State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1092

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Elwin Louis Klimek,
Appellant.

Filed April 15, 2019
Affirmed
Slieter, Judge

St. Louis County District Court
File No. 69VI-CR-18-9

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mark S. Rubin, St. Louis County Attorney, Karl G. Sundquist, Assistant County Attorney,
Virginia, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook , Chief Appellate Public Defender, Roy G. Spurbeck, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Slieter, Judge; and Klaphake,
Judge.

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SLIETER, Judge
Appellant Elwin Louis Klimek challenges his conviction for violating a harassment
restraining order (HRO), arguing that the district court committed plain error when it
admitted the unredacted HRO into evidence. We affirm.
FACTS
On December 28, 2017, A.C. contacted the Virginia Police Department and reported
that appellant called her work phone and left a voicemail the day before. A.C. had a valid
restraining order against appellant at the time. The HRO forbid appellant from having any
contact with A.C. Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant with one count of
violating the HRO under Minn. Stat. § 609.748, subd. 6(c) (2016).
On April 5, 2018, the district court held a jury trial. The state introduced the HRO
into evidence and it was received with no objection. The HRO states that there is
reasonable grounds to believe that appellant harassed A.C. by making harassing phone
calls, making threats, and frightening A.C. with threatening behavior. It forbids appellant
from making direct or indirect contact with A.C., including phone calls, for a period of two
years and is dated July 18, 2016.
The jury found appellant guilty. The district court sentenced appellant to 91 days
in jail. This appeal follows.

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D E C I S I O N
Appellant argues that the district court committed plain error by admitting the HRO
into evidence without redacting the portion that summarized the bad acts committed by
appellant. We disagree.
When a defendant fails to object to an alleged error at trial, this court re views for
plain error. State v. Hill, 801 N.W. 2d 646, 654 (Minn. 2011). In applying the plain-error
test, we reverse only if the appellant demonstrates that the district court (1) committed an
error, (2) that was plain , and (3) that affected the defenda nt’s substantial rights. Id. A
district court error is plain “when it contravenes a rule, case law, or a standard of conduct,
or when it disregards well-established and longstanding legal principles.” State v. Brown,
792 N.W.2d 815, 823 (Minn. 2011). A defendant’s substantial rights are affected when
“there is a reasonable likelihood that the error subst antially affected the verdict.” State v.
Strommen, 648 N.W.2d 681, 688 (Minn. 2002). If those three prongs are satisfied, we may
still only correct the error if doing so would ensure the fairness and integrity of the judicial
proceedings. State v. Crowsbreast, 629 N.W.2d 433, 437 (Minn. 2001).
It is unnecessary to decide whether it was error to admit the unredacted HRO,
because there is no possibility that doing so impa ired appellant’s substantial rights.
Appellant argues that his right to a fair trial was impa ired by the HRO’s introduction
because “[b]y introducing this evidence in the form of a judicial finding, the official
imprimatur of an otherwise neutral court was placed on this evidence.”
This argument is unpersuasive. Even if the HRO had been redacted, the same
information was conveyed to the jury through A.C.’s testimony. At trial, A.C. testified

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that, as a part of her law practice, she became involved with a case dealing with a family
member of appellant. She represented appellant’s mother, a vulnerable adult. A.C.
testified that because of “threat ening messages left for me at my place of employment,”
she removed herself from the case, and eventually sought an HRO against appellant. What
A.C. explained in her testimony was the same information as the statements appellant
claims should have been redacted from the HRO. Appellant cannot demonstrate prejudice
because there is no reason to believe that the statements in the HRO impacted the outcome
of the trial when A.C. testified to the same facts.
The argument that the unredacted HRO amounted to the district court judge
“vouching” for the credibility of A.C. is also unpersuasive. The primary contested issue in
this case was whether appellant knew he was not allowed to contact A.C., and A.C. did not
testify as to that element. All she testified to was that she had the HRO taken out against
appellant, and that he viol ated it. Appellant testified that he did not know he was not
allowed to call her. The fact that the jury did not believe him concerns his credibility, not
A.C.’s. Thus, there is no reasonable likelihood that admitting the unredacted HRO
substantially affected the verdict.
Affirmed.