State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1179

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Kevin Herman Larson,
Appellant.

Filed July 1, 2019
Affirmed
Johnson, Judge

Sherburne County District Court
File No. 71-CR-17-1096

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Kathleen A. Heaney, Sherburne County Attorney, Dawn R. Nyhus, Assistant County
Attorney, Elk River, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Suzanne M. Senecal -Hill,
Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Hooten, Judge; and Reilly,
Judge.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
JOHNSON, Judge
A Sherburne County jury found Kevin Herman Larson guilty of failure to register
as a predatory offender. We conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s
verdict. Therefore, we affirm.
FACTS
In 1993, Larson was convicted of second-degree criminal sexual conduct, in
violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.343, subd. 1(a) (1990). B ecause of that conviction, Larson
is required to register as a predatory offender. See Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 1b(a)(1)(iii)
(2016). But he has steadfastly refused to do so and has been convicted of failure to register
as a predatory offender on six prior occasions.1
This appeal concerns Larson’s seventh conviction of failure to register as a
predatory offender. In 2017, Larson was incarcerated at the prison in St. Cloud, serving a
sentence on a prior conviction of failure to register as a predatory offender. His anticipated
release date was August 3, 2017. On June 1, 2017, Kenneth Kalla, a corrections security
case manager at the prison, met with Larson to discuss his anticipated release. Kalla spoke

1 See State v. Larson , No. A17-1274, 2018 WL 4288994 (Minn. App. Sept. 10,
2018), review denied (Minn. Nov. 27, 2018); State v. Larson , No. A15-1085, 2016 WL
4596403 (Minn. App. Sept. 6, 2016), review denied (Minn. Nov. 23, 2016); State v. Larson,
No. A10-1562, 2011 WL 2672239 (Minn. App. July 11, 2011), review denied (Minn. Sept.
20, 2011); State v. Larson, No. A07-2145, 2008 WL 5396820 (Minn. App. Dec. 30, 2008),
review denied (Minn. Mar. 17, 2009); State v. Larson, No. A06-0623, 2007 WL 2993608
(Minn. App. Oct. 16, 2007), review denied (Minn. Dec. 19, 2007); State v. Larson , No.
A05-0040, 2006 WL 618857 (Minn. App. Mar. 14, 2006), review denied (Minn. May 16,
2006).

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with Larson about, among other things, his obligation to register as a predatory offender.
Kalla brought paperwork to the meeting that Larson could complete and submit, but Larson
refused to look at it, stating, “I’ve never filled out registration paperwork and I never will.”
On June 22, 2017, Special Agent Nathaniel Brovold of the Bureau of Criminal
Apprehension (BCA) met with Larson, reminded him of his obligation to register as a
predatory offender, and provided him with registration paperwork. Larson refused to
complete or sign the paperwork . On August 2, 2017, BCA Special Agent Nicholas Riba
met with Larson and attempted to persuade him to register as a predatory offender. Larson
refused to look at the paperwork that Special Agent Riba provided and did not respon d
when asked whether he was refusing to register.
On August 2, 2017, the state charged Larson with failure to register as a predatory
offender, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subds. 3(a), 5(a) (2016). The case was tried
to a jury on two days in Ap ril 2018. The state called three witnesses —Special Agent
Brovold, Special Agent Riba, and Kalla —each of whom testified to the interactions with
Larson that are described above. Larson, who represented himself at trial, testified about
the reasons why he h ad refused to comply with the requests that he complete the
registration paperwork. The jury found Larson guilty, and the district court sentenced him
to 39 months of imprisonment. Larson appeals.
D E C I S I O N
Larson argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction of failure to
register as a predatory offender.

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When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence for a conviction, we undertake “a
painstaking analysis of the record to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the
light most favorable to the conviction, was sufficient” to support the conviction. State v.
Ortega, 813 N.W.2d 86, 100 (Minn. 2012) (quotation omitted). We seek to “determine
whether the facts in the record and the legitimate inferences drawn from them would permit
the jury to reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of
the offense of which he was convicted.” State v. Salyers, 858 N.W.2d 156, 160 (Minn.
2015) (quotations omitted). “We must assume the jury believed the state’s witnesses and
disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.” State v. Caldwell, 803 N.W.2d 373, 384 (Minn.
2011) (quotation omitted). “[W]e will not disturb the verdict if the jury, acting with due
regard for the presumption of innocence and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, could reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty of the charged offense.”
Ortega, 813 N.W.2d at 100.
The statute on which Larson’s conviction is based requires a person who has been
convicted of second -degree criminal sexual conduct to register as a predatory offender.
Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 1b(a)(1)(iii). When a person is sentenced on such a
conviction, the district court shall inform the offender of the registration requirement. Id.,
subd. 2. If the district court does not do so, the offender’s assigned corrections agent shall
inform the offender of the registration requirement. Id. “[A]t least five days before the
person starts living at a new primary address . . . , the person [who is required to register]
shall give written notice of the new primary address to the assigned corrections agent or to
the law enforcement authority with which the person currently is registered .” Id., subd.

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3(b). In this case, the district court instructed the jury that the elements of the offense
charged are as follows:
First, defendant is a person required to register as a
predatory offender. . . .

Second, the defendant knowingly violated any of the
requirements to register. . . .

Third, the time period during which defendant is
required to register has not elapsed. . . .

Fourth, the defendant’s failure to act took place on or
about August 2, 2017 in Sherburne County, Minnesota.

Larson contends that the evidence is insufficient on the ground that his refusal to
complete the registration paperwork that was provided to him is not, in itself, a failure to
register. In response, the state contends that Larson’s “refusal to complete written forms
was a means by which he chose not to register” and that the jury could reasonably conclude
that Larson was guilty of failure to register as a predatory offender “based on his refusal to
engage in the registration process altogether.”
The statute specifies the form and content of the required registration. The predatory
offender must provide a signed, written statement with the following information: (1) the
offender’s primary address; (2) the offender’s secondary address es; (3) addresses of all
property owned, leased or rented by the offender; (4) addresses of all locations where the
offender is employed; (5) addresses of all schools where the offender is enrolled; and
(6) identification of all motor vehicles owned or reg ularly driven by the offende r. Minn.
Stat. § 243.166, subds. 4(a), 4a (2016). Larson is correct insofar as he asserts that the
statute does not necessarily require him to use the paperwork that was provided to him by

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the BCA special agents and prison staff. He may fulfill his duty to register by signing and
submitting any document that contains the information required by the statute. Thus, t he
pertinent question is whether he signed and submitted a written statement containing the
information required by the statute.
The evidence introduced at trial is sufficient to allow the jury to conclude that
Larson did not sign and submit any written statement to fulfill his duty to register. The
state’s witnesses described Larson’s general attitude concerning his duty to register, which
was consistent throughout the summer of 2017. In addition, Larson testified that he had
refused to register in the past, objected to registering as a predatory offender as a matter of
principle, and “would never sign anything that’s got the word ‘predatory’ on it.” In closing
argument, Larson personally stated that he did not disagree with the prosecutor’s evidence
but that he did not believe that he is “legally required to supply this information.” In light
of the evidence introduced by both the state and Larson, as well as Larson’s argument for
acquittal, a reasonable juror could infer that Larson had not completed the registration
paperwork that was provide d to him and had not submitted any other signed, written
statement with the information required by the statute.
Larson also contends that the evidence is insufficient on the ground that, even if he
did not register with two BCA special agents and a corrections security case manager, the
state did not prove that he failed to register with his assigned corrections agent. Larson is
correct insofar as he asserts that the statute requires him to register with either “the assigned
corrections agent” or “the law enforcement authority that has jurisdiction in the area of the
person’s primary address .” See id., subd. 3 (a). Larson also is correct that his assigned

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corrections agent is Molly Bice, who did not testify at trial. The state’s evidence would
have been stronger if the state had called Bice as a witness and if she had testified that
Larson did not register with her. But the absence of Bice’s testimony is not fatal to the
state’s case if other evidence is capable of proving that Larson did not register with Bice
or with a law-enforcement authority. Because we have determined that the state’s evidence
is sufficient to allow a reasonable juror to infer that Larson never registered at all, the
evidence also is sufficient to allow a reasonable juror to infer that Larson never registered
with Bice or with a law-enforcement authority.
Before concluding, we note that Larson filed a handwritten 12 -page pro se
supplemental brief. We have carefully reviewed the pro se supplemental brief, and we
conclude that it does not contain any grounds for reversal.
In sum, the evidence is sufficient to support Larson’s conviction of failure to register
as a predatory offender.
Affirmed.