State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1829

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

David James Fineday,
Appellant.

Filed September 9, 2019
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Cass County District Court
File No. 11-CR-17-2235

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Benjamin T. Lindstrom, Cass Coun ty Attorney, Jeanine R. Brand, Assistant County
Attorney, Walker, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, St. Paul, M i n n e s o t a ( f o r
appellant)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge; and
Florey, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
In this appeal from his conviction for gross-misdemeanor domes tic assault,
appellant David Fineday argues that his conviction was based solely on the uncorroborated

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testimony of a biased, uncreditable witness and that this testimony is insufficient to sustain
his conviction. Because a jury could reasonably conclude that Fineday was guilty of gross-
misdemeanor domestic assault, we affirm.
FACTS
Following an incident involving C.G., the state charged Fineda y with domestic
assault. According to C.G.’s testimony at trial, Fineday and C. G. had been dating off and
on for about five years. The coup le had lived together for a br ief period of time and were
sexually involved. On the morning of the incident, the couple w as going through one of
their rough patches and they agreed to meet to work things out.
Fineday picked C.G. up in his van. She was wearing her pajamas , so she brought
her work uniform and shoes along, placing them in the back of t he van. As Fineday was
driving, C.G. found another woman’s sweater in the van and deci ded that the relationship
was not going to work. She then as ked Fineday to drive her home . Fineday stopped the
van, and C.G. went to the back of the van to get her work uniform and shoes.
When C.G. returned to the front of the van, Fineday grabbed th e back of her pajamas
and began assaulting her. He started “banging” her around and p unching her. At some
point, Fineday started driving again but he continued to beat C.G. He grabbed her hair, hit
her head against the dashboard, held her down to the floor, and told her that he was going
to “beat [her] and leave [her] in the woods.” As the van approa ched a local casino, C.G.
knew that Fineday would have to slow down to take a turn. Seizi ng the opportunity to
escape, she threw her belongings out the window, opened up the door, and jumped out of
the moving vehicle. As she did, Fineday grabbed her by her paja mas and tried to pull her

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back into the van. With Fineday holding on to her, C.G. was dra gged alongside the van.
She sustained injuries to her legs and feet.
C.G. managed to slip out of Fineday’s grasp, and she ran into the casino. The front
desk called the police, and the responding officer took C.G.’s statement and photographs
of her injuries. The state introduced the recorded statement an d photos at trial. The jury
returned a guilty verdict.
This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
Fineday argues that the state f ailed to present sufficient evidence to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that he committe d domestic assault. “In consid ering a claim of
insufficient evidence, the record is reviewed to determine whet her the evidence, when
viewed in the light most favorable to the conviction, is suffic ient to allow the jurors to
reach their verdict.” State v. Olhausen, 681 N.W.2d 21, 25 (Minn. 2004). “We assume that
the jury believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.” Id. If
the jury, while acting with prope r regard for the presumption o f innocence and for the
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonabl y conclude that Fineday
was guilty, then the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction. See id. at 25-26.
The jury found Fineday guilty o f gross-misdemeanor domestic assault under Minn.
Stat. § 609.2242, subd. 2 (2016). To convict Fineday of this ch arge, the state needed to
prove that (1) Fineday intentionally inflicted or attempted to inflict bodily harm upon C.G.

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and (2) C.G. was Fineday’s family or household member. 1 Minn. Stat. § 609.2242,
subds. 1(2), 2 (2016). “Family or household members” is defined , in part, as “persons
involved in a significant romantic or sexual relationship.” Min n. Stat. §§ 518B.01, subd.
2(b)(7), 609.2242, subd. 1 (2016).
When the evidence is reviewed in the light most favorable to t he conviction, the
record is sufficient to have allowed the jurors to find Fineday guilty of gross-misdemeanor
domestic assault. C.G. testified that Fineday punched her, grabbed her by the hair, banged
her head against the dashboard, and held her to the floor. She also testified as to her injuries
as a result of the assault. This testimony alone is sufficient to allow a jury to reasonably
conclude that Fineday intentionally inflicted or attempted to inflict bodily harm upon C.G.
See State v. Foreman, 680 N.W.2d 536, 539 (Minn. 2004) (“[A] conviction can rest on the
uncorroborated testimony of a single credible witness.” (quotat ion omitted)). But, in
addition, the state presented photos of the injuries C.G. sustained to her legs and feet, which
corroborated her story. Also, because Fineday admitted on cross-examination that he and
C.G. had a significant romantic relationship, the jury could al so reasonably conclude that
C.G. was Fineday’s family or household member.
Fineday’s challenge is based on his argument that C.G.’s testimony was not credible
because she had a motive to lie and her story was not believabl e. Specifically, he argues
that C.G.’s testimony was “highly exaggerated from her initial statement to the police” and

1 A gross-misdemeanor domestic assault charge also requires that the perpetrator commit
the act within “ten years of a previous qualified domestic viol ence-related offense
conviction or an adjudication of delinquency.” Minn. Stat. § 60 9.2242, subd. 2. Fineday
stipulated to this element at trial.

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described acts that seem physica lly impossible. But the jury wa s in the best position to
determine credibility and weigh the evidence. See State v. Hanson, 800 N.W.2d 618, 622
(Minn. 2011) (recognizing that juries are “gen erally in the best position to weigh the
credibility of the evidence and th us determine which witnesses to believe and how much
weight to give their testimony” (quotation omitted)). The jury heard C.G.’s testimony and
the recorded statement that she gave to the police. The jury al so listened to Fineday’s
testimony, the cross-examination of C.G., and Fineday’s closing argument that his version
of events was more reasonable than C.G.’s. The jury made its determination, and this court
may not reweigh the witness’s credibility. Cf. State v. Reichenberger , 182 N.W.2d 692,
695 (Minn. 1970) (“[W]eighing the credibility of a complaining witness who had given
conflicting stories is a function for the jury.”).
The Minnesota Supreme Court has recognized that, in limited cir cumstances, the
interests of justice may require reversal of a conviction based on uncorroborated testimony
when the credibility of that single witness is highly questiona ble. State v. Langteau, 268
N.W.2d 76, 77 (Minn. 1978) (hol ding that, although it was possi ble to justify the jury’s
verdict, “a careful consideration of the record” warranted a ne w trial “in the interests of
justice”); see, e.g., State v. Huss, 506 N.W.2d 290, 293 (Minn. 1993) (determining that the
testimony of the alleged victim o f child abuse was insufficient because there was expert
testimony that the victim had been exposed to highly suggestive material and her testimony
was not sufficiently credible). Th is remedy, however, is for ex treme cases, and Fineday
has not shown that C.G.’s credibility was so suspect as to warrant such relief.
Affirmed.