State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1806

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Carla Leanne Keezer,
Appellant.

Filed September 30, 2019
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

Wadena County District Court
File No. 80-CR-17-811

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Karen B. McGillic, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Kyra L. Ladd, Wadena County Attorney, Wadena, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Richard Schmitz, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Cleary, C hief Judge; and
Cochran, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
COCHRAN, Judge
Appellant Carla Leanne Keezer cha llenges her controlled-substan ce-sale
conviction, arguing that the evidence presented to the jury was insufficient to support the

2
conviction because the state’s w itness was not credible. Becau se we defer to the jury’s
credibility determinations, we affirm.
FACTS
In October 2017, a police office r was conducting surveillance n ear appellant
Carla Leanne Keezer’s residence. The officer had information t hat Keezer’s son was
importing methamphetamine from another state. While monitoring t h e r e s i d e n c e , t h e
officer spoke with an individual (the informant) who was in a v e h i c l e n e a r b y . T h e
informant had a syringe used for methamphetamine in plain view. At the time, the
informant was on probation for fifth-degree controlled-substance crime. The officer asked
the informant where he had come from, and the informant respond ed that he had come
from Keezer’s residence. The informant also told the officer t hat he had purchased
methamphetamine from Keezer. The officer asked the informant w hether he would be
willing to buy additional drugs from Keezer. In return, the of ficer told the informant that
he would not charge the informant with possession of the methamphetamine syringe, which
would also constitute a probation violation for the informant. The informant agreed to
participate in a controlled buy.
The controlled buy occurred later that same day. Several officers were involved in
the controlled buy. The officers gave the informant a recording device to wear. The device
recorded audio of the controlled buy and allowed the officers i nvolved to listen in on the
controlled buy as it happened. The officers gave $800 to the i nformant to purchase an
ounce of methamphetamine from Keezer. They took pictures of the money to document it
before giving it to the informant. The officers also searched the informant and his car

3
before the controlled buy. The officers instructed the informa nt to go to Keezer’s
residence, purchase an ounce of methamphetamine, and meet them at a specified location
afterwards. The informant cont acted Keezer and made arrangemen t s t o m e e t a t h e r
residence. Three police vehicles followed the informant to Keezer’s residence.
When the informant arrived, Keezer and two men were at the resi dence. Keezer
asked the informant to take her to the gas station, which he di d. Police officers followed
them to and from the gas station and observed Keezer in the car . The officers could hear
the informant and Keezer having a conversation through the reco rding device during the
trip to the gas station. When the informant and Keezer returne d to Keezer’s residence,
Keezer went upstairs to her room and the informant eventually followed. Another one of
the men at the residence, Williams, was also in Keezer’s room. Keezer told the informant
that she only had about a quarter-ounce of methamphetamine and that she would give him
the rest in the morning. The informant gave Keezer $700 with t he understanding that
Keezer would give him the rest of the ounce the following day. Keezer’s voice was the
only woman’s voice on the audio re cording of the transaction. Police officers connected
Keezer to the voice on the recording because they had seen her in the car on the way to the
gas station and recognized her voice from listening to her conversation with the informant
while they drove to the gas station.
After the transaction, the infor m a n t l e f t K e e z e r ’ s r e s i d e n c e a nd went to his car.
While in the car, he took a piece of the methamphetamine that Keezer sold to him and hid
it in an electric razor. He then met with the police officers. T h e o f f i c e r s a s k e d t h e
informant whether he had taken some of the methamphetamine for himself. The informant

4
confessed that he took some of it. He told them that it was in the razor. A Bureau of
Criminal Apprehension forensic scientist tested the substance that the informant provided
to police and confirmed that it was approximately 4.4 grams of methamphetamine.
Following the controlled buy, police obtained a warrant to sear ch Keezer’s
residence. They executed the wa rrant later that night. Keezer , Williams, another man
named Basswood, and a fourth man (the homeowner) were all prese nt when the warrant
was executed. Basswood had $60 of the controlled-buy fund money and another $20 was
found in Williams’s bedroom.
The state charged Keezer with thi rd-degree controlled-substance sale under
Minn. Stat. § 152.023, subd. 1(1) (2016), and petty misdemeanor possession of drug
paraphernalia under Minn. Stat. § 152.092(a) (2016), but dismis sed the paraphernalia
charge prior to trial. The sale charge proceeded to jury trial. The state called the informant,
who testified that Keezer sold hi m methamphetamine. The state introduced the audio
recording of the controlled buy. The informant testified that the female voice on the
recording was Keezer’s. At one point in the recording, Keezer counted out the money that
the informant gave her in exchange for the methamphetamine. Ke ezer also said, “I will
give you more tomorrow when we have more. Okay?” The state also called police officer
witnesses who were involved in surveilling the controlled buy. Both parties made remarks
in their closing arguments abou t the informant’s credibility, a n d t h e d e f e n s e a t t o r n e y
specifically referenced the informant’s criminal history and his attempt to keep some of the
methamphetamine from the contro lled buy. The jury found Keezer guilty. The district
court convicted Keezer and sentenced her to 57 months’ imprisonment.

5
Keezer appeals.
D E C I S I O N
Keezer challenges the sufficiency o f the evidence supporting he r conviction of
third-degree controlled-substance sale under Minn. Stat. § 152.023, subd. 1(1). She argues
that the informant was inherently not credible because of his criminal history, his purported
motive to lie, his attempt to k eep a portion of the controlled- buy methamphetamine, and
his imprecise testimony.
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a convi ction, this court
conducts “a painstaking analysis o f the record to determine whe ther the evidence, when
viewed in the light most favorable to the conviction, was suffi cient.” State v. Ortega ,
813 N.W.2d 86, 100 (Minn. 2012) (quotation omitted). We assume that “the jury believed
the state’s witnesses and disbe lieved any evidence to the contr ary.” State v. Caldwell ,
803 N.W.2d 373, 384 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted). “[W]e will not disturb the verdict
if the jury, acting with due regard for the presumption of innocence and the requirement of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty
of the charged offense.” Ortega, 813 N.W.2d at 100.
Keezer argues that the informant ’s testimony was inherently not credible and that
his testimony cannot support her conviction without evidence corroborating the testimony.
Her argument is not supported by case law. The supreme court has held that “a conviction
can rest on the uncorroborated testimony of a single credible witness.” State v. Foreman,
680 N.W.2d 536, 539 (Minn. 2004) (quotation omitted). “The wei ght and credibility of

6
individual witnesses is for the jury to determine.” State v. Bliss , 457 N.W.2d 385, 390
(Minn. 1990). The court of appeals “cannot retry the facts.” Id. at 391.
Keezer notes that the Minnesota Supreme Court has reversed convictions based on
uncorroborated witness testimony where “additional reasons to q uestion [the witness’s]
credibility” exist. See Foreman, 680 N.W.2d at 539. But, in each of the cases cited by
Keezer, there were unique circumstances that gave rise to addit ional reasons to question
the witness’s credibility. For example, in State v. Huss , 506 N.W.2d 290, 292-93
(Minn. 1993), the supreme court reversed a conviction of crimin al sexual conduct
supported by a young child victim’s testimony of sexual abuse b y her father where there
was expert testimony that the young victim had been exposed by her mother to highly
suggestive material. In State v. Langteau, 268 N.W.2d 76, 77 (Minn. 1978), the supreme
court reversed a conviction for assault based on the victim’s u ncorroborated testimony
because the victim’s testimony was questionable and unexplained. And in State v. Gluff,
172 N.W.2d 63, 65 (Minn. 1969), the supreme court reversed a ro bbery conviction based
on an uncorroborated identificati on of the defendant because th e witness had seen the
perpetrator for only a short time and there had been errors in the lineup process.
Other circumstances that arguably affect a witness’s credibility, however, have not
required reversal of a conviction. For example, in State v. Hill , 172 N.W.2d 406, 407
(Minn. 1969), the supreme court affirmed a conviction based on a witness’s testimony
despite the witness’s statements outside of court that he would testify against the defendant
because he did not like the defendant. In State v. Reichenberger , 182 N.W.2d 692, 694
(Minn. 1970), the supreme court affirmed a conviction based on a victim’s testimony

7
despite the victim’s conflicting statements about the incident at various times prior to trial.
And in State v. Triplett, 435 N.W.2d 38, 44-45 (Minn. 1989), the supreme court affirmed
a conviction based on the testimony of a witness even though th ere was evidence that the
witness used drugs, lied to police, and forged checks because t he jury heard evidence of
the behavior that purportedly impugne d his credibility. See also State v. Poganski ,
257 N.W.2d 578, 581 (Minn. 1977) (affirming conviction based on witness testimony
despite evidence that the witness filed false insurance claims and received favorable
treatment for agreeing to testify).
Based on our review of precedent, we conclude that this case do es not present any
additional, unique circumstances that require reversal of Keeze r’s conviction. Here, the
jury was aware of the informant’s history and actions, and was able to take these factors
into account in assess ing his credibility. See Triplett, 435 N.W.2d at 44-45 (deferring to
the jury’s credibility determination when the jury was apprised of evidence that arguably
impugned a key witness’s credibility). We defer to the jury’s credibility determination in
reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, and conclude that th e informant’s express
testimony that Keezer sold him methamphetamine is sufficient to support Keezer’s
drug-sale conviction. See Foreman, 680 N.W.2d at 539.
In reaching this conclusion, we reject Keezer’s assertion that Minnesota has “joined
other jurisdictions in recognizing that informants with similar backgrounds and motives”
to those of the informant are i nherently not credible. Keezer misstates the law. There is
no Minnesota case law adopting such a standard in a challenge based on the sufficiency of
the evidence. The Minnesota cas es cited by Keezer discuss the trustworthiness of an

8
informer in other contexts. See State v. Keeton , 589 N.W.2d 85, 90-91 (Minn. 1998)
(addressing whether the district court erred in admitting an un available witness’s
sentencing hearing transcript int o e v i d e n c e u n d e r a h e a r s a y e x ception);
State v. Maldonado, 322 N.W.2d 349, 351 (Minn. 1982) (discussing, in the probable cause
context, the difference between citizen informers and other typ es of informers). And, in
an unpublished opinion, this cour t expressly declined to follow the out-of-state case law
that Keezer claims Minnesota has joined. 1 State v. Robinson, No. CX-02-662, 2003 WL
42175 (Minn. App. Jan. 7, 2003) (declining to follow People v. Huffman, 532 N.E.2d 556,
562 (Ill. Ct. App. 1988), and State v. Johnson, 627 N.W.2d 753, 763 (Neb. 2001)). As we
noted above, the Minnesota Supreme Court has held that the weig ht and credibility of an
individual witness is for the jury to determine. Bliss, 457 N.W.2d at 390.
We also note that even if Minn esota law required corroborating evidence to
establish an informant-witness’ s credibility at trial, Keezer’s argument fails because the
state presented significant corroborating evidence. The discovery of controlled-buy money
with those at Keezer’s residence, the methamphetamine seized, the testimony of the police
officers that corroborated the informant’s testimony, and most notably, the audio recording
of the controlled buy, all corroborated the informant’s testimo ny and bolstered his
credibility.

1 We note that unpublished opinions of this court are not preced e n t i a l , b u t m a y b e
persuasive. Minn. Stat. § 480A.08 (2018); Dynamic Air, Inc. v. Bloch , 502 N.W.2d 796,
800 (Minn. App. 1993) (holding that, although not binding prece dent, unpublished
opinions may be persuasive).

9
Based on our review of the evidence presented at trial, with pa rticular attention to
the informant’s testimony and the evidence that corroborated it, we conclude that there was
clearly sufficient evidence to support Keezer’s conviction.
Affirmed.