State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-0834

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Austin Dennis,
Appellant.

Filed April 29, 2019
Affirmed
Kalitowski, Judge*

Anoka County District Court
File Nos. 02-CR-14-872, 02-CR-14-3600

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Anthony C. Palumbo, Anoka County Attorney, Kelsey R. Kelley, Assistant County
Attorney, Anoka, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Amy Lawler, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reilly, Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and
Kalitowski, Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
KALITOWSKI, Judge
Appellant Austin Dennis (1) challenges the validity of his guilty pleas for theft and
aggravated robbery, arguing the pleas are not accurate; (2) contends the district court erred
in accepting his pleas; and (3) challenges his incarceration in his pro se brief. We affirm.
D E C I S I O N
“To be constitutionally valid, a guilty plea must be accurate, voluntary, and
intelligent. A defendant bears the burden of showing his plea was invalid. Assessing the
validity of a plea presents a question of law that [appellate courts] review de novo.” State
v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn. 2010) (citations omitted).
Dennis argues that his guilty pleas were not accurate. “For a guilty plea to be
accurate, a factual basis must be established on the record showing that the defendant’s
conduct meets all elements of the charge to which he is pleading guilty.” Barnslater v.
State, 805 N.W.2d 910, 914 (Minn. App. 2011). “[T]he typical way a district court satisfies
the accuracy requirement is by asking the defendant to express in his own words what
happened.” Lussier v. State , 821 N.W.2d 581, 589 (Minn. 2012) (quotation omitted).
But Minnesota courts “have never required that the factual basis for the plea appear
in the plea hearing transcript verbatim.” Id. “[E]ven if a district court does not elicit proper
responses [at the plea hearing], a defendant may not withdraw his plea if the record contains
sufficient evidence to support the conviction.” Id. (quotation omitted). The record may
include the complaint or the presentence investigation (PSI). Id. (“[T]he plea petition and
colloquy may be supplemented by other evidence to establish the factual basis for a plea.”);

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State v. Trott, 338 N.W.2d 248, 252 (Minn. 1983) (complaint and photos of the victim’s
injuries); Burnett v. State, 195 N.W.2d 187, 188 (Minn. 1972) (PSI).
I. Dennis’s guilty plea on the theft count was accurate.
Dennis argues that his guilty plea on the theft count is not supported by a sufficient
factual basis because, during the plea hearing, he did not admit to two elements of the
offense—value of the property taken and intent. We disagree.
A. Value of the property taken
Under Minn. Stat. § 609.52, subd. 2(a)(1) (2012), whoever “ intentionally and
without claim of right takes, uses, transfers, conceals or retains possession of movable
property of another without the other’ s consent and with intent to deprive the owner
permanently of possession of the property ” commits theft. Minn. Stat. § 609.52, subd. 3
(2012), prescribes maximum sentences for different kinds of theft. Minn. Stat. § 609.52,
subd. 3(3), provides that:
[A person who commits theft may be sentenced] to
imprisonment for not more than five years or to payment of a
fine of not more than $10,000, or both, if any of the following
circumstances exist:
(a) the value of the property or services stolen is more
than $1,000 but not more than $5,000; or
. . .
(d) the value of the property or services stolen is not
more than $1,000, and any of the follo wing circumstances
exist:
(i) the property is taken from the person of
another or from a corpse, or grave or coffin containing a
corpse[.]

The theft count implicated subdivision 3(3)(d)(i), which is commonly referred to as
theft from person. Dennis argues that there is no factual basis for the conclusion that the

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value of the phones he took from the victim’s person were “not more than $1,000.” Minn.
Stat. § 609.52, subd. 3(3)(d). While the charge description of the complaint seems to be the
only place in the record where the value of the phones is discussed, we are not persuaded
that Dennis’s guilty plea on the theft count is inaccurate. The overarching principle of the
factual-basis inquiry is to ensure “that the defendant actually committed an offense at least
as serious as the crime to which he is pleading guilty.” Trott, 338 N.W.2d at 252. Here, the
value of the phones does not affect the seriousness of the offense committed because
Dennis admitted that he took the phones from the victim’s p erson. If the stolen phones
were not worth more than $1,000 , then the offense constituted theft from person and the
maximum sentence of a five-year imprisonment or a $10,000 fine would apply under
subdivision 3(3). See Minn. Stat. § 609.52, subd. 3(3)(d)(i). And if the phones were worth
more than $1,000, as Dennis would have us infer from the record, Dennis would be subject
to the same maximum sentence under subdivision 3(3). See Minn. Stat. § 609.52,
subd. 3(3)(a). Dennis committed an offense at least as s erious as theft from a person,
regardless of the value of the phones he stole. Thus, the lack of an admission to the value
of the property taken does not make the guilty plea on the theft count inaccurate.
B. Intent
A conviction for theft requires the defendant’s “ intent to deprive the owner
permanently of possession of the property .” Minn. Stat. § 609.52, subd. 2(a)(1). Intent
“means that the actor either has a purpose to do the thing or cause the result specified or
believes that the act, if successful, will cause that result.” Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 9(4)
(2012). “Intent is generally proved by inferences drawn from a person’s words or actions

5
in light of all the surrounding circumstances.” Nelson v. State, 880 N.W.2d 852, 860 (Minn.
2016) (quotati on omitted). In the context of theft, the fact that a defendant, without
justification, did not return the stolen item to the victim can support an inference of the
requisite intent. State v. Slaughter , 691 N.W.2d 70, 77 (Minn. 2005); see State v. Duea,
414 N.W.2d 513, 515 (Minn. App. 1987) (“ [It] is well established that unexplained
possession of stolen property within a reasonable time after a burglary or theft will in and
of itself be sufficient to sustain a conviction.” (quotation omitted)).
At the plea hearing, Dennis did not specifically admit to having intended to deprive
the victim permanently of her property. And he argues that he did not admit “that he walked
away with the phone, or that he kept the phone, or that he refused to return it.” But the
record contains other information establishing that Dennis had the requisite intent. First, as
part of the plea colloquy, Dennis answered “Yes” to the question: “Did you steal [the
victim’s] phone?” (Emphasis added). Dennis’s own description of his co nduct as stealing
gives rise to an inference that he had intended to deprive the victim permanently of her
property, not to borrow it and restore her possession in the future. Second, according to the
PSI completed in 2014, Dennis told the probation office r that he “took [the]
phones . . . from the victim into his friend’s residence,” “stayed in [the] friend’s residence,
and never returned to the victim[] . . . with the phones or money to pay for them.” Thus,
Dennis admitted to facts that support an inference of intent. Third, the complaint confirms
that Dennis took away the victim’s phone s and did not return them. When the officers
tracked down Dennis in an alley , after hearing the victim’s report that he “pulled out a

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black h andgun, and took [her phone s],” Dennis had the victim’s phone s on him. We
conclude that Dennis’s guilty plea on the theft count was accurate.
II. Dennis’s guilty plea on the aggravated-robbery count was accurate.
Dennis argues that his guilty plea on the aggravated -robbery count was no t
supported by a sufficient factual basis because, during the plea colloquy, he did not admit
to an element of the offense—use of a dangerous weapon.
“Whoever, while committing a robbery, is armed with a dangerous weapon . . . is
guilty of aggravated robbery in the first degree . . . .” Minn. Stat. § 609.245, subd. 1 (2012).
And, because “[a] person is criminally liable for a crime committed by another if the person
intentionally aids, advises, hires, counsels, or conspires with or otherwise procures the
other to commit the crime,” those who commit a robbery together can all be guilty of
aggravated robbery even if only one of them is armed with a dangerous weapon. Minn.
Stat. § 609.05, subd. 1 (2012).
Dennis admitted at the plea hearing that he had committed the robbery of a different
victim than the theft with several accomplices. And a sufficient factual basis exists in the
record to support the conclusion that Dennis or his accomplice was armed with a dangerous
weapon. First, according to the complaint, the victim “was suffering from significant injury
to his head and face with a lot of blood” when the responding officers arrived. He told the
officers that “he was struck multiple times in the head and face with what he believed was
the wood stock of a shotg un.” The shotgun was discovered the next day, and it had blood
on the wood stock. Second, the record indicates that Dennis’s DNA was found on the
shotgun. And Dennis acknowledged the result s of the DNA testing during the plea

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colloquy, stating that it was “one of the reasons why [he] want[ed] to take” the plea bargain.
Third, the PSI notes that although Dennis “denied he had possession of a gun or that he
assaulted the victim,” “ [h]e admitted he knew his co -defendant had possession of a gun
prior to going t o the victim’s residence.” Thus, the record indicates that Dennis handled
the shotgun and was aware of his accomplice’s use of the gun.
III. The district court did not err in accepting the pleas.
Dennis argues that the district court did not “carefully and independently scrutinize
the factual basis” of his pleas. We agree that the district court’s factual-basis inquiry here
was minimal. See State v. Russell , 236 N.W.2d 612, 613 (Minn. 1975) (holding that a
district court must first be satisfied that an ade quate factual basis exists for a guilty plea
before the court accepts it). But, “[i]f the factual basis of a guilty plea is challenged on
direct appeal, this court conducts a de novo review by reviewing the record . . . .” State v.
Johnson, 867 N.W.2d 210, 216 (Minn. App. 2015), review denied (Minn. Sept. 29, 2015).
Thus, our scope of review here is not limited to the district court’s findings. To be granted
relief, Dennis has to show that a sufficient factual basis does not exist, not that the district
court failed to find such a basis. Dennis has failed to show that there was not a factual basis.
Dennis also argues that “the plea consisted almost entirely of leading questions.”
Although appellate courts have discouraged the use of leading questions to establish a
factual basis, the courts “have never held that the use of leading questions automatically
invalidates a guilty plea.” Nelson, 880 N.W.2d at 860. We conclude that the use of many
leading questions here does not invalidate the guilty pleas.

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Finally, because nothing in the record indicates that the guilty pleas were intended
to be Alford pleas, we reject Dennis’s argument that his pleas were not valid because they
failed to conform to Alford.
IV. Dennis’s pro se arguments are waived.
In his pro se brief, Dennis challenges his continued incarceration after the entry of
the guilty pleas, arguing that he was promised release and that he was lied to about the plea
hearing date. But, Dennis fails to support his claim of error by presenting supporting
argument or authority. And it is not obvious from the r ecord that he unintelligently or
involuntarily agreed to the plea bargain because of the alleged representations made to him.
Thus, Dennis’s pro se arguments are deemed waived. See State v. Bowles , 530 N.W.2d
521, 525 n.1 (Minn. 1995) (“[W]e will not consider any claim lacking supporting argument
or authority unless prejudicial error appears obvious upon inspection of the record.”).
Affirmed.