A18-1999

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-1957
A18-1999

State of Minnesota,
Appellant (A18-1999), Respondent (A18-1957,)

vs.

Torrance Lee Royster,
Appellant (A18-1957), Respondent (A18-1999).

Filed December 23, 2019
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-17-25237

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freemen, Hennepin County Attorney, Sean Patr ick Cahill, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant and respondent state)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Pub lic Defender, Roy G. Spurbeck, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant and respondent Royster)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and
Hooten, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
COCHRAN, Judge
In these consolidated appeals, appella nt Torrance Lee Royster challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence suppor ting his conviction of failure to register as a predatory

2
offender. The state appeals Royster’s sentence, arguing that the district court did not have
substantial or compelling reasons to depart from the presumptive sentence. We conclude
that the evidence is sufficient and affirm Royster’s conviction. We also conclude that the
district court’s offense-related findings support the sentencing departure.
FACTS
Appellant Torrance Lee Royster is required to register as a predatory offender due
to a prior offense. In Dece mber 2016, Royster completed an annual predatory-offender
verification form and a duty-to-register-form . On the duty-to-register form Royster
initialed statements indicating that he understood he must register all changes to his
primary address five days before moving and that if he did not have a primary address he
had to report to law enforcemen t within 24 hours of leaving his former primary address.
In June 2017, Royster subm itted a change-of-information fo rm that listed a Thomas
Avenue address as his primary address.
On September 7, 2017, the Bureau of Cr iminal Apprehension (BCA) sent Royster
an address verification form to the Thomas Avenue address. The post office attempted to
deliver the letter but it was “not deliverable as addressed.” The letter was returned to the
BCA on September 18. Because Royster did not complete the verification form, the BCA
considered Royster as a non-compliant predatory offender.
Royster moved out of the Thomas Avenue address in early September. After
moving, Royster contacted an appellate attorney knowledgeable in registration
requirements. The attorney told Royster to go to the police station for a change-of-address
form because he was no longer living at his regi stered address. Royster went to both the

3
BCA and the Minneapolis Police Department to obtain registration paperwork, and was
informed that the correct pl ace to register was at the Minneapolis Police Predatory
Registration Office in city hall. Based on this advice, on October 3, Royster visited city
hall to request a change-of-information form. Royster asked the officer who was assisting
him if he could take the form with him and return later to submit it. The officer responded
that Royster needed to complete the change-of-information form at the office and then the
officer would fax it to the BCA for him. While at the registration office, Royster told the
officer that he was staying with his grandmothe r but did not want to register her address.
Royster also said he was looking for an apartment to rent. Royster told the officer that he
had to go to work and that he would return with an address. Royster left without completing
the form and did not return.
On October 6, three days later, an officer found Royster sleeping on a bench at the
Minneapolis-St. Paul Airport. The officer checked Royster’s identification, which listed a
house on 11th Avenue as his address. The house belonged to Royster’s grandmother.
Royster told the officer that he was staying at the 11th Avenue house. The officer checked
the law-enforcement database and found that Royster was considered non-compliant with
the BCA. Because Royster was non-compliant, the officer arrested him. The state charged
Royster with failure to register as a predatory offender under Minn. Stat. § 243.166 (2016).
Royster waived his right to a jury trial and proceeded with a court trial. At trial, the
state presented the testimony of two police officers and a BCA employee. Royster testified
on his own behalf. Royster testified that he thought he was compliant with the registration
requirements because he was staying at his grandmother’s house and he had previously

4
listed his grandmother as an emergency contact on a predatory-offender registration form.
Royster also testified that his grandmother was concerned about the predatory-offender
community-notification requirements applying to her address. Royster confirmed that he
spoke with an attorney who told him to register, that he went to the registration office to
fill out a form, and that he left without completing the form and did not return.
The district court found Royster guilty of failure to register as a predatory offender
as required by the statute. Royster was previo usly convicted of failure to register as a
predatory offender in 2012. Because this wa s Royster’s second conviction of failure to
register, the felony offense triggered a mi nimum sentence of 24 months’ imprisonment
unless the district court found “substantial and compelling reasons” to impose a different
sentence. Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 5(c)-(d). When pronouncing the verdict, the court
indicated that Royster’s offense was much less serious than the typical failure-to-register
case, and that the court planned to impose a gross-misdemeanor sentence rather than a
felony sentence. The state objected to an y downward departure. The court ordered a
presentence investigation (PSI) report which ultimately recommended that the district court
not depart from the 24-month commitment.
At sentencing, after hearing from the state and Royster, the district court sentenced
Royster’s offense as a gross misdemeanor. Th e court ordered him to serve 365 days in
custody with execution stayed for two years, on the condition that he serve 150 days in the
Hennepin County work house with credit for 63 days se rved, and also imposed several
probation conditions. The court found that a durational departure was warranted because
Royster’s offense was much less serious than the typical failure-to-register case. The court

5
found that a dispositional departure was warr anted because Royster lacked “substantial
capacity” at the time of the offense.
This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
Royster challenges his conviction of failure to register, arguing that the evidence is
insufficient to support the conv iction. The state argues that the district court abused its
discretion in issuing both a downward durational departure and a downward dispositional
departure. We first address the sufficiency of the evidence and then turn to the departure
issue.
I. The direct evidence is sufficient to support Royster’s conviction.
Royster maintains that the circumstantial evidence introduced at trial is insufficient
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he knowingly violated the predatory-offender
registration requirements. The state contends that there is sufficien t direct evidence to
support the conviction. Because the pa rties disagree over whether the traditional
direct-evidence standard or the heightened circumstantial-evidence standard applies to this
court’s review of the sufficiency of the evidence, we first consider the appropriate standard
to employ and then apply the standard to the evidence introduced at trial.
A. We review the sufficiency of the evidence under the traditional standard of
review.

Royster argues that the circumstantial-evid ence standard applies because the state
relied solely on circumstantial evidence to demonstrate the el ements of the crime. The

6
state argues that the traditional standard a pplies because direct evidence supports the
conviction.
The circumstantial-evidence standard is appropriate when the conviction is based
on circumstantial evidence, meaning that proof of the offense, or a single element of the
offense, is based solely on circumstantial evidence. State v. Fairbanks, 842 N.W.2d 297,
307 (Minn. 2014). Circumstantial evidence is “evidence from which the [fact-finder] can
infer whether the facts in disput e existed or did not exist.” State v. Harris , 895 N.W.2d
592, 599 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted). Direct evidence, on the other hand, is evidence
“based on personal knowledge or observation an d that, if true, proves a fact without
inference or presumption.” Id. (quotation omitted). When a disputed element is
sufficiently proven by dire ct evidence alone, we apply the traditional standard.
State v. Horst, 880 N.W.2d 24, 39 (Minn. 2016).
To determine whether the direct-evidence standard or the ci rcumstantial-evidence
standard applies to our review, we first exam ine the elements of th e offense. Under the
predatory-offender registration statute, an offender is required to give written notice to law
enforcement “at least five days before the person starts living at a new primary address.”
Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 3(b). And, an offender must register with law enforcement
within 24 hours if they lack a primary address. Id., subd. 3a. Here, Royster was convicted
of failure to register his change in address after moving from Thomas Avenue, his primary
address. To convict a predatory offender of failure to register, the state must prove (1) that
the defendant is required to register as a predatory offe nder; (2) that the defendant
knowingly violated a registration requirement; (3) that the offense occurred in the county

7
of prosecution; and (4) that the registra tion time period had not elapsed. Minn.
Stat. § 243.166, subds. 5(a); State v. Mikulak , 903 N.W.2d 600, 603-04 (Minn. 2017)
(concluding that an offender must know that he or she violated the statute when the
violation occurred). The only element in dispute is the second element—whether Royster
knowingly violated a registration requirement.
In this case, either standard could co nceivably apply because the second element
was proved by both direct and circumstantial evid ence. But, when a disputed element is
sufficiently proven by direct evidence alone, “it is the traditional standard, rather than the
circumstantial-evidence standard, that governs.” Horst, 880 N.W.2d at 39. Witness
testimony is direct evidence when it reflects a witness’s personal observations and allows
the jury to find the defendant guilty without having to draw any inferences. Id. at 40. We
conclude that the disputed element in this case is proven through direct evidence alone—
specifically, witness testimony and Royster’s si gned duty-to-register form. Accordingly,
the traditional standard applies.
B. The direct evidence is sufficient to supp ort Royster’s conviction of failure
to register as a predatory offender under Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 5.

Under the traditional direct-evidence standard, we limit our review to “a painstaking
analysis of the record to de termine whether the evidence, wh en viewed in the light most
favorable to the convic tion, was sufficient.” State v. Ortega , 813 N.W.2d 86, 100
(Minn. 2012) (quotation omitted). We apply the same standard to a conviction after a court
trial as we do to a conviction after a jury trial. State v. Hough , 585 N.W.2d 393, 396
(Minn. 1998). We assume that the fact-finder believed the state’s witnesses and

8
disbelieved evidence to the contrary. State v. Caldwell , 803 N.W.2d 373, 384
(Minn. 2011). We will not disturb the verdict if the fact-finder, “acting with due regard for
the presumption of innocence” and the require ment of proof beyond a reasonable doubt,
could reasonably conclu de that the defendant was gu ilty of the crime charged.
Bernhardt v. State, 684 N.W.2d 465, 476-77 (Minn. 2004) (quotations omitted).
Royster maintains that the evidence is insufficient to show that he knowingly failed
to register at the time of the offense. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the
conviction, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient. First, Royster’s testimony that he
spoke with an attorney who told him to fill out a new registration form, his testimony that
he was told by an officer how to register, and his acknowledgement on the duty-to-register
form of the registration requirements, all constitute direct evidence of Royster’s knowledge
that he was required to register a change of primary address. Second, the officer’s
testimony that Royster was at the predatory registration office and left without completing
the form or returning to complete the form is direct evidence of Royster failing to register
after moving from his primary address. Taken at face value, this evidence is sufficient to
demonstrate Royster’s knowledge and actions without inference or presumption. See
Harris, 895 N.W.2d at 599.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favor able to the verdict, we conclude that
there is sufficient direct evidence to su pport Royster’s conviction because a fact-finder
could reasonably find that Royster was guilty, beyond a reasonable d oubt, of failure to
register under Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 5.

9
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it issued both a dispositional
and a durational departure.

The state appeals the district court’s im position of a stayed gross misdemeanor
sentence for Royster’s felony o ffense. The state argues th at the sentence is both a
downward dispositional departure and a downward durational departure, and contends that
the record does not support substantial or compelling reasons for either departure. Royster
argues that the district court issued only a durational departure and moreover that any
dispositional departure is suppor ted by the district court’s finding that Royster lacked
substantial capacity. We first determine th at the sentence constitutes both a durational
departure and a dispositional departure. We then turn to whether the district court abused
its discretion in departing from the presumptive sentence.
A. The court issued both a downward du rational departure and a downward
dispositional departure.

Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 5(c) mandates a sentence of at least 24 months in prison
for predatory offenders, such as Royster, who have previously been convicted of failure to
register. The statute also allows the court on its own motion to depart if it finds “substantial
and compelling reasons to do so.” Id., subd. 5(d). The statute specifically provides that
sentencing a person “without regard to the mandatory minimum sentence” is a “departure
from the Sentencing Guidelines.” Id. Here, the district court sentenced Royster without
regard to the presumptive minimum sentence and therefore departed from the sentencing
guidelines.
The Minnesota Sentencing Guid elines establish presump tive sentences for felony
offenses. Minn. Stat. § 244. 09, subd. 5 (2016); Minn. Stat . § 609.02, subd. 2 (2016)

10
(providing that a felony offense is a crime for which a sentence of imprisonment for more
than one year may be imposed). The guide lines define two types of sentencing
departures: dispositional and durational. Minn. Sent. Guidelines 1.B.5 (2017). A
“dispositional departure” places th e offender in a different se tting than that called for by
the presumptive guidelines sentence. Id. at 1.B.5.a. A mitigated dispositional departure
occurs “when the Guidelines recommend a prison sentence but the court stays the
sentence.” Id. at 1.B.5.a.(2). A “durational depa rture” departs in length from the
presumptive guidelines range. Id. at 1.B.5.b. Departures w ith respect to disposition and
duration are separate decisions, with each requiring a written reason for departing.
Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.D.1.a (2017).
In this case, under the plain language of the sentencing guidelines, the pronounced
sentence was both a dispositional departure and a durational departure. The court imposed
a dispositional departure when it sentenced Royster to a stayed sentence rather than the
presumptive commitment to pris on. Minn. Sent. Guidelines 1.B.5.a.(2). And, the court
imposed a durational departure when it imposed a sentence shorter than the presumptive
sentence. Id. at 1.B.5.b.(2).
Royster argues that the judge issued on ly a durational departure because the
sentence actually imposed was a gross misdemeanor sentence and the sentencing
guidelines apply only to felony sentences. Royster’s argument is not persuasive for several
reasons. First, Royster’s argument is in consistent with the plain language of
Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 5. The statute provides for a presumptive felony sentence of
at least 24 months executed in prison where the offender has previously been convicted of

11
failure to register. Id. at subd. 5(c). When the district court departs from the presumptive
sentence, the statute requires the court to fi nd “substantial and compelling reasons to do
so.” Id. As applied to this case, where the district court im posed a stayed sentenced of
365 days, the court was required to find “substantial and compelling reasons” for both
staying the executed prison sentence and issuing a sentence of less than 24 months. The
statute also expressly provides that “[s]entencing a person in the manner described in this
paragraph is a departure from the Sentencing Guidelines.” Id. Second, Royster’s argument
is inconsistent with the plain la nguage of the sentencing guidelines. See Minn. Sent.
Guidelines 2.D.1.a. (“A court departing fro m the presumptive disposition as well as the
presumptive duration has made two separate departure decisions.”).
Third, Royster’s reliance on State v. Bauerly, 520 N.W.2d 760 (Minn. App. 1994)
review denied (Minn. Oct. 27, 1994), is misplaced. In Bauerly, the defendant faced a
presumptively-stayed felony sentence but the district court instead imposed a stayed
gross-misdemeanor sentence. Id. at 762. This court noted that there was no dispositional
departure because the district court “stayed Bauerly’s sentence, which was the presumptive
disposition.” Id. The Bauerly court’s statements imply that had there been a presumptive
prison commit, the departure to a probationa ry gross-misdemeanor sentence would have
constituted a dispositional departure. Consequently, Bauerly supports our conclusion that
the district court’s sentence in this case amounts to both a dura tional and a dispositional
departure.
Accordingly, we conclude that in this case, under the plain language of the
sentencing guidelines, the pronounced sentence was both a dispositional departure and a

12
durational departure. The di strict court imposed a disp ositional departure when it
sentenced the appellant to a st ayed sentence rather than the presumptive commitment to
prison. Minn. Sent. Guidelines 1.B.5.a.(2). The court also imposed a durational departure
when it imposed a sentence shorter than the presumptive sentence. Id. at 1.B.5.b. As a
result, the court was required to find and ex plain substantial and compelling reasons not
only for why it sentenced Royster to 365 days rather than the mandatory 24 months, but
also for why it stayed execution of a mandatory executed sentence. Id. at 2.D.1.a.;
Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 5(d).
B. Both the durational departure and di spositional departure are supported
by the record.

The next issue before us is whether the court based its decision on substantial and
compelling reasons to support each departur e. A district court may depart from the
presumptive sentence only when “identifiable, substantial, and compelling circumstances”
exist to support a departure. Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.D.1 (2017); see also State v. Solberg,
882 N.W.2d 618, 623-24 (Minn. 2016) (discu ssing circumstances to justify a durational
departure); State v. Pegel, 795 N.W.2d 251, 253 (Mi nn. App. 2011) (discussing
circumstances to justify a dis positional departure); Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 5(d) (the
court may depart “if the court finds substan tial and compelling reasons to do so”). We
review a district court’s decision to depart from the presumptive guidelines sentence for an
abuse of discretion. Taylor v. State, 670 N.W.2d 584, 588 (Minn. 2003).
A substantial and compelling circumstance is one that makes a case “atypical.”
State v. Walker , 913 N.W.2d 463, 468 (Minn. App. 2018). The sentencing guidelines

13
provide a non-exclusive list of mitigating and aggravating factors that can constitute
substantial and compelling circumstances th at may justify departure. Minn. Sent.
Guidelines 2.D.3.a (2017). Relevant to this appeal is the catchall provision that indicates
that “other substantial grounds that tend to excuse or mitig ate the offender’s culpability,
although not amounting to a defense,” may constitute a mitigating factor. Id. at 2.D.3.a(5).
We address each departure in turn.
i. Downward Durational Departure
Downward durational departures are jus tified when the offender’s conduct is
“significantly less serious than that typically involved in the commission of the offense.”
State v. Mattson , 376 N.W.2d 413, 415 (Minn. 1985); see also State v. Rund ,
896 N.W.2d 527, 532 (Minn. 2017) (indicati ng that a downward durational departure is
justified when offender’s conduct is less serious than typical). Here, the district court found
a durational departure was warranted because Royster’s offense was much less serious than
the typical failure-to-register case.
The state argues that the district court abus ed its discretion when it concluded that
Royster’s offense was less seri ous than the typical offense. The state contends that
Royster’s offense was actually more serious because Royster ignored advice of officers
and an attorney telling him to register, wa s noncompliant for appr oximately one month,
and avoided registering his gra ndmother’s address. Royster maintains his offense is less
onerous than usual because the typical regist ration offense occurs over a longer period of
time and typical offenders do not make efforts to comply with the statute.

14
Based on our review of the record, we co nclude that the district court relied on
sufficient, appropriate offense-related fa ctors in granting the downward durational
departure. The district court found that Royster took steps to register including visiting the
BCA and contacting an attorney for legal advice. The court also found that the short time
period of noncompliance made the offense less serious. The district court concluded that
these circumstances demonstrated that Royste r’s offense was much less serious than the
typical failure-to-register case. Consequently, we conclude that the district court did not
abuse its discretion by issuing a downward durational departure.
ii. Downward Dispositional Departure
The state argues that the district court abused its discretion by issuing a downward
dispositional departure because the court did not have substantial or compelling reasons to
do so. Royster maintains that the dispositional departure is supported by the record. We
conclude that the record supports the depa rture but not for the reason provided by the
district court.
For a downward dispositional departure, the district court may consider both
offense-related and of fender-related reasons. Walker, 913 N.W.2d at 468. The district
court identified Royster’s past struggles with mental health issues and “lack of substantial
capacity” not related to drugs or alcohol as the reasons for a dispositional departure.
Based on the record, we conclude that Roys ter’s mental health issues and “lack of
substantial capacity” are not sufficiently ex treme to support a mitigating factor in
sentencing. Specifically, the record lacks evidence that Royster had a mental impairment

15
that deprived him of “control over his actions.” See State v. McLaughlin, 725 N.W.2d 703,
716 (Minn. 2007) (stating that “in order to constitute a mitigating factor in sentencing, a
defendant’s impairment must be ‘extreme’ to the point that it deprives the defendant of
control over his actions” (quoting State v. Wilson, 539 N.W.2d 241, 247 (Minn.1995)); see
also State v. Martinson , 671 N.W.2d 887, 891 (Minn. App. 2003), review denied
(Minn. Jan. 20, 2004) (concluding that diagnosis of paranoia and schizophrenia, supported
by a well-documented record of the mental condition, cons tituted a sufficiently extreme
mental impairment to support a downward departure). We conclude that the district court’s
finding that Royster lacked substantial capacity is not adequate to support a departure.
When the reason given by the district court is not adequate to support a departure,
we examine the record to dete rmine whether there is sufficien t evidence to support other
reasons to justify the departure. Williams v. State, 361 N.W.2d 840, 844 (Minn. 1985). If
so, the departure will be affirmed. Id.
We conclude that the district court’s finding that the offense was “significantly less
onerous” than the typical offense also supports the downward dispositional departure. See
State v. Stempfley , 900 N.W.2d 412, 418 (Minn. 2017 ) (holding that a court may depart
when it finds that the offense is significantly less serious th an the typical case). A less
onerous offense can support a dispositional departure without any offender-related finding.  
See id. (affirming a downward dispositional depa rture solely on the grounds that the
offender played a minor or passive role in the offense). And, the same offense-related
reason can support both a durationa l and a dispositional departure. State v. Lalli ,

16
338 N.W.2d 419, 421 (Minn. 1983) (affirming durational and dispositional departures,
both relying on the offense-related factor of a “major economic offense”). Because, as
discussed above, the record s upports the district court’s finding that Royster’s offense is
significantly less onerous than the typical offens e, this mitigating factor also supports the
dispositional departure.
In sum, there is sufficient direct evidence to support Royster’s conviction of failure
to register, and the district court’s finding that the offense was significantly less onerous
than usual supports both the downward durational departure and the downward
dispositional departure.
Affirmed.