James Salvatore Bergman,

1
STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN SUPREME COURT

A18-1784

Court of Appeals Chutich, J.

James Salvatore Bergman,

Respondent,

vs. Filed: February 5, 2020
Office of Appellate Courts
Isanti County Sheriff Christopher Caulk,

Appellant.

________________________

Daniel C. Guerrero, Meshbesher & Spence, Ltd., Minneapolis, Minnesota, for respondent.

Jeffrey R. Edblad, Isanti County Attorney, Timothy C. Nelson, Chief Deputy County
Attorney, Cambridge, Minnesota, for appellant.

Richard D. Hodsdon, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for amicus curiae Minnesota Sheriffs’
Association.
________________________

S Y L L A B U S
Respondent’s right to carry a firearm cannot be reinstated because a district court’s
inherent authority to seal judicial records is not sufficient to satisfy the “expunge ment”
required by section 921(a)(33)(B)(ii) of Title 18 of the United States Code.
Reversed.
2
O P I N I O N
CHUTICH, Justice.
This case considers the narrow question of whether the sealing of judicial records
by the inherent authority of a Minnesota district court is sufficient under federal law to
expunge a previous conviction of respondent James Salvatore Bergman and thereby
reinstate his firearm rights. In 2007, a district court issued an expungement order under its
inherent authority that sealed the judicial records of Bergman’s prior conviction of
domestic assault. Bergman then applied for, and received a permit to carry a firearm . In
2018, the Isanti County Sheriff, appellant Christopher Caulk (the Sheriff), denied
Bergman’s permit-to-carry application because of his prior domestic assault conviction.
Bergman petitioned the district court for a writ of mandamus , which was denied.
Upon appeal, a divided panel of the court of appeals reversed, holding that Bergman was
not disqualified from receiving a permit to carry a firearm. Because we conclude that the
sealing of judicial records under a court’s inherent authority does not satisfy the federal
requirement of expungement, we reverse.
FACTS
Bergman was convicted in 1996 of domestic assault. In 2007, Bergman sought to
expunge his conviction in order “to possess a firearm for the purpose of hunting.” An
Anoka County district court granted Bergman relief under its inherent authority . The
expungement order directed the county court administrator to seal Bergman’s file, remove
the case caption from index books and records open to the public, and “refrain from
disclosing or revealing the file contents without a court order or specific statutory
3
authority.” The district court also ordered the county corrections department to “seal or
otherwise remove references from its records related to [Bergman]’s arrest and subsequent
court proceedings . . . to preclude any public access.”
Bergman states that, starting in 2008, he was consistently granted a permit to carry
a firearm. In 2018, the Sheriff denied Bergman’s permit-to-carry application. In doing so,
the Sheriff relied upon Minnesota Statutes section 624.713, subdivision (1)(10)(viii)
(2018), which incorporates federal law prohibiting a person convicted of “a misdemeanor
crime of domestic violence” from possessing a firearm. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (2018).
Bergman requested reconsideration, but the Sheriff again denied his permit application.
Bergman appealed to the Isanti County District Court by filing a petition for writ of
mandamus under Minnesota Statutes section 624.714, subdivision 12 (2018), asking that
the court order the Sheriff to issue him a permit to carry. The court denied Bergman’s
petition. The court concluded that, because the sealing of Bergman’s conviction did not
remove or eliminate the conviction, it was not “ removed or eliminated as def ined under
federal law.”
Bergman appealed, and a divided panel of the court of appeals reversed the decision
of the district court. Bergman v. Caulk , 931 N.W.2d 114 (Minn. App. 2019). The court
looked to state law “to determine whether Bergman’s domestic-assault conviction” was
expunged. Id. at 117. The court determined that “[f]ederal law does not require that the
expungement be statutory or result in the sealing of records in every branch of
government.” Id. The court concluded that the “2007 expungement order meets the plain
4
meaning of ‘expunged’ in 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(B)(ii),” so that Bergman was “not
disqualified from holding a carry permit.” Id.
The dissent contended that sealing judicial records had no effect on the executive
branch records of Bergman’s conviction, noting that Minnesota distinguishes between
sealing judicial records through inherent authority and the statutory sealing of records held
in the executive branch. Id. at 118–19 (Worke, J., dissenting). The dissent concluded that
the majority’s reasoning “negates the legislative intent to deny permits to carry to
individuals convicted of domestic violence crimes.” Id. at 119.
The Sheriff appealed, and we granted his petition for review.
ANALYSIS
This case requires us to interpret federal and state statutes, and we review matters
of statutory interpretation de novo. Christianson v. Henke, 831 N.W.2d 532, 535
(Minn. 2013).
At the outset, we note that this case does not concern any constitutional challenges.
Nor does Bergman raise any claims of estoppel or contest that his 1996 conviction was for
a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.” The case is simply one of statutory
interpretation, and we look to the relevant state and federal laws to discern the meaning
and import of “expungement.”
Minnesota law makes it a crime for anyone to possess a firearm in public without a
permit. See Minn. Stat. § 624.714, subd. 1a (2018). Applications for carry permits are
“made to the county sheriff where the applicant resides.” Id., subd. 2(a) (2018). Sheriffs
must issue the permit if the person (1) has gun safety training; (2) is “at least 21 years old
5
and a citizen or a permanent resident of the United States;” (3) “completes an application
for a permit;” (4) is not prohibited under certain enumerated provisions; and (5) “is not
listed in the criminal gang investigative data system.” Id., subd. 2(b).
But a sheriff must not issue a permit to a person prohibited from possessing a firearm
under section 624.713 or “any federal law.” Minn. Stat. § 624.714, subd. 2(b)(v), (ix).
Section 624.713 specifically prohibits “a person who . . . is disqualified from possessing a
firearm under United States Code, title 18, section 922(g) . . . (9)” from possessing a
firearm. Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(10)(viii).
This specific federal provision— section 922(g)(9)—makes it “unlawful for any
person . . . convicted in any court of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, to . . .
possess . . . any firearm.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (emphasis added). In turn,
section 921(a)(33) of the United States Code, Title 18, defines “misdemeanor crime of
domestic violence” and also references “expungement.”
Specifically, subsection 921(a)(33)(B)(ii) provides:
A person shall not be considered to have been convicted of such an offense
for purposes of this chapter if the conviction has been expunged or set aside,
or is an offense for which the person has been pardoned or has had civil rights
restored (if the law of the applicable jurisdiction provides for the loss of civil
rights under such an offense) unless the pardon, expungement, or restoration
of civil rights expressly provides that the person may not ship, transport,
possess, or receive firearms.

18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(B)(ii) (emphasis added).1

1 Notably, the court of appeals did not refer to this subsection, but instead referenced
an inapplicable subsection of section 921 that defines “crimes punishable by imprisonment
for a term exceeding one year.” 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20) (2018). Subsection 921(a)(20)
6
Minnesota law therefore incorporates by reference federal law that prohibits persons
convicted of misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence from carrying firearms. Minn. Stat.
§ 624.713, subd. 1(10)(viii). And section 921(a)(33) in Title 18 of the United States Code
provides the relevant federal definition of misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence,
including a reference to whether a crime has been expunged. 2 Because Minnesota law
incorporates this federal law, we conclude that the federal meaning of expungement applies
when determining whether a conviction of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence has
been expunged so as to reinstate firearm rights in Minnesota.
When considering a federal statute, “our task is to give effect to the will of
Congress.” Goodman v. Best Buy, Inc. , 777 N.W.2d 755, 758 (Minn. 2010) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 570
(1982)). If the intent is clear and unambigu ous, then no further analysis is necessary. Id.

differs from subsection 921(a)(33)(B)(ii) by explicitly directing courts to determine
whether such a crime has occurred by looking to the law of the jurisdiction of conviction:

What constitutes a conviction of such a crime shall be determined in
accordance with the law of the jurisdiction in which the proceedings were
held. Any conviction which has been expunged, or set aside or for which a
person has been pardoned or has had civil rights restored shall not be
considered a conviction for purposes of this chapter, unless such pardon,
expungement, or restoration of civil rights expressly provides that the person
may not ship, transport, possess, or receive firearms.

Id. (emphasis added).

2 This subsection says nothing about whether state or federal law should apply to
determine when a conviction is expunged under the statute. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 921(a)(33)(B)(ii) (referring only to the law of the “applicable jurisdiction” in reference
to the restoration of civil rights).
7
We consider the “bare meaning” of the words, as well as their “placement and purpose in
the statutory scheme.” Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, where Congress has not defined “expunged” or “expungement,” we may
consider dictionary definitions to determine a word’s plain meaning. See, e.g., id. at 759
n.2. Because the word “expunge” “frequently appears as a legal [ term] in statutory
references, we may look to legal dictionaries to define it.” Getz v. Peace, 934 N.W.2d 347,
354 (Minn. 2019); see also Minn. Stat. § 645.08(1) (2018). Expunge is defined as “[t]o
remove from a record, list, or book; to erase or destroy .”3 Expunge, Black’s Law
Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).
Applying this definition of expunge here, we must determine whether the 2007
district court expungement order that sealed the judicial records of Bergman’s 1996

3 Federal cases interpreting the term “expunge” as used in section 921(a)(33)(B)(ii) ,
have concluded “that Congress intended . . . to require a state procedure that completely
removes the effects of the misdemeanor conviction in question.” Wyoming ex rel. Crank
v. United States, 539 F.3d 1236, 1239 (10th Cir. 2008 ). See also Jennings v. Mukasey,
511 F.3d 894, 899 (9th Cir. 2007) (concluding that a conviction had not been expunged
when California law contains a “sweeping limitation” on the relief it offers, precluding
persons afforded relief under this statute from possessing a firearm).
The federal cases cited by Bergman do not contradict this interpretation of
expungement because they involve circumstances where, by state law, the effects of the
previous conviction have been completely removed from records. See United States v.
Laskie, 258 F.3d 1047, 1050–52 (9th Cir. 2001) (overturning a conviction for being a felon
in possession of a firearm because an “honorable discharge” of a previous drug conviction
was “unequivocal,” changed the finding of “Guilty” to “Not Guilty,” and released Laskie
from “all penalties and disabilities resulting from the crime of which he has been
convicted”); Siperek v. United States, 270 F. Supp.3d 1242, 1249 (W.D. Wash. 2017)
(concluding that the expungement of plaintiff’s juvenile adjudication was established under
federal law because “Washington law clearly dictates that . . . the sealing of a juvenile
record constitutes expungement of the juvenile offense” because the statute explicitly states
that “the proceedings in the case shall be treated as if they never happened”).
8
conviction removed, erased, or destroyed Bergman’s conviction. 4 In State v. M.D.T., we
spoke about the limitations of sealing judicial records through expungement by inherent
authority. There we said, “[r]ecognition of inherent judicial authority to expunge . . .
criminal records held in the executive branch would effectively override the legislative
policy judgments expressed in” the statutes on expungement. 831 N.W.2d 276, 283 (Minn.
2013). We concluded that it is well-settled law that the sealing of judicial records under
inherent authority simply does not reach those records that are held in the executive branch.
Id. at 282, 284. Accordingly, the district court expungement order here sealed Bergman’s
judicial records, but his executive branch records still exist.
In Minnesota, when sheriffs consider an applicant’s initial or ongoing eligibility, the
law requires them to check records that are held in the executive branch, namely the
National Instant Criminal Background Check System and the Minnesota Crime
Information System. See Minn. Stat. § 624.714, subd. 4(a), (c) (2018). Consequently,
when the Sheriff ran a routine background check to determine Bergman’s eligibility to
possess a firearm, his conviction appeared in the records that the Sheriff was required by
law to check; the Sheriff therefore determined that Bergman was disqualified from

4 We note that, in 2007, expungement by a district court’s inherent authority was the
only remedy available to Bergman. Minnesota Statutes sections 609A.01–.04 (2018) now
provide for statutory expungement, including statutory expungement of misdemeanor
crimes of domestic violence. See Minn. Stat. § 609A.02, subd. 3(a)(3). This remedy may
be available to Bergman. Because the question before us involves the narrower question
of whether expungement by inherent authority satisfies subsection 921(a)(33)(B)(ii), we
express no opinion as to whether statutory expungement may do so.
9
possessing a firearm. Bergman’s conviction was not removed, erased, or destroyed from
the executive branch records relevant to considering an application to possess a firearm.
In sum, the expungement that took place in 2007 under the district court’s inherent
authority did not remove, erase, or destroy the executive branch records of Bergman’s prior
domestic assault conviction. We therefore hold that expungement by inherent authority
does not by itself satisfy the federal meaning of expungement, and Bergman’s right to carry
a firearm in Minnesota cannot be reinstated under these circumstances.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals.
Reversed.