State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-2006

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

James Robert Bazoff,
Appellant.

Filed December 16, 2019
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Cochran, Judge

Traverse County District Court
File No. 78-CR-16-175

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Matthew P. Franzese, Traverse County Attorney, Wheaton, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sara L. Martin, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Pr esiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Smith,
John, Judge.


 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of A ppeals, serving by appoi ntment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
COCHRAN, Judge
Appellant James Robert Bazoff was convicted of two counts of failure to register as
a predatory offender under Minn. Stat. § 243.166 (2016) following a jury trial—one count
of failure to timely register a new primary address (count one) and one count of failure to
timely register a new secondary address (count two). Bazo ff appeals, arguing that the
evidence is not sufficient to su pport either conviction and that the verdicts are legally
inconsistent. Bazoff also raises additional arguments in his pro se supplemental brief.
We conclude that the evidence is sufficien t to support the conv iction of count one
but not of count two. Because we reverse the conviction of count two, we do not reach the
issue of whether the verdicts are legally inc onsistent. We also conclude that Bazoff’s
pro se arguments either are not properly raised on appeal or lack merit. Therefore, we
affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand to correct the warrant of commitment.
FACTS
Bazoff is required to register as a predat ory offender due to a prior offense. In
compliance with the registration requirement s, Bazoff submitted an address verification
form with the Bureau of Criminal Apprehension (BCA) in September 2015. On the form,
Bazoff listed his sister’s house as his primary address and his place of employment. Bazoff
also indicated two secondary addresses: hi s mother’s house in Mounds View and an
address in North Dakota. The form also incl uded a 26-point duty-to -register section.
Bazoff initialed all 26 points, acknowledging that he understo od he must register any
change to his primary address at least five days in advance of moving and any change to

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his secondary addresses within five days of any change taking effect, among other
requirements.
Later that month, Bazoff submitted a pr edatory-offender change-of-information
form with the BCA. On the form, Bazoff listed a new primary address of 305 12th
Street North, Wheaton, Minnesota (the apartment). He provided a start date of October 4
for the new primary address. Bazoff indicated that his secondary addresses and place of
employment were unchanged.
On August 18, 2016, a little less than a year later, Bazoff completed a new
change-of-information form with local law enforcement. Bazoff registered his sister’s
house (the house) as a new primary address. Bazoff also listed the apartment as his
secondary address with an effective date of August 18.
After Bazoff submitted the form, the state charged him with two counts of failing to
register as a predatory offender in violation of Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 5. Count one
alleged that when Bazoff changed his primar y address to the hous e, he violated the
registration requirements by failing to register a primary address five days in advance of
obtaining a new primary address. Count two alleged that Bazoff violated the registration
requirements when he obtained a new secondar y address without first notifying the BCA
or local law enforcement.
Before trial, the parties stipulated that Bazoff was required to register as a predatory
offender between August 1 and August 18 of 2016. The distri ct court informed the jury
about the stipulation and instru cted that the fact that Bazo ff was required to register was
proven.

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During trial, the state pres ented the testimony of seve ral witnesses, including a
Wheaton police officer, the Wheaton police chief, Bazoff’s neighbor at the apartment, and
a former employee of the Traverse County Sheriff’s Office. Bazoff presented the
testimony of his sister and testified on his own behalf.
The trial testimony established that on August 5, 2016, Bazoff told a police officer
that he was moving into the house the next day. On August 6, the officer went to the house
around 9:00 p.m. and found Bazoff there. The officer testified that it appeared that Bazoff
was living at the house.
Two days later, on August 8, 2016, Bazo ff called the police about a suspected
break-in at the apartment. The Wheaton police chief responded to the call. Bazoff told the
chief he was in the process of moving. The chief testified that he saw a large mess on the
floor, but no bed or mattress in the apartment. Bazoff introduced pictures that conflicted
with the chief’s testimony, purportedly showing a bed and a tanning bed in the apartment
after the police chief responded to the break-in call. On rebuttal, the chief maintained that
he did not see a bed or tanning bed in the apartment.
Over the next two weeks, the officer and police chief occasionally watched the
house. The officer and poli ce chief both noticed cars in the driveway, and the officer
observed lights on inside. Bazoff’s neighbor at the apartment testified that he saw someone
carrying two or three boxes of household items out of the apartment in early August and
saw Bazoff on that same day. The neighbor did not see Bazoff after this encounter.
On August 18, the po lice chief encountered Bazoff at the house. Th e chief told
Bazoff that he was required to register at least five days prior to moving. Bazoff became

5
angry and went inside the house. Later that day, Bazoff went to the local law enforcement
office and filed the change-of-information fo rm listing the house as his new primary
address and his apartment as a new secondary address effective August 18. At trial, Bazoff
testified that he knew he was required to regi ster a new primary address at least five days
in advance of living at a new address.
The jury found Bazoff guilty of both counts. The cour t accepted the verdict and
adjudicated appellant guilty on count one. The court left count two unadjudicated. The
warrant of commitment, however, shows convictions for both counts.
This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
Bazoff challenges his convictions on severa l grounds. First, he argues that the
evidence is insufficient to support the convictions. Next , he maintains that the jury’s
verdicts are inconsistent, requiring a new trial. Finally, Bazoff makes a number of
arguments in a pro se supplemental brief. We address each issue in turn.
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Bazoff maintains that the evidence introduced at trial is insufficient to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that he is guilty of either offense.
1 The state contends that the evidence
is sufficient to support each conviction. We consider each charge separately.

1 The district court appears to have intended to adjudicate a conviction on only one count.
While the district court’s orally pronounced se ntence prevails over an inconsistent record
due to clerical error, appellate courts look to the official judgment of conviction in the
district court file “as conclusive evidence of whether an offense has been formally
adjudicated.” Spann v. State , 740 N.W.2d 570, 573 (Minn. 2007) (quotation omitted).
Because the parties acknowledge that Bazoff was convicted fo r multiple offenses in their

6
A. The evidence is sufficient to support Bazoff’s conviction of failure to register
a new primary address under Minn. Stat. § 243.166.

As a preliminary matter, the parties disagree over whether the traditional
direct-evidence standard or the heightened circumstantial-evidence standard applies to this
court’s review of the sufficiency of the eviden ce for count one. The state maintains that
count one is sufficien tly supported by direct evid ence. Bazoff argues that the
circumstantial-evidence standard applies because the state relied solely on circumstantial
evidence.
The circumstantial-evidence standard is appropriate when proof of the offense, or a
single element of the offense, is base d solely on circumstantial evidence.
State v. Fairbanks, 842 N.W.2d 297, 307 (Minn. 2014 ). Circumstantial evidence is
“evidence from which the [fact-finder] can infer whether the facts in dispute existed or did
not exist.” State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 599 (Minn. 2017) (quotations omitted). Direct
evidence, on the other hand, is “based on personal knowledge or observation and that, if
true, proves a fact without inference or presumption.” Id. (quotations omitted).
To determine whether the direct-evidence standard or the ci rcumstantial-evidence
standard applies to our review of count one, we first examine the elements of the offense.
To convict a predatory offender of failing to register, the state must prove (1) that the
defendant is required to register as a predatory offender; (2) that the defendant knowingly
violated a registration requirement or intent ionally provided false information to a law

appellate briefs, we review the sufficiency of the evidence supporting both convictions,
consistent with the warrant of commitment.

7
enforcement authority; (3) venue; and (4) that the registration time period had not elapsed.
Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 5(a). The only element in dispute with regard to count one is
the second element—whether Bazoff knowingly violated the registration requirement set
forth in Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 3(b), that he register a new primary address at least
five days before starting to live at the new address.
In this case, either standard could co nceivably apply becaus e the second element
was proved by both direct and circumstantial evid ence. But, when a disputed element is
sufficiently proven by direct evidence alone, “it is the traditional standard, rather than the
circumstantial-evidence standard, that governs.” State v. Horst , 880 N.W.2d 24, 39
(Minn. 2016) (citations omitted). Witness testimony is direct evidence “when it reflects a
witness’s personal observations and allows th e jury to find the defendant guilty without
having to draw any inferences.” Id. at 40. We conclude that th e disputed element in this
case is proven through direct-evidence alon e—specifically Bazoff’s trial testimony and
Bazoff’s signed duty-to-register form. Accordingly, the traditional standard applies.
Under the traditional direct-evidence standard, we limit our review to “a painstaking
analysis of the record to de termine whether the evidence, wh en viewed in the light most
favorable to the convic tion, was sufficient.” State v. Ortega , 813 N.W.2d 86, 100
(Minn. 2012) (quotation omitted). We assume that the jury believed the state’s witnesses
and disbelieved evidence to the contrary. State v. Caldwell , 803 N.W.2d 373, 384
(Minn. 2011).
Under Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 3(a), an offender is required to register a new
primary address at least five days before the person starts living at the new primary address.

8
To convict Bazoff of violating this registration requirement, the state was required to show
beyond a reasonable doubt both that Bazoff failed to register the house as his new primary
address at least five days in advance of moving and that Ba zoff knew that he violated the
requirement when the violation occurred. State v. Mikulak , 903 N.W.2d 600, 603-04
(Minn. 2017).
Bazoff raises two separate arguments with regard to whethe r the evidence is
sufficient to show that he knowingly violated this registration requirement. First he argues
that the evidence is insufficien t to prove that he had a ne w primary address before he
registered the new primary address on August 18. Viewing the eviden ce in a light most
favorable to the conviction, we conclude that the evidence is suffici ent in this regard.
Bazoff submitted a change-of-information form on August 18. The form indicated that the
apartment—his previous prim ary address—became a secondary address on August 18.
The form listed the house as Bazoff’s new primary address. We conclude that by indicating
that the apartment became his secondary address on August 18, the house necessarily
became his primary address on that same date . And, the form was signed by Bazoff on
that date, August 18. Accordingly, because Ba zoff did not register the house at least five
days in advance of when he indicated it be came his new primary address, he failed to
register in accordance with Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 3(a).
Next, Bazoff argues that the evidence is not sufficient to prove that he knowingly
violated this registration requirement . But Bazoff acknowle dged on the 2015
duty-to-register form that he was required to notify law enforcement five days before

9
moving. And at trial, Bazoff confirmed that he knew he was required to register a new
primary address in advance of moving.
Viewing the evidence in the lig ht most favorable to the ve rdict, we conclude there
is sufficient evidence to support Bazoff’s conviction because a fact-finder could reasonably
conclude that he was guilty, beyond a reas onable doubt, of knowin gly failing to timely
register a new primary address as required by Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 3(b). We affirm
the district court’s conviction on count one.
B. The evidence is insufficient to suppor t Bazoff’s conviction of failure to
register a secondary address under Minn. Stat. § 243.166.

In addition to failing to register the house as his new primary a ddress at least five
days in advance of living there, Bazoff was al so convicted of failing to register the house
as a secondary residence prior to making th e house his primary residence. The parties
agree that the evidence suppor ting the conviction for count tw o is purely circumstantial.
Accordingly, we review the sufficiency of evidence under the circumstantial-evidence
standard.
A conviction based on circumstantial evid ence warrants heightened scrutiny.
State v. Al-Naseer, 788 N.W.2d 469, 473 (Minn. 2010 ). When a conviction is based on
circumstantial evidence, this cour t conducts a two-step analysis. Harris, 895 N.W.2d at
601. First, we identify the circumstances proved at trial, disregarding evidence that is not
consistent with the jury’s verdict. Id. Second, we consider the inferences that can be drawn
from the circumstances proved. Id. Appellate courts give no deference to the fact-finder’s
choice among reasonable inferences at this second step. Id. The evidence is sufficient if

10
the circumstances proved, viewed as a whole, are “consistent with a reasonable inference
that the accused is guilty and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt.”
Id.
To convict Bazoff of count two, the state was required to prove that Bazoff had a
new secondary address and that he knowingly failed to register the address within five days
of the address becoming effective. Minn. St at. § 243.166, subds. 4a , 5(a). A secondary
address is one where a person “regularly or occasionally stays overnight” when not at the
person’s primary address. Id., subd. 1a(i).
The circumstances proved in this case are as follows: Bazoff submitted a predatory
offender change-of-information form in September 2015. On that form, Bazoff registered
the apartment as his primary address, and two secondary addresses, including his mother’s
Mounds View residence. Bazoff listed the house owned by his sister as his place of
employment. On August 5, 2016, an officer met Bazoff at the apartment. Bazoff told the
officer he would be moving the next day to the house. On August 6, 2016, Bazoff was at
the house at 9:00 p.m. Two days later, Bazo ff called the police to the apartment about a
suspected break-in. The polic e chief searched th e apartment for an intruder. While
inspecting the apartment, the ch ief saw items covering the fl oor. The chief did not see a
bed or mattress. Bazoff told th e chief he was in the process of moving. In early August,
Bazoff’s neighbor at the apartment saw someone carrying out small boxes. Over the next
two weeks the officer and police chief noticed lights on and ca rs in the driveway at the
house. On August 18, Bazoff filed another change-of-information form. Bazoff listed the

11
apartment as a secondary address effective A ugust 18, and the house as his new primary
address.
Having determined the circ umstances proved, we next consider whether the
circumstances proved are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any rational
hypothesis other than guilt. Loving v. State , 891 N.W.2d 638, 643 (Minn. 2017). We
conclude that the circumstan ces proved are consistent with a reasonable inference of
guilt—that Bazoff was occasionally staying overnight at the ho use as early as August 6,
when he told police that he was moving, and while his primary address was still his
apartment, but he failed to register the house as a secondary address. We also conclude,
however, that the circumstances proved are cons istent with rational alternative inferences
other than guilt—that Bazoff wa s merely visiting the house pr ior to August 18 when he
registered the house as his primary address; that Bazoff was working at the house but
returning to his apartment at night; or that Bazoff was spending nights at one of the other
secondary addresses that he listed on th e September 2015 change-of-information form,
including his mother’s house. The state presented no evidence that precludes these
alternative inferences. See State v. Hughes , 749 N.W.2d 307, 313 (Minn. 2008)
(concluding that the state has the burden of removing all reasonable doubt).
Because the circumstances proved are c onsistent with rational alternative
hypotheses that are inconsistent with guilt, we conclude that the evidence is insufficient to
support the conviction of failure to register a new secondary address in accordance with
Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 4a(a)(2). Accordingly, we reverse Bazoff’s conviction on this

12
count. Because we reverse on count two, we do not reach the legally inconsistent verdict
issue raised by Bazoff.
II. Pro se Arguments
In his pro se supplemental brief, Bazoff makes additional arguments including an
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim and a claim of prosecutorial misconduct. The brief
is difficult to follow. We address Bazoff’s arguments to the extent we understand them.
A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Bazoff argues his attorneys pr ovided ineffective assistance. To prevail on a claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel, Bazoff must prove (1) that his counsel’s representation
fell below an objective standard of reasonabl eness and (2) that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would
have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 694, 104 S. Ct. 2052,
2064, 2068 (1984); Gates v. State, 398 N.W.2d 558, 561 (Minn. 1987). A person seeking
to establish a claim of ineffective assistan ce of counsel bears the burden of proof.
State v. Jackson, 726 N.W.2d 454, 463 (Minn. 2007). To satisfy that burden, an appellant
“must do more than offer conclusory, argument ative assertions, without factual support.”
State v. Turnage, 729 N.W.2d 593, 599 (Minn. 2007). An appellate court need not analyze
both prongs of the Strickland test if an analysis of on e prong is determinative.
Leake v. State, 767 N.W.2d 5, 10 (Minn. 2009).
Bazoff asserts that his trial counsel was in effective in four ways: (1) failure to
communicate, resulting in improper handling of evidence; (2) failure to follow process;

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(3) failure to present evidence; and (4) failure to adequately prepare a defense. Bazoff does
not rely on case law to support his claims.
“Generally, an [ineffective-assistance-o f-counsel] claim should be raised in a
postconviction petition for relief, rath er than on direct appeal.” State v. Gustafson ,
610 N.W.2d 314, 321 (Minn. 2000). “A post conviction hearing prov ides the court with
additional facts to explain the attorney’s deci sions, so as to properl y consider whether a
defense counsel’s performance was deficient.” Id. (quotation omitted). Without those
additional facts, “any conclusions reached by [an appellate] court as to whether [an]
attorney’s assistance was deficient would be pure speculation . . . .” Id. But an appellate
court may consider an ineffective-assistance -of-counsel claim if the trial record is
sufficiently developed. Torres v. State, 688 N.W.2d 569, 572 (Minn. 2004).
Here, given the record developed at trial, we are able to review only one of Bazoff’s
ineffectiveness claims on direct appeal: his claim that he received ineffective assistance of
counsel due to a lack of commu nication between his attorneys when transferring his file.
During the course of the proceedings, Bazoff was represented by th ree different public
defenders. He argues that his attorneys were ineffective because one of the attorneys failed
to give the attorney who ultimately represented him at trial several photographs that Bazoff
believes are exculpatory. Bazoff himself pr ovided the photographs to his trial attorney
shortly before trial. Though the photographs were introduced at trial, Bazoff argues that if
his trial attorney had received them earlier, his case may have settled and not gone to trial.
This argument lacks merit because Bazoff cannot establish the second requirement
of the Strickland test: “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

14
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland,
466 U.S. at 694, 10 4 S. Ct. at 2068. At trial, the ju ry reviewed the photos, Bazoff’s trial
attorney and the prosecutor addressed them, and Bazoff described them to the jury. Even
assuming the representation was deficient, 2 we are not convinced that the result of the
proceedings would have been different if the trial attorney had rece ived the photographs
earlier because the jury did not find the evidence sufficient to acquit Bazoff.
With respect to the remainder of Bazoff’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims,
the trial record is not adequately developed for our review. Bazoff’s additional claims may
be brought in a timely subsequent petition for postconviction relief.
B. Prosecutorial Misconduct
Bazoff argues that the prosecutor committ ed misconduct by misstating the law,
breaking stipulations, and disparaging the defense during closing argument.
A prosecutor engages in prosecutorial misc onduct when the prosecutor “violates
clear or established standards of conduct, e.g., rules, laws, orders by a district court, or
clear commands in this state’s case law.” State v. Smith , 876 N.W.2d 310, 334-35
(Minn. 2016) (quotations omitted). A prosecutor may “present all legitimate arguments on
the evidence and all proper inferences that can be drawn from that evidence,” but may not

2 While the failure to transfer and produce the photographs arguably rises to inadequate
representation, we do not address the issue because Bazoff failed to prove that the results
of the proceedings may have been di fferent absent the alleged error. Fields v. State ,
733 N.W.2d 465, 648 (Minn. 2007) (requiring bo th prongs to be met for a claim to be
successful).

15
speculate. State v. Pearson , 775 N.W.2d 155, 163 (Minn. 2009); State v. Bobo ,
770 N.W.2d 129, 142 (Minn. 2009).
Because Bazoff did not object at trial to the acts he now claims are misconduct, we
review Bazoff’s claims under a modified plain-error standard. State v. Peltier, 874 N.W.2d
792, 803 (Minn. 2016). Under this standard, Bazoff bears the initial burden of establishing
error that is plain. State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294, 302 (Minn. 2006). A plain error is
one that is “clear or obvious.” Id. (quotations omitted). If Bazoff shows that the
misconduct constitutes plain error, the burden sh ifts to the state to prove that any
misconduct did not prejudice the defendant’s substantial rights. Id. To meet this burden,
the state must show that there is no reasonable likelihood that the absence of the misconduct
would have had a significant impact on the jury’s verdict. Id.
First, Bazoff argues that the prosecutor mi sstated the law by a sserting that the law
requires an offender to register a new primary address before an offender begins to move,
not before the offender actually moves. But Bazoff misquotes the prosecutor. The
prosecutor accurately stated that an offender must register a new primary address “prior to
moving” to a new address. See Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 3(b) (requiring written notice
of a new primary address “at least five days before the person starts living at a new primary
address”). Because the prosecutor did not misstate the law, the claim is without merit.
Second, Bazoff argues the prosecutor violated the stipulation not to discuss his prior
sex offense which prejudiced him at trial. During the prosecution’s examination of one of
the state’s witnesses, the pr osecutor said, “based on your r eading of [Bazoff’s]—of the
criminal history—or not the criminal hist ory but the sex off—the predatory offender

16
registration form, had [Bazoff] moved previously?” The uttering was during the middle of
questioning during the first day of the trial. And the statement was buried among other
witnesses and evidence. We are not persuaded that this stammer in questioning a witness
gives rise to an error that contrave nes case law or standards of conduct. Ramey,
721 N.W.2d at 302.
Lastly, Bazoff argues that the prosecutor made statements during closing argument
that improperly belittled Bazoff and disparaged the defens e. When assessing alleged
prosecutorial misconduct during a closing argument, we “consider the closing argument as
a whole rather than focus on particular phrases or remarks.” State v. Johnson, 616 N.W.2d
720, 728 (Minn. 2000) (quotation omitted). “The state has a ri ght to vigorously argue its
case” and it may argue that th e “evidence does not support particular defenses.”
State v. Davis, 735 N.W.2d 674, 682 (Minn. 2007). But the state may not “belittle the
defense, either in the abstract or by suggesting that the defendant raised the defense because
it was the only defense that may be successful.” Id. at 682-83. A prosecutor engages in
misconduct if he expresses his personal opinion on the defendant’s credibility as a witness.
State v. Ture, 353 N.W.2d 502, 516 (Minn.1984).
The prosecutor made remarks in his cl osing argument about Bazoff’s “bias and
motivation.” The prosecutor su ggested that law enforcement officials “have nothing to
gain by their testimony,” whereas Bazoff has “bias and motivation” because he has “much
more at stake.” The prosecutor opined that the defense’s theory is a “complete fabrication
that’s designed to get [Bazoff] out of the tro uble that he’s in.” The statements made up
approximately a dozen lines out of over twenty pages in the closing argument.

17
The comments by the prosecutor do seem to belittle Bazoff’s defense and may
express an opinion on the credib ility of the defendant. But, the statements directed at
Bazoff were surrounded by arguments about evidence, including testimony from the
witnesses and Bazoff himself. When viewed in the context of the closing argument as a
whole, the comments do not amount to misconduct. See State v. Powers, 654 N.W.2d 667,
679 (Minn. 2003) (concluding that comments by the prosecutor that seemed to disparage
the defense and expressed an opinion on the credibility of the defendant were not
misconduct because they were a small portion of the argument).
In sum, when we review claims of pr osecutorial misconduct, we will reverse only
if the misconduct, when consid ered in light of the whole tr ial, impaired the defendant’s
right to a fair trial. Johnson, 616 N.W.2d at 727-28. Based on the record, we cannot
conclude that these statements impaired Bazoff’s right to a fair trial. Accordingly, Bazoff’s
prosecutorial-misconduct claims fail.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.