William Miller, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-2155

William Miller,
Appellant,

vs.

Public Storage, a foreign Real Estate Investment Trust,
Respondent.

Filed June 24, 2019
Reversed and remanded
Smith, John, Judge*

Anoka County District Court
File No. 02-CV-18-3689

Edward F. Rooney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Jesse H. Kibort, Abraham S. Kaplan, Parker Daniels Kibort LLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota
(for respondent)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Reilly, Judge; and Smith,
John, Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SMITH, JOHN, Judge
We reverse the district court’s dismissal of appellant’s complaint because the
complaint under rule 12.02 (e) states a claim for which relief may be granted for conversion
and civil theft. We remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
FACTS
Appellant William Miller sued respondent Public Storage in June 2018 for
conversion and civil theft. Miller alleged in his complaint that his mother, Penelope
Isleman (“Isleman”), rented a storage locker, unit D3, from respondent beginning in 2009
and running through June 2015. Respondent was aware of, and consented to, the fact that
Isleman was using unit D3 to store not only her own personal property, but also items of
personal property from her mother’s house. Some of those items belonged to Miller. On
May 27, 2015, respondent sold the contents of unit D3 at a public auction without giving
notice to Isleman, her mother, or Miller. Miller alleges t his sale was unlawful, and it
constituted conversion and civil theft on the part of respondent.
The record also indicates that i n March 2017, Isleman and her mother sued
respondent because of the public auction in a case labeled 02 -CV-17-1095 (“file 1095”).
They allege that at some point Isleman told respondent’s employees that her mother would
take over making the monthly payments for the storage locker. That complaint also alleges
that Isleman’s mother continued to make payments on the storage unit through June of
2015, but that from March of 2015 through May 27, 2015 , respondent locked them out of
the storage unit and then sold the property within it.

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In the present case, respondent moved for dismissal of Miller’s complaint for failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(e) on both
of his claims. The district court granted the motion, dismissed the complaint, and entered
judgment against Miller.
D E C I S I O N
Miller challenges the dismissal of his case for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(e). We review such a dismissal de
novo. Greer v. Prof’l Fiduciary, Inc., 792 N.W.2d 120, 126 (Minn. App. 2011). “A claim
is sufficient against a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim if it is possible on any
evidence which might be produced, consistent with the pleader’s theory, to grant the relief
demanded.” Forslund v. State, 924 N.W.2d 25, 33 (Minn. App. 2019) (quotation omitted).
But as an initial matter, it is important for us to clarify what information we consider
when conducting this review. Typically, we “consider only the facts alleged in the
complaint, accept those facts as true, and construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the
non-moving party.” Greer, 792 N.W.2d at 126. But we may also “consider [an] entire
written contract when the complaint refers to the contract and the contract is central to the
claims alleged.” In re Hennepin Cty. 1986 Recycling Bond Litig. , 540 N.W.2d 494, 497
(Minn. 1995). Accordingly, in this case, we consider not only Miller’s complaint, but also
the lease agreement, which is a contract embraced by the complaint and which is central to
the claims alleged.

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I. Errors by the District Court
Before conducting our de novo review of Miller’s complaint, we address his
arguments about specific errors made by the district court in analyzing his complaint. The
first two arguments deal with factual assumptions that the district court made, and the other
two arguments deal with legal conclusions based on those facts.
Miller first argues that the following statement in the district court’s order is
inconsistent with the compl aint, which must be taken as true : “[Respondent] was not
informed in writing of the personal property of [Isleman’s mother] or [Miller].
[Respondent] did not consent, in writing, to Ms. Isleman’s using Unit D3 to house personal
property of persons not on the Rental Agreement.” In his complaint, Miller alleged that
respondent “was aware that unit D3 was being used to store . . . items of personal property
from the former home of plaintiff’s grandmother . . . and [respondent] consented to such
use of unit D3” and that “[a]mong the items from the home . . . that were being stored, with
defendant’s knowledge and consent, in . . . unit D3 were items of personal property
belonging to [Miller].” Keeping in mind that the district court was required to accept as
true the facts in Miller’s complaint “and construe all reasonable inferences in favor of”
Miller, we agree that the district court erred in stating that respondent was not informed
about Miller’s personal property and that respondent did not consent to house that property.
See Greer, 792 N.W.2d at 126.
Miller argues that the following statement in the district court’s order was also
inconsistent with his allegations: “Ms. Isleman failed to pay the rent and defaulted under
her Rental Agreement.” Miller’s complaint alleges that his mother rented unit D3

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“[b]eginning in 2009 and continuously through June 2015.” Accepting this allegation as
true and construing all reasonable inferences in Miller’s favor, the district court should
have assumed at this procedural stage that Ms. Isleman did not default on the lease.
Miller next contests the district court’s legal conclusion regarding his conversion
claim, which reads as follows:
In this case [Miller] states in his complaint that Unit D3 stored
items of personal property belonging to [him], which means
one of two things. Either [Miller] did or did not give all
interest in the property and all possession to his mother, Ms.
Isleman. If [Miller] did give all interest in the property and all
possession to Ms. Islem an, then . . . [Miller] no longer had a
property interest in the items stored in Unit D3. If [Miller] did
not give all interest and possession of the property to Ms.
Isleman, then . . . Ms. Isleman, not [respondent], deprived
[Miller] of his interest by placing his personal property in Unit
D3 and representing in a signed Rental Agreement to be the
owner of such property. Either way, [Miller] cannot satisfy
both elements of conversion and this claim is defeated.
(Emphasis added). This conclusion was erroneous. It rests on the disputed assumption
that Isleman and Miller never informed respondent that Miller wanted to store personal
property in unit D3 and that respondent did not consent to the storage of Miller’s property.
As explained above, the district court should have accepted as true, for the purposes of its
Rule 12.02(e) analysis, that respondent knew about and consented to Miller storing his
personal property in unit D3.1

1 Moreover, the arrangement between Miller and his mother may have constituted a
bailment. See Duxbury v. Spex Feeds, Inc., 681 N.W.2d 380, 386 (Minn. App. 2004) (“A
bailment occurs when goods are delivered, without transferal of ownership, under an
express or implied agreement that the goods will be returned.”), review denied (Minn. Aug.
25, 2004).

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Finally, Miller disputes the district court’s conclusions on his civil-theft claim. The
district court concluded that Miller’s civil-theft claim failed because he would be unable to
show that respondent had no right to take his property. The district court reasoned that
Minn. Stat. § 514.972, subd. 1 (2018), gave respondent a lien on all the property in unit D3
(regardless of whether it was owned by Isleman, her mother, or Miller) and that the lien
attached once Isleman defaulted on the rent. This conclusion is based on the disputed
premise that Isleman defaulted. As we explained above, the district court should have
assumed, consistent with the complaint, Isleman did not default on the lease. If there was
no default, then respondent would have no right to sell the contents of unit D3, so the
district court’s legal conclusion was erroneous.
II. De Novo Review of the Complaint
Having addressed Miller’s concerns with the district court’s analysis of his
complaint, we now turn to our own independent review of its sufficiency. We beg in by
looking at Miller’s conversion claim. The tort of conversion has two elements:
“(1) plaintiff holds a property interest; and (2) defendant deprives plaintiff of that interest.”
Williamson v. Prasciunas, 661 N.W.2d 645, 649 (Minn. App. 2003). Miller alleges in his
complaint that he owned personal property stored in unit D3. And he alleges that
respondent sold his personal property in a public auction without giving him notice. He
asserts that this is sufficient to plead conversion, and we agree.
Respondent argues that the elements of conversion cannot be met on these
pleadings. With respect to the first element—whether Miller had a property interest in the
personal property—respondent argues that Miller either (1) gave the personal property to

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Isleman and thus no longer had any property interest in it ; or (2) retained his property
interest in the personal property but only has a claim against Isleman because she was the
one who harmed his property interest by defaulting on the rent payments. As d iscussed
above in our analysis of the district court’s legal conclusions on conversion, this line of
reasoning assumes that Miller was not rightfully storing the property in unit D3 on his own
and that Isleman defaulted on the lease agreement. To the cont rary, however, it can be
reasonably inferred from the pleadings that respondent was aware that Miller wished to
store his personal property in unit D3 and consented to it. The pleadings similarly indicate
that Isleman and her mother did not default on the lease agreement. We conclude that
respondent’s argument fails and that Miller sufficiently pleaded the first element of
conversion.
Respondent also argues that Miller’s pleadings are insufficient with respect to the
second element of conversion because he failed to demonstrate that respondent’s conduct
was wrongful. Some definitions of conversion specify that the plaintiff must demonstrate
that the interference with his personal property was “without justification.” Dairy Farm
Leasing Co. v. Haas Lives tock Selling Agency, Inc. , 458 N.W.2d 417, 419 (Minn. App.
1990). And respondent argues that its conduct was not wrongful because it complied with
the Minnesota Liens on Personal Property in Self-Service Storage Act, found in Minn. Stat.
§§ 514.970-.979 (2018), and the lease agreement. The lien act in question provides, in
relevant part, that an owner of a self-service storage facility “has a lien against the occupant
on the personal property stored under a rental agreement in a storage space at the self -
service storage facility,” Minn. Stat. § 514.972, subd. 1, and that this lien “attaches as of

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the date the occupant is in default,” id., subd. 2. To enforce the lien, the owner must, inter
alia, “notify the occupant and any person who has delivered to the owner a written notice
of a claim of an interest in the contents in the storage space when rent and other charges
are in default ,” and the owner must deliver the notice either in person or by properly
addressed verified mail. Minn. Stat. § 514.973, subd. 2 (a), (b).
But when making the appropriate reasonable inferences, Miller’s complaint can be
read to allege: (1) that there was no default because payments were made through June
2015; (2) that even if there was a default, respondent failed to notify M iller of the sale
despite knowing about and consenting to his storage of his personal property in unit D3;
and (3) that respondent failed to properly notify Isleman. From this it can be concluded
that respondent did not comply with the statutes governing these kinds of liens.
Accordingly, we do not agree that Miller failed to allege that respondent’s conduct was
wrongful. And we conclude that Miller sufficiently pleaded the second element of
conversion.
We now turn to Miller’s civil -theft claim. “A person who steals personal property
from another is civilly liable to the owner of the property for its value when stolen plus
punitive damages of either $50 or up to 100 percent of its value when stolen, whichever is
greater.” Minn. Stat. § 604.14, subd. 1 (2018). And “steal” has been interpreted to mean
“that a person wrongfully and surreptitiously takes another person’s property for the
purpose of keeping it or using it.” Staffing Specifix, Inc. v. TempWorks Mgmt Servs., Inc.,
896 N.W.2d 115, 126 (Minn. App. 2017) (quotation omitted) , aff’d, 913 N.W.2d 687
(Minn. 2018) . This means that “there must be some initial wrongful act in taking

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possession of the property.” Id. Miller alleges that respondent knew he was storing his
personal property in unit D3 and consented to its storage, sold the personal property, did
so without his consent, and did so without first notifying him or his mother. Miller argues
that his pleadings were sufficient as to civil theft, and we agree.
Respondent asserts that Miller’s pleadings do not sufficiently allege that respondent
stole Miller’s property because the complaint does not allege that respondent acted
“surreptitiously.” But Miller alleged that respondent consented to him storing his personal
property in unit D3 and then failed to give him notice of the sale. He also alleges that
Isleman never defaulted on the lease. We conclude that Miller has sufficiently pleaded
facts that could prove that respondent “surreptitiously” took his property.
Respondent also argues that Miller has no standing under the lien act to claim that
respondent’s conduct was wrongful. This argument assumes: (1) that Miller did not have
respondent’s consent to store his personal property; (2) that there was a default on the lease;
and (3) that proper notice was given. But Miller’s complaint sufficiently pleaded to the
contrary on all three points. And if Miller had respondent’s consent to store his personal
property, then he was entitled to notice of a sale. And if there was no defau lt or notice,
then the sale was improper. We conclude that respondent’s standing argument fails. And
we conclude that Miller sufficiently pleaded his civil-theft claim.
Because Miller sufficiently pleaded both of his claims, the district court erred in
concluding that Miller failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Reversed and remanded.