In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Joseph Valentyn.

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-2115

In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of:
Joseph Valentyn.

Filed May 20, 2019
Affirmed
Rodenberg, Judge

Steele County District Court
File No. 74-PR-18-856

Catherine Brown Furness, Owatonna, Minnesota (for appellant)

Daniel A. McIntosh, Steele County Attorney, Christy M. Hormann, Chief Deputy County
Attorney, Owatonna, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Brat vold, Presiding Judge; Rodenberg , Judge; and
Reilly, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
RODENBERG, Judge
Appellant Joseph Valentyn appe als from the district court’s or der continuing his
civil commitment as a mentally-ill person. He argues that the district court’s findings are
not supported by the record and do not meet the requirements of Minn. Stat. § 253B.12,
subd. 4 (2018). We affirm.

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FACTS
Appellant is a 35-year-old man who has been diagnosed with par anoid
schizophrenia. Appellant has a history of civil commitments an d hospitalizations dating
back to 2006. In April 2018, appe llant’s parents took him to t he Owatonna Hospital
because appellant had become “increasingly delusional and paran oid over the previous
week to the point where they [could] no longer handle him.” Appellant’s parents explained
that appellant had called the FBI several times because he believed that the “Chinese were
trying to get him.” Appellant’s mother reported that appellant was talking to himself and
was on an internet chat room where people were telling him to k ill himself. His mother
also described that appellant would “sit on his bed for hours doing nothing” and would not
eat or take care of his personal hygiene.
During this time, appellant had stopped taking risperidone (a neuroleptic medication
prescribed for appellant) after a previous commitment and assoc iated Jarvis o r d e r h a d
expired.1 Appellant had also stopped contact with all of his outpatient mental-health
providers.
After being evaluated at the Owatonna Hospital, appellant agree d to transfer to
St. Joseph’s Hospital in St. Pau l. While hospitalized, appella nt often refused to take
psychotropic medications, refuse d meals and showers, and neglec ted to care for his

1 The terms ‘neuroleptic,’ ‘major tranquilizer,’ ‘psychotropic,’ and ‘antipsychotic’ are used
interchangeably to describe a major class of drugs that effectuate a “sedation of the nervous
system.” Jarvis v. Levine, 418 N.W.2d 139, 140 n.1 (Minn. 1988).

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personal hygiene. Hospital sta ff reported that appellant’s fai lure to take medications had
contributed to his acute psychosis and deterioration in functioning.
In May 2018, the Steele County Attorney petitioned for appella nt’s civil
commitment. The district court held a preliminary hearing and appointed an examiner.
Appellant was uncooperative with the court-appointed examiner, but the examiner spoke
with a registered nurse and social worker concerning appellant’s status; both described that
appellant’s thought process remained poor, he did not participa te in treatment or group
therapy, and he slept for most of each day. The examiner revie wed appellant’s records,
diagnosed appellant with paranoi d schizophrenia, and recommende d that he be civilly
committed as a mentally-ill person.
The district court determined a t the initial commitment hearing in May 2018 that
appellant was mentally ill as def ined in Minn. St at. § 253B.02, subd. 13 (2018), and that
appellant then met the statutory criteria for civil commitment. The district court committed
appellant for a six-month period. Appellant did not appeal his initial commitment.
After his commitment, appellant received treatment at the Fergus Falls Community
Behavioral Health Hospital. In July 2018, a social-work specialist, J.C., filed a treatment
report in the district court. Included with the report was a t reatment plan describing
appellant’s goals and progress. The plan indicated that appellant had made some progress,
but also noted that appellant req uired a medication regimen to treat his symptoms, his
thought processes remained “disorganized,” and his “thought content [was] paranoid.” The
report recommended continuing appellant’s mental-illness civil commitment.

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In October 2018, J.C. filed another treatment report requesting that appellant’s civil
commitment be continued. The re port detailed that appellant co ntinued to display
symptoms of his mental illness despite extensive hospitalizatio n, and that appellant
“expresses paranoia as well as persecutory and grandiose delusional thought content.” The
report also included that appellant “continues to state that he does not need to take
psychiatric medications and reports that he feels that he does not have any type of mental
illness.” Appellant had “declined all group programming since his admission.”
The district court held a commitment-review hearing in November 2 0 1 8 . T h e
treatment reports, appellant’s medical records, and the testimo ny of Dr. Rambeau
(appellant’s treating psychiatrist) were received into evidence.
Dr. Rambeau testified that appell ant has “expressed paranoia, a s well as what are
called persecutory, so primarily paranoid, delusional beliefs.” She testified that appellant’s
thoughts are organized at times, but at other times, his thoughts become disorganized and
tangential. She further testified that she has not been able t o fully assess appellant’s
progress because he has not been willing to engage in discussion with her. She also stated
that she was concerned that appellant, if discharged, would fail to provide himself with his
basic needs of food, clothing, shelter, and medical care. She opined that extending
appellant’s commitment would give him additional time for his s ymptoms to improve or
to maintain a stable pattern and that the additional time would allow her to make a
recommendation concerning outpatient treatment.
Appellant did not testify, but served as co-counsel. He argued that his commitment
was improper and that he should not be punished for doing his f ederally required duty of

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reporting death threats to the FBI. He argued that he has been suffering from physical
torture and that the neuroleptic drugs have caused him heart damage and caused his weight
to triple.
In summation, appellant explained that his only health problem is that he has been
forced to take risperidone, “the number five most deadly drug in the entire world.” He also
claimed that his confinement is “fascism” and that “this infrin gement of fascism clearly
opposite not Freudians fly-by-ni ght wheeling and dealing but we stern ethics and morals,
flushed out in the federal code of law in the spirit of Jesus Christ and Socrates and the rest
of Christianity and western philosophy.” He stated that he reported the death threats to the
FBI because he “rightly followed federal law and reported a Turkish-born militant, or who
claims to be, who incited assassinating the present President o f the United States of
America 73,000 times or so.”
The district court made findings of fact on the record at the conclusion of the hearing
and found that appellant continues to be mentally ill. After the hearing, in a written order,
the district court continued appellant’s civil commitment—and continued the Jarvis order
authorizing the treatment of neuroleptic medications—for twelve months.2
This appeal followed.

2 In briefing to this court, appellant states that the “order being appealed is the findings and
order granting continued commitment and a Jarvis Order.” Appel lant does not argue,
however, that the district court erred by continuing the Jarvis order, and he cites to no legal
authority on that point. We therefore do not review the Jarvis order. See Fannie Mae v.
Heather Apartments Ltd., 811 N.W.2d 596, 600 n.2 (Minn. 2012) (“[s]ummary arguments
made without citation to legal support are waived”).

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D E C I S I O N
I. The district court’s findings are supported by the record an d meet the
statutory requirements under Minn. Stat. § 253B.12 (2018).

Appellant argues that the distr ict court’s findings are not sup ported by clear and
convincing evidence and that the district court’s findings are insufficient to support his
continued commitment.
When reviewing a district court’s order continuing a mental-ill ness civil
commitment, we are limited to an examination of the district court’s compliance with the
statute, and the commitment must be justified by findings based on evidence at the hearing.
In re Thulin, 660 N.W.2d 140, 144 (Minn. App. 2003). Findings of fact, whether based on
oral or documentary evidence, will not be set aside unless they are clearly erroneous, and
appellate courts defer to the district court’s credibility dete rminations. In re Knops, 536
N.W.2d 616, 620 (Minn. 1995). “We review de novo whether there is clear and convincing
evidence in the record to suppor t the district court’s conclusi on that appellant meets the
standards for commitment.” Thulin, 660 N.W.2d at 144.
In order to civilly commit a pers on, the district court must fi nd that there is clear
and convincing evidence that a person is mentally ill. Minn. Stat. § 253B.09 (2018); In re
Civil Commitment of Janckila, 657 N.W.2d 899, 902 (Minn. App. 2003). A person must
meet the definition as set forth in Minn. Stat. § 253B.02, subd . 13(a), to be mentally ill.
The definition requires that the person poses a substantial lik elihood of physical harm to
self or others, as demonstrated by, among other ways, a recent attempt or threat to harm
s e l f o r o t h e r s . M i n n . S t a t . § 2 5 3 B . 0 2 , s u b d . 1 3 ( a ) . A d i s t r i ct court may continue an

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involuntary commitment beyond six months under a less-stringent standard than an initial
commitment. Minn. Stat. § 253B.12, subd. 4. To continue a commitment, a district court
must find “by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the person continues to be mentally
ill, developmentally disabled, or chemically dependent; (2) inv oluntary commitment is
necessary for the protection of the patient or others; and (3) there is no alternative to
involuntary commitment.” Minn. Stat. § 253B.12, subd. 4.
In determining whether a person continues to be mentally ill at a h e a r i n g u n d e r
section 253B.12, the district c ourt need not find that there ha s been a recent attempt or
threat to physically harm self or others, or a recent failure t o provide necessary personal
food, clothing, shelter, or medical care. Id. “Instead, the court must find that the patient is
likely to attempt to physically harm self or others, or fail to provide necessary personal
food, clothing, shelter or medical care unless involuntary commitment is continued.” Id.
Appellant first argues that the district court should not have relied on the social-
work specialist’s report because it does not meet the statutory requirements in Minn. Stat.
§ 253B.12, subd. 1(b). Appellant’s challenge is to a portion of the report which states:
In the past, [appellant’s] symptoms have caused him to present
a significant threat of serious harm or danger to himself and
others and they have interfered w ith his ability to adequately
meet his personal living needs. He has a history of threatening
to kill his parents and threatened to harm hospital staff.

The report addresses, among other things, appellant’s history o f threats. It was
therefore properly admitted as evidence at the hearing, and the district court did not err in
relying on information in the r eport. The history recited in t he report is relevant to the
issues before the court under section 253B.12, subdivision. 4.

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Appellant argues that the district court’s findings of fact are conclusory and do not
provide an adequate basis for a determination that appellant co ntinues to be mentally ill
because he does not pose a danger to himself or others. Appell ant’s argument, however,
would require that we import the definition of mentally-ill person in Minn. Stat. § 253B.02,
subd. 13(a), into a continued-commitment hearing. The initial- commitment statute
requires a finding that a person “poses a substantial likelihood of physical harm to self or
others.” Minn. Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 13(a). In contrast, in determining whether a person
continues to be mentally ill under section 253B.12, the district court need only find that the
patient is “likely to attempt to physically harm self or others, or to fail to provide necessary
personal food, clothing, shelter, or medical care unless involu ntary commitment is
continued.” Minn. Stat. § 253B.12, subd. 4.
The district court made adequate findings, based on the evidenc e presented at the
hearing, to support the contin ued commitment under Minn. Stat. § 253B.12, subd. 4.
Dr. Rambeau testified that appella nt continues to be mentally i ll and that his symptoms
include paranoia, delusional beliefs, and disorganized thoughts. Similarly, the social-work
specialist’s report details that appellant continues to display symptoms of his mental illness
and that appellant expresses “par anoia as well as persecutory a nd grandiose delusional
thought content.” The district court determined that appellant “still suffers from
[s]chizophrenia,” that his thought process is “circumstantial t o tangential,” and that he
“expresses paranoia as well as persecutory and grandiose delusi onal thought content.” In
addition to the other evidence at the hearing, appellant’s own statements at the hearing
provided further indication of his disorganized thinking.

9
In making the determination that appellant continues to be ment ally ill, the district
court also found that appellant is likely to attempt physical h arm to himself or fail to
provide necessary food, clothing, shelter, or medical care unless commitment is continued.
Dr. Rambeau opined that “when [ appellant] is isolating and is m aking statements that
people want to hurt him and then is not eating, that . . . can actually impair his safety and
interact[ions] with other people.” Although appellant has neve r attempted to kill himself
or harm others, Dr. Rambeau testified that appellant’s conditio n affects his ability to
recognize reality, especially when he “feels that people are after him.” Similarly, the social
worker’s report included that appellant believes that he is nei ther mentally ill nor in need
of medication. The report also noted that, in the past, appell ant has threatened to kill his
parents and to harm hospital staff.
The record supports the district court’s finding that, if disch arged, appellant would
likely stop taking his medication and regress into a worse psyc hological state and that, as
a result, he would be likely to attempt physical harm to himsel f, or fail to provide for his
necessary food, clothing, shelter, or medical care.
Appellant further argues that there is no evidence that he has ever failed to obtain
necessary food, clothing, shelter, and medication and that the statute does not require that
appellant obtain food, clothing, shelter, and medical care on his own. Appellant analogizes
this case to In re McGaughey , 536 N.W.2d 621 (Minn. 1995), arguing that the district
court’s findings are based on speculation.
Appellant’s analogy is inapt. The challenge in McGaughey was to an initial
commitment—not to a continued commitment. 536 N.W.2d at 623. There, the supreme

10
court concluded that the distric t court’s findings were insuffi cient under the statutory
criteria in part because nothing in the record indicated that McGaughey had failed to obtain
necessary food, clothing, shelter, or medical care, or that McGaughey would refuse to take
his medications outside a hospital environment. Id. at 624. The supreme court determined
that the record did not support that McGaughey posed a substantial likelihood of physical
harm to himself or others because McGaughey’s case manager’s te stimony “was entirely
based on unsupported speculation.” Id.
Unlike in McGaughey, the district court here only needed to find that appellant was
likely to attempt physical harm, not that appellant posed a substantial likelihood of physical
harm. Minn. Stat. § 253B.12, subd. 4. And, the district court’s findings here are not based
on speculation. The findings are based on evidence presented at the hearing.
On this point, appellant furth er asserts that Dr. Rambeau’s use o f t h e w o r d
“concern” during her trial testimony does not support the finding that appellant is “likely”
to attempt physical harm to himself or others or fail to provide for himself.
Statutory interpretation presents a question of law that is reviewed de novo. Caldas
v. Affordable Granite & Stone, Inc. , 820 N.W.2d 826, 836 (Minn. 2012). The object of
statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the int ention of the legislative body.
Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2018). “If the language of the statute i s clear and free from
ambiguity, the court’s role is to enforce the language of the statute and not explore the spirit
or purpose of the law.” Caldas, 820 N.W.2d at 836. If the language of the statute is
unambiguous, we apply its plain meaning. Staab v. Diocese of St. Cloud, 853 N.W.2d 713,
716-17 (Minn. 2014).

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As discussed, in determining whet her a person continues to be m entally ill, “the
court need not find that there has been a recent attempt or threat to physically harm self or
others, or a recent failure to provide necessary personal food, clothing, shelter, or medical
care.” Minn. Stat. § 253B.12, subd. 4. “Instead, the court mu st find that the patient is
likely to attempt to physically harm self or others or fail to provide necessary personal
food, clothing, shelter, or medical care unless voluntary commi tment is continued.” Id.
Because the statute does not define “likely” we look to its plain meaning. In this context,
likely means, “[p]ossessing or d isplaying the qualities or char acteristics that make
something probable.” The American Heritage Dictiona ry of the English Language 1042
(5th ed. 2011). It also means, “[w]ithin the realm of credibility; plausible.” Id.
Under the plain language of the statute, the district court was not required to find
that appellant would commit harm to self or others—the district court only needed to find
that it was “likely.” It so found. And, as addressed above, the district court’s findings are
supported by the record, which reflects that the district court considered not only
Dr. Rambeau’s testimony that she was concerned appellant would not be able to provide
for his basic needs, but also other record evidence, including that appellant refuses to take
his medications and then decompensates, that appellant fails to provide for himself, and
that appellant has made threats against his parents and medical staff.
Appellant argues that we should define “likely” in this contex t by importing the
definition of “highly likely” use d in the sexually dangerous pe rson (SDP) statute. See
Minn. Stat. § 253D.02, subd. 16 (2018) (defining SDP as a person who among other things,
is likely to engage in acts of harmful sexual conduct). We decline to do so. The supreme

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court has held that the term “lik ely” as used in the determinat ion of whether a person is
likely to engage in acts of harmful sexual conduct, means “high ly likely.” In re Civil
Commitment of Ince, 847 N.W.2d 13, 16 (Minn. 2014). 3 But that definition has not been
applied to mental-illness civil commitments, and it is not our role to supply words that the
legislature did not include. See Ullom v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 112, 515 N.W.2d 615, 617
(Minn. App. 1994) (stating that courts cannot add to a statute what the legislature purposely
omits or inadvertently overlooks).
II. Although the district court’s order does not strictly compl y with Minn. Stat.
§ 253B.12, subd. 7, the district court’s findings of fact and c onclusions of law
are sufficient when read in light of the entire record.

Appellant argues that the district court’s findings do not stat e the specific conduct
that supports the district court’s final determination, and tha t the district court’s findings
on less-restrictive alternatives do not meet the statutory requirements.
Where continued commitment is ord ered, the findings of fact and conclusions of
law “shall specifically state the conduct of the proposed patie nt which is the basis for the
final determination, that the statutory criteria of commitment continue to be met, and that
less restrictive alternatives h ave been considered and rejected by the court.” Minn. Stat.
§ 253B.12, subd. 7. And the district court shall state its rea sons for rejecting each
alternative. Id. In reviewing whether the least -restrictive program that can m eet the

3 At the time Ince was decided, the sexually dangerous person statue was embodied in
Minn. Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 18c(a) (2012). See Ince, 847 N.W.2d at 16. In 2013, the
statutes were reorganized to further distinguish and clarify law regarding civil commitment
of sexually dangerous persons a nd persons with sexual psychopat hic personalities from
other civil commitments. 2013 Minn. Laws. ch. 49, §§ 2, at 210; 10, at 226; 22, at 229.

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patient’s needs has been chosen, we will not reverse a district court’s findings unless clearly
erroneous. In re Kellor , 520 N.W.2d 9, 12 (Minn. App. 1994), review denied (Minn.
Sept. 28, 1994).
The district court’s findings on less-restrictive alternatives are less-detailed than
would be ideal. The written orde r states that “[l]ess restrict ive alternatives have been
considered and there is no reasonable available alternative.” We read the statement in light
of the entire record. At trial, Dr. Rambeau testified that a lesser-level of care would not be
appropriate because, in speaking with appellant’s mother, she has made the statement that
“he does take his medications while under commitment, but as soon as the commitment is
over that he stops his medications and starts to decompensate.” T h e s o c i a l - w o r k
specialist’s treatment report also discussed that no discharge date had been set and no step-
down living situation had been determined because, for the most part, appellant refused to
meet with service providers and was not cooperative.
The district court, in its oral findings following the hearing , stated that appellant’s
commitment “seems to be the least restrictive care” and that “a step-down program [would
not] be appropriate because of the medication monitoring that has to occur here, and really
the lack of cooperation and follow-up at, really, any treatment plan besides taking the
medications here.”
Despite the written order not sp ecifying which alternatives the district court
considered, the entirety of the r ecord, including the district court’s oral findings on the
record, demonstrates that the district court carefully analyzed less-restrictive alternatives
and gave individualized reasons for rejecting those alternatives. It specifically noted that,

14
if not committed, appellant woul d stop taking medication and de compensate. And the
record adequately supports the d istrict court’s ultimate determ ination. In re Miner , 424
N.W.2d 810, 814-15 (Minn. App. 1988) (stating court did not make a specific finding that
security hospital was the least restrictive available alternative, but its choice was supported
by statement that if Miner was not receiving treatment in a sec ure setting, his symptoms
would become more florid and there would be a possibility that other members of the
“conspiracy” would be at risk), review denied (Minn. Jul. 28, 1988). Accordingly, the
district court properly conclude d that no less-restrictive alte rnative would be appropriate
here.
Moreover, in accordance with Minn. Stat. § 253B.12, subd. 7, t he district court’s
findings of fact and conclusions of law, although brief, specif ically identify the conduct
that was the basis for the district court’s final determination. After the hearing, the district
court explained which evidence it was relying on to make its de termination. And the
district court, in its written or der, again noted the specific conduct. The district court’s
order states that appellant “continues to suffer from [s]chizop hrenia” and that “[h]is
thought process is circumstantia l to tangential. He expresses paranoia as well as
persecutory and grandiose delusi onal thought content. His insi ght and judgment remain
poor.”
The district court also credited the testimony of Dr. Rambeau t hat appellant “has
paranoid delusional beliefs,” that he “believes treatment providers are out to harm him or
kill him,” and that appellant “believes he is hiding from the F B I a n d t h a t t h e F B I i s
recording him.” The order als o notes that appellant “does not believe he has a mental

15
illness and does not need medication.” And while appellant did not testify at the hearing,
the district court had an opportunity to see and listen to appellant.
Given the recommendations to the district court from appellant’s social worker and
psychiatrist, as well as appellant’s medical records, and appellant’s own statements during
the hearing, we conclude that the district court sufficiently complied with the requirements
of Minn. Stat. § 253B.12 and therefore did not err in continuing appellant’s mental-illness
civil commitment.
Affirmed.