Rondell Russell Camp, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-1312

Rondell Russell Camp, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed July 25, 2022
Affirmed
Bryan, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-17-2680

Eric L. Newmark, Newmark Storms Dworak LLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Jonathan P. Schmidt, Assistant County
Attorney, Lindsay Dreyer (certified student attorney), Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Bryan, Judge; and Gaïtas,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRYAN, Judge
In this postconviction appea l, appellant asserts that he received ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel in his direct appeal because counsel failed to challenge an
erroneous self-defense jury instruction given at the close of appellant’s trial for intentional
2
murder. Because t he jury rejected Camp’s testimony that he did not intend to kill the
victim, appellant has not established the necessary prejudice to support his ineffective -
assistance claim. We, therefore, affirm the denial of appellant’s postconviction petition.
FACTS
On January 29, 2017, appellant Rondell Russell Camp fought with S.P., resulting in
S.P.’s death. Respondent State of Minnesota charged Camp with one count of second -
degree intentional murder, and the case proceeded to trial. The state presented evidence at
trial that Camp attacked S.P. with multiple weapons, causing 38 distinct groups of injuries,
rendering S.P. unconscious, and causing his death. Camp also testified at trial and claimed
that he acted in self -defense. According to Camp, S.P. struck him in the head with a gun
in an unprovoked attack. Camp explained that he fought back with a knife and a wrench,
striking S.P. multiple times , before being able to leave for help. Camp testified that S.P.
was awake when Camp left the garage , although this testimony conflicted with the state’s
expert medical testimony.
The trial court granted Camp’s request to give the jury the model self-defense
instruction regarding the justifiable taking of a life, which applies when a person “takes the
life of another, even intentionally.” 10 Minnesota Practice, CRIMJIG 7.06 (2017) . The
trial court did not instruct the jury using the model instruction regarding general self-
defense, which applies to defensive actions resulting in the unintentional taking of a life.
10 Minnesota Practice, CRIMJIG 7.13 (2017) . The jury found Camp guilty of second -
degree intentional murder. The jury was asked to answer special interrogat ories. The jury
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found that Camp acted with particular cruelty , S.P. was particularly vulnerable, and Camp
knew or should have known of that vulnerability.
The trial court imposed a 367- month term of imprisonment . Camp filed a direct
appeal of his conviction, asserting, among other claims, that the state failed to disprove his
claim of self -defense. See State v. Camp, No. A18-0329, 2019 WL 272879 (Minn. App.
Jan. 22, 2019), rev. denied (Minn. March 19, 2019) (Camp I). Appellate counsel did not
challenge the t rial court’s decision to provide the jury with the justifiable -taking-of-life
instruction instead of the general self-defense instruction. In his supplemental brief, Camp
asserted that he received ineffective assistance from trial counsel, but he did not argue that
the ineffective assistance included trial counsel’s request to give the justifiable-taking-of -
life instruction.
This court affirmed the conviction, deciding that the evidence was sufficient to
support the jury’s verdict . After analyzing the elements of a justifiable -taking-of-life
defense, we concluded that “the jury rejected [Camp’s] testimony that S.P. continued to be
the aggressor and remained conscious an d talking even after the final blows were struck.”
Id. at *5. We also concluded that Camp’s “testimony was inconsistent with the medical
testimony that S.P. would have, at a minimum, been rendered unconscious by his injuries.”
Id. We determined that “[ t]he circumstances are consistent with [Camp]’s guilt and
inconsistent with self -defense.” Id. at *4. Those circumstances were:
[T]he handgun was recovered from the passenger -sid e
windshield of the car, away from S.P.’s body. The gun did not
have blood on it, though there was a great deal of blood near
S.P.’s body. Despite the lack of any firearm near S.P., the
condition of S.P.’s body shows that appellant maintained a
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sustained attack, at some point switched weapons, and then
continued the attack, caus ing 38 cutaneous groups of injuries.
The injuries were devastating and effectively pulpified the
frontal bones of S.P.’s head, rendering him unconscious. In
contrast, although appellant suffered a serious ankle injury, his
injuries were otherwise superfi cial. Given the lack of an
accessible firearm, there were not objectively reasonable
grounds for appellant’s sustained attack.

Id. at *5.
In March 2021, Camp filed a petition for postconviction relief. In his petition, Camp
alleged that he was denied ef fective assistance of counsel from both his trial and appellate
counsel because his trial counsel requested the justifiable -taking-of-life instruction instead
of the general self -defense instruction and his appellate counsel failed to challenge this
instruction in the direct appeal. At an evidentiary hearing, Camp withdrew the portion of
his postconviction petition relating to ineffective assistance of trial counsel, and the parties
agreed that Camp’s appellate counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness because the incorrect self-defense instruction was given to the jury and
appellate counsel did not include this issue in the direct appeal . The parties contested
whether appellate counsel’s performance prejudiced Camp.
The postconviction court issued a written order denying Camp’s petition. The
postconviction court accepted the parties’ agreement that the trial court gave the justifiable-
taking-of-life jury instruction in error. The postconviction court agreed with the state that
that based on State v. Carridine , 812 N.W.2d 130 (Minn. 2012) , the erroneous instruction
did not satisfy the prejudice prong of the two -part ineffective -assistance-of-counsel test
identified in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) :
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[T]he State established that [Camp] intentionally caused S.P.’s
death and there is not a rational basis for acquitting [Camp] of
murder in the second degree. [Camp] has failed to establish
that a reasonable probability exists that the jury’s verdict would
have been different had the general self -defense instruction
been given instead of the erroneous justifiable -taking-of-life
instruction. [Ca mp] has failed to establish that his substantial
rights were affected by the erroneous instruction.

Camp appeals the denial of his postconviction motion.
DECISION
Camp asks us to reverse the postconviction court and remand for a new trial, arguing
that he received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel on direct appeal because counsel
did not challenge the jury instructions . Because Camp is unable to establish that the
asserted error affected the outcome of his case, we affirm the postconviction cour t.
Under the federal and state constitutions, a criminal defendant is entitled to the
assistance of counsel. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Minn. Const. art. I, § 6. This right means
“the right to effective assistance of counsel.” McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771
n.14 (1970) (emphasis added). To prove a constitutional violation occurred as a result of
ineffective assistance of appellate c ounsel, Camp must show that his appellate counsel’s
performance on direct appeal “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” and that
“there is a reasonable probability that, but for his counsel’s unprofessional errors,” he
would have received a new trial . Petersen v. State, 937 N.W.2d 136, 139- 40 (quoting and
applying Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 694, to a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel). Courts “may analyze the Strickland requirements in either order and may dispose
of a claim on one prong without considering the other.” Lussier v. State, 853 N.W.2d 149,
6
154 (Minn. 2014). Ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims are reviewed de novo , State v.
Rhodes, 657 N.W.2d 823, 842 (Minn. 2003), as are questions of law embedded in a n order
denying postconviction relief, Petersen, 937 N.W.2d at 139.
Turning to the first Strickland prong, the state concedes that the trial court erred
when it gave the justifiable -taking-of-life instruction instead of the general self -defense
instruction.1 The state charged Camp with second -degree intentional murder. Minnesota
law “mandate[s] that the general self -defense instruction be given in cases where the
defendant claims the death was an unintended or accidental consequence of actions taken
in defense of self.” State v. Pollard, 900 N.W.2d 175, 180 (Minn. App. 2017); State v.
Marquardt, 496 N.W.2d 806, 806 (Minn. 1993) (same); CRIMJIG 7.06, n.1 (“ [The
justifiable-taking-of-life instruction] should be given only when the death was intentional.
When the death was unintentional . . . CRIMJIG 7.13 should be given”). Thus, the state
only contests the prejudice prong of Strickland.

1 This concession does not preclude our independent review of the first Strickland prong.
See State v. Hannuksela, 452 N.W.2d 668, 673 n.7 (Minn. 1990) ( recognizing that even
when parties agree on appeal, appellate courts have the responsibility to “decide cases in
accordance with the law” (quotation omitted)). It is well -settled that appellate courts do
not second -guess appellate counsel ’s decision not to raise a claim that constitutionally
effective counsel could believe would not prevail. Reed v. State , 793 N.W.2d 725, 733
(Minn. 2010) (citing Williams v. State , 764 N.W.2d 21, 31 (Minn. 2009) (“[A]ppellate
counsel is not required to raise claims on direct appeal that counsel could have legitimately
concluded would not prevail.”) and Case v. State , 364 N .W.2d 797, 800 (Minn. 1985)
(“[Appellate c ounsel] has no duty to include claims which would detract from other more
meritorious issues.”)). Given our decision regarding the prejudice prong, we decline the
invitation articulated in Hannuksela to review whether constitutionally effective appellate
counsel here could have believed that Carridine foreclosed reversal. Nor do we need to
address whether the postconviction court should have granted a hearing to determine the
actual reasons, if any, why appellate counsel did not raise the issue.
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In Carridine, the Minnesota Supreme Court concluded that providing the justifiable-
taking-of-life instruction instead of the general self -defense instruction did not affect the
outcome or prejudice the defenda nt because the jury necessarily rejected the elements of
general self-defense when it convicted the defendant of intentional murder :
The district court [] explained to the jury that “[i]n order to
have an intent to kill, the defendant must have acted with the
purpose of causing death or the defendant must have believed
that the act would have that result.” By finding Carridine guilty
of first -degree premed itated murder, the jury necessarily
rejected Carridine’s testimony that it “wasn ’t [his] intent to hit
anyone”—a factual predicate to his argument regarding the
CRIMJIG 7.05 instruction. We thus conclude that CRIMJIG
7.05’s implication that “the defendant must believe it necessary
to kill in order for the killing to be justified,” Marquardt, 496
N.W.2d at 806 n.1, did not affect the outcome of this case and
therefore did not affect Carridine’s substantial rights.

812 N.W.2d at 144.
The prejudice analysis from Carridine applies to our prejudice analysis here.
Although Carridine was charged with first -degree premeditated murder and Camp was
charged with second-degree intentional murder, both offenses required the jury to
determine whether the defen dant intended to take the life of another person. In finding
Camp guilty of an intentional murder, the jury necessarily found that Camp intended to
cause S.P.’s death. Just as in Carridine, given this finding, the jury could not have
acquitted Camp under the general law of self-defense.2 Thus, Camp has not shown that he
would have received a new trial but for appellate counsel’s failure to raise the issue.

2 In addition, the list of circumstances proved in Camp I negate general self -defense. We
previously concluded that “[t]he circumstances are consistent with [Camp]’s guilt and
inconsistent with self -defense,” and we emphasized the condition of S.P.’s body which
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To convince us otherwise, Camp directs our attention to Pollard, in which this court
reversed a conviction on direct appeal because the trial court gave the justifiable -taking -
of-life instruction instead of the general self -defense instruction. 900 N.W.2d at 182. We
conclude, however, that Pollard does not apply. The jury in Pollard acquitted the
defendant of intentional murder and convicted the defendant of unintentional murder. Id.
at 178. By contrast, the jury in this case was asked to determine Camp’s intent and returned
a guilty verdict on the cha rge of intentional murd er, necessarily negating the claim of
general self-defense. In addition, we must apply the Strickland prejudice standard and not
the prejudice standard that the supreme court applied in Pollard, where trial counsel
objected to the erroneous jury instructi on. Id. at 181 (assessing whether the error at issue
was “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”). As noted above, Camp cannot show that there
is a reasonable probability that he would have received a new trial but for appellate
counsel’s error. For these reasons, we are not persuaded to rely on Pollard or to reverse
the postconviction court .
Affirmed.

“shows that [Camp] maintained a sustained attack, at some point switched weapons, and
then continued the attack, causing 38 cutaneous groups of injuries.” Camp I, 2019 WL
272879, at * 4-5. We contrasted this with Camp’s “otherwise superficial” injuries and
stated that “there were not objectively reasonable grounds for [Camp ’s] sustained attack.”
Id. at 5*. Camp cannot establish the second Strickland prong given these circumstances.