State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-2034

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Hassan Farth Muse,
Appellant.

Filed January 21, 2020
Affirmed
Ross, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-17-6607

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Patrick R. Lofton, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Gary R. Wolf, William J. Coughlin, Wolf Law Office, Eagan, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Rodenberg, Judge; and Bratvold,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
ROSS, Judge
A jury found Hassan Muse guilty of attempted first-degree murder and other crimes
after a gunshot victim testified that Muse shot him. Muse appeals, asserting a speedy-trial
violation, ineffective assistance of trial counsel, plain errors during his trial, abuses of the
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district court’s discretion, and a lack of sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict.
None of the assertions warrants reversal, and we therefore affirm.
FACTS
The state accused Hassan Muse of exiting a car, approaching a parked car and
shooting one of the occupants repeatedly. It ch arged Muse with attempted first-degree
murder while committing a drive -by shooting, attempted second-degree murder, drive-by
shooting, and prohibited possession of a firearm.
Muse made a speedy -trial demand on July 9, 2018, waiving three days of the
demand to facilitate a September 10, 2018 trial in Hennepin County District Court. With
Muse’s agreement, the district court released him to a hold in Scott County for an unrelated
charge. Muse was not returned to Hennepin County for trial until September 17, 2018. The
prosecutor announced that he had mistakenly believed that a court-issued warrant would
secure Muse’s return from Scott County . He explained that, once he discovered the
mistake, he had an expedited writ processed for Muse’s return. Muse’s attorney argued
that the delay prejudic ed Muse’s defense because the delay allowed the state to secure
additional witnesses. The district court rejected the argument as speculative and concluded
that Muse’s speedy-trial right was not violated. The case proceeded to a jury trial.
Victim’s Testimony
The gunshot victim, A.A. (“Victim”), survived the shooting and testified at the trial.
He said that he ran into Muse at a gas station on January 20, 2017, and told Muse to leave
Victim’s brother alone. The two argued and traded insults. Victim saw Muse the next night
at the Karmel Mall in Minneapolis and left, sensing “hostility in the air.” Victim later
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caught a ride with his friend M.K. (“Friend”). Victim took the rear passenger-side seat,
Friend drove, and two other passengers took the other seats. Friend drove the group to a
cafe and parked in the alley.
An SUV soon approached and Victim grew suspicious. Friend exited the car to talk
to the SUV’s occupants. Victim saw Muse exit the SUV, approach Friend’s vehicle, pull
out a handgun, and point it at Victim through the open window. Muse then shot Victim
several times. Victim played dead but Muse kept shooting him. Victim was taken to the
hospital, where he told police that Muse shot him. Victim initialed Muse’s photograph two
days after the shooting, confirming his identification of Muse as the shooter.
On cross-examination, Muse’s attorney asked Victim if he had been shot before.
Victim said he had, and Muse’s attorney asked, “How many time[s] have you been shot
before?” The prosecutor objected and the district court sustained the objection. M use’s
attorney later explained the testimony’s purported relevance as follows:
[I]t’s clear that there’s more than one person that has . . . shot
[Victim] in the past who isn’t my client that could be after him
trying to finish the job. It’s an alternative perpetrator theory.
The district court agreed that the examination demonstrated an attempt to elicit
alternative-perpetrator evidence, but it reasoned that Muse had not satisfied foundational
requirements, having failed to establish that a plausible alternative shooter had been at the
scene. The district court explained to Muse’s counsel, “It’s just pure speculation on your
part that since he was shot . . . by somebody else, it’s possible somebody else shot him this
time. That’s not alternative perpetrator.”
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Investigating Officers’ Testimony
Minneapolis Police Officer Zach Seraphine spoke with Victim at the hospital two
days after the shooting . Victim told Officer Seraphine that “Ali Uraaye,” which means
“Stinky Ali,” had shot him. Minneapolis Police Sergeant Abdiwahabi Ali received
information that a shooting victim had identified a suspect by the name Ali Uraaye.
Sergeant Ali knew that Muse went by that nickname, and he provided a photograph of
Muse to Minneapolis Police Sergeant Scott Olson. Sergeant Olson went to the hospital and
spoke with Victim, confirming that he knew Muse. He showed Victim the photograph,
which Victim initialed as depicting the shooter.
Muse’s Waiver of His Confrontation Right and Friend’s Statements
Friend did not appear to testify at Muse’s trial. The prosecutor said that Friend was
fearful about testifying , having received threatening calls from Muse’s friends. The state
moved to admit Friend ’s recorded statements made to police and the prosecutor. Muse’s
lawyer objected, but Muse indicated that he wanted to play portions of Friend’s statements.
The district court explained to Muse that he would be unable to confront Friend about the
substance of the recordings due to his absence from trial, and it explained that the state was
seeking to present evidence despite Muse’s confrontation right on the theory that Muse had
forfeited his confrontation right by wrongdoing.
The state offered the admission of only two statements—an audio recording of
Friend’s interview the night of the shooting and a video recording of Friend’s interview a
few days later. Muse’s attorney indicated that he would review the recordings with Muse
before Muse made a final decision , but he announced the conflict between his preferred
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trial strategy and Muse’s strategy: “[J]ust for the record, Your Honor, I’m against
this . . . [B]ut my client, you know, it’s his case, and so I want to go over it with him and
if this is what he wants after hearing both of these interviews and talking with me about
[it,] then I . . . have to defer to his wishes.” After a break in the record, Muse elected to
have both statements played to the jury.
The first recording was Friend’s January 21, 2017 interview. In it, Friend identified
the shooter as Ali Uraaye, or in English, “Stinky Ali.” But in the second recording, Friend’s
January 24, 2017 interview, Friend claimed he could not say that Muse was the man who
had exited the vehicle. And he claimed that his previous identification of Muse was based
on Victim’s conversation with others in the car.
Muse later formalized his confrontation waiver, indicating that he understood his
right but chose to waive it because he thought there was information the jury ought to
know: that Friend did not identify Muse as the man who exited the vehicle. He waived his
right to testify , and the jury heard closing arguments and began deliberating. The jury
eventually asked the district court to replay Friend’s recorded statements. Muse’s attorney
objected. The district court overruled the objection, reasoning that the evidence would aid
the jury, that it would not be misused, and that it was not unduly prejudicial.
The jury found Muse guilty on all four counts. The district court entered convictions
on the attempted first-degree-murder and prohibited-possession charges. It sentenced Muse
to 220 months in prison. Muse appeals.
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D E C I S I O N
Muse argues that the one-week delay violated his speedy-trial right, that he received
ineffective assistance of counsel, that the district court plainly erred by failing to intervene
throughout trial, that the district court improperly precluded testimony, that the jury should
not have been permitted to replay Friend’s recorded statements, and that there is
insufficient evidence to sustain the guilty verdict. For the following reasons, we affirm his
convictions.
I
Muse argues that the seven-day delay violated his right to a speedy trial. The
argument is not convincing. The United States and Minnesota Constitutions afford criminal
defendants the right to a speedy trial. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Minn. Const. art. I, § 6.
We review a claimed speedy -trial violation de novo. State v. Taylor, 869 N.W.2d 1, 19
(Minn. 2015). We consider the delay’s length, its reason, whether the defendant asserted
his right, and any prejudicial effect. State v. Windish, 590 N.W.2d 311, 315 (Minn. 1999).
The first and third factors are not disputed. A delay exceeding 60 days from the
defendant’s demand creates a presumptio n that a violation occurred. Taylor, 869 N.W.2d
at 19; see also Minn. R. Crim. P. 11.09(b). The parties agree that the one-week delay
necessitates our review of the remaining factors, and that Muse’s proper demand is another
factor weighing in his favor.
We next consider whether the delay is attributable to the state or to Muse. See
Taylor, 869 N.W.2d at 19. We assign different weights to different reasons, assigning less
weight to mistakes or neglect. See id. at 20. The state argues that the delay was a mistake,
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citing the prosecutor’s writ error and prompt effort to secure Muse’s return to Hennepin
County from Scott County. Muse asserts that “the [s]tate arranged to have [Muse] moved
around,” but the assertion overlooks the fact that his counsel agreed to the transfer. The
district court concluded that the situation was a mere mistake, and Muse’s assertion does
not call that conclusion into serious doubt. Because the state had the duty to get Muse to
court but the mistake was not a deliberate attempt to delay the trial, the factor weighs in
Muse’s favor, but only slightly.
The prejudice factor is dispositive here. In considering whether a delay prejudiced
a defendant, we consider three interests: “(1) preventing oppressive pretrial incarceration;
(2) minimizing the anxiety and concern of the accused; and (3) preventing the possibility
that the defense will be impaired.” Windish, 590 N.W.2d at 318. But the first two of these
interests are not implicated if the defendant is already in custody for different offenses.
Taylor, 869 N.W.2d at 20. Muse was in custody in Scott County on another offense. At
oral argument on appeal, Muse’s attorney speculated that Muse might have made bail on
his Scott County charge, but this speculation carries no weight in our analysis. The
circumstances did not implicate the first two interests here.
The most serious interest is the potential impairment of a defendant’s defense.
Windish, 590 N.W.2d at 318. “A defendant does not have to affirmatively prove prejudice;
rather, prejudice may be suggested by likely harm to a defendant’s case.” Id. The district
court rejected the suggestion that the delay afforded the state the opportunity to procure
trial witnesses, finding that the state would have gotten those witnesses to trial even if it
had begun as scheduled. And in any event, t he prejudice interest is primarily concerned
8
with a defendant’s inability to adequately prepare his defense. See Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 654, 112 S. Ct. 2686, 2692 (1992). Muse’s trial attorney acknowledged that
the state properly disclosed the witnesses it intended to produce. So even if the state had in
fact been able to secure more witnesses for trial, this would not trigger any concerns about
an evidentiary impairment harming Muse’s opportunity to defend. Muse fails to develop
any theory on appeal suggesting prejudice, and although we are not inclined to look beyond
his argument to the trial record, we observe that the record offers no apparent support. The
delay did not prejudice Muse.
On balance, despite Muse’s speedy-trial demand and the one-week delay, he cannot
secure reversal on this theory. We turn to his ineffective-assistance argument.
II
Muse argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel warranting a
new trial. The Constitution affords criminal defendants the right to an attorney. U.S. Const.
amend. VI. This right includes the right to effective assistance of counsel, and we analyze
whether this right was violated by applying the two-element test announced in
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984). Applying the
two elements, Muse can prevail only if he demonstrates that his attorney’s performance
was objectively unreasonable and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for his
attorney’s deficient performance, the outcome would have been different. Sanchez-Diaz v.
State, 758 N.W.2d 843, 848 (Minn. 2008). Ineffective-assistance claims involve mixed
questions of fact and law, and our review is de novo. State v. Rhodes, 657 N.W.2d 823,
842 (Minn. 2003). Muse identifies two theories supporting his claim, maintaining that his
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counsel failed to object to leading questions and improperly waived his right to confront
Friend. Neither prevails.
A. Leading Questions
An attorney’s performance is constitutionally substandard if he does not exercise
“the customary skills and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would [exercise]
under the circumstances.” State v. Doppler, 590 N.W.2d 627, 633 (Minn. 1999) (quotation
omitted). An appellant challenging his attorney’s performance must overcome a strong
presumption that his trial attorney’s conduct was reasonable. State v. Lahue, 585 N.W.2d
785, 789 (Minn. 1998). And we are therefore “highly deferential” in scrutinizing the
performance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 2065.
Muse correctly indicates that the prosecutor’s examination of Victim included
leading questions. The prosecutor had even foreshadowed the leading nature of his
questions, signaling to Victim, “So we’re just going to try to do yeses or no[e] s; is that
fair?” The signal prompted no objection from Muse’s attorney. We assume that many
attorneys would have objected either immediately at the signaling or as the leading
questions began. But we cannot say that failure to object fell below an objective standard
of reasonableness.
This is because whether to object to questions is a matter of trial strategy. Leake v.
State, 737 N.W.2d 531, 542 (Minn. 2007). And matters of trial strategy are matters of trial
counsel’s discretion that “will not be second -guessed by appellate courts.” Id. at 536.
Muse’s attorney objected to some, but not all leading questions. There are myriad plausible
reasons why a defense attorney might not object to the leading form of a question. We are
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in a poor position to question the reasons here, given the posture of the appeal. “Generally,
an appeal from a conviction is not the most appropriate way to raise issues of trial counsel’s
ineffective representation. This is true because we do not have the benefit of all the facts
regarding why defense counsel acted as he did.” State v. Cermak, 350 N.W.2d 328, 332
n.5 (Minn. 1984). Muse did not move to stay his appeal to pursue postconviction relief to
develop a record of his counsel’s actual trial strategies or reasoning. Left to the sparse
record here, we cannot accept Muse’s absolute assertion that there could be “no strategy”
justifying the decision not to object. We decline to second-guess Muse’s trial counsel and
hold that Muse has not met his burden on the first ineffective-assistance element.
B. Confrontation Waiver
We also are not persuaded by Muse’s contention that he received ineffective
assistance of counsel based on his attorney allegedly allowing a violation of Muse’s right
to confront Friend by agreeing to the admission of Friend’s recorded interviews. The
United States and Minnesota Constitutions afford criminal defendants the right to confront
the witnesses against them. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Minn. Const. art. I, § 6. We review de
novo whether a defendant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause were violated by the
admission of evidence. State v. Holliday, 745 N.W.2d 556, 565 (Minn. 2008).
The right to confront Friend as a witness belonged to Muse, and, against his
attorney’s advice, Muse personally waived it for strategic reasons. A defendant may waive
or forfeit the right. See, e.g., State v. Washington, 521 N.W.2d 35, 42 (Minn. 1994) (waiver
by intimidating witness). Muse’s right to confront Friend was not violated because Muse
knowingly and intelligently waived the right. He confirmed that he made the choice to
11
allow the recordings knowing that he had the confrontation right and knowing that he
would not be able to exercise it. And Muse made the decision even after he spoke with his
attorney, who had advocated a different strategy, because Muse wanted the jury to hear
Friend’s statements for ex culpatory reasons. Trial counsel performed reasonably b y
identifying the confrontation-right issue and urging Muse not to waive his right. Muse
chose to waive the right anyway, and he fails to identify any ineffective assistance.
III
Muse alternatively blames the district court for the alleged errors of his attorney. He
argues that the district court plainly erred by failing to intervene sua sponte to prevent the
prosecutor from asking leading questions and to prevent Muse from waiving his right to
confront Friend. Because Muse did not object at trial, we review only for plain error.
See State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294, 297 (Minn. 2006). Muse ignores the fact that a district
court’s sua sponte action might “risk highlighting or enforcing rights that the defendant
had, for tactical reasons, decided to waive.” State v. Washington, 693 N.W.2d 195, 205
(Minn. 2005). District courts are generally not required to intrude into the trial . See State
v. Manthey, 711 N.W.2d 498, 505 (Minn. 2006) (holding that failure to act sua sponte to
objectionable testimony was not plain error).
The district court did not plainly err by failing to intervene, sua sponte, to prevent
the prosecutor from directly examining Victim using leading questions. As we have said,
strategic reasons might exist for permitting leading questions, and intrusions by the district
court could have drawn attention to portions of Victim’s testimony. Muse’s reliance on
Kugling v. Williamson, 42 N.W.2d 534 (Minn. 1950), is unconvincing. He claims that its
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“ruling was that a new trial was appropriate where the trial court failed to intervene to stop
a series of leading questions.” But the supreme court actually affirmed the district court,
explaining that “[w]hen and under what circumstances” leading questions are permitted are
issues “almost wholly in the discretion of the trial court” and holding that the district court
did not abuse that discretion. Id. at 538. We likewise see no abuse of discretion in the
district court’s decision not to interject itself into the questioning.
Muse offers no argume nt supporting his confrontation-waiver theory . And the
theory is facially meritless given Muse’s personal decision to waive his confrontation right.
It would not have been proper, let alone obligatory, for the district court to have
undermined the strategic course that Muse expressly charted in his own defense. Muse has
identified no error.
IV
Muse challenges the district court’s preclusion of testimony about Victim having
been shot before, raising the issue in the ineffective-assistance and plain-error contexts.
Because the district court’s ruling was made on the state’s objection and defense counsel’s
arguments, we instead consider whether the district court’s ruling deprived Muse of
a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense. Due process affords every
defendant “a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.” State v. Smith,
876 N.W.2d 310, 331 (Minn. 2016) (quotations omitted). This right includes the right to
present evidence tending to prove that an alternative perpetrator committed the charged
crime. State v. Atkinson, 774 N.W.2d 584, 589 (Minn. 2009). We review the district court’s
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evidentiary ruling for an abuse of discretion. State v. Zumberge, 888 N.W.2d 688, 694
(Minn. 2017).
Muse conflictingly argues both that “[t]he defense theory of the case was that
someone other than [Muse] had shot [ Victim]” and that his defense was not an
alternative-perpetrator theory. He maintains that, because he identified no specific third
party, his theory was merely intended to cast a reasonable doubt on Victim’s identification
of Muse as the shooter . But the alternative-perpetrator defense is indeed intended to raise
reasonable doubt. “The reason for allowing alternative perpetrator evidence is not for
the purpose of establishing the alternative perpetrator’s guilt, but to create a reasonable
doubt as to the defendant’s guilt.” Atkinson, 774 N.W.2d at 590. It is in those cases where
the identity of the perpetrator is in question that the defendant can offer evidence showing
that some other perpetrator committed the crime. State v. Vance, 714 N.W.2d 428, 436
(Minn. 2006). Muse need not have identified a specific third party to trigger the
alternative-perpetrator theory. Muse’s trial counsel understood this, expressly saying that
he was attempting to present evidence on an alternative-perpetrator theory. The district
court properly characterized the attempt, and we will not accept Muse’s attempt to recast
it on appeal.
We have no difficulty concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion
by precluding further testi mony after Muse failed to lay proper foundation. Before
presenting alternative- perpetrator evidence, a defendant must lay foundation with
“evidence that has an inherent tendency to connect the alternative perpetrator to the
commission of the charged crime.” Atkinson, 774 N.W.2d at 590. Upon proper foundation,
14
a defendant may offer evidence of motive, threats, or other facts showing that a different
person committed the crime. Id. Muse’s presentation to the district court only hinted at a
link to a different perpetrator, when his counsel argued, “[I]t’s clear that there’s more than
one person that has . . . shot him in the past who isn’t [Muse] that could be after him trying
to finish the job.” But Muse provided no offer of proof about any details connecting the
prior shooter to Muse’s alleged crime, such as when Victim had been shot, who had shot
him, or what the motive had been. The district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding
evidence that Victim had been shot before.
V
Muse argues that the district court erred by allowing the jury to review Friend’s
statements during deliberations. District courts may permit juries to review audio or video
evidence in open court after notice to the parties and an opportunity to be heard. Minn. R.
Crim. P. 26.03, subd. 20(2)(a)–(b). We review the district court’s decision to grant a jury’s
request to review evide nce for an abuse of discretion. State v. Everson, 749 N.W.2d 340,
345 (Minn. 2008). The district court should consider whether the evidence will aid the jury,
unduly prejudice a party, or be subjected to improper use. Id. Here the evidence was helpful
because it was probative of material facts. Muse cannot reasonably argue otherwise, having
originally agreed to the evidence anticipating that the jury would rely on it to find Friend’s
identification of him incredible. And the record does not suggest that the jury would subject
the evidence to improper use. The district court did not abuse its discretion.
VI
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Muse argues that his convictions must be vacated because there is insufficient
evidence to support the jury’s verdict. When a disputed element is proved by direct
evidence, we apply a traditional sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard, reviewing the record
to determine whether the evidence favorable to the conviction would permit the jury to find
the defendant guilty. State v. Horst , 880 N.W.2d 24, 39– 40 (Minn. 2016). But when the
direct evidence of guilt on a n element is not sufficient, we apply a stricter, two-step
standard of review to the circumstantial evidence. Loving v. State, 891 N.W.2d 638, 643
(Minn. 2017). Under this standard, we first identify the circumstances proved, deferring
to the jury’s acceptance of the state’s evidence and its rejection of inconsistent evidence.
Id. Then we consider whether the circumstances proved are consistent only with a
defendant’s guilt. Id. Only if a reasonable inference other than guilt exists will we reverse
the conviction. Id.
The jury returned guilty verdicts on all four counts. The prohibited-possession
verdict means that the state proved that Muse was an ineligible person (which was
stipulated to) who knowingly and actually possessed a firearm. See Minn. Stat. § 624.713,
subd. 1(2) (2016). The drive-by-shooting verdict means that the state proved that Muse had
just exited a vehicle when he recklessly discharged a firearm at or toward another motor
vehicle and at or toward a person. See Minn. Stat. § 609.66, subd. 1e(b) (2016). The
attempted-second-degree-murder verdict means that the state proved that Muse attempted
to and intended to cause Victim’s death. See Minn. Stat. § 609.19, subd. 1(1) (2016). And
the attempted-first-degree-murder-while-committing-drive-by-shooting verdict means that
the state proved that Muse attempted to and intended to cause Victim’s death while Muse
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was engaged in a drive-by shooting. See Minn. Stat. § 609.185(a)(3) (2016). Both attempt
crimes required the state to prove that Muse intended to commit the crimes and took a
substantial step toward their commission. See Minn. Stat. § 609.17, subd. 1 (2016).
There is sufficient direct evidence to establish almost all of the ele ments. Victim
testified that the shooting took place on January 21, 2017, while he was seated in a vehicle.
He saw an SUV approach and watched Muse exit. And he described how Muse
approached, drew a gun, and shot Victim repeatedly. Muse contends that Victi m’s
testimony was “simply not credible.” But we view this evidence in the light most favorable
to the jury’s verdict, assuming it disbelieved any contradictory evidence. State v. Griffin,
887 N.W.2d 257, 263 (Minn. 2016). The jury, as the trier of fact, is best positioned to
decide credibility and weigh evidence. State v. Al-Naseer, 788 N.W.2d 469, 473 (Minn.
2010). The testimony of even a single credible witness can support a conviction. State v.
Foreman, 680 N.W.2d 536, 539 (Minn. 2004). Because Victim’s testimony is direct
evidence of the shooting and Muse’s identity as the shooter, we consider only whether that
evidence was sufficient to permit the jurors to find that the state proved most of the charged
offenses’ elements beyond a reasonable doubt. It was.
The remaining elements concern Muse’s intent to commit the attempted crimes, see
Minn. Stat. § 609.17, subd. 1, and in this case, an intent to kill Victim specifically. The
circumstantial evidence of intent to kill overwhelmingly supports the verdict. The phrase
“with intent to” simply “means that the actor either has a purpose to do the thing or cause
the result specified or believes that the act, if successful, will cause that result.” Minn. Stat.
§ 609.02, subd. 9(4) (2016). A defendant’s intent is typically inferred from circumstantial
17
evidence, and where it is, we apply heightened scrutiny. See State v. Boldman, 813 N.W.2d
102, 107 (Minn. 2012). Intent to kill may be inferred from the m anner of a defendant’s
conduct. State v. Hall, 722 N.W.2d 472, 477 (Minn. 2006). And a jury may infer that a
person intends the natural and probable consequences of his actions. State v. Johnson ,
616 N.W.2d 720, 726 (Minn. 2000). Close proximity and purposeful aiming may indicate
an intent to kill. See, e.g., Griffin, 887 N.W.2d at 265.
The circumstances proved lead to only one reasonable inference, which is that Muse
intended to kill Victim. The state proved that Victim and Muse had a heated argument the
night before the shooting, that Muse exited a vehicle and approached Victim in another
vehicle while focusing his attention specifically on him, that Muse shot at Victim with a
deadly weapon from close range, that Victim alone was struck by the bullets, that Victim
suffered multiple bullet wounds, and that Muse kept shooting at Victim as Victim
attempted to play dead. The jury’s finding of Muse’s intent to kill Victim was practically
inescapable on these facts.
Muse’s argument for a different conclusion focuses mistakenly on identification and
does not contest that the shooter (which the jury determined was Muse) evidenced an intent
to kill by his focused firing at Victim even after Victim feigned death. The state proved
circumstances entirely inconsistent with Muse’s innocence. Sufficient evidence supports
the guilty verdict.
Affirmed.