State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1287

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Tamorris Mcquill Dempsey,
Appellant.

Filed June 29, 2026
Affirmed
Jesson, Judge*

Clay County District Court
File Nos. 14-CR-24-2821, 14-CR-25-627

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Brian J. Melton, Clay County Attorney, Megan J. Kelly, Assistant County Attorney,
Moorhead, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Amy Lawler, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Bond, Judge; and Jesson ,
Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JESSON, Judge
In this direct appeal, we address appellant Tamorris Mcquill Dempsey’s arguments
that he received ineffective assistance of counsel related to a plea offer and that the district
court’s 132-month sentence following his plea unfairly exaggerated the criminality of his
conduct. We conclude that the record is insufficient at this point as to Dempsey’s
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel argument and therefore decline to address the merits. But
reaching the second issue, we determine that the district court’s imposition of three
consecutive sentences following the plea does not exaggerate his criminality. As a result,
we affirm the 132-month sentence.
FACTS
In August 2024, the respondent S tate of Minnesota charged Dempsey with six
felonies: (a) attempted second- degree murder, (b) three counts of second-degree assault
with a firearm, (c) first -degree burglary, and (d) unlawful possession of a firearm. 1 This
set of charges stemmed from allegations of Dempsey going to the victims’ residence,
assaulting one victim , and then shooting towards the home with the other two victims
inside. This will be referred to as the “home-assault file.” As of January 2025, a settlement
conference was scheduled for March 13, and a jury trial was scheduled for March 17.

1 In violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.19, subd. 1(1) (2024), Minn. Stat. § 609.222, subd. 1
(2024), Minn. Stat. § 609.582, subd. 1(c) (2024), and Minn. Stat. § 609.165, subd. 1b(a)
(2024), respectively.
3
Shortly before the scheduled trial, on February 26, 2025, Dempsey was also charged
with felony third-degree assault and misdemeanor domestic assault for an unrelated event
that occurred in September of 2023. 2 According to the complaint, Dempsey was seen
yelling at someone in a grocery store parking lot and when a woman attempted to intervene,
Dempsey grabbed the woman’s neck and squeezed. This will be referred to as the “parking
lot file.”
An attorney from the public defender’s office (the public defender) was appointed
to represent Dempsey on both files. However, on February 21, 2025, a private attorney
(private counsel) assumed representation of Dempsey on the home-assault file.
On March 10, 2025, private counsel filed a motion to withdraw, and the district
court held a hearing the next day. Private counsel informed the court that at Dempsey’s
request, she was seeking to withdraw, and that Demsey would like the public defender
reappointed. At the March 11 hearing, Dempsey told the district court that between hiring
private counsel and still communicating with the public defender , he had “some things
confused.” He explained that on March 6, private counsel informed him of a plea offer
from the state that would expire on March 10. The offer was then retracted by the state on
March 7. Dempsey stated that he did not have enough time to understand the offer.
The district court stated that it was concerned Dempsey was “playing games” so
close to trial, expressed some difficulty with finding him indigent again after he had hired
private counsel, and explained that even if the public defender’s office were reappointed,

2 In violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.223, subd. 1 (2022), and Minn. Stat. § 609.2242, subd.
1(1) (2022), respectively.
4
he may not be appointed the same attorney. Private counsel stated she did not wish to make
any comments. In the end, the district court asked Dempsey if he wanted private counsel
to withdraw or not, and Dempsey stated, “I wish for her to remain my attorney.”
Two days later, private counsel requested a plea hearing, which was held on March
14. At this hearing, private counsel represented Dempsey on the home-assault file, and the
public defender appeared on the parking lot file. Dempsey entered an Alford plea in both
files.3 The district court accepted the pleas.
With regard to the home-assault file, the state’s offer of proof explained that
Dempsey and his son, Markees, went to the home of victim W.J., where W.J. was with his
fiancé and her 11- year-old child. Dempsey began pounding on the front door, and when
W.J. opened the door, Dempsey began assaulting him. Ring doorbell footage shows
Dempsey asking Markees to go to the car and get a gun, and Markees then bringing the
gun back to Dempsey. Dempsey then shot at the door and the window of the home. Five
shell casings were recovered, and bullets were recovered from the door and siding of the
home.4
On the parking lot file, the state’s offer of proof explained that victim M.H. was
driving in a grocery store parking lot and observed Dempsey yelling at her friend. When

3 In an Alford plea, the defendant maintains his innocence but admits that the state has
sufficient evidence to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at trial.
See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37-38 (1970).

4 Dempsey agreed the state would prove that Dempsey was shooting at the door and
window of the home after W.J. ran inside. Prior to this, W.J. and his fiancé were yelling
at Dempsey to leave because there was a child in the home. Dempsey was charged with
three counts of second-degree assault for shooting at the home with the three victims inside.
5
M.H. attempted to intervene, Dempsey threw a phone at her through the open window of
her vehicle. Dempsey then reached through the window, grabbed M.H. by the throat with
his hand, and squeezed. M.H. would testify that the more she struggled, the harder
Dempsey squeezed her neck. The state would also offer expert testimony on strangulation.
As part of a global plea agreement, the district court imposed a cumulative sentence
of 132 months. The chart below summarizes the plea agreement and sentencing.
Home Assault File
Count Statute Charge Disposition
1 § 609.19, subd. 1(1) Attempted second-degree murder Dismissed
2 § 609.222, subd. 1 Second-degree assault Convicted. 36
months, concurrent
w/ count 6.
3 § 609.222, subd. 1 Second-degree assault Convicted. 36
months, concurrent
w/ counts 2 & 6.
4 § 609.222, subd. 1 Second-degree assault Convicted. 36
months, concurrent
w/ counts 2, 3 & 6.
5 § 609.582, subd. 1(c) First-degree burglary Dismissed.
6 § 609.165, subd. 1b(a) Felony firearm violation Convicted. 60
months.

Parking Lot File
Count Statute Charge Disposition
1 § 609.223, subd. 1 Third-degree assault Convicted – 12
months, concurrent
w/home assault file.
2 § 609.2242, subd. 1(1) Domestic assault-fear Dismissed
TOTAL 36+36+60 = 132 MONTHS

6
At the sentencing hearing, when asked if he would like to address the court,
Dempsey stated that private counsel was ineffective, interfered with his personal life, did
not file anything in his defense, and that her investigation was flawed. He also asserted he
was pressured by her to take the offer, which he did not have time to consider, and that she
had withheld the state’s prior plea offer.
Dempsey then asked the court to consider a 96-month sentence, explaining that there
was previously a 96 -month offer from the state that he did not have sufficient time to
consider.5 He alleged that the offer had a deadline of March 10, but he received it on the
6th, and the offer was retracted on the 7th. Dempsey stated that private counsel blamed
the public defender for Dempsey not receiving the offer sooner, and that private counsel
would not tell him when she received the offer. The district court asked Dempsey if he
was requesting that the court reject the global 132-month plea agreement, and he said, “I’m
gonna go through with the—with the plea.”
Dempsey appeals.
DECISION
I. The record is insufficient for this court to evaluate Dempsey’s ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel argument on direct appeal.

Dempsey argues that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because private
counsel did not promptly convey a 96-month plea offer from the state. We begin our
analysis of this argument with the clear understanding that, when the prosecution offers a

5 Outside of Dempsey’s comments at the hearings, the district court record does not reflect
information confirming the dates or existence of the 96-month offer.
7
plea bargain, defendants have the right to effective assistance of counsel in being informed
of and considering the offer. Eason v. State, 950 N.W.2d 258, 267- 68 (Minn. 2020). On
direct appeal, Minnesota courts use the Strickland test to evaluate ineffective-assistance-
of-counsel claims. State v. Ellis-Strong, 899 N.W.2d 531, 535 (Minn. App. 2017) (citing
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). Under the two-prong Strickland test,
a defendant must show that “(1) counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness, and (2) that a reasonable probability exists that the outcome would have
been different but for counsel’s errors.” Andersen v. State, 830 N.W.2d 1, 10 (Minn. 2013).
An ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim should generally be raised in a
postconviction petition for relief, rather than on direct appeal. State v. Gustafson , 610
N.W.2d 314, 321 (Minn. 2000). This approach may provide the court with additional facts
to explain the defense attorney’s decisions, so the district court may fully consider whether
counsel’s performance failed to meet the Strickland test. Id. For example, testimony from
counsel and other witnesses who have knowledge of communications regarding the plea
agreement between counsel and the defendant may be available. Robinson v. State, 567
N.W.2d 491, 495 (Minn. 1997). And appellate courts may decline to reach the merits of
an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim on direct appeal when the record is inadequate.
Gustafson, 610 N.W.2d at 321.
Here, the only information in the record regarding counsel’s communications with
Dempsey on the alleged plea offer is contained within statements Dempsey made to the
district court at the March 11 and May 12, 2025 hearings. At the March 11 hearing,
Dempsey told the court,
8
Hiring [private counsel] and dealing with [the public defender,]
I had got some things confused. I had got an offer from the
prosecutors, and I had received some information March 5th
from her. She had talked to me on the phone, ma’am, and she
had talked to me and visited me March 6th, and I noticed the
paper date said February 26th. [Private counsel] had did some
paperwork February 24th. She was looking into my case and
doing some things, and I had a whole totally misconception
about what was going on.
. . .
By the time I got the papers or other, I had a visit with [private
counsel] on March 6th, and the date said I had an option until
March 10th, and then the same day, she had told me that [the
prosecutor] had —pulled the offer for the 7th. I didn’t even
have hours. I didn ’t even have time to understand or even
negotiate the deal with —with [private counsel], let alone [the
public defender] had supposedly mentioned it to me before, but
there was other things that [private counsel] had mentioned to
me about the offer and speaking with you, and I’m just caught
in the whole moment of everything.

And at the sentencing hearing, Dempsey asked the court to consider a 96-month
sentence because he received ineffective-assistance-of counsel. He explained that private
counsel told him that she had mentioned the offer to him in February, but that he never saw
“the paper” until March 6. According to Dempsey, the paper had a March 10 deadline, and
that “[w]hen I considered it on March 10th to take the 96 months, they said they pulled the
plea.” Dempsey said he relied on the March 10 deadline and then the offer was retracted
on the 7th. And having received the offer on March 6, which was then retracted on March
7, Dempsey explained that he had “less than 20 hours to make a decision.” Private counsel
declined to comment on anything Dempsey stated.
The above quotes and summary of Dempsey’s statements to the district court are
insufficient to review Dempsey’s claims under the Strickland test. The record does not
9
contain any information from which to determine whether counsel’s performance fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness. Private counsel said very little on the
record overall and never commented on Dempsey’s allegations. Nor did she confirm his
version of events. Any conclusions reached by this court as to whether private counsel’s
representation was deficient would be pure speculation. See Gustafson, 610 N.W.2d at 321
(“[T]he record before us is devoid of the information needed to explain the attorney’s
decisions. Under these facts, any conclusions reached by this court as to whether
Gustafson’s attorney’ s assistance was deficient would be pure speculation.”).
Furthermore, despite making his concerns known to the district court, Dempsey still stated
under oath that he wished to move forward with the 132-month offer.
Dempsey’s claims require consideration of facts not in the record. Accordingly, we
decline to reach the merits of those claims without prejudice to Dempsey’s right to raise
them in a postconviction proceeding.
II. Dempsey’s sentence does not unfairly exaggerate the criminality of his conduct.

Dempsey next argues that his sentence should be reduced because the consecutive
sentencing he received exaggerates the criminality of his conduct. “ We review a district
court’s decision to impose consecutive sentences for an abuse of discretion.” State v. Ali,
895 N.W.2d 237, 247 (Minn. 2017). And a decision regarding permissive, consecutive
sentences like those imposed here, will not be overturned unless the overall sentence
“unfairly exaggerates the criminality of the defendant’s conduct.” State v. McInnis, 962
N.W.2d 874, 892 (Minn. 2021); see also Minn. Stat. § 244.11, subd. 2(b) (2024)
(permitting appellate review of a sentence to determine if it is “unreasonable” or
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“excessive”). When evaluating whether a sentence meets this standard, we look to past
sentences received by other offenders. State v. Fardan, 773 N.W.2d 303, 322 (Minn.
2009). And we rely on our “collective, collegial experience in reviewing a large number
of criminal appeals from all the judicial districts.” State v. Norton, 328 N.W.2d 142, 146-
47 (Minn. 1982).
Here, the district court imposed two consecutive sentences of 36 months for assault
in the second-degree, and another consecutive sentence of 60 months for unlawful
possession of a firearm. This was not a departure from the guidelines; the sentences
imposed on these offenses reflect the statutory minimums. See Minn. Stat. § 609.11, subd.
5(b) (2024) (providing for “not less than five years”); Minn. Stat. § 609.11, subd. 5(a)
(2024) (providing for “not less than three years”). Moreover, consecutive sentences for
second-degree assault are permissive under the guidelines. Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.F.2
(describing permissive consecutive sentences). And Dempsey also received a concurrent
sentence for one of the second-degree assault charges in the home-assault file and a
concurrent sentence in the parking-lot file.
Because Dempsey’s crimes in the home-assault file involved the egregious conduct
of shooting at a house with three people inside, imposing consecutive sentences for two of
the assault victims and for the firearm charge does not exaggerate the criminality of his
conduct. It is a well-established principle that a defendant is more culpable when there are
multiple victims. State v. Alger, 941 N.W.2d 396, 400 (Minn. 2020). And t he supreme
court has “repeatedly affirmed the imposition of multiple consecutive sentences in cases
11
involving violent crimes against multiple victims.” Sanders v. State, 23 N.W.3d 86, 93
(Minn. 2025).
To convince us otherwise, Dempsey relies on two nonprecedential cases in which,
he asserts, other defendants received shorter sentences for far more serious conduct. 6 We
address each case in turn.
In State v. Wiley, the defendant broke into a home in the middle of the night and
shot at the two victims, but the gun misfired. No. A09-135, 2009 WL 3255600 at *1 (Minn.
App. Oct. 13, 2009), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 15, 2009) . The jury found the defendant
guilty of first-degree burglary and two counts of second-degree assault and the district court
imposed consecutive sentences of 48-month sentence for the first-degree burglary
conviction and 36-month sentences for each assault conviction, for a total of 120 months.
Id. Dempsey argues his offense was less serious than the defendant in Wiley because
Dempsey’s crime occurred during the day, and he only shot at the exterior of the home
rather than “directly at the two victims.”
We are not persuaded. As part of his Alford plea, Dempsey acknowledged that the
state’s evidence would permit a jury to find that he shot towards the window where victim
W.J. was standing and shot at the door as W.J. fled through it. Further, Dempsey’s crime
involved three victims, and he only received consecutive sentences for two of the assaults.
Finally, the defendant in Wiley was not convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm,

6 Nonprecedential opinions are not binding authority but may be cited as persuasive
authority. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

12
which carries a mandatory minimum of 60 months. Wiley does not demonstrate that
Dempsey’s sentence exaggerated the criminality of his conduct.
Nor does Dempsey’s sentence conflict with State v. Chatman. In Chatman, the
defendant got into an altercation with an unknown man and shot towards the man.
No. A18-1410, 2019 WL 3407180, at *1 (Minn. App. July 29, 2019), rev. denied (Minn.
Oct. 29, 2019). The bullet missed and struck another person waiting at a nearby bus stop,
who survived his injuries. Id. Like Dempsey, the defendant in Chatman received a 60-
month sentence for unlawful possession of a firearm. Id. The Chatman defendant also
received 60-months for second-degree assault, and 160-months for first-degree assault, to
be served concurrently. Id.
Chatman does not convince us that Dempsey’s sentence exaggerated the criminality
of his conduct. Dempsey went to the victim’s home, brought his son as back-up, and
immediately began assaulting W.J. when he opened the door. He asked for his son to get
him a gun from the car and told W.J. he was going to kill him. Dempsey then shot multiple
times at the window and exterior of the home, with an 11-year -old child inside. The
assertion that firing once is “much more serious” than firing numerous times, directly at a
home with three people inside, is not logical.
In sum, the consecutive sentences Dempsey received were permissible, do not
unfairly exaggerate the criminality of his conduct, and the district court did not abuse its
discretion by following the plea agreement and imposing the consecutive sentences.
Affirmed.