In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Kadyn Star Scherer.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0148

In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Kadyn Star Scherer.

Filed July 21, 2025
Affirmed
Bratvold, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-MH-PR-24-1353

Gabe Monson, Hennepin County Adult Representation Services, Minneapolis, Minnesota
(for appellant Kadyn Star Scherer)

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Brittany D. Lawonn, Senior Assistant
County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent Fairview Health Services)

Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and Harris,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRATVOLD, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s order to civilly commit her as a person who
poses a risk of harm because of mental illness. Appellant contends that the district court’s
decision must be remanded because its factual findings are inadequate for appellate review
and therefore fail to sufficiently address the less restrictive alternatives considered and the
reasons for rejecting each alternative and ordering commitment. Because we conclude that
the district court’s factual findings are adequate for appellate review and support the district
court’s decision when read in light of the entire record, we affirm.
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FACTS
Appellant Kadyn Star Scherer is 21 years old and has a history of anxiety and
depression. In fall 2024, Scherer was a university student, and her mental health began to
decline “around the election.” On November 13, 2024, Scherer was admitted to a hospital
in St. Cloud for one week to treat her mental health. Her symptoms included suicidal
ideation, paranoia, hiding under her bed, and eating only crackers. After she was discharged
from the hospital, Scherer withdrew from university and moved to the Twin Cities area to
live with her family.
On December 10, 2024, Scherer’s mother called 911 and reported that Scherer was
making suicidal statements, “yelling and screaming” at family members, “banging on her
brother’s bedroom door,” pacing, throwing things in the kitchen, and not sleeping. An
ambulance transported Scherer to Fairview Southdale Hospital in Edina for evaluation;
Fairview admitted her on a 72-hour hold.
On December 12, 2024, Scherer was transferred to PrairieCare Medical Group with
“acute mania in a completely dysregulated state.” PrairieCare staff diagnosed Scherer with
“bipolar disorder, current episode manic severe with psychotic symptoms.” That same day,
Fairview Health Services filed two petitions— one asked the district court to civilly commit
Scherer, and the second sought authority to administer neuroleptic medication.
On December 23, 2024, the district court held an evidentiary hearing on the
petitions.1 The district court heard testimony from the psychiatrist overseeing Scherer’s

1 At the hearing, the attorney appearing for the petitioner told the district court that she was
appearing “for the Petitioner PrairieCare.” The attorney explained that the “petition was
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treatment at PrairieCare, a court-appointed examiner, and Scherer . The district court
received Scherer’s medical records and the examiner’s report as evidence. Scherer opposed
civil commitment, arguing that less restrictive alternatives were available, including a
continuance for dismissal, appointing a substitute decisionmaker, and continuing the
hearing for two weeks while “the medication [Scherer] is currently taking titrates.”
On December 24, 2024, the district court determined in a written order that there
was (1) clear and convincing evidence that, due to her mental illness, Scherer “poses a
substantial likelihood of physical harm to [herself] or others as demonstrated by a recent
attempt or threat to physically harm [herself ] or others” and (2) “no suitable alternative to
judicial commitment.” The district court civilly committed Scherer to the commissioner of
human services and the head of PrairieCare. On the same day, the district court also issued
an order authorizing the use of neuroleptic medication.
Scherer appeals the civil commitment order.
DECISION
An individual may be civilly committed under the Minnesota Commitment and
Treatment Act, Minn. Stat. §§ 253B.001-.24 (2024), if a district court finds by clear and
convincing evidence that the individual “poses a risk of harm due to mental illness” and
that there is no “suitable alternative to judicial commitment.” Minn. Stat. § 253B.09,

originally filed by Fairview . . . but Ms. Scherer was transferred to PrairieCare and they
have assumed the petition.” We note, first, that the record does not otherwise indicate that
PrairieCare substituted for Fairview as the petitioner and, second, that the district court’s
order committed Scherer “to the Commissioner of Human Services and the head of
PrairieCare.” Because no party to the appeal makes an argument about the identit y of the
petitioner, we do not address it further.
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subd. 1(a). A district court must carefully consider “reasonable alternative dispositions” to
commitment. Id. These include, but are not limited to, “dismissal of petition; voluntary
outpatient care; voluntary admission to a treatment facility, state-operated treatment
program, or community-based treatment program; appointment of a guardian or
conservator; or release before commitment.” Id.
If the district court orders commitment, it must commit the individual “to the least
restrictive treatment program or alternative programs which can meet the patient’s
treatment needs.” Id. When determining the least restrictive program available for a
prospective patient, the district court must consider “a range of treatment alternatives” as
well as the “patient’s treatment preferences and willingness to participate” in treatment.
Id., subd. 1(b). Upon receiving a petition and conducting a hearing, the district court “shall
find the facts specifically, and separately state its conclusions of law.” Id., subd. 2(a). “If
commitment is ordered, the findings shall also identify less restrictive alternatives
considered and rejected by the court and the reasons for rejecting each alternative.” Id.,
subd. 2(b).
In appeals of a district court’s civil commitment order, “[w]e have often stressed the
need for findings on each of the statutory requisites with a clear recitation of the evidence
relied upon” by the district court in reaching its conclusions. In re Danielson, 398 N.W.2d
32, 37 (Minn. App. 1986). “[M]ere recitations of evidence,” conclusory findings, and
findings “not meaningfully tied to [the] conclusions of law” are insufficient to support
involuntary commitment. In re Civ. Commitment of Spicer, 853 N.W.2d 803, 810- 11
(Minn. App. 2014). Appellate courts review whether the district court complied with
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applicable law and whether the district court’s factual findings support the commitment. In
re Knops, 536 N.W.2d 616, 620 (Minn. 1995). Appellate courts, however, cannot
meaningfully review a n order of commitment “if it does not identify the facts that the
district court has determined to be true and the facts on which the district court’s decision
is based.” Spicer, 853 N.W.2d at 811-12 (remanding for further findings when the district
court’s order committed the appellant as a person who has a mental illness and is dangerous
to the public).
Scherer does not challenge the district court’s order authorizing the use of
neuroleptic medication or its determination that she poses a risk of harm to herself or others
due to her mental illness. Instead, she argues that the district court “failed to adequately
address less restrictive alternatives to civil commitment” and seeks a remand for additional
findings. We understand Scherer’s argument to be challenging the district court’s
determination that there was no suitable alternative to judicial commitment, rather than the
district court’s determination that the inpatient treatment program at PrairieCare was the
least restrictive treatment program.
A. The District Court’s Findings

The district court issued a five-page order of commitment with seven paragraphs of
factual findings, one of which has six subparts. In paragraph 1, the district court found that
Scherer suffers from “[b]ipolar effective disorder (manic with psychosis), which is a
substantial psychiatric disorder of thought, mood, perception, and orientation which
grossly impairs her behavior, capacity to recognize reality, and ability to reason or
understand.”
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In paragraph 2, the district court found that, because of her mental illness, Scherer
“engages in grossly disturbed behavior or experiences faulty perceptions, and, due to this
impairment, poses a substantial likelihood of causing physical harm.” The district court
found that this was shown by, among other things, Scherer’s (1) repeated threats of suicide
or self-harm, including the day before the commitment hearing; (2) delusions and paranoia;
(3) uncooperative behavior in treatment; (4 ) statement that “she would not take her
medications once she got home”; and ( 5) inability to make her needs known to treatment
staff.
In paragraph 3, the district court briefly summarized the testimony of the
psychiatrist overseeing Scherer’s treatment and the court-appointed examiner, found their
testimony “to be credible and persuasive,” and agreed with the ir conclusion that Scherer
“meets the criteria for civil commitment.”
After determining that Scherer met the criteria for commitment, the district court
made findings about alternatives to civil commitment:
4. . . . [T]he Court Examiner . . . originally opined in his
Examiner’s Report filed December 18, 2024, that [Scherer]
does have the capacity to make a competent decision as to
whether she should be treated with antipsychotic medications.
However, in the hearing on December 23, 2024, Ms. Scherer’s
treatment doctor . . . has opined Ms. Scherer cannot provide
informed medical consent and [the court examiner], at the
hearing, adopted this position as well.

5. [Scherer’s] illness cannot be adequately treated by
dismissal of the Petition, voluntary inpatient or outpatient care,
the appointment of a Guardian or Conservator, or a conditional
release.

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6. The least restrictive, appropriate, available placement
is a commitment to the Commissioner of Human Services and
the head of Prairie Care Medical Group. The Court considered
denying the petition and allowing for voluntary participation
with recommended treatment but rejected this alternative due
to [Scherer’s] past conduct, present behavior, and current
needs. While [Scherer] testified [that] she does not feel she is
mentally ill, the Court did not find such testimony persuasive,
even if firmly and sincerely believed by [Scherer].

The district court concluded that “[t]here is no suitable alternative to judicial commitment.”
B. Analysis

Scherer maintains that the district court erroneously rejected the alternatives to civil
commitment based on her “past conduct, present behavior, and current needs.” Scherer
argues that the district court’s “vague and conclusory findings do not clearly articulate the
evidentiary basis for rejecting less restrictive alternatives or what facts the district court
found to be true.” Respondent argues that “[a] review of the entire record, as well as the
entirety of the district court’s order and its questions posed during the trial in this matter,
establish that the district court specifically considered the less restrictive alternatives and
ultimately rejected them.”
On appeal, Scherer relies on nonprecedential opinions in which this court remanded
a civil commitment order for further findings when the district court did not address
conflicting evidence about less restrictive alternatives to civil commitment. In re Civ.
Commitment of Tempel, No. A24-0772, 2024 WL 4586395, at *2-5 (Minn. App. Oct. 28,
2024) (remanding for further findings because the district court summarily concluded that
“commitment . . . is the least restrictive alternative” without addressing the
court-appointed examiner’s medical opinion that a stay of commitment for outpatient care
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was the least restrictive alternative); In re Civ. Commitment of Lynard, No. A23-1067,
2023 WL 8889524, at *3 (Minn. App. Dec. 26, 2023) (remanding for further findings
because “[d]espite evidence in the record of an alternative to commitment—specifically, a
stay of commitment with admission into [a treatment] facility which [appellant] agreed to
enter—the district court provided no reasons for rejecting a less-restrictive alternative”). 2
In a similar vein, this court has also remanded for further findings when a district court’s
civil commitment order failed to identify the less restrictive alternatives that it considered.
In re Civ. Commitment of Staaf, No. A21-0594, 2021 WL 4059768, at *4, *6 (Minn. App.
Sept. 7, 2021) (remanding for further findings because the district court “did not list the
alternatives it had considered,” even though the record included no medical opinions
opposing commitment).
Still, this court has affirmed a civil commitment order after concluding that the
district court’s determinations rested on sufficient findings “in light of the entire record.”
In re Civ. Commitment of Valentyn, No. A18-2115, 2019 WL 2168777, at *6 (Minn. App.
May 20, 2019). In Valentyn, the district court found that “less restrictive alternatives have
been considered and there is no reasonable available alternative.” Id. (quotation marks
omitted). This court recognized that t he district court’s findings, if read in isolation, were
“less-detailed than would be ideal.” Id. But this court reviewed the findings in light of the
evidence presented at the commitment hearing, including the treatment doctor’s testimony

2 We are not bound by nonprecedential opinions but may consider them as persuasive
authority. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c) (“Nonprecedential opinions and
order opinions are not binding authority . . . but nonprecedential opinions may be cited as
persuasive authority.”).
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“that a lesser-level of care would not be appropriate” and a report that Valentyn “refused
to meet with service providers and was not cooperative.” Id. This court also considered the
district court’s oral finding that involuntary commitment “seems to be the least restrictive
care and that [the alternative] step-down program would not be appropriate because of the
medication monitoring that has to occur here, and really the lack of cooperation and
follow-up at, really, any treatment plan besides taking the medications here.” Id. at *7
(quotation marks omitted).
This court concluded that, “[d]espite the written order not specifying which
alternatives the district court considered, the entirety of the record, including the district
court’s oral findings on the record, demonstrates that the district court carefully analyzed
less-restrictive alternatives and gave individualized reasons for rejecting those
alternatives.” Id. Thus, this court concluded that there were sufficient findings for
meaningful appellate review on less restrictive alternatives to commitment and affirmed
the commitment order. Id.
Consistent with the approach taken in Valentyn, we also consider the entire record
in evaluating the sufficiency of the district court’s findings on less restrictive alternatives
to judicial commitment. Paragraph 4 of the district court’s order explains that Scherer’s
psychiatrist and the court-appointed examiner agreed that Scherer “cannot provide
informed medical consent.” At the hearing, the psychiatrist testified that “a less restrictive
option requires an ability [to give] informed consent” and that he had “not been able to get
informed medical consent [from Scherer] for primary medical decision-making, including
the current medications, length of stay, and outpatient recommendations.” The psychiatrist
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testified that, “based on [his] lack of ability to get informed consent for the required
treatments,” he could not “see a less restrictive option other than the commitment process.”
Paragraph 5 identified alternative dispositions considered by the district court,
including dismissal of the petition, voluntary inpatient or outpatient treatment, the
appointment of a guardian or conservator, and conditional release. The district court found
that none of these alternatives would adequately treat Scherer’s mental illness.
Paragraph 6 evaluated alternative program placements and rejected proceeding with
“voluntary participation with recommended treatment” because of Scherer’s “past conduct,
present behavior, and current needs.” Although paragraph 6 does not give examples of
Scherer’s “past conduct, present behavior, or current needs,” the district court’s earlier
findings address these issues. Paragraphs 2 and 4 summarize evidence and find facts that
limit the adequacy of voluntary alternatives, such as Scherer’s repeated threats of suicide
or self-harm, delusions and paranoia, uncooperative behavior during voluntary treatment,
stated intent not to take medication “once she got home,” and inability to make her needs
known or provide informed consent. And unlike some cases in which this court has ordered
a remand, this record includes no medical opinions that conflict with the district court’s
determination that there is no suitable alternative to judicial commitment. Cf. Tempel,
2024 WL 4586395, at *2-5; Lynard, 2023 WL 8889524, at *1, *3.
Although some of its findings lack particularity, the district court identified the
alternative dispositions and the alternative treatment programs it considered—and stated
its reasons for rejecting them. See In re King, 476 N.W.2d 190, 193-94 (Minn. App. 1991)
(noting that appellate review was “hampered in part by the scant trial court findings” but
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determining that the district court’s findings, which included that “[o]ther placements were
considered but rejected,” were sufficient and supported by the record (quotation marks
omitted)). Because the district court’s order, when read as a whole, explains its reasons for
rejecting alternatives to judicial commitment and less restrictive program alternatives, we
conclude that the findings are sufficient for appellate review.
Scherer’s brief to this court does not argue that the evidence is insufficient to sustain
the district court’s civil commitment order. Appellate courts generally decline to reach
issues that are not raised on appeal. State Dep’t of Labor & Indus. v. Wintz Parcel Drivers,
Inc., 558 N.W.2d 480, 480 (Minn. 1997); see In re Civ. Commitment of Kropp, 895 N.W.2d
647, 653 (Minn. App. 2017) (applying Wintz in the civil commitment context), rev. denied
(Minn. June 20, 2017).
Even so, the record evidence supports the district court’s findings and determination
that there is no suitable alternative to civil commitment. Scherer’s psychiatrist testified that
Scherer “would have been denied [admission] into [an inpatient] residential setting because
of the acuity of the psychosis.” The psychiatrist also testified that he spoke twice with
Scherer about the appointment of a substitute decisionmaker, but that the second
conversation “didn’t go very well” and “didn’t go in the favor of being willing to accept
the input of a guardian.” And, as mentioned, the psychiatrist testified that Scherer’s
inability to provide informed consent excluded voluntary treatment options. Both the
psychiatrist and the court-appointed examiner testified that they believed civil commitment
is the only suitable alternative for Scherer.
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The record evidence also established that Scherer resisted treatment. Scherer
testified that she did not believe she was mentally ill. When asked if she was “willing to
stay at the hospital until the medical team there says [she is] okay to leave,” Scherer
responded, “I don’t know, I’m not sure,” and she added, “I feel like they don’t listen to
me.” The psychiatrist testified that Scherer told him that “she would not take her
medication when she goes home.” This testimony fully supports the district court’s
decision to reject voluntary treatment options. See Minn. Stat. § 253B.09, subd. 1(b)
(stating that courts must consider the patient’s “willingness to participate voluntarily in the
treatment ordered” in deciding the least restrictive program available).
Given the severity of Scherer’s mental illness, her inability to consent to voluntary
treatment options, and her resistance to treatment, we conclude that the district court did
not err when it granted the petition and civilly committed Scherer.
Affirmed.