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STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN SUPREME COURT

A18-0398

Court of Appeals Lillehaug, J.
Dissenting, Gildea, C.J., Anderson, J.
Firefighters Union Local 4725, et al.,

Respondents,

vs. Filed: October 9, 2019
Office of Appellate Courts
City of Brainerd,

Appellant.

________________________

Marshall H. Tanick, Teresa J. Ayling, Meyer Njus Tanick, PA, Minneapolis, Minnesota,
for respondents.

Pamela L. VanderWiel, William J. Everett, Anna L. Yunker, Everett & VanderW iel,
P.L.L.P., Rosemount, Minnesota, for appellant.

M. William O’Brien, Timothy J. Louris, Emily L. Marshall, Miller O’Brien Jensen, P.A.,
Minneapolis, Minnesota, for amici curiae Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1005;
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 160; International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers, Local 949; International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 49; and
International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 70.

Cort C. Holten, Jeffrey D. Bores, Chestnut Cambronne PA, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for
amicus curiae Minnesota Police and Peace Officers Association Legal Defense Fund.

Susan L. Naughton, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for amicus curiae League of Minnesota Cities.

________________________

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S Y L L A B U S

1. A public employer’s violation of Minn. Stat. § 179A.13, subd. 2(2) (2018),
a provision in the Public Employment Labor Relations Act (PELRA) that prohibits the
unfair labor practice of interfering with the existence of an employee organiz ation, is not
excused because the public employer’s interference was a matter of “inherent managerial
policy” under another provision in PELRA, Minn. Stat. § 179A.07, subd. 1 (2018).
2. The plain language of Minn. Stat. § 179A.13, subd. 2(2), which prohibits the
unfair labor practice of inter fering with the existence of an employee organization, does
not require that the public employer’s interference be motivated by antiunion animus.
Affirmed.
O P I N I O N

LILLEHAUG, Justice.
This appeal concerns a labor dispute under the Public Employment Labor Relations
Act (PELRA), Minn. Stat. §§ 179A.01 –.25 (2018). Firefighters Union Local 4725 (the
Local) and union president Mark Turner sued the City after it restructured its fire
department and eliminated all of the union positions. The district court granted summary
judgment to the City. The court of appeals reversed , concluding that the City committed
an unfair labor practice under Minn. Stat. § 179A.13, subd. 2(2), which prohibits public
employers from “interfering with the . . . existence . . . of any employee organization,” and
remanded to the district court. The City sought further review, acknowledging that the
decision to restructure the fire department interfered with the existence of the Local, but
contending that the decision was an authorized exercise of the City’s “inherent managerial

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policy” under a different section of PELRA, Minn. Stat. § 179A.07, subd. 1. We affirm
the court of appeals’ decision, but with reasoning that differs in part.
FACTS
The Local is an affiliate of the Internation al Association of Fire Fighters and
represents five firefighters who were employed by the City on a full-time basis. The five
firefighters were the entire membership of the Local at the time of the City’s decision to
restructure the fire department in 2015.
In 2010, the City experienced a budget deficit following a decrease in both property
tax values and state aid. The City attempted to restructure its fire department by eliminating
the full-time fire equipment operator (FEO) positions and have the FEO duties performed
by paid on-call (POC) firefighters, who receive nominal compensation and limited benefits.
All of the FEO employees , but none of the POC firefighters, were members of the Local.
The Brainerd City Council passed a resolution to adopt this plan, but later rescinded it due
to public opposition.
In January 2015, the City and the Local negotiated and signed a new three -year
collective bargaining agreement that covered the union FEO employe es, but not the
nonunion POC firefighters. Six months later, the City informed the Local in writing that
the City again sought to restructure the fire department to save money. The restructuring
would eliminate the FEO position s as a cost -saving measure. The Local vigorously
opposed the City’s proposal to lay off all of the Local’s members.
In September 2015, the City Council passed a resolution to restructure the fire
department by eliminating the FEO positions, using POC firefighters to perform the work

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previously performed by the FEO employees, and creat ing a full-time assistant fire chief
position. The effect of the restructuring was that the union FEO employees lost their jobs
and their duties were performed by nonunion firefighters.
In January 2016, the Local filed a complaint in the district court alleging four counts.
Count I—the only claim at issue in this appeal—alleged that the City, in eliminating the
FEO positions, laying off the FEO employees, and promoting a POC firefighter to the new
assistant-chief position (rather than rehiring an FEO employee), had engaged in unfair
labor practices prohibited by PELRA .1 In Count I, the Local claimed that the City had
engaged in three types of prohibited unfair labor practices:
(1) interfering, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in sections 179A.01 to 179A.25;

(2) dominating or interfering with the formation, existence, or
administration of any employee organization or contributing other support to
it; [and]

(3) discriminating in regard to hire or tenure to encourage or discourage
membership in an employee organization[.]

Minn. Stat. § 179A.13, subd. 2(1)–(3).
The City moved for summary judgment on all counts. It is important for the analysis
that follows to understand the legal position that the City took. The City acknowledged—

1 Count II alleged that the City improperly amended the Brainerd City C harter, and
Counts III and IV alleged that the City retaliated against Local members for making
statements critical of City personnel and the City’s proposed restructuring of the fire
department, in violation of the First Amendment of the U nited States Constitution and
Article I, Section 3, of the Minnesota Constitution. Counts II, III, and IV are not at issue
in this appeal.

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indeed, asserted affirmatively—that its actions had eliminated the Local.2 In its statement
of undisputed facts in support of summary judgment , the City represented tha t, “[a]s a
result of the restructuring, the FEOs were laid off and the [Local] was dissolved.” The City
further asserted that the Local’s claim concerning the City’s promotion of a nonunion POC
firefighter to the new assistant-chief position was meritless because PELRA did not apply
after the Local members “were no longer public employees and Firefighters Uni on Local
4725 no longer existed.” The City reemphasized this assertion in its reply memorandum,
stating that its decision to promote “cannot be construed as an act meant ‘to encourage or
discourage membership in an employee organization,’ especially one that no longer exists.”
The City’s representation that its actions had eliminated the Local was supported by
testimony from two City officials. During the fire chief’s deposition, he was asked whether
“there would be a union left without any members” employed by the City. He responded,
“No.” The fire chief also stated that it wa s “correct” to say that “the restructuring . . .
eliminate[d] the union” and, as a result, “the union would no longer exist.” Similarly, the
City administrator stated during his deposition that it is “a fair presumption” and “logical”
to say that “the union would be eliminated” if “their positions were eliminated” by the City.
The Local cross-moved for partial summary judgment. Relevant to this appeal, on
Count I, the Local argued, among other things, that the City’s actions had violated section

2 The City has not dispute d that the Local is an “employee organization” under
PELRA. An employee organization is “any union or organization of public employees
whose purpose is, in whole or in part, to deal with public employers concerning grievances
and terms and conditions of employment.” Minn. Stat. § 179A.03, subd. 6. PELRA
prohibits both public employers and employee organizations from engaging in certain
unfair labor practices. See Minn. Stat. § 179A.13, subds. 2–3.

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179A.13, subdivision 2(2) , of PELRA by “interfering with the . . . existence or
administration” of the Local.
In response, the City argued that , even though the Local had been eliminated, the
City’s actions were lawful under—indeed, authorized by—another provision in PELRA,
Minn. Stat. § 179A.07, subd. 1, which deals with “matters of inherent managerial policy.”
Such matters include “the organizational structure, selection of personnel, and direction
and the number of personnel.” Id. The City argued that decisions by a public employer on
these matters , such as those that prompted this lawsuit, may well interfere with the
existence of employee organizations like the Local, but are nonetheless allowed by
PELRA. Therefore, urged the City, a decision on a matter of inherent manage rial policy
is not an unfair labor practice.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the City on Counts II, III,
and IV, which are not before us. On Count I, the district court granted summary judgment
in part, determining that the C ity’s actions were within its authority under Minn. Stat.
§ 179A.07, subd. 1. The district court also denied summary judgment in part , concluding
that fact issues existed as to whether the City had violated PELRA by failing to negotiate
the terms and cond itions of employment, which are subjects of mandatory negotiation
under another provision of PELRA, Minn. Stat. § 179A.03, subd. 19.
The City moved for reconsideration of the partial denial of summary judgment on
Count I, arguing that the Local had not properly raised the issue of mandatory negotiation
under section 179A.03, subdivision 19. The district court granted the City’s motion for
reconsideration and ordered complete summary judgment in favor of the City.

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The Local appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed on Counts II, III, and IV, but
reversed on Count I. Firefighters Union Local 4725 v. City of Brainerd, 920 N.W.2d 232,
245 (Minn. App. 2018). On Count I, the court of appeals reached only the issue of whether
the City had violated section 179A.13, subdivision 2(2). Considering the “plain language”
of the statute, the court of appeals held that the “City violated Minn. Stat. § 179A.13, subd.
2(2), when, during the midst of an operating bargaining agreement, it unilaterally
eliminated all FEO positions, effectively dissolving [the Local].” 920 N.W.2d at 239. The
court of appeals concluded that it is not a matter of inherent managerial policy for a public
employer “to reorganize a department when the reorganization interferes with the existence
and administration of a union.” Id. at 240. Therefore, the court of appeals remanded to
the district court “to fashion an appropriate remedy.” Id.
The City petitioned for review , presenting a single issue: “Does a departmental
reorganization that results in the dissolution of a bargai ning unit constitute a statutorily
authorized exercise of a public employer’s inherent managerial authority . . . or is it an
unfair labor practice, as the Court of Appeals determined below?” The Local requested
conditional cross-review on issues related to Counts II, III, and IV. We granted the City’s
petition but denied the Local’s request for conditional cross-review.
ANALYSIS
This case concerns the relationship between two provisions in PELRA: an unfair
labor practices provision, Minn. Stat. § 179A.13, subd. 2(2), and the inherent managerial
policy provision, Minn. Stat. § 179A.07, subd . 1. Both provisions have been part of

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PELRA since it was enacted in 1971. 3 Statutory interpretation is an is sue of law that we
review de novo. 500, LLC v. City of Minneapolis, 837 N.W.2d 287, 290 (Minn. 2013).
This appeal arises from cross -motions for summary judgment on Count I. We
review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Commerce Bank v. W .
Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 870 N.W.2d 770, 777 (Minn. 2015). Summary judgment is appropriate
when “there is no genuine issue of material fact and a party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.01; see Senogles v. Carlson, 902 N.W.2d 38, 42 (Minn.
2017). Here, we see no genuine issue of material fact —and the parties have identified
none—that would prevent us from interpreting and applying the statutes.
I.
PELRA designates certain “practices ” of public employers that are “specified” in
section 179A.13 as “unfair labor practices.” Minn. Stat. § 179A.13, subd. 1. We turn first
to the unfair labor practices provision at issue in this case, section 179 A.13, subdivision
2(2). The relevant statutory language provides that “[ p]ublic employers, their agents and
representatives are prohibited from . . . interfering with the formation, existence, or
administration of any employee organization[.]” Minn. Stat. § 179A.13, subd. 2(2).4

3 See Act of Nov. 3, 1971, ch. 33, §§ 6, 8, 1971 Minn. Laws Extra Sess. 2709, 2716,
2719–20.

4 The National Labor Relations Act makes it an “unfair labor practice for an
employer . . . to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor
organization,” but, unlike PEL RA, does not reference interference with an organization’s
“existence.” See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (2012).

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We have never interpreted section 179A.13, subdivision 2(2), and, as it happens,
this case does not require a comprehensive discussion of the reach and nuance of the words
“interfering,” “formation,” “existence,” and “administration.” Throughout the case, the
City’s legal position has been that its actions interfered with the existence of the Local. In
the district court, the City represented that its actions resulted in the dissolution of the
Local. On appeal, as the court of appeals observed, the City “acknowledged” that the “fire-
department re structuring resulted in the elimination of the entire union.” Firefighters
Union Local 4725, 920 N.W.2d at 240. And before us, the City agreed that it “did interfere
with the existence of” the Local, albeit for a “vital” reason.5
Instead, the City asks u s to interpret PELRA as prohibiting under the unfair labor
practices provision, section 179A.13, subdivision 2(2) , only those acts that are not
permitted under the inherent managerial policy provision, section 179A.07, subdivision 1.
In other words, the C ity posits that PELRA excuses what would otherwise be an unfair
labor practice when the City takes an action that falls within the public employer’s inherent
managerial authority. We turn now to that issue.
Under Minn. Stat. § 179A.07, subd. 1, “A public employer is not required to meet
and negotiate on matters of inherent managerial policy.” The statute further provides that
“[m]atters of inherent managerial policy include, but are not limited to, such area s of
discretion or policy as the functions and programs of the employer, its overall budget,

5 At oral argument, the following exchange occurred: “So is it fair to summarize the
City’s position as follows: the City did interfere with the existence of the Union but did so
for a good reason?” Counsel: “It did so for vital reasons, yes.” Court: “So you would
agree with that statement?” Counsel: “It’s difficult not to. I mean, of course . . . .”

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utilization of technology, the organizational structure, selection of personnel, and direction
and the number of personnel.” Id.
The City argues that the decisi on to restructure the fire department falls squarely
within the authority granted by section 179 A.07, subdivision 1. The City asserts that the
decision affected the City’s budget and involved changing the fire department’s
organizational structure and num ber of personnel. According to the City, such personnel
decisions designed to address budgetary issues are clearly determinations on inherent
managerial policy. See, e.g., Arrowhead Pub. Serv. Union v. City of Duluth , 336 N.W.2d
68, 71 (Minn. 1983) (stat ing that a city’s decision regarding “the number of personnel it
employs to conduct its operations” is a matter of policy); Minneapolis Ass’n of Adm’rs &
Consultants v. Minneapolis Special Sch. Dist. No. 1 , 311 N.W.2d 474, 476 (Minn. 1981)
(stating that a school district’s “decision to decrease administrative staff as a means of
dealing with declining enrollment and a reduced budget” constitutes “a decision regarding
matters of inherent managerial policy”).
The court of appeals rejected the City’s position that the decision to restructure the
fire department was a decision on a matter of inherent managerial policy. The court of
appeals held that “it is not an ‘inherent managerial policy’ for an employer to reorganize a
department when the reorganization i nterferes with the existence and administration of a
union.” Firefighters Union Local 4725 , 920 N.W.2d at 240 . The Local makes a similar
argument.
We disagree with the court of appeals and the Local ; under the plain language of
section 179A.07, subdivision 1, the City’s decision clearly implicated matters of inherent

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managerial policy. Section 179A.07, subdivision 1, gives specific examples of what falls
within this category, i ncluding decisions about budget, organizational structure, and
number of personnel. The Local recognized this when it entered into the collective
bargaining agreement; in that document, the City expressly retained its “full and
unrestricted right” to determine the fire department’s manpower, set its budgets, modify its
organizational structure, and “perform any inherent managerial function not specifically
limited” by the agreement.
According to the City, the fact that the restructuring of the fire department was a
decision on a matter of inherent managerial policy ends the matter. But it does not. The
plain language of section 179A.07, subdivision 1, specifically limits the extent of the legal
protection that such a decision enjoys. It provides only that a public employer “is not
required to meet and negotiate on matters of” inherent managerial policy. In other words,
this provision addresses the scope of “mandatory bargaining” under PELRA. See City of
W. Saint Paul v. Law Enf’t Labor Servs., Inc. , 481 N.W.2d 31, 34 (Minn. 1992) . The
provision does not address, much less diminish, the force of the PELRA provisions that
explicitly “prohibit[]” a public employer from engaging in certain actions, designated as
“unfair labor practices .” Minn. Stat. § 179A.13, subd s. 1(a), 2. This plain -language
reading of the PELRA provisions harmonizes them. See Erickson v. Sunset Mem’l Park
Ass’n, 108 N.W.2d 434, 441 (Minn. 1961) ( stating that where “reasonably possible” we
interpret a statute to avoid conflict with other statute s). Therefore, we reject the City’s
argument that a public employer has inherent managerial authority to commit an unfair
labor practice.

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Thus, on the decision to restructure the fire department, the City may not have been
legally required to meet and negotiate with the Local. 6 But section 179A.07, subdivision
1, does not otherwise provide legal immunity from a charge of an unfair labor practice
under section 179A. 13, subdivision 2(2). For us to recognize such immunity, we would
have to read an exception into subdivision 2(2). But we cannot add language to a statute;
rather, we “must apply the plain language of the statute as written[.]” State v. Noggle, 881
N.W.2d 545, 550 -51 (Min n. 2016) ; see also Rohmiller v. Hart , 811 N.W.2d 585, 590
(Minn. 2012) (“We cannot add words or meaning to a statute that were intentionally or
inadvertently omitted.”). That black-letter rule of statutory interpretation has special force
here, because the Legislature d emonstrated elsewhere in PELRA that it knows how to
subordinate union rights to the provision governing matters of inherent managerial policy.7
But the Legislature did not do so when it prohibited unfair labor practices.

6 We say “may not” because sometimes the effects of a decision on a matter of
inherent managerial policy may implicate the “terms and conditions of employment ” and
be subject to mandatory bargaining. So, for example, we held in Gen. Drivers Union Local
346 v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 704, 283 N.W.2d 524 (Minn. 1979), that it was an unfair labor
practice for the school district to refuse to negotiate with the union its decision to contract
out bus driving services. Id. at 527–28. In General Drivers, “[w]e rejected the argument
that contracting out was an inherent managerial decision not subject to collective
bargaining, and held that because it resulted in job termination the subject was a term and
condition of employment.” Foley Educ. Ass’n v. Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 51, 353 N.W.2d 917,
923 (Minn. 1984). Whether the City’s restructuring triggered mandatory bargaining is not
before us.

7 The Legislature has specified that “terms and conditions of employment,” which
generally are subject to mandatory bargaining, are “subject to section 179A.07.” Minn.
Stat. § 179A.03, subd. 19 ; see Minn. Stat. § 179A.07, subd. 2 (addressing a public
employer’s obligation to meet and negotiate) . Consequently, we have held that
“[n]egotiable terms and conditi ons of employment are limited to exclude matters of

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The City also relies on policy reasons to support its position. According to the City,
accepting the Local’s argument that restructuring the fire department was “prohibited” by
section 179A.13, subdivision 2(2), would lead to an “untenable” and “unworkable” result.
Amicus curiae League of Minnesota Cities similarly argues that the result reached by the
court of appeals is “bad public policy” because it “will prevent public employers from
having the flexibility they need to respond to changes and to adjust their organizational
structures to protect public interests.”8 The amicus labor organizations disagree.
Whatever the merits of these competing arguments, when the language of a statute
is clear and unambiguous, we do not consider public policy. E.g., Axelberg v. Comm’r of
Pub. Safety, 848 N.W.2d 206, 213 (Minn. 2014) (stating that when a statute “needs revision
in order to make it embody a more sound public policy, the Legislature, not the Judiciary,
must be the reviser”); Buskey v. Am. Legion Post #270 , 910 N.W.2d 9, 14 (Minn. 2018)
(“When the words of a law in their application to an existing situation are clear and free
from all ambiguity, then our role is to enforce the language of the statute and not explore
the spirit or purpose of the law.” (citations omitted) (in ternal quotation marks omitted)).
In this case, the City has conceded—using the very words of section 179A.13, subdivision
2(2)—that it interfered with the existence of an employee organization. This interference
is a “prohibited” unfair labor practice. Minn. Stat. § 179A.13, subds. 1, 2(2). Section

inherent managerial policy.” Hill-Murray Fed’n of Teachers v. Hill -Murray High Sch. ,
487 N.W.2d 857, 866 (Minn. 1992).

8 The dissent, too, is based on what is essentially a policy argument: that cities should
not be “chilled” from making decisions on matters of inherent managerial policy.

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179A.07, subdivision 1, does not immunize that otherwise unlawful interference. If the
language of section 179A.13, subdivision 2(2), does not embody sound public policy, it is
up to the Legislature to revise it.
II.
We next analyze the City’s argument that a public employer’s decision on a matter
of inherent managerial policy that interferes with the existence of an employee organization
is an unfair labor practice only if the decision was based on an unlawful motive, s uch as
antiunion animus. The City suggests that whether municipal decisions are motivated by
antiunion animus could be analyzed through a McDonnell Douglas-style burden-shifting
test used in employment cases. See, e.g., Hansen v. Robert Half Int’l Inc. , 813 N.W.2d
906, 918 –20 (Minn. 2012) (explaining the burden -shifting framework for employment
discrimination claims set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 792
(1973)). We decline to read a motive element into section 179A.13, subdivision 2 (2), for
three related reasons.
First, we cannot read a motive element into the statute because the Legislature did
not write one. The plain and ordinary meaning of “interfere” is “to interpose in a way that
hinders or impedes.” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 609 (10th ed. 2001). The
definition does not include intent or motive elements. And, again, we cannot add words to
a statute. “To do so would violate a basic rule of interpretation, as we do not add words or
phrases to unambiguous statutes or rules. ” Walsh v. U.S. Bank , 851 N.W.2d 598, 604
(Minn. 2014).

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The dissent would read a new element into the statute by narrowing the word
“interfere” to mean “intentionally interfere.” But, as the very definition cited by the dissent
makes clear, the word “interfere” encompasses both intentional and unintentional conduct.
See Garner’s Dictionary of Legal Usage 471, 570 (3d ed. 2011). Moreover, the dissent’s
proposed amendment to the ordinary definition of “interfere” does not even do the jo b it
undertakes; here, there is no question that the City’s conduct was intentional, whatever its
motive.
Second, t he unfair labor practices provisions of PELRA show that, when the
Legislature wants to require a motive element, it knows how to do so—and, in fact, did so
in succeeding paragraphs. Section 179A.13, subdivision 2(3), prohibits “discriminating in
regard to hire or tenure to encourage or discourage membership in an employee
organization.” Subdivision 2(4) prohibits “discriminating . . . because the employee has”
engaged in protected activity. And subdivision 2(5 ) prohibits “refusing to meet and
negotiate in good faith.”9 We cannot consider subdivision 2(2) to include an element that
so plainly appears in other parts of the statute.
Third, even if we had the basis to add a motive element to section 179A.13,
subdivision 2(2), the City has not proposed a precise standard, and it is not clear which one

9 The two Supreme Court cases cited by the City regarding antiunion animus dealt
with different types of unfair labor practices—claimed violations of statutory pro visions
that prohibit interference with the rights of union members and prohibit discrimination that
discourages membership in a union. Metro. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693, 700 (1983);
Am. Ship B ldg. Co. v. NLRB , 380 U.S. 300, 311 (1965). Cf. Minn. Stat. § 179A.13,
subd. 2(1), (3).

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we should adopt. How strong must the anti-union animus be? What about mixed-motive
cases? Should we add “with the intent to,” “with the primary purpose of,” “based on ,”
“based in substantial part on,” or “based in part on”? And then, after settling on a standard,
we would have to decide whether the burden should shift and, if so, when and how. We
conclude that, even if it would be good policy to add a new motive element to a 48-year-old
law, the drafting task—again—would be for the Legislature.10
Our plain reading of PELRA does not, as the dissent charges, favor one section of
the statute over another. Quite the contrary; we read the sections in harmony —not in
conflict—with one another. We decline to do what the dissent would do: judicially amend
the plain language of one section to favor another.
Although our reasoning differs in part from that of the court of appeals, we hold that
the City engaged in an unfair labor practice prohibited by Minn. Stat. § 179A.13, subd.
2(2). Therefore, we affirm the court of appea ls’ decision that the district court erred by
failing to grant summary judgment to the Local on the PELRA claim.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.

Affirmed.

10 The dissent would insert an anti-union animus element into subdivision 2(2), but
declines to tell us how that element would be phrased and whether and how burdens would
shift. Instead, the dissent would punt these basic questions of law to the district court.

D-1
D I S S E N T
GILDEA, Chief Justice (dissenting).
This case involves two provisions in Minnesota’s Public Employment Relations Act
(PELRA): Minn. Stat. § 179A.07 (2018) (listing inherent managerial policy matters and
exempting such matters from meet and confer requirements), and Minn. Stat. § 179A.13,
subd. 2(2) (2018) (defining as an unfair labor practice actions that interfere with the
existence of a union). The majority effectively concludes that the City cannot exercise the
inherent manageri al authority given in section 179A.05 because to do so constitutes an
unfair labor practice under section 179A.13. In other words, the majority prioritizes the
protections in section 179A.13 and nullifies the powers in section 179A.07. Because the
majority departs from our obligation to give effect to both statutes, I respectfully dissent.
This case comes to us after the City decided to make changes to its workforce. The
City determined to eliminate all of its full -time firefighters, and use part-time firefighters.
The City contends that this was an inherent managerial policy decision and therefore not
subject to negotiation with the union. The City is undoubtedly correct, for section 179A.07
specifies that “[m]atters of inherent managerial policy inc lude . . . selection of personnel,
and direction and the number of personnel.” And the City says that it made this managerial
decision for budgetary reasons.
For their part, respondents argue that the City’s implementation of its decision is an
unfair l abor practice in violation of section 179A.13, subdivision 2(2). Under this
provision, the City is prohibited from “interfering with the . . . existence . . . of [a union].”

D-2
Minn. Stat. § 179A.13, subd. 2(2). Respondents contend that the City’s decision eliminated
the union because the terminated firefighters were the only members of the union.
The district court resolved the competing claims in favor of the City, effectively
concluding that section 179A.07 trumped section 179A.13. In essence, the district court
held that because the City’s decision was an inherent managerial policy decision, it could
not be an unfair labor practice.
The court of appeals reached the opposite conclusion, holding that because the
City’s decisio n eliminated the union it could not be an inherent management decision.
Firefighters Union Local 4725 v. City of Brainerd , 920 N.W.2d 232, 240 (Minn. App.
2018). The court of appeals effectively concluded that section 179A.13 trumped section
179A.07.
The majority reaches the same result as the court of appeals. Although recognizing
our obligation to give effect to both statutes, the majority attempts to sidestep the problem.
Specifically, the majority concludes that the two statutes do not actually conf lict because
section 179A.07 and section 179A.13, subdivision 2(2), address different things. I
disagree.
Under section 179A.07, the City does not have to bargain with a union over the
City’s decision to eliminate personnel. The majority acknowledges a s much. But, even
though the City can make the decision to eliminate personnel without bargaining, the
majority concludes that the City cannot implement that decision due to section 179A.13,
subdivision 2(2). The majority’s conclusion that the City canno t implement its decision
because it is an unfair labor practice nullifies the City’s inherent management discretion.

D-3
In other words, the City can make the decision to eliminate personnel without bargaining,
but the City cannot implement the decision in th e circumstances here because to do so
would be an unfair labor practice. Under the majority’s reasoning, the two statutes
therefore conflict, at least as they operate in the circumstances of this case.
At bottom, the majority has done what the court of a ppeals did —it chooses
section 179A.13, subdivision 2(2), over section 179A.07. Our obligation, however, is to
give effect to both provisions. See Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2018) (“Every law shall be
construed, if possible, to give effect to all of its provis ions.”); Minn. Stat. § 645.17(2)
(2018) (“[T]he legislature intends the entire statute to be effective and certain[.]”).
There is a way to resolve the conflict that gives effect to both provisions, and that is
the path I would follow. Under section 179A.1 3, subdivision 2(2), employers “are
prohibited from . . . interfering with the . . . existence . . . of any employee
organization . . . .” Minn. Stat. § 179A.13, subd. 2(2). The statute does not define the term
“interfering,” but the term could be defined either as one of strict liability or one requiring
intentional conduct. For example, Garner’s Dictionary of Legal Usage 471, 570 (3d ed.
2011) provides: “To interfere is to hamper, frustrate, or meddle in a deleterious way. One
interferes with someone or something . . . by meddling either intentionally or
unintentionally.” And “intentional” means “[d]one with the aim of carrying out the act.”
Intentional, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). Consistent with these definitions,
interfering with the existence of the union is proven if the conduct that interferes was done
“with the aim of” interfering. Id. Because our task is to give effect to both

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section 179A.13, subdivision 2(2), and section 179A.07, I would interpret “interfering” in
section 197A.13, subdivision 2(2), in accord with these definitions.1
Such an interpretation is consistent with how we interpreted a different part of
PELRA in the past. See Minn. Ed. Ass’n v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 495 , 290 N.W.2d 627,
631 (Minn. 1980). The question in that case was whether the school district committed an
unfair labor practice because the district refused to arbitrate the union’s claim. Id. at 629.
There was no question that the school district had refused to arbitrate. Id. at 628. The
union, relying on the provision in PELRA that made it an unfair labor practice to refuse to
comply with compulsory binding arbitration agreements, 2 argued that the school district’s
“ ‘good faith’ or lack thereof” wa s not relevant to the question of whether an unfair labor
practice had been committed. Id. at 631. Essentially, the union argued that the reason the
school district refused to arbitrate was irrelevant; all that mattered was the school district’s
refusal to arbitrate. Id.
We rejected the union’s absolutist interpretation. We said that to conclude that the
school district’s refusal was automatically an unfair labor practice “would ‘chill’ rights

1 I acknowledge that the statute does not separately list an intent element. But because
the statute does not define “interfere,” we can look to dictionary definitions. E.g., State v.
Strobel, 932 N.W.2d 303, 308 (Minn. 2019). As shown above, “interfere” is defined to
include intentional conduct.

2 PELRA has been amended since the case was decided but the relevant statutory
language is unchanged. Compare Minn. Stat. § 179.68, subd. 2(6) (1982) (prohibiting
public employers from “refusing to comply with grievance procedures,” including binding
arbitration of grievances) , with Minn. Stat. § 179A.13, subd. 2(b) (2018) (making it an
unfair labor practice to “refus[e] to comply with grievance procedures,” including binding
arbitration of grievances).

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granted under the Uniform Arbitration Act.” Id. To preserv e the rights given in the
arbitration statute, we adopted a “fair interpretation” of refusal in PELRA. Id. We held
that, because the arbitrability of the claim was “reasonably in doubt,” the school district
had not committed an unfair labor practice. Id.
I would follow the same analysis here. Interpreting inference without regard to the
City’s motives would chill the City’s rights under section 179A.07. To avoid that result, I
would interpret “interfering” in section 179A.13, subdivision 2(2), as act ing with the
intention to interfere with the union. This interpretation gives effect to the protections in
section 179A.13, subdivision 2(2), and to the powers in section 179A.07.
Throughout this litigation, the City has maintained that it did not make the decision
at issue here from an anti -union animus. And the City has argued, as an alternative to its
assertion that inherent management decisions cannot be unfair labor practices, that
decisions made from anti-union animus could be unfair labor practices. The district court,
however, did not decide this issue. The district court effectively held that because the
City’s decision was an inherent managerial policy under section 179A.07, it was not an
unfair labor practice under section 179A.13, subdivision 2(2). Just as I disagree with the
majority’s (and court of appeals’) decision to prioritize section 179A.13, subdivision 2(2),
over section 179A.07, so too do I disagree with the district court’s decision to prioritize
section 179A.07 over section 179A.13, subdivision 2(2). We must give effect to both.
In my view, the way to resolve this conflict and give effect to both statutes is to
interpret section 179A.13, subdivision 2(2), to require that the unfair labor practice be
motivated by anti -union ani mus. With this interpretation, if a City uses its inherent

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management authority as a disguise for anti-union animus, the decision would be an unfair
labor practice. As applied here, the City argues that it made the decision for budgetary
reasons, but if the facts demonstrate that the decision was made because the City intended
to interfere with the existence of the union, the City would have committed an unfair labor
practice. Because the district court did not reach this issue, I would remand the unfair -
labor-practice claim (Count I of the complaint) to the district court for a determination on
whether the City’s decision was made with the intent to interfere with the union. 3

ANDERSON, Justice (dissenting).

I join in the dissent of Chief Justice Gildea.

3 The majority is unclear about what standard should apply to an intent requirement
or how the level of animus is to be measured. These questions were not decided below or
adequately briefed here. In my view, the parties should litigate these questions in the first
instance in the district court on remand. See In re Tr. Known as Great N. Iron Ore Props.,
243 N.W.2d 302, 308 (Minn. 1976) (“We better fulfill our function as a reviewing court
when we review issues after they have been decided below, rather than deciding them
ourselves in the first instance.”).