State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1196

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

William Deshawn Paige,
Appellant.

Filed August 2, 2021
Affirmed
Gaïtas, Judge

St. Louis County District Court
File Nos. 69DU-CR-19-2926, 69DU-CR-19-1101

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mark S. Rubin, St. Louis County Attorney , Nathaniel T. Stumme, Assistant County
Attorney, Duluth, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Amy Lawler, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Gaïtas,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
GAÏTAS, Judge
Appellant William Deshawn Paige challeng es his convictions and sentences for
receiving stolen property and thre ats of violence, arguing that his guilty pleas are invalid
and that the district court erred in imposing presumptive sentences. We affirm.
2
FACTS
In 2019, respondent State of Minnesota charged Paige with mu ltiple offenses in
three separate criminal complaints. Paige eventually reached a global settlement with the
state. He agreed to plead guilty to threats of violence, Minn. Stat. § 609.713, subd. 1
(2018), and to aiding and abetting receiving st olen property, Minn. Stat. §§ 609.05, subd.
1, .53, subd. 1 (2018). In exchange, the state agreed to recommend downward dispositional
departures from the sentencing guidelines for the offenses, 1 to dismiss the additional
charges in the complaints, and to support Paige’s request for release from jail pending the
sentencing hearing. The guilty-plea petitions, signed by Paige and received during his plea
hearing, stated that “if he is charged with a new criminal offense while awaiting sentencing,
then the State is not bound by the agreement to the departure.”
During the plea hearing, Paige’s attorney summarized the plea agreement, including
the condition that required Paige to remain law abiding pending sentencing. Paige testified
under oath that he had review ed both plea petitions “line by line” with his attorney. He
agreed that, after consulting w ith his attorney, he understood the terms of the agreement
and by signing the petitions he was confirming his understanding for the court. The district
court asked Paige whether his desire for immediate release from custody was the sole basis
for the guilty pleas, and Paige replied, “No, no, it’s not.” Paige confirmed that he
understood that violating the conditions of his release would jeopardize the plea agreement.

1 Under the agreement, Paige would receive a 36-month stay of execution and five years
of probation for the threats-of-violence offense, and a concurrent “downward dispositional
departure”—with no specified stayed sentence—for the receiving-stolen-property offense.
3
After establishing the terms of the guilty -plea agreement, Paige’s attorney asked
Paige a series of questions to provide a fact ual basis for the pleas. The attorney first
inquired about the circumstances surrounding the receiving-stolen-property offense. Paige
admitted that he had an interaction with poli ce while in possession of a laptop, gaming
console, and checkbook that did not belong to him. He stated that he found the items in a
trash bin outside an apartmen t complex and agreed that he “suspected” the items were
stolen and collectively worth more than $1,000. Regarding the threats-of-violence offense,
Paige admitted that he had threatened a residential maintenance worker with a “2x4” board
and that this action reasonably caused the worker fear. The district court found that Paige’s
admissions were sufficient to establish his guilt of the two offenses.
Following the plea hearing, Paige was re leased from custody. Soon after, Paige
threatened the same maintenance worker while wielding a knife. He was then charged in
a new complaint with second-degree assault.
At Paige’s sentencing hear ing, he moved to postpone the imposition of sentence.
He also moved to discharge his attorney and to represent himself with the assistance of
advisory counsel. The district court granted Paige’s motions.
Representing himself, Paige later filed a written motion to withdraw his guilty pleas
to threats of violence and receiving stolen property. He asserted that he “did not understand
all of the details” regarding the agreed-upon sentence, including that “the state could
change its agreement on the [d]e parture before [he] was gran ted it.” Paige’s motion also
alleged that he was “falsely charged” with a new crime. The stat e opposed the motion,
4
arguing that Paige violated a negotiated and understood term of his guilty-plea agreement
and therefore should not be allowed to withdraw the pleas.
After a hearing, the district court issu ed a written order deny ing Paige’s motion to
withdraw his guilty pleas. The district court concluded that the pleas are valid and that, at
the time of the pleas, Paige understood that the agreed-upon sentencing departure was
conditioned on no new charges, among other things.
At Paige’s request, the district court de layed sentencing until after the disposition
of the new charge. Paige was found guilty, convicted, and sentenced in the new case. He
later appeared for sentencing in this case. Again representing himself, Paige asked the
district court to honor the terms of the orig inal plea agreement and to impose downward
dispositional departures for the threats-o f-violence and receiv ing-stolen-property
convictions. The state opposed any departure, requesting an executed sentence within the
presumptive range because Paige had failed to remain law abiding.
The district court denied Paige’s depart ure motion and sentenced him to 36 months
in prison for the threats-of-violence conviction and a concurrent term of 21 months for the
receiving-stolen-property conviction.
Paige appeals.
DECISION
I. Paige’s guilty pleas are constitutionally valid.

Paige first argues that his guilty pleas are constitutionally infirm. To satisfy
constitutional requirements, a guilty plea must be intelligent, accurate, and voluntary.
Dikken v. State , 896 N.W.2d 873, 876 (Minn. 2017). A defendant bears the burden of
5
showing that a guilty plea does not comport with these requirements. State v. Raleigh, 778
N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn. 2010). The validity of a guilty plea presents a question of law that
is reviewed de novo. Id.
Paige raises two separate challenges to th e validity of his guilty pleas. He first
argues that his pleas are “unintelligent” beca use the plea agreement did not specify what
would happen if the state was no longer bound by its terms. And he contends that his guilty
pleas are inaccurate because they are not supported by sufficient facts.
A. The guilty pleas are intelligent.
Paige first argues that the district c ourt abused its discre tion in denying his
presentencing motion to withdraw his guilty pleas because the pleas are not intelligent. He
claims that his pleas are “unintelligent” because his plea agreement did not make clear that
the district court would have authority to impose the presumptive sentence if Paige failed
to remain law abiding pending sentencing.
When a defendant moves to withdraw a guil ty plea before sentencing, the district
court may, “[i]n its discretion[,] . . . allow the defendant to withdraw a plea . . . if it is fair
and just to do so.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 2. That decision will be reversed “only
in the rare case” that the district court has conclusively abused its discretion. State v. Jones,
921 N.W.2d 774, 782 (Minn. A pp. 2018) (quotation omitted), review denied (Minn.
Feb. 27, 2019). This is not one of those rare cases.
“To be intelligent, a guilty plea must represent a k nowing and intelligent choice
among the alternative courses of action available.” Dikken, 896 N.W.2d at 877 (quotation
and alterations omitted). “Whether a plea is intelligent depends on what the defendant
6
knew at the time he entered the plea . . . .” Id. More specifically, a plea is intelligent when
it embodies the defendant’s understanding of the charges, the rights he has waived, and,
most importantly here, the consequences of entering the plea. Id.; see Nelson v. State, 880
N.W.2d 852, 858 (Minn. 2016).
The district court rejected Paige’s ar gument that his pleas are not intelligent,
observing that Paige’s attorney took “great care” in reviewing the plea agreement and made
a “detailed record” in court. Accordingly, the district court concluded that plea withdrawal
on this basis would not be fair and just. Ba sed on our de novo review of the record, we
agree that Paige’s guilty pleas are intelligent.
The written guilty-plea petitions stated, among other conditi ons, that “if [Paige] is
charged with a new criminal offense while awaiting sentencing, then the State is not bound
by the agreement to the departure.” Defense counsel read all terms of the plea agreement
into the record, including the following.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Mr. Paige will be released from
custody at the time of the plea – so today – onto [intensive
pretrial release] . . . .

The agreement calls for fi ve years of supervised
probation. If between now and sentencing Mr. Paige fails to
comply with [intensive pretrial release] , fails to either
cooperate with the Presentence Investigation process or appear
for sentencing, or is charged with a new criminal offense, then
the State would no longer be bound by its agreement for a
downward departure . All sentences are going to run
concurrent.

(Emphasis added.) Defense counsel repeated these terms twice while summarizing the
agreement. Paige also agreed that he had reviewed the plea petitions with his attorney “line
7
by line” and confirmed that he fully understood the terms of the agreem ent. The district
court then verified that Paige understood the relevant consequences of pleading guilty:
THE COURT: Well, um, my only question, Mr. Paige, is you
– obviously, you’re getting, um, out of jail as a component of
this agreement, right, onto – onto Pretrial Release?

PAIGE: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: But you, um – that’s not the only reason you’re
pleading guilty?

PAIGE: No, no, it’s not.

THE COURT: And you fully u nderstand that if you don’t
follow what happens, th at that – you may no t stay out of jail,
right?

PAIGE: Yes, I understand that.

THE COURT: And you may no t have the departure, you
understand that?

PAIGE: Yeah, I know what probation is, Your Honor.

Paige argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to withdraw his pleas
because he did not understand that, if he viol ated the plea agreement, the district court
would have authority to impose the presump tive sentence. But as noted, the record does
not support that claim. Instead, the record shows that Paige understood the consequences
of pleading guilty and his obligations under the plea agreement. He also understood what
would happen if he violated the plea agreement—he would go back to jail and he would
not be guaranteed a downward departure. We therefore conclude that the district court did
not abuse its discretion in denying Paige’s motion to withdraw his guilty pleas on the
ground that the pleas are not intelligent.
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B. The guilty pleas are accurate.
Paige next argues that his guilty pleas are not accurate. He did not challenge the
accuracy of his guilty pleas in the district court; he raises this claim for the first time on
appeal. A defendant may att ack the validity of a guilty plea on direct appeal. Brown v.
State, 449 N.W.2d 180, 182 (Minn. 1989). But once a defendant has been sentenced, plea
withdrawal is only permissible “if withdraw al is necessary to correct a ‘manifest
injustice.’” Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 93 (quoting Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1).
A manifest injustice occurs when a guilty plea is not accurate. Id. at 94. “For a
guilty plea to be accurate, a factual basis must be established showing that the defendant’s
conduct meets all elements of the offense to which he is pleading guilty.” Jones, 921
N.W.2d at 779; see also State v. Iverson , 664 N.W.2d 346, 349-50 (Minn. 2003). If the
defendant negates an essential element of the offense during the plea colloquy, the factual
basis is inaccurate and the plea is invalid. Jones, 921 N.W.2d at 779.
Paige contends that his admissions during the guilty-plea hearing failed to establish
his guilt of the two offenses, rendering the pleas inaccurate and therefore invalid. Applying
de novo review, we examine each offense sepa rately to ensure that Paige’s admissions
during the plea hearing satisfied th e elements of the offenses. See State v. Johnson , 867
N.W.2d 210, 214-15 (Minn. App. 2015) (reviewing de novo th e accuracy of appellant’s
guilty plea, which appellant challenged for the first time on direct appeal), review denied
(Minn. Sept. 29, 2015).
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Receiving stolen property
The receiving-stolen-property statute provides that “any person who receives,
possesses, . . . or conceals any stolen property or property obtained by robbery, knowing or
having reason to know the property was stolen or obtained by robbery ,” is guilty of this
offense. Minn. Stat. § 609.53, subd. 1 (emphasis added). Paige claims that his guilty plea
to aiding and abetting receiv ing stolen property is in accurate because he merely
“suspected” the items in his possession were stolen. He contends that suspecting property
is stolen does not satisfy the knowledge element.
During his plea colloquy, Paige admitted that police found him in possession of a
laptop, gaming co nsole, and a checkbook th at did not belong to him. The following
exchange then occurred:
DEFENSE COUNSEL: [W]hen you had the contact with law
enforcement, you kind of told them how you came into
possession of the property, right?

PAIGE: Yes, I did.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: That y ou had found it in – the day
before outside of – so on Chri stmas, when they had contact
with you outside of that apartment building, that you had found
the property in the garbage can there?

PAIGE: Yes.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: And now you and I have had a few
discussions about this matter, right?

PAIGE: Yes.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: And with regards to, you know, the
items in question, particularly, like, the laptop, [video game
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console] and checkbook, not items that are typically thrown
away, right?

PAIGE: Yes.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: And that you’re agreeing that it’s
completely reasonable to say you should have had – you know,
we’re not talking about actua l knowledge, but that it’s
completely reasonable, you sh ould have known or suspected
they were stolen?

PAIGE: Yeah, I suspected it.

Paige plainly agreed that he had reason to know that the items were stolen and, in fact,
suspected this was the case.
Moreover, “[k]nowledge that the prop erty was stolen may be proven by
circumstantial evidence.” State v. True, 378 N.W.2d 45, 48 (Minn. App. 1985); see also
State v. Becklund , A18-1546, 2019 WL 3293462, at *2 (Minn. App. July 22, 2019)
(upholding guilty plea wh ere defendant agreed when aske d: “And you knew or should
have had reason to know that [the car] was, in fact, stolen property; is that correct?”). Paige
also acknowledged that expensive electronics and a checkbook are not typically thrown in
the trash. This admission provided additi onal circumstantial evidence of Paige’s
knowledge that the items were stolen.
We conclude that Paige’s ad missions were sufficient to establish the elements of
receiving stolen property. Thus, his guilty plea to this offense is accurate.
Threats of violence
A person who “threatens, dire ctly or indirectly, to co mmit any crime of violence
with purpose to terrorize another or to cause evacuation of a build ing, . . . or in a reckless
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disregard of the risk of causing such terror” commits the offe nse of threats of violence.
Minn. Stat. § 609.713, subd. 1. “A threat is a declaration of an intention to injure another
or his property by some unlawful act.” State v. Olson, 887 N.W.2d 692, 698 (Minn. App.
2016) (quotation omitted). Threats can be made through words or actions. Id.
Paige asserts that, because he did not adm it to having the intent to terrorize or to
cause evacuation of a building, his guilty plea to threats of violence is inaccurate. He
argues that “[he] told the district court that he picked up a 2x4 but did not hit or threaten to
hit the maintenance worker.”
But the record reveals that Paige admitted that he bra ndished a piece of wood and
threatened the victim with it. He further agreed that, by usi ng the 2x4 to scare the victim
away from his apartment, he made a threat of violence and reasonably caused the victim
fear. During questioning by the state, Paige conceded, “Yeah, he got – he got in my face,
start[ed] yelling, so I picked something up to back him up, so, yeah, I did threaten him .”
(Emphasis added.)
Given these admissions, we are satisfied that there is an adequate factual basis for
the offense of threats of violence. We therefore reject Paige’s claim that his guilty plea is
inaccurate.
In sum, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Paige’s presentencing motion to withdraw his guilty pleas and that there is no manifest
injustice requiring plea withdrawal because Paige’s pleas are accurate. We therefore reject
Paige’s request to remand to the district court for plea withdrawal.
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II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing presumptive
sentences after Paige violated his conditional plea agreement.

Paige also argues that the district court erred in imposing the presumptive sentences
for his offenses and in imposing a sentence on the upper end of the presumptive range for
the threats-of-violence conviction. According to Paige, his “plea agreement did not give
the court discretion as to his sentence, a nd did not convert the plea agreement into a
‘straight plea’ following [his] new charge.” He contends that the district court should have
either imposed his bargained-for downward dispositional departures or allowed him to
withdraw his guilty pleas.
“The essence of plea agreements . . . is that they repres ent a bargained-for
understanding between the gove rnment and criminal defendants in which each side
foregoes certain rights and assumes certain risks in exchange for a degree of certainty as to
the outcome of criminal matters.” State v. Meredyk, 754 N.W.2d 596, 603 (Minn. App.
2008) (quoting United States v. Porter , 405 F.3d 1136, 1145 ( 10th Cir. 2005)). District
courts resolve fact questions regarding the terms of a plea agreement. State v. Brown, 606
N.W.2d 670, 674 (Minn. 2000). But the interpretation and enforcement of plea agreements
present questions of law that appellate courts review de novo. Id.
In interpreting a plea agreem ent, Minnesota courts “look to what the parties to the
plea bargain reasonably understood to be the terms of the agreement.” Id. (quotation and
alteration omitted). A court may consider both the terms included in the plea petition and
those expressed on the record during the plea hearing. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.01, subd.
13
1; In re Ashman, 608 N.W.2d 853, 858 (Minn. 2000); State v. Hamacher, 511 N.W.2d 458,
459-60 (Minn. App. 1994).
Here, both plea petitions cont ained nearly identical cl auses expressing that the
parties “agree to a downward dispositional departure,” but that “the State is not bound by
its agreement to a departure” if Paige is char ged with a new offense before sentencing.
Under the clear terms of the plea agreement, the promised departures were explicitly
conditioned on Paige remaining law abiding until sentencing.
Where a plea agreement includes an unconditional promise for a particular sentence,
the district court must either impose the agreed-upon senten ce or allow the defendant to
withdraw the plea. See State v. Kunshier , 410 N.W.2d 377, 379- 80 (Minn. App. 1987),
review denied (Minn. Oct. 21, 1987); see also Kochevar v. State , 281 N.W.2d 680, 687
(Minn. 1979) (“It is well settled that an un qualified promise which is a part of a plea
arrangement must be honored or else the guilt y plea may be withdraw n.”). But a district
court has no obligation to im pose an agreed-upon senten ce that was premised on a
condition that the defendant violated. See State v. Montez, 899 N.W.2d 200, 203-04 (Minn.
App. 2017) (concluding that agreed-upo n sentence was conditioned on defendant
remaining law abiding, and a vi olation of that condition afford ed district court discretion
to determine sentence); State v. Batchelor , 786 N.W.2d 319, 324 (Minn. App. 2010)
(determining reduced sentence hinged on plea agreement condition requiring defendant to
remain law abiding); cf. Black v. State, 725 N.W.2d 772, 776 (Minn. App. 2007) (noting
that “appellant did not receive an unqualif ied promise regarding the sentence to be
imposed” and, despite the district court’ s warnings, appellant entered a voluntary and
14
intelligent plea). Likewise, a defendant is not entitled to plea withdrawal under these
circumstances. See Batchelor, 786 N.W.2d at 324. Because Paige’s agreed-upon
downward dispositional departur es were conditional, and he violated the condition, the
district court was not obligated to impose a ny particular sentence or to allow Paige to
withdraw his guilty pleas.
Absent substantial and compelling circumstances, the district court was required to
impose sentences within the presumptive ranges provided by the Minnesota Sentencing
Guidelines. State v. Walker , 913 N.W.2d 463, 468 (Minn. App. 2018); Minn. Sent.
Guidelines 2.D.1 (2018). “This court will not generally review a district court’s exercise
of its discretion to sentence a defendant when the sentence im posed is within the
presumptive guidelines range.” State v. Delk, 781 N.W.2d 426, 428 (Minn. App. 2010),
review denied (Minn. July 20, 2010). Here, the district court imposed presumptive
sentences for both offenses. See Minn. Sent. Guidelines 4.A, 5.A (2018). 2 Although the
sentence for the threats-of-violence offense was at the upper end of the presumptive range,
the district court was well within its discreti on to impose this sentence. Accordingly, the
district court did not err in sentencing Paige.
Affirmed.

2 While one of Paige’s offenses occurred in December 2018 and the other in August 2019,
the applicable sentencing gu idelines are identical. See Minn. Sent. Guidelines 4.A, 5.A
(Supp. 2019).