State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1410

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Delorien Robert Daniel Chatman,
Appellant.

Filed July 29, 2019
Affirmed
Reyes, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-17-21393

Keith Ellison, Minnesota Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Jonathan P. Schmidt, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jennifer Workman Jesness,
Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Rodenberg, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and
Reyes, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
REYES, Judge
In a direct a ppeal from his convictions of first - and second -degree assault and
unlawful possession of a firearm, appellant argues that (1) the state did not present

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sufficient evidence to prove identity for all three convictions ; (2) the state did not present
sufficient evidence to prove that he had the requisite i ntent for second-degree assault; and
(3) the district court abused its discretion in sentencing. We affirm.
FACTS
On the evening of August 22, 2017, appellant Delorian Robert Chatman traveled to
downtown Minneapolis. After getting into an altercation with an unknown man, appellant
pulled out a firearm and shot toward the man. The bullet missed the man and struck M.P.,
who had been waiting at a nearby bus stop. After the shooting, appellant ran from the
scene. Surveillance footage captured appellant downtown, and multiple eyewitnesses
observed the altercation and shooting , allowing law enforcement to identify appellant as
the shooter. M.P. sustained injuries but survived.
Appellant is not eligible to possess a firearm due to prior felony convictions. The
state charged appellant with one count of unlawful possession of a firearm , one count of
second-degree assault against the unknown man , and one count of first -degree assault
against M.P. A jury found him guilty on all counts. The district court sentenced appellant
to 60 months for the unlawful -possession conviction, 60 months for the second -degree-
assault conviction, and 160 months for the first -degree-assault conviction, to be served
concurrently. This appeal follows.

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D E C I S I O N
I. The state presented sufficient evidence of identity to sustain all three
convictions.
Appellant argues that the state presented insufficient evidence to sustain his
convictions because there is a reasonable alternative hypothesis that he was not the shooter.
We disagree.
When reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence, we carefully review the record “to
determine whether the evidence and reasonable in ferences drawn therefrom, viewed in a
light most favorable to the verdict, were sufficient to allow the jury to reach its verdict.”
Lapenotiere v. State , 916 N.W.2d 351, 360 -61 (Minn. 2018) (quotation omitted). When
the challenged conviction is based on circumstantial evidence, we apply a two -step
analysis. State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 598 -601 (Minn. 2017). First, we identify the
circumstances proved “by resolving all questions of fact in favor of the jury’s verdict,” in
deference to the jury’s credibility determinations. Id. at 600. Second, we “independently
consider the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the circumstances proved.” Id.
at 601 . The circumstances proved must, as a whole, “be consistent with a reasonable
inference that the accused is guilty and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except
that of guilt.” Id. We assume “the jury believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any
evidence to the contrary.” State v. Moore, 438 N.W.2d 101, 108 (Minn. 1989).
To convict appellant of unlawful possession of a firearm, the state had to prove that
appellant possessed a firearm and that he was ineligible to possess a firearm. See Minn.
Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2) (2016). To convict appellant of second-degree assault, the state

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had to prove that appellant assaulted the unknown victim with a weapon. See Minn. Stat.
§ 609.222, subd. 1 (2016). And to convict appellant of first-degree assault, the state had to
prove that appellant assaulted M.P. and inflicted great bodily harm on him. See Minn. Stat.
§ 609.221, subd. 1 (2016).
The state proved the following circumstances: On the evening of August 22, 2017,
a man got off the light -rail train in downtown Minneapolis and went to a CVS on 11th
Street and Hennepin Avenue. Surveillance -video footage shows a man wearing a blue
backpack, glasses, a grey hooded sweatshirt, jeans, red and black shoes, and his hair in
dreadlocks. Law enforcement identified appellant as the man in the CVS through a search
warrant, which allowed law enforcement to obtain pharmacy records that showed appellant
went to the CVS to fill a prescription. Video footage shows that appellant left the CVS
and walked north on Hennepin Avenue to Sixth Street. He then turned left on Sixth Street
and began walking with another man northwest on Sixth Street toward Target Field.
The two men got into an altercation , and the other man punched appellant
repeatedly. Multiple eyewitnesses, including M.P., Z.S., D.G., and N.E. -H, observed the
altercation. The closest witness to the scene, Z.S., described the m an being punched as
having a small blue backpack, jeans, red and black Air Jordan shoes, and long dreadlocks.
After appellant was on the ground, the other man ran towards Hennepin Avenue. Z.S.,
D.G., and N.E. -H. then observed appellant stand up, pull out a gun, and shoot at the
unknown man. The bullet struck M.P. Z.S. also saw appellant turn around and hold the
gun against his stomach.

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Just after the shooting, Z.S., N.E.-H., and another witness, M.S., observed appellant
run across Sixth Street and continue diagonally towards Fifth Street and First Avenue. He
entered a parking lot, crossed it, and continued running toward Fifth Street. Surveillance
video again picked up appellant when he entered the parking lot. The video shows a man
wearing the same clothes that appellant wore in the CVS and matching the description that
eyewitnesses gave to law enforcement. The man in the surveillance footage is traveling in
the same direction as the witnesses described the shooter run. Appellant conceded that he
ran in the same direction as the man in the surveillance video and wore “the exact same
thing” as he did. Law enforcement recovered appellant’s glasses, with his DNA, at the
scene of the shooting.
When law enforcement interviewed appellant, he initially claimed that he was not
in Minneapolis on the day of the shooting . After law enforcement showed him vi deo
footage of him in downtown Minneapolis, he asked, “well do you have a gun, where’s the
gun[?]” before learning that officers had not recovered a gun. He appeared surprised when
he heard the wrong person was shot, and blurted out “I – I didn’t mean to shoot, umm – I
didn’t shot,” and then put his head down on the table. He also asked the officer, “why did
it take you so long to come and talk to me?”
The circumstances proved lead to a reasonable hypothesis of guilt. Appellant argues
that the reasonable alternative hypothesis inconsistent with guilt is that another person got
into a fight and fi red the gun. But a ppellant’s hypothesis relies on circumstances not
proved, such as the fact that police did not observe signs that he had been in a physical
altercation; that the shooter used his right hand to shoot the gun but appellant is left-handed;

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and that the witnesses did not describe the white gloves that appellant claims he wore.
These are not circumstances proved. Appellant testified and presented his version of events
to the jury, and to the extent that his version of events conflicted with the state’s witnesses,
we assume the jury believed the state’s witnesses.
In order for appellant’s alternative hypothesis to be true, there would have needed
to be another man at the scene wearing identical clothing as appellant who got into an
altercation, shot the gun, and ran off diagonally towards First Avenue and Fifth Street. But
witnesses only described one person matching appellant’s description and running away.
And the surveillance video only picked up one person, not two. Appellant’s alternative
hypothesis is inconsistent with the circumstances proved and is not reasonable.
II. The state presented sufficient evidence to prove that appellant acted with the
requisite intent for second-degree assault.
Appellant argues alternatively that the state failed to present sufficient evidence to
show that he intended to cause fear of immediate bodily harm or death in the unknown
person. We are not persuaded.
Intent is a product of the mind, based on inference, and is generally prove d by
circumstantial evidence. State v. Cooper, 561 N.W.2d 175, 179 (Minn. 1997). We
therefore apply the two-step analysis described above and rely on the same circumstances
proved.
In order to convict appellant of second-degree assault, the state had to show that he
assaulted the unknown victim with a dangerous weapon. Minn. Stat. § 609.222, subd. 1.
Assault is defined as: “an act done with intent to cause fear in another of immediate bodily

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harm or death” (assault -fear); or “the intentional infliction of or attempt to inflict bodily
harm upon another” (assault -harm). Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 10 (2016) (emphasis
added).
Appellant argues that the jury could only convict him under assault-fear because the
state charged appellant with assault -fear, the district co urt instructed the jury on assault -
fear, and the state argued that appellant committed the assault when he pulled out the gun
and intended to cause fear in the unknown victim, causing him to run. Appellant argues
that taking the extra step of firing the g un at the unknown victim demonstrated his intent
to cause assault-harm, not assault-fear.
First, appellant’s contentions that assault -harm was “uncharged and uninstructed”
and that the state argued exclusively under an assault -fear theory are factually i ncorrect.
The state charged appellant with second -degree assault without differentiating between
assault-fear and assault -harm. Moreover, t he district court’s instructions to the jury
included both the definition of assault-fear and assault-harm. Finally, in addition to arguing
under a theory of assault-fear, the state also argued that when appellant “pulled the trigger
at that man, he assaulted that man as well.” In other words, the state submitted that second-
degree assault could have been proved under assault-harm or assault-fear.
Appellant’s argument is also incorrect legally. While caselaw differentiates
between the type of intent required for assault -fear and assault-harm, it does not indicate
that they are two different crimes. See State v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 303, 309 (Minn. 2012)
(referring to assault-fear as requiring specific intent and assault-harm as requiring general-

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intent). Both are different forms of an assault. Id. at 312. Further, neither caselaw nor the
statute state that assault-fear and assault-harm are mutually exclusive.
Moreover, appellant’s assertion that an assault-harm theory cannot support the
verdict because the district court did not instruct the jury on assault-harm is misguided. “A
reviewing court’s limited determination on sufficiency review . . . does not rest on how the
jury was instructed.” Musacchio v. U.S., 136 S. Ct. 709, 715 (2016). We will not disturb
a jury’s verdict if the jury could reasonably conclude that the appellant was guilty of the
charged offense. State v. Olhausen , 681 N.W.2d 21, 25 -26 (Minn. 2004). Here, the
charged offense is second-degree assault. There are multiple means of committing second-
degree assault. And, as appellant concedes, the state’s “evidence proved the requisite intent
for assault-harm.”
Finally, appellant’s alternative theory of innocence is that he intended to harm the
unknown person, and therefore, he could not have had the requisite intent for assault-fear.
We will reverse on sufficiency -of-the-evidence grounds only if the circumstances proved
support an alternative hypothesis that is inconsistent with guilt. Harris, 895 N.W.2d at
600. But appellant’s theory of innocence is not inconsistent with guilt. It is based on
another means of completing the elements of the same crime , and instead, it is another
theory of guilt . The state presented sufficient evidence to support the intent element of
appellant’s second-degree-assault conviction.

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III. The district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing appellant.
Appellant argues that the district court’s imposition of multiple sentences for first -
and second-degree assault unfairly exaggerates the criminality of his conduct and that the
sentence for first-degree assault is disproportionate to the offense. We disagree.
The district court sentenced appellant to 60 months in prison for the felon -in-
possession conviction, 60 months for the second -degree-assault conviction, and 160
months for the first -degree-assault conviction, to run concurrently. The district cou rt
imposed the sentences in th at order, using the Hernandez method of sentencing appellant
for each crime in the order the crimes occurred, adding a criminal -history point for each ,
and using the score to calculate the subsequent sentences . See State v. W illiams, 771
N.W.2d 514, 522 (Minn. 2009) (explaining Hernandez method). Because appellant had a
prior offense involving a firearm, the district court imposed mandatory minimum sentences
of 60 months for the felon -in-possession and second -degree-assault convictions pursuant
to Minn. Stat. § 609.11, subd. 5(a) (2016).
A. The district court’s imposition of a sentence for the second-degree-
assault conviction does not unfairly exaggerate the criminality of
appellant’s conduct.

A district court may impose multiple sentences on convictions arising out of the
same behavioral incident when multiple victims are involved, provided that (1) the crimes
affect multiple victims and (2) multiple sentences do not unfairly exaggerate the criminality
of the defendant’s conduct. State v. Ferguson, 808 N.W.2d 586, 590 (Minn. 2012). We
review the district court’s decision to impose multiple sentences w ith multiple victims for
an abuse of discretion. State v. Cruz-Ramirez, 771 N.W.2d 497, 512 (Minn. 2009).

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Appellant concedes that the district court has the discretion to impose the sentences
it did. But he contends that the imposition of a sentence for the second -degree-assault
conviction unfairly exaggerated the criminality of his conduct because the first -degree-
assault conviction subsumed his actions for second-degree assault. He further contends
that this assault was less severe than the typical second-degree assault because the unknown
victim beat appellant, and appellant pulled out the gun “arguably to defend himself.”
Caselaw supports imposing multiple sentences for each victim when a defendant
has been convicted of multiple assaults. See, e.g., State v. Montalvo, 324 N.W.2d 650, 652
(Minn. 1982) (holding that imposing two sentences for two assault convictions in volving
two victims did not unfairly exaggerate criminality of appellant’s conduct ). Here, the
district court did not abuse its discretion when it imposed separate sentences for each of
appellant’s assault convictions, which involved different victims.
B. Appellant’s guideline sentence for his first-degree-assault conviction is
not disproportionate to the offense.

The district court sentenced appellant to 160 months in prison based on a c riminal-
history score of four. Appellant’s sentence is within the guideline range. See Minn. Sent.
Guidelines 4.A (providing that guideline range for first -degree assault with criminal -
history score of four is 114 to 160 months). We will not generally review a district court’s
exercise of discretion in sentencing when th e sentence is in the guideline range , and we
decline to do so here . State v. Delk , 781 N.W.2d 426, 428 (Minn. App. 2010), review
denied (Minn. July 20, 2010).
Affirmed.