In re the Matter of:

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-0180

In re the Matter of:

Rodney Tristan Miller (Deceased),
Petitioner,

vs.

Pamela Marie Spera FKA Pamela Marie Miller,
Appellant,

Maria Malloy OBO Minor,
Respondent.

Filed January 27, 2025
Reversed and remanded
Frisch, Chief Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-FA-000264110

Pamela M. Spera, Eden Prairie, Minnesota (attorney pro se)

Maria Molloy, San Francisco, California (pro se respondent)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Frisch, Chief Judge;
and Kirk, Judge.∗

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
FRISCH, Chief Judge
In this second appeal related to the valuation of retirement assets subject to division,
appellant argues that the district court erred by improperly valuing her interest in her former
husband’s retirement accounts, thereby impermissibly modifying the existing judgment
and decree. Appellan t also argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying
her motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. We conclude that the
district court erred by assigning a value to appellant’s share of the retirement accounts that
resulted in the impermissible modification of the original property distribution. We
therefore reverse the valuation determination by the district court and remand to impose
the proper valuation and reconsider appellant’s request for a new trial in light of the proper
valuation determination.
FACTS
On May 17, 2004, the district court dissolved Rodney Miller and appellant Pamela
Marie Spera’s marriage by stipulated judgment and decree (the J&D). Miller v. Miller,
953 N.W.2d 489, 491 (Minn. 2021). Spera and Miller had three joint children. Id. At the
time of the dissolution, Miller and Spera each had several retirement accounts in their own
names, which are set forth in the J&D with account numbers. The J&D directs Miller and
Spera to divide these individual accounts equally by transferring half of the interest in each
account to the other party and provides that “[t]he value of the accounts is to be determined
at the time of the division of the accounts, which shall be done within 30 days” of the entry
of the J&D. The J&D also provides that Miller and Spera must cooperate in facilitating
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the conveyances set forth in the J&D and that if either party failed to do so, the J&D “shall
operate as said conveyance.” Finally, the J&D provides that the district court shall “retain
jurisdiction” over “assets or income which have not been disclosed and/or divided herein”
for purposes of making an equitable division. Spera and Miller did not divide their
respective retirement accounts before the commencement of this action.
After Miller and Spera divorced, Miller had a child with respondent Maria Molloy.1
Miller, 953 N.W.2d at 491. In 2015, Miller changed the beneficiary designations of his
retirement accounts and listed each of his four children, including his child with Molloy,
as co-beneficiaries. Id.
In 2018, Miller died intestate. Id. Shortly thereafter, Spera moved the district court
to enforce the J&D “to implement the division of the parties’ interests in the retirement
accounts.” Spera asked that the district court value the retirement accounts as of the date
of the order compelling division of the accounts, less any contributions after the date of the
original J&D. Molloy moved to intervene on behalf of her child’s interest in Miller’s
retirement accounts. The district court denied Molloy’s motion and she appealed to this
court. Miller v. Miller, No. A19-0372, 2020 WL 1676639, at *1 (Minn. App. Apr. 6, 2020),
aff’d, 953 N.W.2d 489 (Minn. 2021).
We reversed and remanded, concluding that the district court erred in denying
Molloy’s motion to intervene. Id. at *1-3. The supreme court affirmed, concluding in
relevant part that Molloy’s child had “some interest in property awarded in the [J&D] and

1 We note that the caption in this case denotes respondent’s last name as “Malloy,” but we
apply the spelling used in respondent’s brief throughout this opinion.
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that interest [was] sufficient for Molloy to intervene as a matter of right.” Miller, 953
N.W.2d at 495- 96. But the supreme court limited Molloy’s intervention right “to the
valuation of Miller’s retirement accounts” and specified that she did not have the “right to
intervene as to the division of the retirement accounts, which is a matter governed by [the
J&D]” and could not make arguments about the timeliness of Spera’s enforcement action.
Id. at 496.
On remand, the district court held a trial regarding Spera’s enforcement action. At
trial, Spera asked the district court to divide the retirement accounts using the value of the
accounts at the time of J&D, less any contributions to those accounts after 2004. She also
requested that she be awarded earnings on the valuation of her share of the accounts since
the entry of the J&D. Spera introduced expert testimony and an expert report regarding
valuation of some of the accounts. Molloy asserted that the accounts should be divided
based on a valuation in June 2018. In a January 2023 order, the district court concluded
that neither valuation was appropriate for “effectuating an equitable division” of the
retirement accounts “as contemplated in the J&D” and instead ordered the accounts be
divided using the 2004 valuation. The result of the division was to award Spera a
$130,028.68 equalizer payment. The district court did not award Spera any earnings on
her share of the accounts.
Spera moved for a new trial or amended findings, arguing that the district court’s
order was not justified by the evidence and contrary to law. She also argued that a new
trial was warranted based on newly discovered evidence that Miller transferred funds from
an account subject to the J&D to another a ccount. Following a hearing, the district court
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denied Spera’s motions, concluding that she had failed to show that the district court’s
valuation order was not justified by evidence or contrary to law, and that the evidence Spera
argued was newly discovered was considered by the district court in its initial order.
Spera appeals.
DECISION
Spera argues that the district court clearly erred in valuing the retirement accounts
and abused its discretion in denying her request for a new trial. She claims that, in
interpreting and implementing the J&D, the district court altered her substantive rights by
making an inequitable division of the retirement accounts, and that in so doing, the district
court failed to follow the remand instructions from the supreme court. She also asserts that
the district court abused its discretion in denying her motion for amended findings or a new
trial based on newly discovered evidence. We address each issue in turn.
I. The district court made an error of law and impermissibly modified Spera’s
substantive rights.
Spera argues that the district court impermissibly modified the J&D because its
order on remand granted Spera less property than she was entitled to receive pursuant to
its original terms. We agree.
With few exceptions not applicable here, a district court may not modify a final
property division. Redmond v. Redmond, 594 N.W.2d 272, 275 (Minn. App. 1999); see
also Minn. Stat. § 518.145 (2022) (providing for reopening of a dissolution decree for
specified reasons within a year of entry of the judgment and decree). But if the terms of a
judgment are ambiguous, a district court “may issue orders to implement, enforce, or
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clarify the provisions of a decree, so long as it does not change the parties’ substantive
rights.” Redmond, 594 N.W.2d at 275.
We first address whether the J&D was ambiguous and therefore subject to
implementation, enforcement, and clarification. A “document is ambiguous if it is
reasonably susceptible to more than one meaning.” Suleski v. Rupe, 855 N.W.2d 330, 339
(Minn. App. 2014) (quotation omitted). We review de novo whether a J&D is “clear or
ambiguous.” Id.
We discern no ambiguity in the J&D, which provides that the retirement accounts
were to be valued at the time of the anticipated division in 2004. Paragraph 28 of the J&D
provides:
By virtue of the divorce decree and judgment entered on
this day dissolving the bonds of marriage existing between the
Petitioner and Respondent, along with this Order, the parties
are ordered by the court to divide equally between themselves
their interests in all of the above retirement accounts, by
transferring one-half of the interest in each of the parties’
individual accounts to the other party, pursuant to the divorce
decree and judgment. The value of the accounts is to be
determined at the time of the division of the accounts, which
shall be done within 30 days of the date of this Order.
This language unambiguously reflects: (1) that Miller and Spera were to divide the
specified retirement accounts equally between them; (2) that the division was contemplated
to occur within 30 days of entry of the J&D, and (3) that the value of the accounts to be
divided would be determined “at the time of the division of the accounts.” The only
reasonable interpretation of this language is that the accounts were to be divided in 2004
and that the account values were to be determined at that time. See Staffing Specifix, Inc.
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v. TempWorks Mgmt. Serv., Inc., 913 N.W.2d 687, 692 (Minn. 2018) (“The primary goal
of contract interpretation is to determine and enforce the intent of the parties.” (quotation
omitted)).
Instead of applying this clear and unambiguous language to the valuation of the
identified retirement accounts, the district court concluded that the retirement accounts
should be divided in accordance with a different provision of the J&D that contemplated
“assets or income which have not been disclosed and/or divided herein.” That provision
afforded the district court continued jurisdiction over such assets “for the purpose of
making an equitable division thereof.” But the provision invoked by the district court does
not speak to the valuation of any such assets and is otherwise inapplicable because the J&D
expressly sets forth the accounts to be valued and divided and the manner of valuation and
division of those assets. The district court’s order on remand departed from the
unambiguous directive set forth in the J&D regarding the division of the retirement
accounts. The district court therefore erred as a matter of law in relying on this provision
of the J&D to value and divide the retirement accounts.
And we are not persuaded by Spera’s asserted alternative interpretation that the J&D
unambiguously provides that the division of the retirement accounts be solely based on the
valuation of those accounts at the time of the actual division of the accounts —here, 20
years after the entry of the J&D. This approach is inconsistent with the plain language of
the J&D, which expressly directs that the accounts “shall” be divided within 30 days of the
entry of the J&D and that the accounts are to be valued at the time of division. We therefore
conclude that Spera’s interpretation is unreasonable because it departs from established
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principles of contract construction that require provisions to be harmonized and interpreted
“in such a way as to give meaning to all of its provisions.” Brookfield Trade Ctr., Inc. v.
County of Ramsey, 584 N.W.2d 390, 394 (Minn. 1998); see also Palmi v. Palmi, 140
N.W.2d 77, 81 (Minn. 1966) (“[I]n arriving at the meaning of a judgment or decree, the
judgment as a whole should be considered in interpreting any particular clause or sentence
therein[.]”); Blonigen v. Blonigen, 621 N.W.2d 276, 281 (Minn. App. 2001) (applying the
rules of contract construction to a stipulated dissolution judgment), rev. denied (Minn. Mar.
13, 2001).2
We next consider whether the district court’s erroneous interpretation of the J&D
was harmless. See Goldman v. Greenwood, 748 N.W.2d 279, 285 (Minn. 2008)
(concluding that the district court’s error did not require reversal where the district court
reached the “correct” result) (citing Minn. R. Civ. P. 61 (requiring courts to disregard
harmless error)). We recognize that the implementation and enforcement of the J&D is
complicated by the amount of time that elapsed between the entry of the J&D and Spera’s
present enforcement action, along with Miller’s unilateral movement of funds from the
accounts subject to division to different accounts. But our caselaw is clear that an order
implementing, enforcing, or clarifying provisions of a J&D may not give one party “more
or less” than they received under the original property division. Hanson v. Hanson, 379

2 We decline to consider Molloy’s substantive arguments that the valuation method adopted
by the district court was appropriate because these arguments rely on Molloy’s
interpretation of the J&D. Molloy’s right of intervention was narrowly prescribed by the
supreme court and limited “to the valuation of Miller’s retirement accounts.” See Miller,
953 N.W.2d at 495-96 (concluding that Molloy lacked the “right to intervene as to the
division of the retirement accounts,” which is governed by the J&D)).
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N.W.2d 230, 233 (Minn. App. 1985). We conclude that the district court’s error in its
valuation of the accounts, and the resulting error in the division of the accounts, was not a
harmless legal error because it modified the J&D by giving Spera less than she received
under the original property division.
The district court ordered that Spera receive half of the retirement accounts as
valued in 2004, producing in 2024 an equalizer payment in an amount that would have
been appropriate if the equalizer payment were ordered in 2004. But in so doing, the
district court did not consider that the accounts were not actually divided in 2004 or that
the value of the accounts had changed in the 20 years that had elapsed since the entry of
the J&D. The district court’s failure to consider the changes to the value of the assets in
the 20 years since the entry of the J&D adversely affected Spera’s substantive rights
because it ignored the appreciation in value of those accounts to Spera’s disadvantage.
The effect of the district court’s order on remand was to award all of the gains on
Spera’s portion of Miller’s retirement accounts to Miller, and all the gains on Miller’s
portion of Spera’s retirement accounts to her. The district court ignored the gains since
2004 to which either Miller was entitled on Spera’s accounts or Spera was entitled on
Miller’s accounts. A division of the accounts based on their 2004 valuation disadvantaged
Spera because Miller kept all of the gains on the larger share of retirement funds that he
held when the J&D was entered. The district court’s method of dividing the retirement
accounts afforded Miller 20 years of investment gains on an equalizer payment he should
have paid Spera on the portion of the accounts that she would have been free to invest of
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her own accord if the division of those accounts had occurred in 2004 as directed by the
J&D.
We have recognized that a party’s substantive rights identified in a dissolution
judgment can be impermissibly altered if there is a change in an asset’s value between the
entry of a dissolution judgment and the effectuation of that judgment’s property division,
or if there is a long-term delay in the division or distribution of assets required by a
dissolution judgment. In Sirek v. Sirek, we contemplated the effect of changes to the value
of assets occurring between a dissolution decree and division of marital property reversing
and remanding with specific instructions for the district court to adjust the marital-property
division to account for a substantial change in value of the property. 693 N.W.2d 896, 900
(Minn. App. 2005); see also Bender v. Bender, 671 N.W.2d 602, 606 (Minn. App. 2003)
(affirming district court’s adjustment to parties’ stipulated division of property to account
for a decrease in value of an account); Wood v. Wood, No. A19-0554, 2019 WL 6836788,
at *3-5 (Minn. App. Dec. 16, 2019) (affirming clarification of a dissolution decree when a
district court awarded a party appreciation on a former spouse’s retirement accounts where
there had been a significant change in value from the valuation date to the eventual division
date); Charlson v. Charlson, No. A18-1058, 2019 WL 1923469, at *7 (Minn. App. Apr. 29,
2019) (affirming a district court’s property distribution that divided a party’s 401(k) after
adjusting for gains and losses between the valuation date and the distribution date), rev.
denied (Minn. July 16, 2019); Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c) (providing that
nonprecedential opinions are “not binding authority” but “may be cited as persuasive
authority”). And we have also considered the effects of a long-term delay in implementing
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a dissolution judgment and concluded that the district court abused its discretion by
dividing marital assets over four years without any interest without justifying its decision .
Thomas v. Thomas, 407 N.W.2d 124, 124, 127 (Minn. App. 1987) (citing Minn. R. Civ. P.
52.01 (generally requiring a district court to make particular and specific findings of facts
when acting as fact-finder)).
In sum, we conclude that the district court both made an error of law in interpreting
the J&D and in otherwise altering Spera’s substantive rights in its order on remand by not
considering the appreciation of Spera and Miller’s retirement accounts when dividing those
assets. We therefore reverse and remand for the district court to divide the retirement
accounts according to their value at the time of the J&D and to determine and divide any
gains on those accounts consistent with this opinion.3
II. We remand Spera’s request for a new trial to the district court to consider her
motion for amended findings or a new trial.
Spera also asserts that the district court abused its discretion in denying her motion
for a new trial or amended findings based on newly discovered evidence. The evidence
that Spera appears to allege is newly discovered is information that a transfer of funds from
a Vanguard account not set forth in the J&D was actually from the Vanguard account listed
in the J&D.
In a dissolution proceeding, a district court “may order a new trial or grant other
relief” based on newly discovered evidence. Minn. Stat. § 518.145, subd. 2(2). To warrant

3 With this conclusion in mind, we decline to reach Spera’s argument that the district court
abused its discretion by flouting the supreme court’s instructions on remand.
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relief, the asserted newly discovered evidence (1) must not, with the exercise of due
diligence, have been discoverable before the relevant proceeding; (2) must be relevant and
admissible; and (3) must not be cumulative, contradictory, or impeaching, and would likely
affect the outcome of the case. Bender v. Bernhard, 971 N.W.2d 257, 263 (Minn. 2022).
We review a district court’s decision whether to reopen an existing ruling for newly
discovered evidence for an abuse of discretion. Id.
In denying Spera’s motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, the
district court noted that it was “aware based on the record evidence that Mr. Miller had
closed the Vanguard account included in the J&D and transferred the funds to other
accounts and took this into account when issuing the [order on remand.]” The district court
then determined that the evidence that Spera alleged was newly discovered was “produced
at trial” and represented in Spera’s trial exhibits, and that the evidence was not otherwise
relevant to its disposition.
It appears the district court misunderstood which evidence Spera asserted was newly
discovered. Spera acknowledged that the identified transfer into the nonmarital account
was reflected in the record, but the origin of that transfer was not. Spera asserted that
evidence she newly discovered establishes that origin. We agree with Spera that the
identified evidence was not included in the record. And the district court’s determination
that the newly discovered evidence was not relevant was based on its improper valuation
of the retirement accounts. We therefore remand Spera’s request for a new trial to the
district court to reconsider Spera’s motion, taking into account this new evidence and its
relevance to the valuation. See Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) (stating
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that we generally address only those questions previously presented to and considered by
the district court).
Reversed and remanded.