Save Lake Calhoun,

1
STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN SUPREME COURT

A18-1007

Court of Appeals Lille ha ug, J.
Dissenting, Gildea, C.J , Anderson, J.

Save Lake Calhoun,

Respondent,

vs. Filed: May 13, 2020
Office of Appellate Courts
Sarah Strommen, et al.,

Appella nts.
________________________

Keith Elliso n, Attorney General, Liz Kramer, Solicitor General, and Christina Brown,
Assistant Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for appellants.

Erick G. Kaardal, Mohrman, Kaardal & Erickson, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota, for
respondent.

Lewis A. Remele, Jr., Mark R. Bradford, and Colin S. Seaborg , Bassford Remele, P.A.,
Minneapo lis, Minneso ta, for amicus curiae Minneapolis Park & Recreation Board.
________________________

S Y L L A B U S
1. A petitio n for a writ of quo warranto is an appropriate method to challe nge
the authority of the Commissioner of the Department of Natural Resources to issue an order
changing the name of a lake.
2. The Commis s io ner of the Department of Natural Resources had autho rit y
under Minnesota Statutes § 83A.02 (1) , (3) (2018) to issue an order changing the name of
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a lake. That authority is not limited by Minnesota Statutes § 83A.05, subd. 1 (2018), which
prohibits a county board from changin g a lake name “which has existed for 40 years. ”
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

O P I N I O N

LILLEHAUG, Justice.
On January 18, 2018, the Commissioner of the Department of Natural Resources
(the Commissioner) issued an order changing the offic ia l name of a well -kno wn
Minneapolis lake from Lake Calhoun to Bde Maka Ska. The Commissioner invoked his
authority under Minnesota Statutes § 83A.02 (1), (3) (2018) to do so. Another statute
within chapter 83A prohibits changing a body of water’s name “which has existed for 40
years.” Minn. Stat. § 83A.05, subd. 1 (2018). Respondent Save Lake Calhoun contends
that, based on the 40- year limita t io n in section 83A.05, the name change was beyond the
Commiss io ne r’ s authorit y under section 83A.02, and that the courts should so rule by
issuing a writ of quo warranto. Appellants (collectively, the Commissioner) respond that
the writ is not available or should be abolished, and that, in any event, the 40-year limitat io n
does not apply to the Commiss io ner’s statutory authority to change the name of the lake.
We conclude that, in this case, the writ of quo warranto is an appropriate method to
challe nge the Commiss io ner ’s authorit y. But we decline to issue the writ because the
Commissio ner has statutory authority to change the name s of Minnesota lakes, includ ing
those with names existing for 40 years or more. Under Minnesota law, the body of water
that was Lake Calhoun is now Bde Maka Ska.
Therefore, we affirm the court of appeals in part, reverse in part, and remand.
3
FACTS
This case is about the legal name of a lake entirely located within the City of
Minneapo lis. Among the names by which Native people knew it was Bde Maka Ska. In
the 1820s , white people began to call it Lake Calhoun , and eventually that became the
offic ia l name of the lake. The name has been in existence for considerably more than 40
years.
In April 2015, the Minneapolis Park and Recreation Board passed a resolution to
develop a master plan for the Chain of Lakes Regional Park , which includes the lake at
issue. The plan , approved in 2017, proposed to change the offic ia l name of the lake from
Lake Calhoun to Bde Maka Ska.
After approving the master plan, the park board directed its staff to circulate and
forward to the Hennepin County Board, via filing with the county auditor, a petition to
change the lake name signed by at least 15 registered voters. The idea seems to have been
to initiate a name change under Minnesota Stat utes §§ 83A.05–.07 (2018), which grant
county boards the authority to change the name s of bodies of water, subject to
Commissioner approval.
The petition was filed and presented to the county board. B ut the county attorney
advised the board, citing section 83A.05, subdivision 1, that the board did not have the
authority to change a lake “name which has existed for 40 years.”
So, the county board took another tack. After public notice, public comment, and a
public hearing, the county board passed Resolution No. 17-0489 on November 28, 2017,
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“recommend[ing]” that the Department of Natural Resources “take the steps necessary” to
change the name from Lake Calhoun to Bde Maka Ska.
The county submit ted the resolut io n and other supporting documents to the
Commiss io ne r. The Commiss io ne r received comment s supporting and opposing the
name-change, includ ing a petitio n from Save Lake Calhoun submitt ed on behalf o f
homeowners near the lake. After considering the submissions, and invok ing his autho rit y
under Minneso ta Statutes section 83A.02, paragraphs (1) and (3), 1 the Commiss io ne r
decided that it would “serve the public interest” to change the name of the lake. By order
dated January 18, 2018, the Commiss io ne r renamed it Bde Maka Ska.
In response, Save Lake Calhoun petitioned the court of appeals for a writ of
certiorari. The court of appea ls dismis sed the petitio n because the Commiss io ner ’s order
was not a reviewable quasi-jud ic ia l decision. In re Proposed Renaming of Lake Calhoun,
No. A18-0261, Order at 4 (Minn. App. filed Mar. 6, 2018) .
On April 25, 2018, Save Lake Calhoun petitioned the Ramsey County District Court
for a writ of quo warranto . Save Lake Calhoun argued that , because the Lake Calhoun
name had existed for more than 40 years, the Commiss io ne r had exceeded statutory
authority by changin g the name. The Commis s io ner moved to dismiss or, in the alternat i ve ,
to change venue. By order filed June 15, 2018, t he district court denied the petitio n for a

1 The Commissio ner’s order did not purport to invoke any statutory authority und er
Minn. Stat. § § 85A.05–.07. Thus, there is no material issue of disputed fact as to what
authority the Commissio ner invoked.
5
writ of quo warranto, reasoning that ongoing action was necessary to obtain the writ and
that there was no such action.
Save Lake Calhoun appealed. The court of appeals reversed the district court and
directed that judgment be entered for Save Lake Calhoun. See Save Lake Calhoun v.
Strommen, 928 N.W.2d 377, 390 (Minn. App. 2019). The court determined that the writ
of quo warranto was available because the Commiss io ner ’s action was an ongoing exercise
of power. Id. at 385–86. Reaching the merits of the case, the court concluded that the
Commiss io ne r lacked the authority to change a lake name in existence for more than 40
years. Id. at 388–89. The Commis s io ner sought review, and we granted it.
ANALYSIS
I.
The Minnesota Constitutio n, Article VI, Section 2, gives us “origina l jurisdic t io n in
such remedial cases as are prescribed by law.” This includes the power to issue ancient
writs includ in g, as relevant here, writs of quo warranto. Minn. Stat. § 480.04 (2018). Quo
warranto is an available remedy to challenge official action not authorized by law. State
ex rel. Graham v. Klumpp, 536 N.W.2d 613, 614 n.1 (Minn. 1995) (explaining that a writ
of quo warranto is “ designed to test whether a person exercising power is legally enti t led
to do so.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Although we have original jurisd ictio n to issue the writ, in Rice v. Connolly , we
instructed that petitions for the writ sh ould be filed in the first instance in district court .
488 N.W.2d 241, 243–44 (Minn. 1992). Consistent with that instruc t io n, Save Lake
Calhoun commenced this quo warrant o matter in the district court. The district court
6
dismis sed the petition for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. We
review such a dismiss a l de novo, accepting the facts alleged in the complaint— here, the
petitio n—as true and construing all reasonable inferences in favor of Save Lake Calhoun.
See Walsh v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 851 N.W.2d 598, 606 (Minn. 2014).
The Commis s io ner argues in three respects that quo warranto is not—or should no t
be—available in this case. First, the Commissioner argues that Save Lake Calhoun cannot
use a writ of quo warranto to challenge official misconduct. But Save Lake Calhoun’s
petition alleges more than mere misconduct; it alleges that an official has acted without
legal authority. State ex rel. Lommen v. Gravlin highli ghts this distinc t io n. 295 N.W. 654,
655 (Minn. 1941).
In Lommen, the plaint i ff filed a petitio n for a writ of quo warranto to prevent the
Commiss io ne r of Administration from purchasing uniforms without competitive bidding.
Id. at 654–55. We explained that a writ of quo warranto cannot be used as “preventive of,
or remedy for, official misconduct and [may] not be employed to test the legality of the
official action of public or corporate officers.” Id. at 655 (citation omitted) (inte r na l
quotation marks omitted). In that case, neither party questioned the offic ia l’s legal
authority to purchase uniforms. Ins tead, the issue was whether the offic ia l could properly
exercise that authority witho ut using the competitive-bidding process.
By contrast, Save Lake Calhoun alleges that the Commissioner exceeded the
statutory authority of the office, usurping the power held by others. A petitio n for a writ
of quo warranto properly challenges this type of action because it concerns whether legal
authority exists, not whether legal authority has been misused.
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Second, the Commiss io ne r, relying on the decision of the court of appeals in State
ex rel. Sviggum v. Hanson, argues that a writ of quo warranto is not available because no
ongoing action exists. 732 N.W.2d 312, 319–20 (Minn. App. 2007). Although Sviggum
discussed the absence of ongoing action, its primary focus was on mootness. Id. at 322–23.
Sviggum arose out of a government shutdown. Id. at 315. Because the Legislature
did not appropriate funds for necessary executive functions, a district court issued an order
authorizing the finance commissio ner to fu nd those functio ns. Id. Subsequently, the
Legislature passed an appropriations bill that retroactively funded those same functio ns.
Id. at 316. Because the Legislature’s bill was retroactive, it—not the district court
order—fund ed the executive functio ns and effectively mooted the district court’s order .
Id. at 323. Accordingly, the court of appeals dismissed the petitio n for lack of a case or
controversy. Id. Sviggum is weak support for the Commiss io ner ’s positio n here. This case
is not moot; the Commissioner’s order remains in effect .
Our precedent confirms that quo warranto is an available remedy to challenge the
type of conduct at issue in this case. In State ex rel. Palmer v. Perpich , 182 N.W.2d 182,
183 (Minn. 1971), we considered the lieutenant governor’s statutory authorit y to call the
senate to order and require each senator, when called, to present a certificate of election.
See Minn. S tat. § 3.05 (2018). When calling the senate to order, the lieutenant governor
rejected a valid certificate of election. Palmer, 182 N.W.2d at 183–84. We concluded that
the lieutenant governor acted witho ut legal authority, explaining that “[n]owhere do we
find in our Constitutio n or our statutes any provisio n giving the lieutenant governor the
right or power to determine who is eligible to be a member of the senate.” Id. at 185–86.
8
We all but issued the writ after concluding that the lieutenant governor had exceeded his
statutory and constitutio nal authority.2 Id. at 185–86. In short, Palmer demonstrates that
a writ of quo warranto is an available remedy to challenge whether a n offic ia l’s act io n
exceeded the offic ia l’ s statutory authority. See also State ex rel. Danielson v. Vill. of
Mound, 48 N.W.2d 855, 865 (Minn. 1951) (issuing a writ of ouster after determining that
the village’s officers annexed a territory not “within the scope of the power delegated to
[them]”).3
Here, Save Lake Calhoun a sserts that the Commissioner exceeded the
Commiss io ne r’ s statutory authority by changing the name of the lake to Bde Maka Ska.
Like the lieutenant governor in Perpich, and like the villa ge officer s in Danielson, quo
warranto is available to decide whether the Commissio ner exceeded statutory authority.4
Third, the Commis s io ner urges that we abolish the common-law writ of quo
warranto. We decline to do so. We made clear in Rice, in 1992, that the writ “exist[s] sid e

2 Although we did not issue the writ, we “as sume[d] that the parties w[ould] no w
conform to this opinio n witho ut the necessity of issuing a formal writ.” Palmer,
182 N.W.2d at 186.

3 The court of appeals relied upon State ex rel. Mattson v. Kiedrowski , 391 N.W.2d
777 (Minn. 1986), and Rice, 488 N.W.2d 241, for the proposition that ongoing action exists
here. Save Lake Calhoun, 928 N.W.2d at 385–86. But neither case discusses ongoing
action, and our precedent does not require it.

4 The Commissioner also argues that a writ of quo warranto is u navailable because a
declaratory judgment action is available. But, when questioned during oral argument about
the availability of a declaratory judgment action, the Solicitor General was equivocal about
whether declaratory relief was available and, if so , under what circumstanc es.
Accordingly, we are not persuaded that the petition should be dismissed on that ground.
9
by side with the appropriate alternative forms of remedy heretofore available.” 488
N.W.2d at 244. The underlying reason for the writ —to rein in government officials who
exceed their constitutional or statutory authority—remains as valid as ever. To the extent
that anyone might seek to misuse the quo warranto petition process, the judiciary has the
power and the tools to deal with any abuses.5
II.
Having established that the writ is available if the Commissioner exceeded statutory
authority, we turn to the merits of the dispute. Did the Commis sioner have the statutory
authority to change a lake name in existence for 40-plus years?
A.
In this case, the relevant facts are undisputed, so the questio n is one of law that we
review de novo. State v. Bakken, 883 N.W.2d 264, 267 (Minn. 2016). 6 The legal issue is
whether the Commissioner exceeded authority by failing to heed a statutory time limit at i o n.
This issue is a matter of statutory interpretation. Our role in interpreting statutes “is to
ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.” Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2018). “If
the intent is clear, we apply the statute accordi ng to its plain meaning. ” Fish v. Ramler

5 The writ of quo warranto discussed here is not one of the ancient writs excluded
from the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure by Rule 81.01(a) and Appendix A. As with
any other actions of a civil nature, and consistent with the Rules, district courts have the
power to administer quo warranto matters “to secure [their] just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 1.

6 The dissent invokes John Adams’s famous observation that “ [f]acts are stubborn
things.” But here, the material facts—stubborn or otherwise—are undisp uted. Therefo re,
the question before us is one of statutory interpretation, and thus is one of law.
10
Trucking, Inc., 935 N.W.2d 738, 741 (Minn. 2019). “[W]e do not add words or phrases to
unamb iguo us statutes or rules.” Walsh, 851 N.W.2d at 604.
In determining a statute’s plain meaning, “words and phrases are construed
according to rules of grammar and according to their common and approved usage.” Minn.
Stat. § 645.08(1) (2018); see also State v. Garcia- Gutierrez, 844 N.W.2d 519, 521
(Minn. 2014). We do not read words in isolation; the meaning of a word is i nformed by
how it is used in the context of a statute. State v. Henderson, 907 N.W.2d 623, 626 (Minn.
2018). We consider a statute as a whole “to harmonize and give effect to all its parts.” Van
Asperen v. Darlings Olds, Inc., 93 N.W.2d 690, 698 (Minn. 1958). And we presume that
the Legislature “intended the entire statute to be effective and certain .” Id.
With these canons of statutory interpretatio n in mind, we turn to the parties’
arguments on how to interpret the lake -name statutes. Save Lake Calhoun’s position is
straightforward; it contends that the controlling statute is Minnesota Statu tes § 83A.05,
subd. 1, which provides: “A name of a lake, river, stream, or other body of water may be
given or changed under sections 83A.05 to 83A.07 except that a name which has existed
for 40 years may not be changed under the provisions of sections 83A.05 to 83A.07.”
Save Lake Calhoun acknowledges that the Commissioner has authority to change a
lake name, but argues that this authorit y is limited by sections 83A.05 to 83A.07. Save
Lake Calhoun points specifically to Minnesota Statutes § 83A.02(3), which provides that
the Commissioner shall change a lake name “in cooperation with the county boards and
with their approval.” Save Lake Calhoun reasons that the reference to county boards ties
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together sections 83A.02 and 83A.05, thus binding the Commiss io ne r to the 40-year
limitation in section 83A.05, subdivision 1.
The Commissio ner responds that section 83A.05 does not bind the Commissio ner.
Instead, chapter 83A establishes two avenues for changing a lake name: the process in
sections 83A.05 to 83A.07 that addresses county board determinations; and a separate
process in sections 83A.02 to 83A.03 that gives the Commiss io ner the power to determine
the names, not just of lakes, but of streams, places, and other geographic features.
In particular, the Commis s io ner points to two paragraphs of section 83A.02.
Paragraph 1 says that the Commissioner shall “determine the correct and most appr opriate
names of the lakes, streams, places and other geographic features in the state . . . by written
order.” Paragraph 3 provides that the Commissioner shall change names “in cooperation
with the county boards and with their approval . . . with the end in view of elimi nat i ng, as
far as possible, duplication of names within the state.” The Commissioner asserts that the
power bestowed by paragraph 1 is independent of the Commissioner’s power bestowed by
paragraph 3 and may be exercised without the involvement of county boards. In any event,
the Commissio ner argues, the 40- year time limitation i n section 83A.05, subdivision 1,
does not limit the Commissioner’s power granted by paragraphs 1 and 3 of section 83A.02.
B.
After a careful review of the entir ety of chapter 83A, and reading the chapter and
its sections as a whole, we conclude that the Commissioner had the authority to change the
name o f the lake from Lake Calhoun to Bde Maka Ska, even though the Lake Calhoun
name has existed for more than 40 years.
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Reading and comparing the plain language of sections 83A.05–.07 to the plain
language of sections 83A.02–.03 shows that the Legislature created two avenues to change
lake names. The avenue in sections 83A.05 –.07 is what we will refer to as the county
board process. That process is commenced by a petition of 15 or more legal voters. Minn.
Stat. § 83A.05, subd. 2(a). Detailed requirements for the petition, a bond, notice, and
hearing are included. Minn. Stat. § 83A.05, subd. 2(c) (describing what a petition must
include) ; Minn. Stat. § 83A.06, subds. 3–5 (describing the bond, notice, and hearing). The
county board can “select and approv e a name as it determines is in the permanent, best
interests of the affected county. ” Minn. Stat. § 83A.07, subd. 1. Notably, county board
selection and approval is not the last step in the county board process; any county board
determination must be approved by the Commissioner. Minn. Stat. § 83A.04.
The county board process does not apply to lakes whose offic ia l names have been
in existence for 40 years. The plain language of section 83A.05, subdivision 1, makes clear
that a lake name “may be given or changed under sections 83A.05 to 83A.07 except that a
name which has existed for 4 0 years may not be changed under the provisions of sections
83A.05 to 83A.07.” (Emphas is added.) The two specific references to “sections 83A.05 to
83A.07” demonstrate unambig uo usly that the 40-year limita t io n applies specifica l ly and
solely to the county board process, and not to the rest of chapter 83A. Put another way,
the 40-year limitatio n is a check on the county boards, not on the Commissio ner.
The other avenue to change a lake name —wha t we will call the Commis s io n e r
process—is found in se ctions 83A.02–.03. Paragraph 1 of section 83A.02 gives the
Commissioner authority to “determine the correct and most appropriate names” of lakes.
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Minn. Stat. § 83A.02(1). And that power covers not just lake names; specifically, the
Commiss io ne r is authorized to “determine the correct and most appropriate names of the
lakes, streams, places and other geographic features in the state.” Id. The meaning of the
word “determine ” is clear; it means to decide offic ia lly. See Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate
Dictionary 315 (10th ed. 1996) (“[T]o fix conclusively or authoritatively”); see also
Determination, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (“The act of de ciding something
offic ia l ly. ”). And as chapter 83A makes plain, the Legislature used the word “determine ”
to include both “giving” and “changing” names. Section 83A.04 refers to both a name
change and a name establis hme nt as “determining or fixing such name.” Minn. Stat.
§ 83A.04. So do the sections about the county board process , which inc lude both lake
naming and renaming. Minn. Stat. § 83A.05, subd. 1. Subdivisions 2 and 6 of section
83A.06 use the word “determine” to include both lake naming and renaming. So does
section 83A.07, subdivision 1, which refers to county boards “determining the name of a
body of water.”7
The dissent sees section 83A.02(1), the Commiss io ne r’ s power to determine, as a
“record-keeping function.” But paragraph 1 expressly gives the Commis s io ner the power
to decide, not just the “correct” name, but the “most appropriate name.” And the other uses
of the word “determine” in chapter 83A do not smack of mere record-keeping. See Minn.

7 Under section 83A.02(1), the Commissioner’s chosen name is a “[n]ame
designatio n[]” to which the rulemaking provisions of the Administrative Procedures Act
do not apply. In this context, the word “designatio n ” means “giving the . . . thing a
particular descriptio n” or “a name or title. ” Designation, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed.
2014).
14
Stat. §§ 83A.04, 83A.06, subds. 2, 6, 83A.07, subd. 1. Finally—and bearing in mind that
paragraph 1 covers not just bodies of water—if the dissent’s analys is were correct, once a
record name was identified, no place or geographic feature could ever be renamed, whether
the name was greater or less than 40 years old. That makes no sense.
Significantly, nowhere in the sections regarding the Commissioner process is ther e
a word, or even a hint, about any time limitation on the power to determine. To the
contrary: the 40-year limitation in section 83A.05, subdivision 1, is expressly confined to
sections 83A.05 to 83A.07, the county board process. This shows that the Legislature knew
very well how to limit public officials’ authority to change long-existing lake names. But
it did not so limit the Commiss io ner.8 Therefore, the Commissio ner had authority under
section 83A.02(1) to “determine the correct and most appropriate name[]” of the lake.
Because the Com missio ner had, and exercised, authority under paragraph 1 of
section 83A.02, we could avoid the question of whether the Commissio ner also had
authority under paragraph 3 of section 83A.02, which has the stated purpose of involving
county boards when “the end in view” is “ eliminating, as far as possible, duplication of

8 Not only is the Commissioner’s power broader than a county board’s as to what
may be named and renamed (and when), the Commissioner’s grounds for action are
broader than a c ounty board’s. A county board may consider only the “permanent, best
interests” of the county. Minn. Stat. § 83A.07, subd. 1. By contrast, the Commissio ner
has the power to “determine the . . . most appropriate name []” of a lake. Minn. Stat.
§ 83A.02(1). The Commissioner can consider the best interests of the entire state, which
holds title to our navigable waters and their beds, Minn. Stat. § 1.0451, subd. 1 (2018), “in
trust for the people of the state,” State v. Longyear Holding Co., 29 N.W.2d 657, 669
(Minn. 1947).
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names within the state.”9 We address the issue, however, because both Save Lake Calhoun
and the dissent contend that the phrase in section 83A.02(3)—“in cooperation with the
county board s and with their approval” —prohibits not just county boards, but also the
Commissio ner, from changing a name in existence for 40 years.
We are not persuaded by this contentio n. Again, section 83A.05, subdivision 1,
expressly restricts the 40 -year time limitation to the county board process. By contrast,
section 83A.02(3) requires county board “approval,” but it does not incorporate—expressly
or implied l y—the county board process in sections 83A.05–.07. 10 Nor does paragraph 3
state the form of approval required. 11 In the legal world, “approval” means “ [t]o give
formal sanction to; to confirm authoritatively.” Approval, Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed.
2004). Here, there is no question that the county board formall y approved the change in

9 In this case, the record reflects that another Lake Calhoun is located in Kandiyohi
County.

10 According to the Commissioner’s Order, the Department of Natural Resources has
a long standing policy to encourage counties that request a name change to comply with
the notice and hearing requirements in section 83A.06. In this case, as recognized in the
Order, such notice and hearing was requested by the department and the county board
complied with the request.

11 By contrast, section 83A.04, which requires Commissioner approval of any county
board order establishing or changing the name of body of water, requires the
Commissioner’s “written approval . . . endorsed on any resolution determining or fixing
such name,” with the endorsement “prior to recording with the county recorder.”

16
name from Lake Calhoun to Bde Maka Ska ; indeed , it specifica ll y requested and
recomme nded it. Thus, the Commissio ner made the change “with their approval.”12
Accordingly, the Commissioner had authority under either and both paragraphs 1
and 3 of section 83A.02 to change the lake name, and the 40- year time limitation in section
83A.05, subdivision 1, did not apply to that decision.
C.
The dissent agrees that th e plain language of chapter 83A controls, but reads the
chapter to apply the 40 -year limitation to the Commissioner. For the reasons already
explained, this reading is unreasonab le, so the statute is not ambiguo us. See Henderson,
907 N.W.2d at 625 (“A statute is ambiguo us if it is susceptible to more than one reasonable
interpreta t io n.”).
Despite acknowledging that a plain-language statutory reading makes the legislative
history irrelevant, the dissent devotes five pages to that history. In the intere st of
completeness, we have carefully examined that history. Not only does it fail to undermine
our plain-lang uage reading, rather, it firmly supports it.
The county board process , includ in g the 40 -year time limita t io n, was enacted in
1925. Act of Apr. 8, 1925, ch. 157, 1925 Minn. Laws 146–48. It eventually became part
of Minnesota Statutes chapter 378, which dealt with county board powers and duties
relating to bodies of water. Minn. Stat. ch. 378 (1941).

12 Save Lake Calhoun has not argued that the approval of the Kandiyohi County
Board—the county within which another Lake Calhoun is located —was required. In any
event, that lake name was not changed.
17
The Commiss io ner process was enacted in 1937 as part of the creation of the State
Geographic Board . Act of Mar. 8, 1937, ch. 63, 1937 Minn. Laws 108. It eventua ll y
became part of Minnesota Statutes chapter 354 , which dealt with the powers and duties of
the state board. The state board was given the duty and the power to “determine the correct
and most appropriate names of the lakes, streams, places and other geographic features. ”
Minn. Stat. § 354.02(1) (1941). And it was given the further duty and power, “[i]n
cooperation with the county boards and with their approval, to change the names of lakes,
streams, places, and other geographic features.” Minn. Stat. § 354.02(3) (1941).
Nowhere in chapter 354 did the Legislature place any time limit at io n on the state
board’s power over names. To the contrary, it granted to the state board the same broad
powers regarding the names of lakes and streams as to the names of places and geographic
features. At the same time, the Legislature further restricted the power of county boards
over names of bodies of water, as follo ws: “No county board shall order the change of or
establish the name of any lake, river, or other body of water without the written approval
of” the state board. Minn. Stat. § 354.04 (1941). That limitation on the county board
process continues to this day. See Minn. Stat. § 83A.04.
The question of whether the state board could change the name of a body of water
without regard to the 40-year li mitatio n found in chapter 378 —the county board
process—arose soon thereafter, in 1940. Op. Att’y Gen., No. 273a (Apr. 26, 1940). The
issue was whether Gnatt Lake (unfortunately -named almost half a century before) could
be given a more pleasant moniker. Id. at 1. The question was answered quickly and
defi ni tively by a letter opinio n of the Attorney General. Id. He opined that there was no
18
express or implied legal limitation on the power of the state board to rename , and that the
decision “is one which calls for the exercise of sound judgment and discretion by the
board.” Id. at 2. In the 80 years since, the Legislature has not taken issue with that
proposition.
The fina l relevant pieces of legislative history do not help the dissent ’s analysis ,
either. In the 1960s, chapter 354, containing the state board process, became chapter 83A.
In 1969, all of the state board’s powers were transferred to the Commiss io ne r. Minn. Stat.
§ 83A.015 (1969). Chapter 83A contained no 40-year limitation.
In 1990, the Legislature transplanted the county board process from chapter 378 int o
chapter 83A, by adding sections 83A.05 to 83A.07. Act of Apr. 6, 1990, ch. 391, art. 8,
§ 7, 1990 Minn. Laws 354, 693–95 (codified at Minn. Stat. § 83A.05–.07) . But, in so
doing, the Legislature made crystal clear —by use of the words “under the prov is io ns o f
sections 83A.05 to 83A.07” —that the 40 -year limita t io n was not transplanted into the
remainder of chapter 83A. Minn. Stat. § 83A.05, subd. 1. The dissent is exactly correct
that the 1990 amendment was not intended to change the law —and it did not. The law
since 1937 has been that the state board —now the Commis s io ner—has the power to name
and rename lakes, streams, places, and geographic figures, regardless of the age of their
names.
Finally, a few words are necessary in response to the dissen t’s fear that the
Commiss io ne r, an “une lect ed office ho lder in St. Paul,” will use “absolute power” to change
19
many beloved Minnesota lake names over the objections of local officials.13 If history is
any guide, that fear is misplaced. The power to name and rename lakes has been vested in
the State Geographic Board, and then the Commissioner, since 1937. Nothing in the record
suggests that a program of wholesale lake renaming over local objection is in the offing.
In any event, who should have the power to name lakes, and whether all 40-year-old
names of bodies of water , places, and geographic features , should be permanent, are
matters of policy for the Legislature. If the Legislature sees or foresees excessive
name-changing, it can legislate to curb it.14
In sum, when we interpret chapter 83A as a whole and read the plain language of its
sections, we conclude that the 40 -year limitation on a lake name-change applies only to
county boards, not to the Commiss io ne r. Applying our interpretatio n to the undisp u ted
facts of this case, we conclude that the Commissio ner had statutory authority to change the
name from Lake Calhoun to Bde Maka Ska.

13 Obviously, this scenario is not present in this case. Here, the Commissioner and the
county board agreed that the name should be changed from Lake Calhoun to Bde Maka
Ska.

14 The Legislature may legislate so long as it does not pass a local or special law i n
violat io n of Article XII, Section 1 of the Minnesota Constitutio n. Minn. Const. art. XII,
§ 1. For example, in 1995, the Legislature directed that the Commissioner, in cooperation
with county boards, rename all geographic features in Minnesota that contained the word
“squaw.” Act of Apr. 18, 1995, ch. 53, § 1, 1995 Minn. Laws 100.
20
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals in part and reverse in
part, and remand to the district court for entry of judgment in favor of appellants.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

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D I S S E N T
GILDEA, C.J. (dissenting).
The lakes in Minnesota are one of our greatest resources, and much of our State’s
identity is bound up in our justifiable and collective pride in our lakes. See, e.g., Petraborg
v. Zontelli, 15 N.W.2d 174, 182–83 (Minn. 1944) (“Our North Star state has been c alled
the Land of 10,000 Lakes. It has a remarkable natural endowment of lakes, rive r s ,
waterfalls, and woodlands . . . . These lakes constitute the outstanding natural attraction of
our state. An enlightened public opinion has been aroused to an apprec iatio n of the extent
and importance of this endowment.”). With respect to our lakes, t he majority’s decision
today wrests some measure of control over this resource from those with the greatest tie to
it—those who live on or near the lake —and gives over t hat control to an unelected
officeho lder in St. Paul —the Commissioner of the Department of Natural Resources
(“DNR”).1 As a result of today’s decisio n, the DNR has unbounded power to change the
name of every lake in Minnesota, at any time and for any (or no) reason. Under today’s
decision, if the DNR desires to change the names of Lake Vermilion, Lake Minneto nka,
Lake of the Woods, Gull Lake, etc., it can do so without any input from the communities
where these lakes are located.
This decisio n should upset and unsettle every Minnesotan and most especially those
who live in a community with a lake. Hopefully, the Legislature will correct the majority’s

1 Because this case is about an abuse of governmental power, I agree with the majority
that the writ of quo warranto is an available remedy.
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error. In the meantime and because the majority’s d ecision is incons ist e nt with legis la t i ve
intent and settled precedent, I dissent.2
This case is about chapter 83A. In this statute, the Legislature addresses lake-name
changes in two places. In section 83A.05, voters are given the power to initiate lake-name
changes. If 15 or more voters in a county with a lake desire to change that lake’s name,
they can petitio n the county board to make the change. Minn. Stat. § 83A.05, subd. 2(a)
(2018). The statute lays out a detailed process the county board is to follow, Minn. Stat.
§§ 83A.05–.07 (2018), and if at the end of that process, the county board approves of the
name change, the county must secure the “written approval” of the DNR before the change
becomes effective, Minn. Stat. § 83A.04 (2018). Importantly and dispositively for this
case, the county board’s power does not extend to lake names that have been in existence
for more than 40 years. Minn. Stat. § 83A.05, subd. 1.
The other place where lake -name changes are referenced in the statute is section
83A.02(3). In this provision, the DNR is authorize d, “in cooperation with the county
boards and with their approval,” to change the names of lakes to avoid name duplicatio n.
Minn. Stat. § 83A.02(3) (2018).
Neither of these provisions authorize the DNR to do what it did here.

2 The majority sophistically seeks to downplay the impact of its rule of law,
emphasizing that “[f]rom 1937 to 1990, the Legislature took no action to limit the State
Geographic Board’s power to change old lake names.” Of course, bef ore this decision,
there was no reason for the Legislature to step in. Until this decisio n, nobody —not the
Legislature, not the people of Minnesota, and not even the DNR Commissioner —k new
that the DNR had the power to change lake names without limitation. Taking a lesson fro m
history, we know that “absolute power corrupts absolutely.” Gertrude Himmelfarb, Lord
Action: A Study in Conscience and Politics 239 (1952).
D-3
I.
I begin with the lake -name-change provisio n in section 83A.05 and John Adams’
reflection that “[f]acts are stubborn things.” Frederic Kidder, History of the Boston
Massacre, March 5, 1770; consisting of the narrative of the town, the trial of the soldiers:
and a historical intr oduction, containing unpublished documents of John Adams, and
explanatory notes, 3 (Joel Munsell ed., 1870). The facts in this case compel the conclusio n
that the lake-name change was a change made under section 83A.05. Accordingly, I would
hold that the DNR’s action here—changing the name of a lake that is more than 40 years
old—is unlawful.
The petitione rs—people who live and work on and near the lake at issue —brought
this action arguing that the lake’s name could not be changed because the lake had been
named “Lake Calhoun” for more than 40 years. The petitioners relied on Minn. Stat.
§ 83A.05, subd. 1. This statute plainly and unamb iguo usly prohibits the changing of a
lake’s name when that name “has existed for 40 years.” Id. The court of appeal s agreed
with the petitioners. Save Lake Calhoun v. Strommen, 928 N.W.2d 377, 386 (Minn. App.
2019).
The majority comes out differently, holding that the 40- year limitation does not
apply because the name change here was not, as a factual matter, a name change under the
provisions of sections 83A.05–.07. Rather than a change under sections 83A.05 –.07, the
D-4
majority concludes that this was a name change under a different provision in the statute—
section 83A.02 (2018).3 I disagree.
The parties agree that Lake Calhoun has been the name of the lake for more than
40 years. And, as the majority acknowledges, the process to change the name of Lake
Calhoun to Bde Maka Ska did not begin with the DNR; it began in 2015 when the
Minneapo lis Park and Recreation Board began developing a master plan for the Chain of
Lakes Regional Park.
The park board wanted to change the name of the lake, and it asked its legal counsel
to research whether it had authority to do so. The park board’s counsel concluded that the
“park board lacked the authority to change the name of the lake” and highlighted that the
only process to change a lake name in Minnesota is the county board process under sections
83A.05–.07. Save Lake Calhoun, 928 N.W.2d at 380.
Because it had no authority, the park board placed its hope in the Hennepin County
Board. Following the process outlined in section 83A.05, the park board directed staff to
obtain and forward to the County Auditor a petition signed by at least 15 registered voters.
See Minn. Stat. § 83A.05, subd. 2(a) (“Fifteen or more legal voters residing in a county
where all or a part of a body of water is located may petition the county board of the county
where the petitioners reside or the body of water is located to change the name of . . . a . . .
lake . . . .”). Once it had the required signatures, the park board submitted the voter petitio n

3 The majority reaches this conclusion even though it concedes that the idea behind
the petition “seems to have been to initiate a name change under Minnesota Statutes
§§ 83A.05–.07.”
D-5
to the county board to change the name of Lake Calhoun. In addition to this petition, the
county board received two other voter petitions, each signed by more than 15 voters who
represented that they lived in Hennepin County.
The county board also sought an opinion from its legal counsel, the county
attorney’s office, to research whether it had authority to change Lake Calhoun’s name. The
county attorney concluded that the board had “no role in renaming a water body that has
existed for more than 40 years,” citing Minn. Stat. § 83A.05, subd. 1. Save Lake Calhoun,
928 N.W.2d at 381.
In legal terms, and fo r our purposes here, this should have been the end of the
attempted name change: a petitio n, brought under sections 83A.05, sought to change the
name of Lake Calhoun—a name that had existed for more than 40 years. Under section
83A.05, the Legislature ha s prohibited such a name change, so that should have been the
end of the story.4
But, as the majority cryptically confirms, “the county board took another tack.” Put
differently, the county board sought an end run around the legal framework. Although t he
county attorney had concluded that the county board could not change the name of a lak e

4 The Hennepin County Board Commissioner who offered and moved to vote on the
name change also confirms that this was a name change pursued under section 83A.05
when he explained that the Hennepin County Board was “responding to a petitio n fro m
residents that went through the park board, which is where the lake is located right now. ”
Bd. of Comm’rs – Nov 28th, 2017, Hennepin Cty., Minn., (http://hennepinmn.granicus.co m/
MediaPlayer.php?view_id=10&clip_id=3202&meta_id=92848) (documenting the comme nt s
of the Hennepin County Board Commissioner at 26:55). By referring to the residents’
petitio n, the commiss io ne r confir ms that this was a name-change pursued under section
83A.05, subdivis io n 2.
D-6
that had existed for 40 years, the county attorney reached out to the DNR Commissioner’s
office. A DNR staff member suggested that the DNR would take the position t o i nterpret
section 83A.02 so as to give the DNR unrestricted power to change the name of Lake
Calhoun. But evidently, even in the eyes of the county attorney, this was risky, so he
sought reassurance.
The county attorney sent a direct inquiry to the Comm issioner, Tom Landwehr,
asking him to confirm that the DNR would interpret Minn. Stat. § 83A.02 as giving the
Commiss io ne r unrestricted power to change Lake Calhoun’s name. In his letter, the county
attorney qualified his request, stating that “[s]tate la w does not outline a clear process for
renaming water bodies with names that have existed for more than 40 years.” He then
explained that he wanted the Commissioner to confirm that the DNR did not “[take] the
position that there was no legal authority und er Minnesota law to rename the lake” and
“that [DNR] would consider a name change request for Lake Calhoun from the Hennepin
County Board of Commissioners if it were to approve a name change after following the
process outlined in Minn. Stat. §§ 83A.05–.07.” (Emphasis added.)
Although there is no official response in the public record, the Commissioner must
have eventually confirmed he would so act because the county board moved forward with
Resolut io n No. 17-0489.5 In this resolutio n, the county board “r ecommend[ed]” that the

5 Also, on the day that the county board passed its resolution, one of the Hennepin
County Commissio ners expressed that the DNR “gave a very expansive interpretatio n o f
the statute, and really said, forget that language about 40 years.” Bd. of Comm ’s – Nov
28th, 2017, Hennepin Cty., Minn. , (http://hennepinmn.granicus.com/MediaPla yer.
php?view_id=10&clip_id=3202&meta_id=92848) (documenting the comments of the
Hennepin County Board Chair at 33:57).
D-7
DNR change the name of Lake Calhoun to Bde Maka Ska. But the statute prohibits this
name change because the petition was initiated under the name -change process set out in
section 83A.05. Put differently, this was not a name change initiated under the DNR’s
authority in section 83A.02. The facts make it clear that this name change was not the
DNR exercising power under section 83A.02; this was local officials trying to change the
name of a lake that they knew they had no power to c hange.
These facts, stubborn though they may be, lead inescapably to the conclusio n that
the name change of the lake cannot stand because it violates the statute. See Minn. Stat.
§ 83A.05, subd. 1 (“A name of a lake . . . may be given or changed under s ections 83A.05
to 83A.07 except that a name which has existed for 40 years may not be changed under the
provisions of sections 83A.05 to 83A.07.”). I would resolve the case on that basis and
affir m.6

6 If the case cannot be resolved on this basis, then, at a minimum, the question as to
whether this name-change took place under sections 83A.05–.07, as I conclude, or under
section 83A.02, as the majority concludes, is one of fact that needs to be remanded to the
district court. As we recently reaffirmed , “ [t]here is no justification for dismissing a
complaint for insuff ic ie nc y . . . unless it appears to a certainty that the plainti ff would be
entitled to no relief under any state of facts which could be proved in support of the claim. ”
Walsh v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 851 N.W.2d 598, 601–02 (Minn. 2014) (citation omitted)
(interna l quotatio n marks omitted). The petition for quo warranto alleges that the Hennepin
County Board received the petition that section 83A.05 contemplates and the Hennepin
County Board’s Resolution establishes that the board received a petition from “registe red
voters in Hennepin County. ” These facts are more than sufficient to withstand our “broad-
brush” pleading standard. Walsh, 851 N.W.2d at 605. And to the extent that the majorit y
contends that these facts leave room for some other inference as to how this lake -name
change was initiated, we have no power, under our recent precedent, to resolve such
inferences as a matter of law. See, e.g., Montemayor v. Sebright Prods ., Inc., 898 N.W.2d
623, 628 (Minn. 2017) (noting that summary judgment is “inappropriate when reasonable
persons might draw different conclusion s from the evidence ” (citatio n omitted) (inte r na l
quotation marks omitted)).
D-8
II.
The majority largely leaves out the facts and pr oceeds from the premise that the
name change was done lawfully under section 83A.02. Even if we could ignore the facts
and make the leap that section 83A.02 is relevant, the majority reaches the wrong
conclusio n under that statute.
In section 83A.02, the Legislature sets out “powers and duties” of the DNR:
The commissioner of natural resources shall:

(1) determine the correct and most appropriate names of the lakes, streams,
places and other geographic features in the state, and the spelling thereof
by written order published in the State Register. Name designations are
exempt from the rulemaking provisions of chapter 14 and section 14.386
does not apply;

(2) pass upon and give names to lakes, streams, places, and other geographic
features in the state for which no single, generally accepted name has
been in use;

(3) in cooperation with the county boards and with their approval, change the
names of lakes, streams, places, and other geographic features, with the
end in view of eliminating, as far as possible, duplication of names within
the state;

(4) prepare and publish an official state dictionary of geographic names and
publish the same, either as a completed whole or in parts, when ready;

(5) serve as the state representative of the United State s Geographic Board
and cooperate with that board to the end that there shall be no conflic t
between the state and federal designations of geographic features in the
state.

Minn. Stat. § 83A.02.
We must interpret the statute so that none of the powers or duties in the statute
renders any other power “superfluous, void, or insignificant.” Amaral v. Saint Cloud
D-9
Hosp., 598 N.W.2d 379, 384 (Minn. 1999). In other words, our job is to give effect to all
of the provisions in section 83A.02, and that means that the paragraphs in section 83A.02
have to address different things. Bearing our judicial obligatio n in mind, the statute is
easily understood.
Paragraph 1 sets out the DNR’s obligation to write down the names of the lakes in
Minnesota and choose the name in the event that there are competing names for the same
lake. Paragraph 2 sets out the DNR’s power to name lakes that are yet unnamed. And
paragraph 3 sets out the DNR’s power to change the names of lakes. 7
The majority ignores our obligatio n to give effect to all provisions in chapter 83A.
Ignoring that judicial duty, the DNR argues (and the majority concludes) that the DNR has
sweeping authority to change lake names under both paragraphs 1 and 3 of section 83A.02.
I disagree.
A.
Paragraph 1 does not apply at all. Paragraph 1 gives the DNR the task of figuring
out the generally accepted name of each lake in the state and recording that name. The
DNR must figure out the names of the lakes in Minnesota. In doing so, the DNR must
resolve inconsistencies when different names are used for the same lake or when the lake
name is spelled in different ways. After resolving those differences, the DNR must pub lis h
the names in the State Register.

7 Paragraphs 4 and 5 are additional ministerial duties. See Minn. Stat. § 83A.02(4)–
(5). But because these paragraphs are not relevant to the analysis here, I do not discuss
them further.
D-10
The last sentence in paragraph 1 confirms that this task is a record-keeping funct io n.
Paragraph 1 concludes with “[n]ame designations are exempt from the rulemak ing
provisions of chapter 14 and section 14.386 does not apply.” The word “designation” is
being used as a synonym for the word “determine” so the defi nition of “designate” should
shed light on the meaning of “determine” in paragraph 1. The word “designate” means
“[t]o call by a distinctive title, term, or expression.” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate
Dictionary 312 (10th ed. 2001). More specifically, Bla ck’s Law Dictionary defines
“designate” as the act of “represent[ing] or refer[ring] to (something) using a particular . . .
name . . . .” Designate, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). These definitions further
support the conclusio n that “determine”—as used in paragraph 1 —is not a broad grant of
name-changing power, but rather is the simple duty of identifying the names of
Minnesota’s lakes.
Exempting the duty in paragraph 1 from chapter 14 and section 14.386 reinforces
that the Legislature intended this paragraph to be limited to the task of figuring out the
names of Minnesota’s lakes. This duty may include researching files in various counties
or settling disputes about the spelling of the lake name—but it does not encompass simply
re-naming lakes whenever the DNR feels like it. Indeed, giving an administrative agency
the broad and unbrid led authority that the majority vests in the DNR, through its
interpretation of paragraph 1, is fundamentally at odds with our representative democracy.
See, e.g., City of Arlington v. F.C.C., 569 U.S. 290, 315 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)
(“[T]he danger posed by the growing power of the administ ra t ive state cannot be
dismis sed. ”); Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 499
D-11
(2010) (noting that the administrative state “now wields vast power and touches almost
every aspect of daily life,” which only “heightens the concern that [such power] may
slip . . . . from . . . the people.”). Plainly, such is not what the Legislature in tended.
But, the majority contends, paragraph 1 gives the DNR the authority to “determin e ”
lake names. The majority discusses the definition of “determine,” and it concludes that its
meaning must include “giving” and “changing” lake names. To support t hat conclus io n,
the majority cites the use of “determine” in other sections of chapter 83A. And,
“[u]ndo ubted ly, there is a natural presumptio n that identical words used in different parts
of the same act are intended to have the same meaning,” but this “ presumption is not rigid
and readily yields whenever there is such variatio n in the connectio n in which the word s
are used as reasonably to warrant the conclusion that they were employed in different parts
of the act with different intent.” Atl. Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States , 286 U.S.
427, 433 (1932).
Here, it is strikingly clear that the meaning of the word “determine” in paragraph 1
cannot include “give” or “change. ” This is true because the DNR’s authority to “give” lak e
names is set out in paragraph 2 and the DNR’s authority relative to changing the names of
lakes is set out in paragraph 3. 8

8 If there were any ambiguit y about the meaning of the word “determine, ” the
legislative history would support my interpretation. In 2004, the Legislatur e amended
section 83A.02(1) to exempt the Commiss io ne r’ s designat io ns from the Adminis tr a t i ve
Procedures Act: “determine the correct and most appropriate names of the lakes . . . and
the spelling thereof by written order published in the State Register. Name designations
are exempt from the rulemaking provisions of chapter 14 and section 14.386 does not
apply.” Act of May 19, 2004, ch. 221, § 1, 2004 Minn. Laws. 611, 611 (codified as Minn.
D-12
Paragraph 3 expressly grants the DNR the power to “change.” If “determine” in
paragraph 1 also means “change,” then paragraph 3 is rendered superfluous. See Amaral,
598 N.W.2d at 384. The majority makes no attempt to explain how its interpretation of
paragraph 1 gives effect to the other paragraphs in the statute.
Moreover, if the majority is right that the meaning of “determine” includ es
“change,” then we should be able to substitute the word “change” for the word “determine ”
in paragraph 1. But when we do so, the result is absurd: The commissioner of natural
resources shall: (1) change the correct and most appropriate names of the lakes. 9 Simply

Stat § 83A.02(1)) (emphasis added). The legislative materials th at accompanied this bill
through committee meetings help to clarify the meaning of the word “determine ” in
paragraph 1. The materials included a “Fact Sheet” (created by the DNR) to explain what
an “exemption from rulemaking” meant. It read: “This bill would exempt the
commissioner of natural resources from the rulemaking provisions of Chapter 14 for
making determinations in the follo wing areas: designations, natural resource activities,
fees, and grants.” Dep’t of Nat. Res., Exemption From Rulemaking, H.F. 2433, 83rd Legis.
Sess. (2004) (emphasis added). Also, the authors of the bill submitted a “bill summary”
that specifically explained what exempting paragraph 1 meant: “DNR name designations
of lakes, streams, places and other geographic features of the state are exempt from
rulemaking, and must be done by written order in the State Register.” Staff of Comm. on
Env’t & Nat. Res. Policy, DNR Rule Exemption For Activities, H.F. 2433, 83rd Legis. Sess.
(2004) (emphasis added). In short, these materials show that both the DNR and the autho rs
of the amendment viewed the word “determine ” to mean “designate.” And, as explained
above, there is no dou bt that the meaning of the word “designate ” does not includ e
“change. ”

9 The majorit y also points to the use of the word “determine” in sections 83A.04, .06,
.07. Whether the word “change” can reasonably replace the word “determine” in those
sections varies. Compare Minn. Stat. §§ 83A.04, .06, with Minn. Stat. § 83A.07. That
there are different outcomes further supports the conclusion that the Legislature used
“determine” with a different intent in each section. See Atl . Cleaners & Dryers, Inc.,
286 U.S. at 433. Thus, the use of the word “determine” in other sections should no t
influence the conclusion about the meaning of “determine” here.
D-13
put, this reading makes no sense. For those reasons, the majority is wrong to conclude that
the meaning of “determine” in paragraph 1 includes “change.”
The majority’s reading also effectively nullifies the Legislature’s decision in section
83A.05 to give voters the power to initiate name changes and counties the power to change
lake names. If the majority’s interpretation is correct, there is no reason to go through the
detailed, step-by-step process set out in the statute or seek input from local re sidents that
sections 83A.05–.07 require. The majority’s grant of total discretion to the DNR makes
this process, and consequently, the desires of the local residents, completely irrelevant. 10
Reading sections 83A.05–.07 out of the statute is not within the judicial power.
Based on this analysis, it is clear that paragraph 1 does not give the DNR the
authority to change the name of this lake or any other lake in Minneso ta.
B.
Paragraph 3 does not give the DNR authority to do what it did here either. Thi s
paragraph reads: “in cooperation with the county boards and with their approval, [the DNR
shall] change the names of lakes . . . with the end in view of eliminating, as far as possible,
duplication of names within the state.” Minn. Stat. § 83A.02(3).

10 The majority quotes from the DNR Order that the DNR thought that the name
change “would ‘serve the public interest.’ ” Neither the DNR nor the majority explain ho w
that is the case. Moreover, because it is our duty to construe the evidence in the light mo s t
favorable to the petitioner, Walsh, 851 N.W.2d at 606, and because the petition cit e s
“significant oppositio n to the name change,” the DNR’s unsubstantiated conclusio n sho uld
bear no weight.
D-14
1.
From the plain language, the DNR can only change the name of a lake “in
cooperation with the county boards and with their approval” and “with the end in view o f
eliminating, as far as possible, duplication of names within the state.” Id. The plain
language limits the DNR’s power to change lake names only when the DNR desires to
eliminate duplicate names. Id.
There is a passing reference in the DNR Order to the fact that there is at least one
other lake in Minnesota named “Lake Calhoun.” Giving the D NR the benefit of the doub t
as to its motive and ignoring the factual record as to what really happened here, paragraph 3
could be relevant. But the DNR’s authority under this paragraph is limited only to those
name changes that can be done “with the[] ap proval” of the relevant county board. Id.
The majority defines “approval” to mean “[t]o give formal sanction to; to confirm
authoritatively. ” Approval, Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004). Without analysis, the
majority then concludes: “Here, there is no question that the county board formall y
approved the change in name from Lake Calhoun to Bde Maka Ska; indeed, it specifica lly
requested and recommended it.”
The majorit y’ s conclus io n is flawed. It is a legal imposs ib il it y for this county board
to formally or authoritatively approve of this name change; it cannot approve of the name
change because the Legislature has explicitly withheld from the county board the legal
authority to approve of a change to a lake name that has existed for 40 or more years.
Minn. Stat. § 83A.05.
D-15
Moreover, the Legislature outlined only one process for county boards to change
lake names—the process in sections 83A.05–.07. The fact that the Leg is la t ur e did no t
outline any other process further confirms that the only way for the county board to give
its approval is set out in those sections. To find some other process for how the county
board can approve a name change, as the DNR desires, is mer e conjecture. And to find
that “approval” does not mean the process outlined in sections 83A.05–.07 effectively
gives the DNR the power to define what “approval” does mean. Our precedent confirms
that we cannot give the DNR such lawmaking power because l awmak ing is not in the
purview of an administrative agency. Hassler v. Engberg, 48 N.W.2d 343, 359–60 (Minn.
1951) (“Administrative officers may be clothed with power to exercise a discretion under
a law, but not a discretion as to what the law shall be.” ).
Based on this plain-language interpretation of paragraph 3, the DNR had no power
to change the name of Lake Calhoun.
2.
But the DNR argues that paragraph 3 can be interpreted as not incorporating the
process outlined in sections 83A.05–.07. Even if t here is an alternate reading that is
reasonable and so paragraph 3 is ambiguous, the relevant canons of construction confirm
that my interpretation is the interpretation that is most consistent with the legislative intent.
See Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2018) (outlining the factors to be considered “[w]hen the words
of a law are not explicit,” including legislative history, former laws on the same subject,
and the consequences of the interpretation).
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The legislative history, including the predecessor statutes t o chapter 83A, confirms
that the Legislature did not intend for the DNR to have authority to change lake names
when those names are more than 40 years old.
After the Civil War, there was a surge in exploration and settlement in the western
territor ies. U.S. Bd. on Geographic Names, Princip les, Policie s, and Procedures: Dome s t ic
Geographic Names 1 (2016) (“U.S. Bd. Principles”). As a result, “[i]nconsistencies and
contradictions among many names, spellings, and applications became a serious problem
to sur veyors, map makers, and scientists.” U.S. Bd. on Geographic Names , U.S.
Geological Survey, https://www. usgs. go v/core -science-systems/ngp/board- on-
geographic-names (last visited on Apr. 16, 2020). To standardize geographic names,
President Benjamin Harris on, in 1890 and by executive order, created the United States
Board on Geographic Names to adjudicate unsettled conflicts about the names of
geographic features, including lake names. See U.S. Bd. Principles 1. In 1906, President
Theodore Roosevelt, agai n by executive order, granted the U.S. Geographic Board
authority to standardize (a) new names given to lakes and (b) any changes to lake names.
See id. Prior to 1925, Minnesota did not have a process for resolving these disputes on its
own, so the federal government was in charge of resolving disputes and standardizing (no t
regulating) proposed names and name changes to Minnesota geographic features. See id;
see also Act of Apr. 8, 1925, ch. 157, 1925 Minn. Laws 146.
But, in 1925, the Minnesota Legislat ure enacted the first statute “providing for a
method for changing the name of, or givin g a name to, any lake . . . wholly within the
boundaries of this state.” Act of Apr. 8, 1925, ch. 157, 1925 Minn. Laws 146. And the
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Legislature gave the power to give a name or change a name of a lake to local voters of the
county that contained the lake through a petition process:
That whenever it is desired to change the name of, or give a name to any
unnamed lake, river, stream or body of water located within the boundaries
of this state, any 15 or more legal voters, residing within the county where
all or any part of such body of water is located, may petition the County
Board of the County wherein said petitioners reside, to change the name of,
or to give a name to any previously unnamed lake, river, stream or other body
of water, however designated.

Act of Apr. 8, 1925, ch. 157, § 1, 1925 Minn. Laws 146 (codified as amended at Minn.
Stat. § 83A.05, subd. 2(a)). This method did not provide for a way to change a la ke name
that had existed for 40 or more years: “no name of any lake, river, stream or other body of
water, which name has existed for forty (40) years shall be changed under the provisio ns
of this act.” Act of Apr. 8, 1925, ch. 157, § 1, 1925 Minn. Laws 146 (codified as amended
at Minn. Stat. § 83A.05, subd. 1). And it commanded that names should not duplicate other
names:
That in choosing and fixing the name of any . . . lake . . . the County Board
or Boards shall, as far as possible not duplicate name s of existing lakes . . . .
[T]he State Commissioner of Drainage and Waters . . . shall compare the
names suggested in said petition with the names of other lakes, rivers,
streams and bodies of water within the state . . . .

Act of Apr. 8, 1925, ch. 157, § 5, 1925 Minn. Laws 146, 147–48 (codified as amended at
Minn. Stat. § 83A.07).
In 1937, the Minnesota Legislature created the State Geographic Board and
amended the 1925 law. The law creating the State Geographic Board contains the same
language as sections 83A.015 to 83A.04 except for a few minor differences. Compare Act
of Mar. 8, 1937, ch. 63, §§ 1–4, 1937 Minn. Laws 108, with Minn. Stat. §§ 83A.015,
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83A.02-.04. And the powers and duties granted to the State Geographic Board are almost
identica l with the powers and duties given to the DNR in section 83A.02. Compare Act of
Mar. 8, 1937, ch. 63, § 2, 1937 Minn. Laws 108 (codified as Minn. Stat. § 354.02 (1941)),
with Minn. Stat. § 83A.02.
The 1937 legislation also amended the 1925 petition process, m aking the State
Geographic Board subject to the petition process. Act of Feb. 24, 1937, ch. 35, 1937 Minn.
Laws 68, 68–69 (codified as Minn. Stat. § 378.01 (1941)). It amended section 1 to read:
That whenever it is desired to change the name of, or give a name to any
unnamed lake . . . the State Geographic Board or any 15 or more legal voters,
residing within the county where all or any part of such body of water is
located, may petitio n the County Board of the County . . . .

Id. (alterat io n in origina l). The amendments therefore added the State Geographic Board
as a petitioner. The 40 -year limitation slightly changed as well: “No name of any lake,
river, stream, or other body of water, which name has existed for 40 years, shall be changed
under the provisio n of sections 378.01 to 378.06.” Minn. Stat. § 378.01 (1941) (emphasis
added).
Including the State Geographic Board as a party that could petition to change a lake
name strongly suggests that the State Geographic Board was not created with stand -alone
authority to change the names of lakes (other than in the situation where multiple lakes had
the same name). If the Legislature intended to endow the State Geographic Board with
broad authority to name and change the names of lakes in section 354.02 ( now,
section 83A.02), it would make no sense to subject the State Geographic Board to the
petition process.
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In 1969, the Legislature transferred the powers and duties vested in the State
Geographic Board to the DNR Commissioner. Act of June 9, 1969, ch. 1129, art. 3, § 3,
1969 Minn. Laws 2312, 2339 (codified as Minn. Stat. § 83A.015 (2018)). At that time, the
statute read: “When it is desired to change the name of, or give a name to, any unna med
lake, river, stream, or body of water located within the boundaries of this state, the
commissioner of natural resources , or any 15 or more legal voters . . . .” Mi nn. Stat.
§ 378.01 (1971) (emphasis added). Again, the petition process explicitly includes the
Commiss io ne r.
The final amendments occurred in 1990. The 1990 amendments governed the
“recodifying, clarifying, and relocating provisions relating to water l aw,” totaling
400 pages. Act of Apr. 6, 1990, ch. 391, art. 1, 1990 Minn. Laws 354. Relevant here, the
1990 amendments relocated Minn. Stat. §§ 378.01–.06 (1971) (the statutory scheme
governing changing and naming water bodies) to chapter 83A, creating § § 83A.05–.07.
Act of Apr. 6, 1990, ch. 391, art. 8, §§ 7–9, 1990 Minn. Laws 354, 693–95. This relocatio n
put chapter 83A in its current form.
There is one relevant change that occurred in the 1990 amendme nts.
Section 83A.05, subdivision 2, removed “the commissioner of natural resources” as a
person who can petition the county boards to change or give a name to a water body. Act
of Apr. 6, 1990, ch. 391, art. 8, § 7, 1990 Minn. Laws 354, 693 (codified as Minn. Stat.
§ 83A.05, subd. 2)). It now reads:
Subd. 2. Petition for name. (a) Fifteen or more legal voters residing in a
county where all or a part of a body of water is located may petition the
county board of the county where the petitioners reside or the body of water
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is located to change the name of or give a name to a previously unna med
lake, river, stream, or other body of water located within the state.

Minn. Stat. § 83A.05, subd. 2. There is no discussion about why the Legislature removed
“[t]he commissioner of natural resources” as a petitioner.
But importantly, the 1990 bill concluded with article 10, which stated:
The legislature intends this act to be a clarification and reorganization of
provisions of laws affecting water. The changes that have been made are not
intended to alter the laws affecting water and shall not be construed by a court
or other authority, to alter the meaning of the law. It is intended that
decisions construing laws that are recodified by articles 1 to 10 are not
affected by the recodification.

Act of Apr. 6, 1990, ch. 391, art. 10, § 1, 1990 Minn. Laws 354, 750. Consistent with this
direction, the Legislature’s decision to remove the Commissioner from the petition process
cannot be read as giving the DNR substantive authority he did not previously have. Just
as before the 1990 amendments, so too after them: the DNR is effectively bound by the
petition process under section 83A.02, paragraph 3, because the DNR has to act “in
cooperation with the county boards and with their approval.” And county boards cannot
approve a name change without going through the petitio n process.
In sum, the legislative history and former laws on the subject confirm that the better
interpretation of the phrase, “in cooperation with the county boards and with their
approval,” in par agraph 3 means the county board petition process in sections 83A.05–
.07.11

11 The majority relies on a 1940 attorney general opinion to conclude otherwise. But
such reliance is misplaced. See Star Tribune Co. v. Univ. of Minn. Bd. of Regents ,
683 N.W.2d 274, 289 (Minn. 2004) (noting that “[o]pinions of the Attorney General are
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The consequences of each interpretation confirm this as well. Under the DNR’s
interpretation, it can effectively change the name of any lake in Minnesota at any time with
essentially no role for those most impacted by the change—the people who live on or near
the lake. The majority concedes that its interpretation elevates the DNR’s naming decision
above “the permanent, best interests of the affected county.” The Legislature made i ts
intent clear, however, that those most directly impacted by the name change should be the
ones with the power to initiate the change.12 See Minn. Stat. §§ 83A.05–.07.
My interpretatio n is consistent with this intent and preserves the right of lo cal
residents and communities to play a meaningful role in lake -name changes. My
interpretatio n also gives effect to the stability the Legislature sought through the 40 year

not binding on the courts” and that “the concluso ry approach of this letter opinio n renders
it less than persuasive”).

12 The majorit y states, “The Commis s io ner can consider the best interests of the entire
state.” (Emphasis added.) Of course, under the majority’s interpretation that allows the
DNR to change lake names on a whim, the DNR can consider whatever it wants. But
nothing requires the DNR to consider the b est interest of the entire state. And the statute
the majority cites has nothing to do with acting in the best interest of the state, it merely
provides: “Pursuant to applicable federal and state law under which Minnesota was
admitted to the union on equ al footing with the origina l 13 states, navigable waters and
their beds located within the exterior boundaries of the state are owned by the state.” Minn.
Stat. § 1.0451, subd. 1 (2018). Nowhere in that statute is the DNR required to act in “the
best interests of the entire state.” Rather, the majority, in this opinion, rubber stamps a rule
of law that permits the DNR to change the name of a lake for any reason whether in the
best interest of the state or not. To be clear, as stated above, the Legislature decided to give
the power to change the name of a lake to the people when it provided that “[f]ifteen or
more legal voters residing in a county where all or a part of a body of water is located may
petitio n the county board of the county where the petitioners reside or the body of water is
located to change the name of or give a name to a previously unnamed lake, river, stream,
or other body of water located within the state.” Minn. Stat. § 83A.05, subd. 2(a). It is
people in the county with the body o f water who can petitio n; thus the Legislature did
explicitly state that people who live near the lake should have a greater say in its name.
D-22
time limit expressed in section 83A.05. Minn. Stat. § 83A.05, subd. 1. It makes sense that
the Legislature intended that lakes that have held the same name for more than 40 years
would continue to be so named. Changing the names of all of our 10,000- plus lakes every
time the polit ica l winds blow a certain directio n undermines stabilit y th at residents and
communities need. See generally U.S. Board Princip le s, supra at 11 (2016) (explaining
that the names of geographic features, like lakes, serve an important function that “requires
a high degree of stability”). And if in fact the name of a lake is as pernicious as the name
at issue here is argued to be, the Legislature can provide a remedy, as the majority notes it
has with other lake names. See Minn. Const. art. XII, § 1.
For all of these reasons, the most reasonable interpretation of the approval provisio n
in paragraph 3 is that it incorporates the approval process set out in sections 83A.05–.07.
Following this analysis, I would affirm the court of appeals.
III.
The majority declares: “the body of water that was Lake Calhoun is now Bde Maka
Ska.” This court has no more authority to change the name of the lake than the DNR.
Because the majority’s opinion is contrary to legislative intent and settled precedent, I
dissent.

ANDERSON, Justice (dissenting).
I join in the dissent of Chief Justice Gildea.