State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1546

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Aleshia Lynn Becklund,
Appellant.

Filed July 22, 2019
Reversed and remanded
Rodenberg, Judge

Wright County District Court
File No. 86-CR-17-2591

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Thomas N. Kelly, Wright County A ttorney, Greg T. Kryzer, Assist ant County Attorney,
Buffalo, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sara J. E uteneuer, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Roden berg, Presiding Judge; Cleary, Chief Judge; and
Bjorkman, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
RODENBERG, Judge
Appellant Aleshia Becklund appe als from her conviction and sentence for receiving
stolen property, arguing that her guilty plea was invalid because her plea colloquy failed to

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establish either that she knew or had reason to know the car wa s stolen or that she was in
possession of the stolen car. Because appellant’s plea colloquy contained no admission of
the element of possession, we reverse and remand.
FACTS
The state charged appellant with felony receiving stolen property under Minn. Stat.
§ 609.53, subd. 1 (2016), and gross misdemeanor giving a peace officer a false name under
Minn. Stat. § 609.506, subd. 2 (2016). Under an agreement with the state, appellant
pleaded guilty to the charge of receiving stolen property. In exchange for appellant’s plea,
the state agreed to dismiss the giving-a-peace-officer-a-false-name charge. The agreement
also contemplated that, if appellant successfully completed tre atment, the state would
recommend at sentencing that the district court consider a disp ositional departure to
probation for 30-months under a s tay of the 30-month sentence. If appellant violated the
agreement’s terms, the district court would impose the 30-month sentence.
At the guilty-plea hearing, appellant testified that she had be e n a passenger in a
stolen vehicle in May 2017. Appellant’s attorney asked her if she “made some admissions
or represented to the deputy tha t [she] possessed [the] vehicle .” Appellant answered,
“Yes.” Appellant also testified that she “knew or should have had reason to know that [the
car] was, in fact, stolen property.” The district court accept ed appellant’s guilty plea,
finding that she “made a knowi ng, voluntary and intelligent wai ver of [her] rights, [and]
provided sufficient facts to support [her] plea.”
Between the plea hearing and sentencing, appellant began a treatment program, but
she failed to complete it and was discharged. At sentencing, t he district court confirmed

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the terms of the earlier agreement and explained that it was go ing to “follow that
agreement.” The district court then sentenced appellant to a 3 0-month prison term with
277 days’ credit for time served.
This appeal followed.
D E C I S I O N
Appellant argues on appeal that her guilty plea was not valid b ecause the factual
basis provided in support of the plea did not establish two elements of the offense: (1) that
appellant “knew or had reason to know” that the car in which sh e was a passenger was
stolen, and (2) that she received, possessed, transferred, bought, or concealed the car.
Appellant did not move to withdraw her guilty plea before the d istrict court. But,
appellant is not required to have first raised the issue to the district court; she is entitled to
challenge the sufficiency of her plea on direct appeal. Brown v. State, 449 N.W.2d 180,
182 (Minn. 1989); State v. Johnson , 867 N.W.2d 210, 214 (Minn. App. 2015), review
denied (Minn. Sept. 29, 2015).
There is no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea after it has been entered. Perkins
v. State, 559 N.W.2d 678, 685 (Minn. 1997). To withdraw a guilty plea after sentencing, a
defendant must show that withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice. State v.
Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 93 (Minn. 2010) (citing Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.0 5, subd. 1). A
manifest injustice occurs if a plea is not valid. Id. at 94. A constitutionally valid plea must
be voluntary, intelligent, and accurate. Id.; see also Perkins , 559 N.W.2d at 688. A
defendant bears the burden of showing that the plea was invalid . Lussier v. State , 821
N.W.2d 581, 588 (Minn. 2012).

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An accurate plea must be established on a proper factual basis. State v. Theis, 742
N.W.2d 643, 647 (Minn. 2007). O rdinarily, an adequate factual basis is established by
questioning the defendant and asking the defendant to explain under oath in his or her own
words the circumstances s urrounding the crime. Williams v. State , 760 N.W.2d 8, 12
(Minn. App. 2009), review denied (Minn. Apr. 21, 2009). “[A] court should be particularly
wary of situations in which the factual basis is established by asking a defendant only
leading questions.” Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94. A proper factual basis exists “if the record
contains a showing that there is credible evidence available wh ich would support a jury
verdict that defendant is guilty of at least as great a crime as that to which [s]he pled guilty.”
Nelson v. State, 880 N.W.2d 852, 859 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted).
Appellant pleaded guilty to receiv ing stolen property under Min n. Stat. § 609.53,
subd. 1. A person is guilty of receiving stolen property if sh e “receives, possesses,
transfers, buys or conceals any stolen property or property obtained by robbery, knowing
or having reason to know the property was stolen or obtained by robbery.” Minn. Stat.
§ 609.53, subd. 1. Here, in orde r for appellant to be found gu ilty of receiving stolen
property, the state was required to prove that: (1) the car was stolen or obtained by robbery;
(2) appellant received, possessed, transferred, bought, or conc ealed the car; (3) appellant
knew or had reason to know the property was stolen or obtained by robbery; and
(4) appellant’s act took place on (or about) May 28, 2017, in Wright County. 10 Minnesota
Practice, CRIMJIG 16.48 (2015).
We first address appellant’s argument that her guilty plea was invalid because the
plea colloquy “established at most only that [appellant] ought to have had reason to know

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the vehicle was stolen and did not unequivocally establish that she did have reason to know
the vehicle was stolen.”
Appellant cites State v. Melina in support of her argument that her admission—that
she “should have” had reason to know that the car was stolen—provided an insuffi cient
factual basis for the required mental state. 210 N.W.2d 855, 856-57 (Minn. 1973). But in
Melina, in finding the defendant guilty, the district court’s use of the “should have known”
language was not sufficient because, at that time , Minn. Stat. § 609.53 only applied to a
defendant with actual knowledge. Minn. Stat. § 609.53, subd. 1 (1972). The statute has
since been amended to include both actors who know the property in question to be stolen
and those who have “reason to know.” See 1982 Minn. Laws ch. 613, § 1, at 1470
(amending statute and adding that any person who possesses stol en property knowing “or
having reason to know the property was stolen or obtained by ro bbery” and omitting
“knowing the same to be” language).
At the plea hearing, appellant’s attorney asked, “And you knew or should have had
reason to know that [the car] was, in fact, stolen property; is that correct?” Appellant
answered, “Yes.” The inclusion of the words “should have” before “had reason to know”
suffices to satisfy the third element of the offense.
Appellant next argues that the factual basis is insufficient to support her guilty plea
because she did not admit that she actually possessed the car.
To obtain a conviction under Minn. Stat. § 609.53, subd. 1, the state must establish
either actual or constructive possession of stolen property. State v. Peterson, 375 N.W.2d
93, 95 (Minn. App. 1985). Because the stolen property here was a car in which appellant

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was a passenger, the state was required to prove constructive p ossession. To prove
constructive possession, the state must prove that (1) police f ound the property in a place
under appellant’s exclusive control to which other people did not normally have access; or
(2) if found in a place to which others had access, there is a strong probability (inferable
from other evidence) that appellant was at the time consciously exercising dominion and
control over the property. State v. Florine, 226 N.W.2d 609, 611 (Minn. 1975).
The purpose of the constructive-possession doctrine is to inclu de within the
possession statute those cases where the state cannot prove act ual or physical possession
at the time of arrest, but where the inference is strong that t he defendant at one time
physically possessed the thing in question or exercised dominion and control over it. State
v. Lozar, 458 N.W.2d 434, 441 (Minn. App. 1990), review denied (Minn. Sept. 28, 1990).
Proximity is an important consideration in assessing constructi ve possession. State v.
Smith, 619 N.W.2d 766, 770 (Minn. App. 2000), review denied (Minn. Jan. 16, 2001).
Constructive possession need not be exclusive, but may be shared. Id.
During the plea colloquy, appellant’s attorney asked, “You made some admissions
or represented to the deputy that you possessed this vehicle?” Appellant answered “yes.”
But appellant did not admit that she actually possessed the car, and the remainder of the
plea colloquy does not establish whether appellant actually or constructively possessed the
car.
When the officer stopped the car in which appellant was a passenger, R.B. was the
driver. Appellant told the officer that the car belonged to her, but the officer later confirmed
that the car was not appellant’s and that it was stolen. The c ar was reported stolen about

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11 days earlier. There is no indication from the complaint or elsewhere in the record that
appellant ever drove the car, or that she was exercising dominion and control over it during
the 11-day period after it was stolen. What is clear from the record is that appellant’s claim
to have been the owner of the car was a lie. The remainder of the record does not provide
sufficient information to deter mine whether appellant “possesse d” the car. See Lussier,
821 N.W.2d at 589 (collecting cases and noting that the distric t court may look to other
record evidence to determine whether the plea was supported by a sufficient factual basis).
The record suggests the contrary—in a presentence investigation report, appellant stated
that her only involvement in the offense was that she was “ridi n g i n a c a r t h a t w a s n ’ t
[hers].” The record contains no other witness statements or other evidence that appellant
drove or otherwise exercised control over the vehicle.
While appellant’s plea colloquy established a factual basis con cerning the first,
third, and fourth elements, neither the plea colloquy nor the r ecord support a finding that
the possession element was admitted or proved. And we are unaware of any authority for
the notion that a person “possesses” every vehicle in which she is a passenger. On the
second element, the factual basis is insufficient. Accordingly, appellant’s guilty plea was
inaccurate, and we reverse and remand to the district court to allow appellant to withdraw
her guilty plea. But we note that, because appellant’s plea wa s made under an agreement
with the state that included dismissal of other charges, the st ate may choose to withdraw
from the agreement on remand. State v. Montermini, 819 N.W.2d 447, 455 (Minn. App.
2012); see Johnson v. State , 877 N.W.2d 776, 779 (Minn. 2016) (noting that where
appellant’s requested relief would alter a bargained-for sentence, a district court on remand

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may allow the state to withdraw from the agreement and move for ward to trial on the
original charges).
Reversed and remanded.