained attack.
II. The prosecutor’s questions regarding the defense expert’s remuneration do not
amount to misconduct.

Appellant asserts that the prosecutor engaged in prejudicial mi sconduct by
questioning appellant’s expert witness about being paid to testify. Appellant acknowledges
that he did not object to this alleged misconduct.
“[B]efore an appellate court reviews an unobjected-to error, there must be (1) error;
( 2) t ha t i s pl a i n; a n d ( 3) t he error must affect substantial ri ghts.” State v. Griller , 583
N.W.2d 736, 740 (Minn. 1998). F or unobjected-to prosecutorial misconduct, our review
is under a modified plain-error standard. State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294, 299-300 (Minn.
2006). If an appellant establishes that the prosecutorial misconduct is plain error, then the
burden shifts to the state to show that the misconduct did not affect the appellant’s

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substantial rights. Id. at 302. This requires a showin g “that there is no reasonable
likelihood that the absence of the misconduct in question would have had a significant
effect on the verdict of the jury.” Id. (quotations omitted). If a ll prongs of the modified
plain-error test are met, an a ppellate court “then assesses whe ther the error should be
addressed to ensure fairness and the integrity of the judicial proceedings.” Id.
During the direct examination of the defense’s biomechanics expert, the expert was
asked about his fees and testifie d that he charges $245 per hou r. On cross-examination,
the following exchange occurred between the prosecutor and the defense’s expert:
Q: You were paid by the defense, correct?
A: Yes.
Q: By the hour?
A: Crane Engineering was, yes.
Q: Your firm was paid by the hour, correct?
A: Yes.
Q: And that’s where you derive your salary?
A: Yes.
Q: And you said $245 an hour?
A: Yes.
Q: For all aspects of the w ork that you performed?
A: Yes.
Q: To initially study t he evidence, correct?
A: Yes.
Q: To prepare and write a report?
A: Yes.
Q: To communicate w ith the defense team?
A: Yes.
Q: To prepare for your testimony today?
A: Yes.
Q: To prepare the PowerPoint presentation?
A: Yes.
Q: To testify?
A: Yes.
Q: Including any wait time in the hallway to testify?
A: Yes.
Q: How many hour s did you bill?

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A: So far 14 hours.

It is improper to assert, without grounds, that a professional witness is testifying in
a predetermined manner for money. State v. Wahlberg, 296 N.W.2d 408, 419-20 (Minn.
1980). In this case, the expert testified during direct examin ation that he was being paid
for his services. The prosecuto r then, on cross-examination, d elved into the specifics of
that payment. The prosecutor’s numerous questions had a cumulative effect, but there was
no objection, and the prosecutor never overtly stated that the expert was testifying in a
predetermined manner based upon his remuneration. The prosecut or’s questions did not
violate “clear or established standards of conduct.” State v. McCray, 753 N.W.2d 746, 751
(Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted). We discern no plain error.
III. The prosecutor’s statements in closing arguments that appellant stomped on
S.P.’s head did not affect appellant’s substantial rights.

Appellant argues that the prosecutor committed prejudicial misc onduct in closing
arguments by asserting that appellant stomped on S.P.’s head, w ithout a factual basis to
support such assertions. Appellant acknowledges that there was no objection to these
statements.
4
During his closing argument, the prosecutor suggested that appellant broke his ankle
while stomping down on S.P.’s head at the end of the fight. Th e prosecutor stated that

4 Also, during opening statements, the prosecutor stated that appellant likely broke his foot
stomping on S.P.’s head. However, appellant does not challenge this statement on appeal.

14
appellant “even stomped [S.P.],” and it appears that the prosec utor demonstrated the act
for the jury.5 At the close of his argument, the prosecutor further stated:
But what single explanation explains the broken foot and the
injuries . . . ? I suggest to you that, A, the ambulance foota ge of
how much pain the defendant was in would stop even him from
beating on [S.P.] once he’s down and immobilized. You can see
the pain that he was in. So if that’s true and that’s a debili tating
injury as was testified to and he can no longer put his weight on
his foot and it’s going to cause a great deal of pain, the inference
is that it happened much towards the end of these events, which
also indicates it was caused by the stomping motion on a head that
is breaking, that is slick with blood, that is mobile and movin g
and breaks at different rates; cheekbones or different structures in
the forehead bone, the jaw bone is a different structure and rolled
that ankle breaking it. And at that point, the defendant decided he
needed to hobble out of the garage. One explanation I offer yo u
to explain multiple phenomena.

A prosecutor may argue “reasonable inferences from the facts pr esented.” State v.
Johnson, 616 N.W.2d 720, 728 (Minn. 2000). And a prosecutor need not present a
colorless argument. State v. Porter , 526 N.W.2d 359, 363 (Minn. 1995). But the
prosecutor should refrain from making remarks that are intended to inflame the passions
and prejudices of the jury. State v. Mayhorn, 720 N.W.2d 776, 786-87 (Minn. 2006).
We need not determine if the prosecutor’s statements were plain -error misconduct
because, even assuming so, appellant’s substantial rights were not affected. In determining
whether substantial rights were affected, we “consider the strength of the evidence against
the defendant, the pervasiveness of the improper suggestions, a nd whether the defendant
had an opportunity to (or made efforts to) rebut the improper suggestions.” State v. Davis,

5 The transcript, by including th e word “indicating” in parenthe ses, suggests that the
prosecutor demonstrated the stomping for the jury

15
735 N.W.2d 674, 682 (Minn. 2007). As the state notes, the evid ence strongly suggested
that appellant’s actions were ex cessive and beyond the scope of reasonable self-defense,
the prosecutor’s statements were limited in number and constituted only a limited portion
of the closing argument, and the jurors were instructed that the statements of attorneys are
not evidence. Moreover, appellant had an opportunity, and indeed attempted, to rebut the
prosecutor’s assertion that the ankle injury was caused by stom ping. For example,
appellant’s counsel noted in closing argument that there was no blood on appellant’s shoes.
It is not reasonably likely that t he verdict would have been di fferent without the
prosecutor’s comments.
IV. Appellant’s pro se arguments are unavailing.

Appellant also filed a pro se supplemental brief in which he ar gues that (1) one of
the jurors was biased; (2) a witn ess was biased; (3) evidence w as not properly addressed
and his trial counsel was ineffective; (4) a witness committed perjury; (5) his Miranda
rights were violated; (6) the d istrict court improperly reopene d direct examination;
(7) evidence was tampered with at the crime scene; (8) self-def ense is applicable; (9) the
prosecutor engaged in misconduct; and (10) a lack of probable cause. We have thoroughly
reviewed appellant’s claims and find them to be without merit.
Affirmed.