State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-0799

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Kevin Herman Larson,
Appellant.

Filed May 27, 2025
Affirmed
Johnson, Judge

Rice County District Court
File No. 66-CR-22-3111

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Brian M. Mortenson, Rice County Attorney, Sean R. McCarthy, Assistant County
Attorney, Faribault, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jessica Merz Godes, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Schmidt, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Larkin,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JOHNSON, Judge
A Rice County jury found Kevin Herman Larson guilty of failure to register as a
predatory offender. We conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s verdict
2
and that a plainly erroneous jury instruction did not affect Larson’s substantial rights.
Therefore, we affirm.
FACTS
In 1993, Larson was convicted of second- degree criminal sexual conduct, in
violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.343, subd. 1(a) (1990). Because of that conviction, Larson
is required to register as a predatory offender. See Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 1b(a)(1)(iii)
(2022). But he consistently has refused to do so. Since 2004, he has been convicted of
failure to register on eight prior occasions.1
This appeal concerns Larson’s ninth conviction of failure to register. A jury found
that he did not do so upon his release from the Faribault correctional facility on December
27, 2022. Approximately three months earlier, on September 12, 2022, a case worker at
the prison, Ann Braulik, met with Larson to discuss his anticipated release and his
obligation to register as a predatory offender with the Bureau of Criminal Apprehension

1See State v. Larson (Larson IX), No. A21-0220, 2021 WL 6010122 (Minn. App.
Dec. 20, 2021), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 980 N.W.2d 592 (Minn. 2022); State v. Larson
(Larson VIII), No. A18-1179, 2019 WL 3000749 (Minn. App. July 1, 2019), rev. denied
(Minn. Sept. 25, 2019); State v. Larson (Larson VII), No. A17- 1274, 2018 WL 4288994
(Minn. App. Sept. 10, 2018), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 27, 2018); State v. Larson (Larson
VI), No. A15 -1085, 2016 WL 4596403 (Minn. App. Sept. 6, 2016), rev. denied (Minn.
Nov. 23, 2016); State v. Larson (Larson V), No. A13-0485, 2014 WL 502915 (Minn. App.
Feb. 10, 2014) (reversing conviction on charge of failing to register a new primary address
because the state failed to prove that appellant had a new primary address); State v. Larson
(Larson IV), No. A10- 1562, 2011 WL 2672239 (Minn. App. July 11, 2011), rev. denied
(Minn. Sept. 20, 2011); State v. Larson (Larson III), No. A07-2145, 2008 WL 5396820
(Minn. App. Dec. 30, 2008), rev . denied (Minn. Mar. 17, 2009); State v. Larson (Larson
II), No. A06-0623, 2007 WL 2993608 (Minn. App. Oct. 16, 2007), rev. denied (Minn.
Dec. 19, 2007); State v. Larson (Larson I), No. A05-0040, 2006 WL 618857 (Minn. App.
Mar. 14, 2006), rev. denied (Minn. May 16, 2006).
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(BCA). According to Braulik, Larson stated that he was innocent of the underlying crime
and, thus, was not required to register. Later, on December 8, 2022, Special Agent Lucas
Munkelwitz of the BCA met with Larson to discuss his refusal to register. Larson did not
respond during the meeting. Braulik met with Larson for a second time on December 21,
2022, to remind him of his obligation to register. Braulik brought to the meeting a copy of
the BCA predatory-offender registration form, which Larson could have complete d and
submitted to fulfill his registration requirement, but Larson refused to do so, stating, “I will
never sign that piece of sh-t paper.” On December 27, 2022, the day of his release, Special
Agent Munkelwitz met with Larson for a second time to remind him of his obligation to
register and to inform him that if he did not register, he would be arrested. Larson refused
to talk to Special Agent Munkelwitz. Special Agent Munkelwitz arrested him immediately
after their meeting, upon his release from the prison.
The next day, the state charged Larson with failure to register as a predatory
offender, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 243.166 (2022), without reference to any particular
subdivision of the statute. The case was tried to a jury on October 31, 2023, and November
1, 2023. The state called three witnesses— Braulik, Special Agent Munkelwitz, and a
department of corrections investigator—each of whom testified to the interactions with
Larson that are described above. The state also introduced several exhibits, including
copies of Larson’s prior convictions of failure to register and a copy of the BCA registration
form like the one that Braulik had provided to Larson. Larson did not testify and did not
present any other evidence. The jury found Larson guilty, and the district court sentenced
him to 39 months of imprisonment. Larson appeals.
4
DECISION
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Larson first argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. When
reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence for a conviction, we undertake “a painstaking
analysis of the record to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most
favorable to the conviction, was sufficient.” State v. Ortega, 813 N.W.2d 86, 100 (Minn.
2012) (quotation omitted). We seek to “determine whether the facts in the record and the
legitimate inferences drawn from them would permit the jury to reasonably conclude that
the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the offense of which he was
convicted.” State v. Salyers, 858 N.W.2d 156, 160 (Minn. 2015) (quotation omitted). “We
must assume that the jury believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to
the contrary.” State v. Caldwell, 803 N.W.2d 373, 384 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted).
As such, we will not overturn a verdict “if the jury, acting with due regard for the
presumption of innocence and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could
reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty of the charged offense.” Ortega , 813
N.W.2d at 100.
The statute on which Larson’s conviction is based requires a person who has been
convicted of second-degree criminal sexual conduct to register as a predatory offender.
Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 1b(a)(1)(iii). When a person is sentenced on such a
conviction, the district court shall inform the offender of the registration requirement. Id.,
subd. 2. If the district court does not do so, the offender’s assigned corrections agent shall
inform the offender of the registration requirement. Id. To convict a person of failing to
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register, the state is required to prove that: (1) the defendant is required to register as a
predatory offender; (2) the defendant was given notice or reasonably should have known
that he had a duty to register; (3) the defendant knowingly violated a registration
requirement; and (4) the defendant’s failure to act took place in the alleged county. Id.,
subds. 1b(a), 3-6.
In this case, the district court instructed the jury it should find Larson guilty if he
violated section 243.166 in any one of three ways: (1) by not signing predatory-offender
registration forms; (2) by not giving written notice of his new primary address to his
assigned corrections agent or a law-enforcement authority, as required by subdivision 3(b);
and (3) by not registering with the law-enforcement authority that ha s jurisdiction in the
area where he would be staying if he did not have a new primary address, as required by
subdivision 3a(b).
Larson contends that the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he
violated section 243.166 in any of the three ways alleged by the state. We consider the
three means of proof in the order in which they were presented in the district court’s jury
instructions.
A. Predatory Registration Forms
Larson argues that the state did not prove that he violated the registration statute by
not signing one or more predatory-offender registration forms. He contends that he “had
no obligation under the registration statute to affix his signature on the predatory offender
registration form” that was provided to him. The state does not respond to this argument.
6
We agree with Larson that not signing the registration form that was provided to
him, by itself, is not a violation of section 243.166. In Larson VIII, we stated that “the
statute does not necessarily require him to use the paperwork that was provided to him by
the BCA special agents and prison staff.” 2019 WL 3000749, at *2. The registration
statute requires that an offender’s registration include a “signed, written statement” with
the following information: (1) the offender’s primary address; (2) the offender’s secondary
address; (3) addresses of all property owned, leased or rented by the offender; (4) addresses
of all locations where the offender is employed; (5) addresses of all schools where the
offender is enrolled; (6) identification of all motor vehicles owned or regularly driven by
the offender; (7) the expiration years of license plate tabs of all motor vehicles owned by
the offender; and (8) all telephone numbers of the offender. Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subds.
4(a), 4a. But no particular form or format is required.
Thus, the state’s evidence that Larson did not sign the predatory-offender
registration form provided to him by Braulik is insufficient as a matter of law to prove a
violation of the registration statute.
B. Registration of New Primary Address
Larson also argues that the state did not prove that he failed to give written notice
of a new primary address to his assigned corrections agent or a law-enforcement authority,
as required by subdivision 3(b). The relevant statutory provision states:
Except as provided in subdivision 3a, at least five days
before the person starts living at a new primary address,
including living in another state, the person shall give written
notice of the new primary address to the assigned corrections
7
agent or to the law enforcement authority with which the
person currently is registered.

Id., subd. 3(b).
The duty to register a new primary address has two parts. First, a person who is
required to register must “give advance notice of the new primary address to which the
person plans to move, ” at least five days before the person starts living there, “to the
assigned corrections agent or to the law-enforcement authority with which the person
currently is registered.” State v. Nelson, 812 N.W.2d 184, 188 (Minn. 2012); see also
Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 3(b). Second, th e person must give written notice that he is
“‘no longer staying’ at the previously registered primary address.” Nelson, 812 N.W.2d at
188 (citing Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 3(b)). To prove that a person failed to register a
new primary address in violation of subdivision 3(b), “the state must prove the existence
of a new primary address.” Nelson, 812 N.W.2d at 188.
In its responsive brief, the state does not respond to this argument and does not
identify any evidence that Larson had a new primary address. Braulik testified that Larson
intended to leave the Faribault prison and go “to a homeless shelter.” The registration
statute expressly excludes homeless shelters from the definition of “primary address.”
Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 1a(d), (h). Consequently, the state’s evidence tends to prove
that Larson did not have a new primary address.
Thus, the evidence is insufficient to prove that Larson failed to give written notice
of a new primary address to his assigned corrections agent or a law-enforcement authority,
as required by subdivision 3(b).
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C. Registration with Law Enforcement
Larson also argues that the state did not prove that he failed to register with the law-
enforcement authority that has jurisdiction in the area where he would be staying, if he did
not have a new primary address, as required by subdivision 3a(b). The relevant statutory
provision states:
[A] person with a primary address of a correctional facility who
is scheduled to be released from the facility and who does not
have a new primary address shall register with the law
enforcement authority that has jurisdiction in the area where
the person will be staying at least three days before the person
is released from the correctional facility.

Id., subd. 3a(b).
For purposes of this nonprecedential opinion, we assume without deciding that, to
prove a violation of subdivision 3a(b), the state must prove that the offender “does not have
a new primary address.” Cf. State v. Hall, 931 N.W.2d 737, 741-43 (Minn. 2019)
(reviewing caselaw concerning whether absence of fact or condition is element of offense).
Larson contends that “there was no direct evidence that [he] did not have a new primary
address.” But, as stated above, Braulik testified that Larson intended to leave the Faribault
prison and go “to a homeless shelter,” which, as a matter of law, is not a “primary address.”
See id., subd. 1a(h), (d). Larson also contends that “the circumstances proved are consistent
with a reasonable inference that Larson was leaving the prison and would be living at a
new primary address.” But Larson does not identify the circumstances proved that might
support an inference that he intended to move to a new primary address. Accordingly, the
9
only reasonable inference is that Larson did not have a primary residence when he was
released from the Faribault prison.
Larson argues further that, if he is subject to the requirements of subdivision 3a(b),
the state did not prove that he failed to register “with the law enforcement authority that
has jurisdiction in the area where [he] will be staying” because he “had no obligation to
provide either Braulik or Munkelwitz with information about where he would be staying
upon his release.” Larson is correct insofar as he asserts that subdivision 3a(b) did not
require him to register with Braulik or Special Agent Munkelwitz. He was required to
register with the chief of police or the county sheriff with jurisdiction over the area where
he would be staying after his release. Id., subd. 1a(f) (defining “law enforcement authority”
as “chief of police” or “county sheriff”) . In addition, he was required to do so “at least
three days before [he was] released from the correctional facility.” Id., subd. 3a(b).
The evidence introduced at trial is sufficient to allow a jury to find that Larson did
not register with a chief of police or a county sheriff during the three-day period before his
release from the Faribault prison. Special Agent Munkelwitz testified that , as of the day
of his release, Larson was noncompliant with the registration requirements. The state
introduced into evidence a recording of a conversation between Special Agent Munkelwitz
and Larson on the day of Larson’s release in which Special Agent Munkelwitz told Larson
that “at this point . . . you have been noncompliant in violation of the Minnesota predatory
offenders law.” Special Agent Munkelwitz further testified that Larson had never
completed his mandatory predatory offender registration at any point over the last 20 years.
A reasonable juror could infer that, if Larson had registered before he was released from
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prison, he would have done so with the knowledge or assistance of prison staff and BCA
personnel, including the testifying witnesses. In light of this evidence, a reasonable jury
could find that Larson did not register with any law enforcement authority before his
release from the Faribault prison, as required by subdivision 3a(b).
In sum, the evidence introduced at trial is sufficient to support Larson’s conviction
of failure to register as a predatory offender.
II. Jury Instructions
Larson also argues that the district court erred by instructing the jury that he was
required to sign a registration form that had been provided to him and that his failure to do
so is a violation of the registration statute.
A district court must instruct the jury in a way that “fairly and adequately explain[s]
the law of the case” and does not “materially misstate[] the applicable law.” State v. Koppi,
798 N.W.2d 358, 362 (Minn. 2011). A district court must define the crime charged and
should explain the elements of the offense. State v. Ihle, 640 N.W.2d 910, 916 (Minn.
2002). A district court need not provide “detailed definitions of the elements to the
crime . . . if the instructions do not mislead the jury or allow it to speculate over the
meaning of the elements.” State v. Davis, 864 N.W.2d 171, 177 (Minn. 2015) (quotation
omitted). An appellate court reviews jury instructions “as a whole to determine whether
the instructions accurately state the law in a manner that can be understood by the jury.”
State v. Kelley, 855 N.W.2d 269, 274 (Minn. 2014). A district court has “considerable
latitude in selecting language for jury instructions.” State v. Gatson, 801 N.W.2d 134, 147
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(Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted). Accordingly, we review a district court’s jury
instructions under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Koppi, 798 N.W.2d at 361.
In this case, the district court instructed the jury as follows:
First, the defendant was a person required to register as
a predatory offender. . . .

Second, the defendant was given notice on or before
December 27, 2022, that the defendant had a duty to register.

Third, the defendant knowingly violated any of the
requirements to register.

. . . .

The requirements to register include:

• signature on predatory offender registration
forms.

• At least five days before the person starts living
at a new primary address, the person shall give written notice
of the new primary address to the assigned corrections agent or
to the law enforcement authority with which the person
currently is registered. The written notice required by this
paragraph must be provided in person. The corrections agent
or law enforcement authority shall, within two business days
after receipt of this information, forward it to the bureau.

• A person with a primary address of a correctional
facility who is scheduled to be released from the facility and
who does not have a new primary address shall register with
the law enforcement authority that has jurisdiction in the area
where the person will be staying at least three days before the
person is released from the correctional facility.

Larson concedes that he did not preserve this argument by objecting to the
instruction in the district court. In the absence of an objection , this court reviews only for
plain error. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 31.02; see also State v. Reek, 942 N.W.2d 148, 158
12
(Minn. 2020). Under the plain-error test, an appellant is entitled to relief on an issue to
which no objection was made at trial only if (1) there is an error, (2) the error is plain, and
(3) the error affects the appellant’s substantial rights. State v. Griller, 583 N.W.2d 736,
740 (Minn. 1998). If these three requirements are satisfied, the appellant also must satisfy
a fourth requirement: that the error “seriously affects the fairness and integrity of the
judicial proceedings.” State v. Little, 851 N.W.2d 878, 884 (Minn. 2014). If an appellate
court concludes that any requirement of the plain-error test is satisfied, the appellate court
need not consider the other requirements. State v. Brown, 815 N.W.2d 609, 620 (Minn.
2012).
A. Plain Error
Larson contends that the district court plainly misstated the law by instructing the
jury that he violated the registration statute if he did not put his “signature on predatory
offender registration forms,” one of which had been provided to him by Braulik. As we
said in Larson VIII, and as discussed above, see supra I.A., the statute does not require that
Larson register by using any particular form. 2019 WL 3000749, at *2-3. Thus, the district
court plainly erred by instructing the jury that Larson was required to sign registration
forms such as the form that was provided to him by Braulik.
B. Substantial Rights
Larson contends that that the district court’s plain error affected his substantial
rights. An error affects a defendant’s substantial rights if “the error was prejudicial and
affected the outcome of the case.” State v. Gutierrez, 667 N.W.2d 426, 434 (Minn. 2003)
(quotation omitted). “In the context of jury instructions, . . . an error affects substantial
13
rights when there is a reasonable likelihood that a more accurate instruction would have
changed the outcome in this case.” Id. at 434-35 (quotation omitted). An appellant bears
a “heavy burden” in seeking to satisfy the third requirement of the plain-error test. State v.
Davis, 820 N.W.2d 525, 535 (Minn. 2012) (quotation omitted).
Larson contends that “it is most likely that the jury relied on the purported ‘signature
on predatory offender registration forms’ requirement as that was the focal point of the
state’s case.” He cites the prosecutor’s opening statement, in which the prosecutor stated
that Larson was told that he “needed to sign the required predatory offender registration
form” and that he refused to do so. Larson also cites testimony of the state’s witnesses that
Larson did not sign the predatory-offender registration form. And he cites the prosecutor’s
statement in closing argument that the jury could find Larson guilty based on his failure to
comply with any of three requirements, including his refusal to sign the predatory-offender
registration form.
At trial, Larson’s defense did not focus on whether he signed the form provided to
him. In closing argument, Larson’s attorney argued that the registration requirements were
as “clear as mud” and asserted that Larson did not understand what he was required to do
upon his release from prison.
We believe that there is no “reasonable likelihood that a more accurate instruction
would have changed the outcome in this case.” Gutierrez, 667 N.W.2d at 434-35
(quotation omitted). There was overwhelming evidence that Larson failed to register with
law enforcement during the three-day period before his release from the Faribault prison,
as required by subdivision 3a(b). If the district court had properly instructed the jury, the
14
jury likely would have returned a verdict of guilty based on Larson’s failure to comply with
subdivision 3a(b), which was proved with overwhelming evidence. See supra part I.C.
Thus, the plainly erroneous instruction did not affect Larson’s substantial rights.
Before concluding, we note that Larson filed a pro se supplemental brief. We have
carefully reviewed the pro se supplemental brief, and we conclude that it does not contain
any grounds for reversal.
Affirmed.