A18-1065

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1058
A18-1065

In Re the Marriage of:

Donald M. Charlson, petitioner,
Respondent (A18-1058), Appellant (A18-1065),

vs.

Angela K. Charlson,
Appellant (A18-1058), Respondent (A18-1065).

Filed April 29, 2019
Affirmed
Rodenberg, Judge

Olmsted County District Court
File No. 55-FA-13-1830

Amber Lawrence, Dittrich & Lawren ce, P.A., Rochester, Minnesota (for respondent-
husband)

Shelly D. Rohr, Wolf, Rohr, Gemberling & Allen, P.A., St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant-
wife)

Considered and decided by Halbrooks, Presiding Judge; Rodenber g, Judge; and
Smith, John, Judge.


 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by app ointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
RODENBERG, Judge
Wife Angela Charlson appeals from a supplemental judgment and decree of
dissolution, arguing that the district court erred in dividing the parties’ property and abused
its discretion by denying her requests for financial-receiver f ees and conduct-based
attorney fees. Husband Donald Charlson argues in his cross-app eal that the district court
abused its discretion in the property division. We affirm.
FACTS
Husband and wife were married in South Dakota in 1993. The day before their
marriage, they signed a premarital agreement (PMA). 1 Attached to the PMA were
documents describing both parties’ separate assets. Wife was t hen working in the
restaurant-franchise industry and owned, among other businesses and assets, three South
Dakota Taco John’s franchises. Wife listed those businesses and other assets in the PMA.
Husband had been working as a financial advisor at Edward Jones and identified “0 assets”
in the PMA. The PMA included provisions relating to the parties’ nonmarital property and
how it would be treated in relation to their marital estate. It specifically provided that each
party’s separate property would remain the nonmarital property of that party in the event
that the parties comingled marital and nonmarital funds. The P MA did not specify how

1 M i n n e s o t a l a w r e f e r s t o s u c h a greements as antenuptial agreeme nts. See Minn. Stat.
§ 519.11 (2018). Here, we refer to the agreement as a premarit al agreement, consistent
with South Dakota law.

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property was to be divided upon dissolution. It provided that South Dakota law would
govern its interpretation.
The parties lived in Rochester, Minnesota, during most of their marriage. Husband
continued to work as a financial advisor at Edward Jones and wa s promoted to partner.
Wife continued to work in the franchise industry. During the marriage, the parties invested
i n o t h e r b u s i n e s s e s , i n c l u d i n g Massage Envy locations in Sioux Falls, South Dakota
(SFME), and in Rogers, Minnesota (ME Rogers). SFME was incorporated in South Dakota
in 2011. The parties owned and op erated SFME together. Husband’s daughter managed
SFME. ME Rogers was incorporated in Minnesota in 2012 and was operated similarly to
SFME. Both locations employed massage therapists and administr ative staff to run the
day-to-day operations of the franchises.
In March 2012, husband petitioned to dissolve the marriage in a n action in
Minnesota district court. Wife claimed that several assets wer e her nonmarital property,
including SFME, ME Rogers, and various bank accounts. Wife sought to enforce the 1993
PMA, asserting that both parties were South Dakota residents wh en the agreement was
created and that the agreement expressly provided that it was t o be interpreted according
to South Dakota law. Husband argued that the PMA no longer con trolled disposition of
the parties’ assets because both had been residing in Rochester for over fifteen years.
The Minnesota district court bifurcated the case and granted the parties a dissolution
of marriage in February 2015. It suspended the Minnesota proceedings so that the validity
and enforceability of the PMA could be determined in separate court proceedings in South

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Dakota. The parties stipulated to a valuation date, and the district court ordered that “[t]he
valuation date for the parties’ assets shall be December 31, 2013.”
In August 2014, the South Dakota circuit court (circuit court) determined that the
PMA was valid and enforceable and concluded that a tracing method be used to determine
the parties’ marital and nonmarital property. In 2015, that ca se proceeded to trial before
the circuit court to determine which of the parties’ assets wer e nonmarital property and
which were marital property. The circuit court undertook only to adjudicate which
property was marital and which property was nonmarital and made no attempt to divide
property.
In the South Dakota proceedings, wife argued that, regardless of any comingling of
her separate assets with the parties’ marital assets, the PMA m andated that her separate
property remain separate. Husband argued that once funds were placed into marital
accounts, the once-separate funds became marital property, and purchases made with those
funds were marital property. Both parties presented extensive testimony and documentary
evidence from financial experts concerning the value of their b usiness interests and the
tracing of wife’s separate property. Financial experts purported to apply the provisions of
the PMA to opine whether particu lar assets were marital or nonm arital. The experts
calculated the nonmarital and marital interests in various asse ts using a percentage and a
dollar value of the assets. Concerning SFME and ME Rogers, the parties agreed before
the circuit court to use the valuation date to which they had a greed in the Minnesota
proceedings. The circuit court did not separately value those assets.

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The circuit court adopted wife’s expert’s methodology and concl uded that the
parties’ 25% interest in ME Rogers was a combination of wife’s separate property and
marital property.2 Based on the December 2013 stipulated valuation date, the parties’ 25%
interest was valued at $40,000. The circuit court adopted the “methodology and tracing
analysis” of wife’s expert concerning those interests in ME Rogers, and concluded wife’s
nonmarital interest had a value of $7,670 as of December 2013 ( 19.2% of $40,000). The
remaining marital property interest in ME Rogers was therefore valued at $32,330 as of
December 2013 (80.8% of $40,000).
The same four shareholders who owned ME Rogers also owned SFME. The parties
owned a 75% interest in SFME, and husband was designated as the franchise owner so that
he could receive a $6,000 veteran’s discount on the franchise fee. Husband’s three friends
each held an 8.33% interest. The circuit court applied the par ties’ stipulated valuation of
their 75% interest in SFME of $1,220,000. Through the use of the expert tracing testimony
and the use of a marital-loan concept, the circuit court determ ined that the parties used a
portion of wife’s separate property to acquire SFME by way of wife’s separate funds that
were placed into a joint account close in time to the acquisiti on of SFME. Based on her
contributions, the circuit court determined that wife owns an 83.9% nonmarital interest in
the parties’ 75% share of SFME. Applying that percentage interest to the stipulated value,
wife’s nonmarital interest as of December 2013 was determined t o be $1,023,967. The
parties’ remaining 16.1% interest in SFME was determined to be marital property.

2 The remaining 75% interest in ME Rogers was owned by three of husband’s friends.

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The circuit court also determined that husband’s Edward Jones 4 01(k) and profit-
sharing plans were marital prope rty. Because husband had liste d his assets as “0” on the
PMA disclosure and had not presented evidence that the property was nonmarital, the
circuit court found the entirety of both plans to be marital.
Husband appealed the circuit court’s decision to the South Dakota Supreme Court.
See Charlson v. Charlson , 892 N.W.2d 903, 904 (S.D. 2 017). Husband argued that the
circuit court erred when it concluded that the PMA contemplated use of the tracing and
marital-loan methodologies to determine the parties’ separate property interests. Id. at 907.
Husband did not challenge the circuit court’s factual findings, its list of assets to be valued,
or the values placed on those assets. He likewise did not disp ute the details of wife’s
expert’s tracing report in relation to particular assets. Id. The South Dakota Supreme Court
affirmed the circuit court, concluding that the PMA contemplate d that the parties might
comingle their assets and that the circuit court properly used the tracing and marital-loan
methodologies. Id. at 910-12.
Following the conclusion of the South Dakota proceedings, the M innesota district
court was left to equitably divi de the parties’ property. Husb and requested to change the
stipulated valuation date, but the district court denied that request.
At trial in Minnesota, both parties testified about their invol vement in and
contributions to SFME and ME Rogers. By the time of trial, ME Rogers had been sold and
SFME’s profitability had significantly declined. During the South Dakota proceedings, the
parties had been receiving distributions of $24,000 per month from SFME, but SFME was
no longer making distributions by the time of trial in Minnesota.

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During all of this, ME Rogers was sold. The district court determined that, because
the sale of ME Rogers resulted in husband receiving $13,441.74 3—a significantly lower
amount than the 2013 valuation—it was neither just nor equitable to award wife $23,834.83
for her nonmarital interest plus her one-half marital interest in the 25% share of ME Rogers.
The district court determined t hat the parties should each rece ive a percentage of the net
sale proceeds from ME Rogers base d on the South Dakota court’s determination of their
respective interests in ME Rogers. As a result, wife’s 19.2% nonmarital-property interest
in the net sale proceeds amounted to $2,580.81, and husband wou ld be credited with
receiving $10,860.93 against his share of the marital estate.
In the Minnesota trial, wife requested that the district court award SFME to husband,
despite her earlier position in the South Dakota courts that SF ME was her separate
property. Wife asked the district court to award her 83.9% of SFME’s cash value according
to the December 2013 valuation date, which would equate to husb and paying her
$1,023,967 for her separate property interest and $98,016.50 for her one-half interest in the
marital portion of the asset. Husband requested that SFME be a warded to wife and that
she pay him for his marital share of it, $98,016.50.
Because neither party wanted SFME, the district court ordered that the parties’ 75%
interest in SFME be sold and that , after all costs associated w ith the sale were paid from
sale proceeds, wife should receive 83.9% of the remaining proce eds, representing her

3 Husband received the sale proceeds because he was the designat ed franchise owner, but
the parties agree that those proceeds included wife’s interest.

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nonmarital percentage interest as determined by the South Dakota courts. The district court
ordered that the remaining proceeds be divided equally between the parties.
The district court divided the remaining property. It divided the marital portion of
husband’s Edward Jones 401(k) account, subject to market gains and losses from the
valuation date to the date of di vision. Wife was to pay husban d an equalization payment
in the amount of $40,233.85 within 90 days of the district court’s order, subject to a four-
percent interest rate. The district court denied both parties’ requests for financial-receiver
fees.4 During the Minnesota proceedings, husband had incurred $293,297.72 in attorney’s
fees and wife had incurred $442,409.33 in attorney fees. The d istrict court denied wife’s
request for conduct-based attorney fees.
Both husband and wife made post -trial motions, and the distric t court issued an
order amending several findings of fact. It denied the parties’ motions for a new trial.
This appeal followed.
D E C I S I O N
I. The district court did not err in its application of the Sou th Dakota courts’
decisions concerning wife’s nonma rital property and it did not abuse its
discretion by equitably dividing the parties’ interests in SFME and ME Rogers.

Wife challenges several aspects of the district court’s property division. She argues
that the district court erred by failing to give full faith and credit to the decision of the South
Dakota courts, made inconsistent findings of fact and conclusio ns of law, improperly

4 Concerning the financial-receiver fees, husband requested reimbursement of $2,500 and
wife requested reimbursement of $49,114.

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changed the valuation date and thereby denied her due process of law, and failed to preserve
her nonmarital property interests as determined in South Dakota.
We first address wife’s argument that the district court did no t give full faith and
credit to the South Dakota judgment because the district court awarded her a percentage
interest in SFME and ME Rogers, instead of a cash payment from husband using the
December 2013 stipulated valuation. Wife argues that the determination of the cash value
of SFME and ME Rogers are fixed by reason of res judicata, beca use the values were
adjudicated by the South Dakota circuit court.
Wife’s argument is misplaced. Th e South Dakota circuit court d id not purport to
divide the parties’ assets. Its role was to “determine whether the assets and debts of the
parties are separate property, m arital property, or a combinati on of both separate and
marital property.” The circuit court was not “deciding what [was] an ‘equitable’ division
of the parties’ debts and assets.” That task was left for the Minnesota district court. And
the district court applied the determination of the South Dakota courts.
In a marital-dissolution action, the district court has broad discretion in valuing and
dividing property, and its deter minations will not be overturne d except for abuse of
discretion. Antone v. Antone, 645 N.W2d 96, 100 (Minn. 2002). A district court abuses
its discretion by making findings unsupported by the evidence, misapplying the law, or
reaching a clearly erroneous conclusion that is contrary to log ic and the facts on record.
Johnson v. Johnson, 902 N.W.2d 79, 84 (Minn. App. 2017). If the district court’s division
of property has an acceptable basis in fact and principle, a re viewing court must affirm
even if it might have taken a different approach. Servin v. Servin, 345 N.W.2d 754, 758

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( Mi nn. 19 8 4) . “ Upo n a di s s ol ut i on of a m ar r i a ge , . . . t he c ourt shall make a just and
equitable division of the marital property of the parties witho ut regard to marital
misconduct, after making findings regarding the division of the property.” Minn. Stat.
§ 518.58, subd. 1 (2018).
Wife’s assertion that the asset values are fixed because of the doctrine of res judicata
and that she is entitled to a cash payment equivalent to the stipulated December 2013 values
of SFME and ME Rogers also fails. Those values were agreed to by the parties. The South
Dakota courts determined wife’s percentage interest in SFME and ME Rogers, and it then
applied the percentages so determined to the parties’ stipulated values. By the time of the
Minnesota trial, the values of t hese entities had changed drama tically. The district court
properly construed the South Dakota decisions and awarded wife her nonmarital property
by way of a percentage interest. The value and disposition of that property was not finally
determined in South Dakota.5

5 It is not clear to us that the Minnesota district court was bo und to divide the parties’
marital assets in strict complia nce with the values to which th e parties stipulated. First,
“[i]f there is a substantial cha nge in the value of [a marital] a s s e t b e t w e e n t h e d a t e o f
valuation and the final distribution, the court may adjust the valuation of that asset as
necessary to effect an equitable distribution.” Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 1. The record
supports a finding that there was a “substantial change” in the values of the franchises.
Second, it is undisputed that persons other than the parties to this dissolution proceeding
had ownership interest in the franchises. It is unclear what e ffect dividing the parties’
franchise interests at their stipulated but stale values would have had on the interests of the
nonparties. See Danielson v. Danielson , 721 N.W.2d 335, 339 (Minn. App. 2006)
(recognizing that “in a dissolution proceeding, a district cour t lacks personal jurisdiction
over a nonparty and cannot adjudicate a nonparty’s property rights”); Fraser v. Fraser, 642
N.W.2d 34, 38 (Minn. App. 2002) (noting that statutory authority providing for division of
marital property in a marriage dissolution action “does not aut horize the district court to
adjudicate the interests of third parties”).

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The district court, construing the South Dakota circuit court’s decision, divided the
parties’ 25% interest in ME Roge rs, consisting of both marital and nonmarital property.
The district court determined that it was “obligated to divide the parties’ business interest
in ME Rogers in a just and equitable fashion while also applying the South Dakota Circuit
Court decision.” The circuit cour t trial was held in April 201 5. ME Rogers was sold in
2016. The net sale proceeds for ME Rogers amounted to approximately $53,766.96. Each
shareholder received an initial payment of $12,500 from the sale and an additional $941.74
after the sale. Because the sale resulted in the parties receiving approximately $27,500 less
than the 2013 valuation, the district court determined that it would be inequitable to divide
the property according to the pre vious valuation. The district court, relying on the
percentage interests determined by the South Dakota courts, det ermined that wife had a
19.2% nonmarital interest in ME Rogers, with a separate cash value of $7,699.65.
The district court concluded that it “would not be just or equi table to award [wife]
$23,834.83 for her nonmarital interest and one-half marital int erest in [the parties’] 25%
share of ME Rogers when the fair market value of the ME Rogers franchise resulted in
[husband] receiving only $13,441.74.” Husband was awarded $10,860.93 against his share
o f t h e m a r i t a l e s t a t e a n d w i f e ’ s 1 9 . 2 % i n t e r e s t i n t h e n e t s a l e proceeds amounted to
$2,580.821. The district court determined that husband owed wi f e t h e v a l u e o f h e r
nonmarital interest and her one-half interest in the marital portion of the net sale proceeds,
accounted for in the final adjustment of the division of assets . The district court’s award
to wife of a percentage interest in the actual sale proceeds of the sale of ME Rogers was
within the district court’s discretion.

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Similarly, the district court, construing the South Dakota deci sion, determined that
the parties’ 75% interest in SFME was a combination of their ma rital and nonmarital
property. The district court co ncluded that, because neither p arty wanted SFME at the
stipulated December 2013 value, the most-equitable disposition of SFME would be to sell
it and divide the net sale procee ds based on the percentage int erests determined in South
Dakota.
The stipulated December 2013 value of SFME was approximately $1.2 million. At
trial, the district court was presented with evidence that SFME was no longer a profitable
business, and the previous monthly distributions of $24,000 had ceased. A Massage Envy
regional director testified at trial that a large reduction in Massage Envy members resulted
in a substantial drop in revenue from membership dues. He furt her testified that the
opening of a second Massage Envy location in Sioux Falls also c ontributed to SFME’s
decreased business. The district court also heard testimony from husband and the regional
director that, over time, it had become difficult for SFME to o btain qualified massage
therapists.
Wife testified that she no longer wanted the SFME location and that she wanted
SFME to be awarded to husband in the property division. Wife testified that she no longer
had control over the SFME location and that an amended buy-sell agreement would restrict
transferring husband’s interest to her. Husband likewise did not want SFME at the earlier-
stipulated December 2013 valuation, and asked that it be awarded to wife.
The district court recognized as dispositive the South Dakota courts’ determination
of the parties’ percentage ownership of marital and nonmarital property based on the PMA

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and gave that determination the full faith and credit to which it was entitled. Neither party
wanted SFME at the earlier-stipulated value. The inequity inherent in treating that as the
value of SFME for property-division purposes was recognized by the parties’ mutual desire
to weaponize the asset as something to be awarded to the other at that value. Against this
backdrop, the district court acted within its discretion in declining to award SFME to either
party at that value.
Wife also argues that she was d enied due process of law because the district court
allowed S.H., the Massage Envy regional director, to testify at trial. Wife argues that she
was prejudiced because husband engaged in a “trial by ambush tactic” when this testimony
was admitted at trial. Wife argues that the district court improperly used this testimony to
make findings concerning a decline in the value of SFME. We re view the district court’s
evidentiary rulings at trial for abuse of discretion. City of Moorhead v. Red River Valley
Coop. Power Ass’n , 830 N.W.2d 32, 39 (Minn. 2013 ). And we discern no abuse of t he
district court’s discretion in this circumstance. The parties’ trial positions concerning
SFME make evident that its real value had changed from the earl ier stipulation. The
complained-of trial testimony was relevant to explain that change in value.
Wife moved post-trial to amend the district court’s findings of fact and conclusions
of law, and order for judgment and judgement and decree, or in the alterative for a new
trial. Wife submitted an over-72- page post-trial motion to sup port her argument that she
was denied due process. Wife was given a full and fair opportu nity to be heard on her
argument. See Haefele v. Haefele, 621 N.W.2d 758, 764 (Minn. App. 2001) (stating that
due process requires that a hearing be fair, practicable, and r easonable), review denied

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(Minn. Feb. 21, 2001). The dis trict court ruled the testimony of S.H. to be relevant and
admissible. On this record, we see no denial of wife’s due-process rights.
II. The district court acted within its discretion when it deni ed both parties’
requests for an award of conduc t-based attorney fees and wife’s request for
financial-receiver fees.

Wife challenges the district court’s denial of conduct-based attorney fees.
“A refusal to award attorney fees will not be reversed absent a c l e a r a b u s e o f
discretion.” Kitchar v. Kitchar , 553 N.W.2d 97, 104 (Minn. App. 1996), review denied
(Minn. Oct. 29, 1996). Conduct-based attorney fees may be imposed “against a party who
unreasonably contributes to the length or expense of the proceeding.” Minn. Stat. § 518.14,
subd. 1 (2018). Conduct-based f ees may be based on the impact that a party’s behavior
has on the costs of the litigation regardless of the relative financial resources of the parties.
Dabrowski v. Dabrowski, 477 N.W.2d 761, 766 (Minn. App. 1991). “While bad faith could
unnecessarily increase the length or expense of a proceeding, it is not required for an award
of conduct-based attorney fees under Minn. Stat. § 518.14, subd. 1.” Geske v. Marcolina,
624 N.W.2d 813, 818-19 (Minn. App . 2001). The requesting party bears the burden of
establishing that the other par ty’s conduct unreasonably contri buted to the length or
expense of the proceeding. Id. at 818.
The district court denied both parties’ requests for conduct-b ased attorney fees
based upon its determination that, “from the Court’s perspectiv e, each party has, mostly,
presented colorable legal arguments on difficult issues. In re viewing the record and
proceedings herein, the Court fi nds that both parties’ actions have unnecessarily
contributed to the length and expense of the dissolution procee ding.” The district court

15
explained that “[t]hroughout this litigation, each party has complained that the other party
has unnecessarily contributed to the cost of the proceedings, h as violated court orders,
and/or has been non-cooperative and obstinate.”
The district court was familiar with the parties and their cont inuing conflict,
carefully dealt with the parties’ aggressive litigation tactics, and was in the best position to
evaluate the extent to which each party’s conduct unreasonably contributed to the time and
expense of the proceeding. See 650 N. Main Ass’n v. Frauenshuh, Inc., 885 N.W.2d 478,
494 (Minn. App. 2016) (“Because the district court is the most familiar with all aspects of
the action from its inception through post trial motions, it is in the best position to evaluate
the reasonableness of requested attorney fees.” (quotation omitted)), review denied (Minn.
Nov. 23, 2016). The district court made adequate findings and concluded that, while both
parties had presented colorable legal arguments, each had contr ibuted to the costs of
litigation. Its denial of attorney’s fees was within its discretion.
Wife also argues that she is entitled to an award of financial- receiver fees that the
parties shared during the protracted litigation. Wife argues t hat the receiver was only
necessary because husband failed to follow a temporary order and was diverting funds into
his own accounts which resulted in the receiver having to perfo r m a “ t r u e - u p ” o f t h e
accounting to ensure that all funds were properly accounted for.
We review a district court’s dete rmination of whether to award receiver’s fees for
an abuse of discretion. Ronay v. Ronay, 369 N.W.2d 6, 12 (Minn. App. 1985). The district
court concluded that “[b]oth parties bear some responsibility f or unduly increasing the
work required of, and therefore the fees charged by [the financial receiver]” and that “his

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fees will continue to be paid out of the [parties’ joint bank] account.” The district court
ultimately determined that it was “fair and equitable that parties will be equally responsible
for [the financial receiver’s] fees.” As with the attorney-fee issue, the district court was in
a better position than we are to evaluate who should bear the costs of the financial receiver.
The district court’s findings are supported by the record, and the district court acted within
its discretion when it denied wife’s request for an award of financial-receiver fees.
III. The district court acted within its discretion when it awa rded wife the post-
2013 gains and losses on the funds in husband’s 401(k).

Husband argues in his cross appeal that, because the circuit co urt did not award
gains or losses on the pretax accounts, the district court erre d when it awarded wife a
percentage share of his 401(k), including gains and losses after the valuation date.
The Edward Jones 401(k) account was marital property. A district court is afforded
broad discretion in effectuating a division of marital property . Rutten v. Rutten , 347
N.W.2d 47, 50 (Minn. 1984). We must affirm a district court’s decision concerning the
division of marital property so long as it has an “acceptable b asis in fact and principle.”
Bollenbach v. Bollenbach, 175 N.W.2d 148, 154 (Minn. 1970).
The district court awarded husba nd the funds remaining in his 4 01(k) plan after
transferring wife $405,502.29, adj usted for market gains or los ses from December 31,
2013, to the date of distribution. The 401(k) plan was the onl y pretax account that was
divided between the parties.
At trial, the district court heard testimony that expert witnes s J . L . h a d t r i e d t o
equalize the pretax retirement ac counts because they were going “to have a future tax

17
liability associated with them, so in order to neutralize that impact on the parties, we
typically would allocate those as sets equally if possible.” J. L. further explained that a
transfer to wife, by way of a Qualified Domestic Relations Order, of a portion of the 401(k)
would equalize the pretax retirement assets at the date of valu ation. The district court,
attempting to equalize the property division, reasoned that “it is fair and equitable to
equally divide the marital porti on of the above-mentioned pre-t ax retirement accounts,
subject to market gains/losses from the valuation date to the d ate of division, so that both
parties will equally bear the tax consequences of these account s.” This was within the
district court’s discretion in effectuating a fair division of the marital estate.
After seven years of trials and appeals in two states, this complex marital-dissolution
action has generated tens of t housands of pages of testimony, e xhibits, and reports, more
than three-quarters of a million dollars of attorney’s fees, large expert-witness and receiver
costs, and hundreds of pages of court decisions. In those seve n years, the values of many
of the parties’ assets have changed, including a substantial de crease in the value of the
once-million-dollar-plus SFME, whic h decrease the district cour t found was not
exclusively the fault of either party. Other assets have increased in value during the course
of this protracted litigation. Presented with this complex situation, and required to resolve
it fairly and equitably, the district court made findings that the record supports and a
disposition within its discretion. The question before us is n ot whether that disposition is
perfect. The question on appeal is whether the district court reversibly erred. It did not.
Instead, it carefully evaluated t he evidence, faithfully applie d the determination of the

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South Dakota courts concerning the PMA, and arrived at a resolution of the complex issues
that falls squarely within its discretion.
Affirmed.